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INTRODUCTION: 
STATES, CONSUMPTION 
AND MANAGING RELIGIONS
Bryan S. Turner, Adam Possamai 
and Jack Barbalet
When sociologists refer to the contemporary crisis of  multiculturalism, they 
are typically talking about how modern states, especially liberal democratic 
states, respond to the rise of  “public religions.” These religious confl icts 
and uncertainties about appropriate state responses to them have produced 
a general retreat from multiculturalism – at least in Europe (Joppke, 2004). 
More specifi cally, the contemporary problem of  politics and religion has been 
increasingly orchestrated around the global revival of  Islam and the emergence 
of  a global Muslim community. However, the particular issues surrounding 
Muslim minorities in non-Muslim secular societies can be seen as simply 
one instance of  the more general issue of  state and religion relationships in 
modern complex societies. There is growing awareness about the limitations 
of  the Westphalian solution to religious confl icts and hence political theory 
is undertaking a serious reconsideration of  liberalism as the philosophical 
basis of  political strategies to manage confl icting cultural, religious and ethnic 
interests. In the modern global world where state boundaries have been 
contested, there is a need to rethink how the competing claims of  secular 
and religious citizens can be articulated and respected within public discourse 
(Habermas, 2008).
This question – how to manage the public expression of  religion in 
multicultural and therefore multifaith societies – is not simply an issue for 
conventional liberal societies, because religious revivalism and community 
confl ict raise political issues across a wide spectrum of  modern societies. 
Throughout much of  Asia (as subsequent chapters demonstrate), religious 
evangelism and the prospect of  widespread conversions to expanding faiths 
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cause diffi culties for states that seek to balance the composition of  civil society 
(Turner, 2009a). 
States of  very different political orientations and ideologies intervene to 
manage religions in the interests of  public order. One example is Singapore, 
which has a strategy of  “upgrading” Islam primarily through the agency 
of  the Singapore Council for Muslims (MUIS) (Kamaludeen, Pereira and 
Turner, 2009). Singapore might be appropriately considered a “well-ordered 
hierarchical society” (Rawls, 2001) in which the various religions are not 
only managed but upgraded through various educational strategies. While 
Singapore is a small country in Southeast Asia, it presents an interesting social 
case study from which we can derive a number of  sociological lessons.
While liberal democracies such as Australia, Canada, Britain and the 
United States also have similar strategies to manage religions, their religious 
policies will probably remain primarily implicit and minimal. One example 
is the diffi culty in Britain where governments refused to include Muslims but 
included Jews and Sikhs under the Race Relations Act; hence Muslims felt 
they were discriminated against as a minority (Fetzer and Soper, 2005). This 
case study illustrates the problem which will be examined later as to whether 
religious groups in secular constitutions should be treated by the law as either 
voluntary associations or ethnic minorities. This question about the voluntary 
character of  religious organizations was an important aspect of  Brian Barry’s 
criticisms of  the immunities and privileges which religious groups such as the 
Amish enjoyed in liberal societies such as the United States (Barry, 2001). 
Liberal post-secular consumer societies may be prevented from adopting 
explicit policies of  intervention in religious management and are more likely 
to continue to treat – or attempt to treat – religion as a private matter, that is to 
treat religious groups as voluntary associations. Given the liberal commitment 
to freedom of  religion, they will in all likelihood attempt to resist what José 
Casanova (1994) has called the “deprivatization” of  religion by simply ignoring 
it. However, even liberal societies may be forced, albeit reluctantly, to take an 
interest in the goods and services that are delivered by religious groups. States 
have typically taken an interest in the exposure of  minors to religious messages, 
fearing the possibility that they may be exposed to “brainwashing,” and 
have frequently intervened to monitor, regulate or eliminate so-called “cults.” 
A case in point is that of  Scientology in contemporary France (Possamai and 
Lee, 2004). Attempts to manage religions in a more general sense may become 
more common in post-secular societies, especially if  religion increasingly 
dominates the defi nition of  ethnic identity. 
This opening refl ection on the management of  religions in the contemporary 
world lends some support to the somewhat paradoxical claim that “religious 
liberty is a matter of  government regulation” (Gill, 2008: 47). Pressure on the 
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state to support religious tolerance will vary considerably in terms of  majority-
minority religious relations. Whereas dominant religious groups will seek state 
regulation of  minority religions, religious liberty will be more vigorously pursued 
by marginalized minority religious movements and groups. It is in the interests 
of  hegemonic religions such as an established church to prefer state regulation 
rather than religious competition in an open market, because their erstwhile 
monopolistic advantages may be eroded by such open religious competition. 
Effective governance is clearly more problematic in pluralistic environments, 
where there is plenty of  scope for religious competition and confl ict and where 
trust in governments may be eroded by policies that are seen to favor one 
religion over another. This problem of  the perception of  partiality on the part 
of  secular states may explain the relative failure of  British governments in their 
attempts to accommodate a growing and more assertive Muslim community 
in the late twentieth century (Joppke, 2009). Because virtually all modern 
societies are multicultural and multiracial, the “management of  religion” is an 
inevitable component of  modern government, despite the liberal preference 
for treating religion as a matter of  private conscience and therefore of  little 
overt concern to secular states. In other words, there is a paradox that, precisely 
because religion is important in modern life as the vehicle of  personal identity, 
it has to be controlled, overtly or covertly, by the state to minimize the costs of  
government in reducing friction between competing groups and in avoiding 
more open examples of  social confl ict. Ultimately, the policies of  securitization 
on the part of  states in a global environment of  uncertainty and confl ict will 
require parallel policies to manage and regulate religion.
These issues constitute the substantive dilemmas that sit behind the 
philosophical debates of, among others, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. 
We can read Rawls’ debate about “the original position” as a commentary 
on Hobbes’ fi ction of  the state of  nature. Rawls (1971) in A Theory of  Justice 
adopts the idea of  a “veil of  ignorance” to say that we might imagine an ideal 
future society but not know what our position in such a thought experiment 
might be. In this hypothetical game, we would be unlikely to describe a slave 
society for fear that in the future we might be a slave. Reasonable and rational 
people would want to live in a decent and well-ordered society in which one’s 
freedom would not impinge on somebody else and one’s wealth would not 
seriously damage the life chances of  another. Out of  this thought experiment, 
Rawls (1993) created his famous model of  liberalism in which he argued that 
a decent functional society was one in which there is tolerance of  differences 
in belief  but within the framework of  a shared consensus about basic beliefs. 
However, it was his attempt to extend these arguments to international affairs 
in The Laws of  Peoples (Rawls, 1999) that may be more relevant to our discussion 
here. In this later discussion, Rawls outlined a typology of  societies within 
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which liberal principles might operate. He argued that in a well-ordered but 
liberal society there would be an “overlapping consensus” of  fundamental 
doctrines (1999: 171).
By contrast, authoritarian and hierarchical societies would rule by extralegal 
means. Rawls regarded his arguments as utopian but nevertheless realistic, 
because he assumed that reasonable and rational people would, given the veil 
of  ignorance, want a society that was well ordered but also in his terms decent. 
A well-ordered society would depend less on the coercive force of  law and 
more on the consensus of  citizens in whose interest it is to protect institutions 
that satisfy their collective needs.
Barry’s criticism of  multiculturalism is probably compatible with Rawlsian 
liberalism in the sense that an overlapping consensus of  beliefs might be diffi cult 
to sustain in a society that is too divided by incommensurable doctrines. Jürgen 
Habermas has also followed John Rawls’ defense of  liberal principles in his 
attempt to extend his original theory of  communicative rationality to deal 
with societies in which religious fundamentalism has been growing. In Between 
Facts and Norms, Habermas (1996: 61) recognized that Rawls had “certainly 
shown that a normative theory of  justice of  the sort he proposes can gain 
entry to a culture in which the basic liberal convictions are already rooted 
through tradition and political socialization in everyday practices and in the 
institutions of  individual citizens.” In this respect, Rawls’ political theory was 
both a normative view of  justice and a defense of  American democracy as a 
clear example of  a society in which there is a “reasonable pluralism.” In the 
traditional liberal position, different religions could be accommodated within 
the civil sphere on the condition that they remained merely private beliefs. 
Casanova’s commentary on public religions sparked off  an important debate 
about how and whether radical religious doctrines could be accommodated 
within a Rawlsian “reasonable pluralism.”
In recent years, Habermas (2006, 2008; Habermas and Mendieta, 2002) 
has recognized that the conventional liberal view is in need of  repair. He also 
recognized that the legality of  the state was no automatic guarantee of  the 
legitimacy of  the public arena, because a well-ordered hierarchical society is 
not necessarily a wholly legitimate society. The contemporary situation has 
forced critical theorists like Habermas and pragmatists like Richard Rorty to 
start taking religion seriously. This is what they mean by the idea of  a post-
secular society. It does not mean suddenly that social life is pervaded by religion 
or that the conventional theory of  secularization is dead. It simply means 
that organized religion cannot be ignored or dismissed precisely because it 
has erupted into the public domain. He has proposed that in a post-secular 
society it is necessary for both secular and religious citizens to engage in a 
public defense of  their beliefs (Habermas and Mendieta, 2002; Habermas and 
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Ratzinger, 2006). It is not suffi cient to say that humanism and secularism are 
self-evidently true or that religious conviction needs no justifi cation because it is 
based on revelation. Communicative openness is a requirement of  democratic 
norms in a public space and hence customs and beliefs have to be rationally 
justifi ed and defended. This rule applies, for example, to secular humanists 
and to fundamentalists alike.
There are many aspects of  this argument that are problematic. For one 
thing, holding to a religious belief, for example, in the sinfulness of  mankind 
may be very different from believing that parliamentary institutions can offer 
a better defense of  common interests. Religious beliefs tend to be affective and 
habitual, not neutral and deliberative. Furthermore, if  I am already convinced 
that my beliefs are true by divine authority, what need have I to defend these 
in public? In short fundamentalist beliefs (in any religious tradition) may be 
as a matter of  fact incommensurable with liberalism. These confl icts over 
“fundamental doctrines” become divisive in the public sphere when issues 
about conversion and apostasy come into play. The public order can become 
disrupted by radical conversionist movements, as happened frequently in the 
modern histories of  India, Malaysia and Indonesia (Veer, 1996). It is precisely 
here – over the management of  conversion, dress codes, religious education 
and interfaith marriages – that the state becomes involved in the management 
of  religions. Of  course, this discussion of  religion and politics has so far tended 
to assume that we are talking about active citizens in a participatory democracy 
and active communities of  the pious in the religious fi eld. But is the citizen in a 
decent well-ordered democracy necessarily an active participant?
In this introduction, we claim that in modern liberal democracies the 
active citizen is becoming increasingly a passive consumer in which the 
traditional bases of  effective civic participation through work, public service 
and reproduction are no longer the fundamental conditions of  citizenship 
entitlement (Turner, 2008). This erosion of  citizenship was dramatically 
illustrated by the credit crunch of  2008–10, in which citizens in Britain, 
Australia and the United States were admonished by their respective 
governments to shop in order to save both the economy and the society. 
The new duty of  the responsible citizen is to consume in order to promote 
economic activity and paradoxically at the same time to save, because 
personal savings in Western societies are at an all time low. In post-industrial 
capitalism, there is a permanent tension between asceticism as the legacy of  
the Protestant ethic and acquisitiveness as the legacy of  the consumer boom 
of  the postwar economic strategy of  the West.  States have also adopted 
the same sales techniques that were originally developed by the advertising 
industries to promote consumerism. Political parties increasingly treat citizens 
as an audience that must be cultivated by sales techniques (focus groups, 
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opinion polls, marketing strategies and national identity as branding) and the 
quality of  political leadership is tested by ratings in the opinion polls. Policies 
are increasingly developed on the basis of  focus-group data rather than long-
term national needs. Of  course, this development of  political salesmanship 
is not especially compatible with the vision of  communicative rationality in 
Habermas’s theory or with Rawls’ view of  a liberal well-ordered society.  
One colorful illustration of  these developments might be taken from Italy 
under Silvio Berlusconi. Over the last two decades, the Italian economy grew 
by a mere 1.5 percent against the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) average of  2.6 percent. In Italy only 12.9 percent 
of  the population has a university degree compared to 26 percent in the 
other OECD countries. Italy was ranked 84 out of  128 countries in the 
World Economic Forum 2007 index of  gender equality. Nevertheless, after 
years of  public scandal and incompetent government, Berlusconi’s popularity 
remained high and he appeared to be largely immune from criticism, because 
he controlled a large section of  the Italian television and print media. In late 
2010 and early 2011 of  course, Berlusconi was faced by such a wave of  new 
scandals, including alleged shady dealings with the Libyan leader Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi , that it seemed even he could not service such a litany 
of  public scandals. From different ends of  the political spectrum, leaders like 
Berlusconi and Putin have achieved notoriety and celebrity status. Alongside 
the fi nancialization of  the state and “casino capitalism” (Strange, 1986), the 
passive consumer citizen is an appropriate fi gure in a world of  political 
entertainment or “videocracy” (Stille, 2010).
At the same time, the rise of  religious markets, megachurches, religious 
advertisements and the use of  growth consultants to boost church membership 
also suggest that religion has become deeply embedded in the market (Turner, 
2011). The commercialization of  religion is true of  both fundamentalist 
movements that promote the growth of  congregational religion and the 
spirituality of  New Age tendencies that are post-institutional, unorthodox and 
hybrid. The result is an important fusion between passive secular citizenship 
and the spiritual marketplace. With this critical erosion of  active citizenship, 
the state has a political interest in the surveillance – and periodically in the 
supervision – of  both the secular and religious markets. Our argument is that 
there is an important cultural and political development taking place with 
the growth of  casino capitalism, celebrity politics and the growth of  passive 
citizenship and consumer religion. This cultural mixture may throw a more 
critical light on the idea of  a post-secular society.
The disciplinary management of  religions in well-ordered hierarchical 
regimes such as Singapore and South Korea may obviously remain unavailable 
to liberal democratic regimes such as Australia, Britain and Canada, which 
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may seek to contain religion within the private domain. Only when such 
conventional approaches fail are they likely to feel compelled to take up more 
interventionist strategies. Spirituality as a lifestyle is in any case unlikely to pose 
a signifi cant public threat precisely because it is individualistic and inward in 
personal orientation. Only when religion becomes “deprivatized” and takes 
up a political agenda may the states be unable to maintain such laissez-faire 
attitudes. Faith becomes a political issue when religious and ethnic identities 
merge and religious minorities feel excluded from the common weal. 
There is obviously a dystopian aspect to our argument. Insofar as liberal 
societies may slide inevitably towards authoritarian systems with the global 
development of  securitization in response to real or imagined terrorist 
threats, then all governments will embrace more open policies regarding the 
management of  religions. In such circumstances, religion may be banned or 
suppressed, and draconian measures may be put in place to eradicate religious 
leaders and their institutions. These strategies were of  course common in 
centralized socialist states such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China 
during the cold war. Various chapters in this collection (5, 7 and 8) explore 
the problems of  religion and centralized party politics in various communist 
and post-communist societies. However, repression has never been entirely 
successful (Yang, 2010) and authoritarian states may seek to cultivate passive 
religiosity during periods of  liberalization under the guise of  leisure and 
tourism. There is some indication that in contemporary China, religion can be 
revived because it is attractive to overseas Chinese who may wish to invest in 
post-communist China. While Falon Gong is seen as a threat to the monopoly 
of  the Party, Buddhist monasteries may be rebuilt to stimulate religious 
tourism. While it is normally assumed that such minorities are suppressed (in 
Vietnam and China) because they are seen as a threat to the authority of  the 
Party, we suggest that an alternative strategy for managing religions would be 
to commercialize them. There is some evidence from China that Buddhism 
and Daoism, for example, are being allowed to enjoy some partial revival 
but only as a form of  cultural tourism (Luke, 1987; Yang, 2004). Shrines can 
grow and fl ourish only if  they can be contained within religious theme parks – 
perhaps the counterparts of  the science parks that are so popular in modern 
universities. Religion and science would therefore no longer need to compete 
with each other as both would contribute to the growth of  the economy. 
Religious institutions can become valuable aspects of  entertainment and 
leisure industries; they can be promoted in religious parks just as governments 
stimulate interest in science through science museums and exhibition sites. 
Religious commodifi cation is a powerful force in Asia, but equally so in the 
West. The global interest in the death and funeral of  Michael Jackson was 
a powerful example of  the notion that citizens have become spectators to be 
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entertained by spectacular events – the death of  Lady Diana, the Olympic 
Games, the World Cup, American Idol and so forth. These events are as it 
were the Disneyland equivalent of  the idea of  civil religion (Bellah, 1967). 
They involve celebrity, orchestrated emotions and powerful rituals. They have 
a quasi-religious aura.
The Sociology of  Secularization
While secularization and post-secular society are clearly issues in Western 
Europe, religion in its various and complex manifestations is obviously thriving 
in many parts of  Asia, Africa and Latin America. The growth of  Pentecostalism 
and the eruption of  charismatic movements in Africa and Latin America are 
well-known developments outside the Western world that bring into question 
the narrow focus of  much philosophical and sociological debate (Adogame, 
2010). There is now a reverse missionary movement in which a revitalized 
Christianity is being brought back to the West by African missionaries working 
with diasporic communities of  migrants. Islamic revivalism is important in 
Southeast Asia, but equally signifi cant among migrant communities in the 
West. Approximately one-third of  Muslims now live as minority communities 
outside the Middle East.
While it is widely held that the conventional secularization thesis of  
sociologists in the 1960s was limited and often therefore misguided and 
misleading, to abandon the secularization thesis in its entirety would be equally 
mistaken. There is an alternative thesis to the simple notion of  secularization 
as membership decline and growing social irrelevance, namely that religion 
has been democratized through commercialization in which secularization is 
manifest through the growth of  megachurches, drive-in confessionals, buy-
a-prayer, religious fi lms, commercial pilgrimages, a global spiritual literature 
and the sale of  amulets and other religious paraphernalia. Religion has been 
modernized through religious markets that sell spiritual goods and services and 
as a result religion has at the same time become increasingly democratized. 
The relationship between the sacred and profane is no longer vertical in terms 
of  a hierarchy of  authority but horizontal as power is more equally shared 
with the laity. 
One aspect of  democratization is that the mysterious and unspeakable 
character of  the sacred domain is arcane in societies that have at least in 
principle embraced values relating to equality and participation. Thus in 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the sacred realm was characterized by the 
ineffable character of  the holy (Turner, 2009b). The sacred was located  in a 
hierarchical world – a great chain of  being – and  this sacred reality was manifest 
in human affairs through the communication of  intermediaries – prophets, 
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angels, mythical creatures, mystical birds or spirits – but the communication 
from the sacred to the profane world was paradoxically unspeakable (Nancy, 
2005). The other forms of  exchange between the sacred and profane plane 
involved various sacrifi cial activities.
These intermediary systems are disappearing in modern societies where 
media are omnipresent, democratically devolved and spatially dispersed. We 
inhabit an information-saturated social environment in which communication 
comes from everywhere and invades the everyday world.  In place of  the 
ineffable character of  the sacred realm, religion becomes fully available to 
the literate masses, because its message is made plain and simple through 
commercialized media and popular culture. In the West, the laity is just as 
likely to consume its religiosity through the fi ctional works of  Dan Brown, the 
big screen productions of  Mel Gibson or the sacrilegious music of  Madonna 
as it is to attend a conventional church, synagogue or mosque. Perhaps the 
most compelling illustration of  the democratization of  the sacred is that 
the Lord has become our friend with whom we can communicate freely 
(Zabala, 2005: 17).
We can think of  the secularization thesis as simply a subtheme of  the more 
general notion of  modernization and that modernity involved the differentiation 
of  the various subsystems of  society in which the religious becomes a 
specialized set of  services alongside welfare and education. In a theory that 
followed Max Weber’s notions about the rationalization and differentiation of  
society, Casanova identifi ed three aspects of  secularization: the differentiation 
of  the various spheres of  the social system; secularization in terms of  the 
decline of  religious belief  and practice; and fi nally the marginalization of  
religion to the private sphere. Through a number of  discrete comparative 
studies, Casanova argued that secularization as differentiation is indeed the 
key component of  modern secularization. The sociology of  religion has to 
evaluate these components separately, carefully and independently, because 
the decline of  religious belief  and practice is not necessarily the dominant and 
universal feature of  religion in the modern world. Much of  the variation in 
secularization is illustrated in this volume by chapters on Australia (Chavura), 
India (Sriprakash and Possamai), Israel (Levy) and Britain (Beckford).
Sociologists of  religion have been forced to review their assumptions about 
secularization with the eruption of  various public religions such as the Iranian 
Revolution, the rise of  Solidarity, the involvement of  Roman Catholicism in 
the Sandinista Revolution and the growth of  the Christian Right in America. 
There is nevertheless much confusion surrounding the ideas of  secularization 
and resacralization. We propose that the debate about secularization could be 
rendered conceptually more precise if  we draw a simple distinction between 
“political secularization” which we might call the conventional differentiation 
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thesis and “social secularization” which we might conveniently defi ne as the 
anthropological thesis of  commodifi cation. The former refers specifi cally to 
the issues surrounding the historical separation of  church and state, and to the 
contemporary differentiation of  the spheres of  the social system, namely 
the specialization of  the subsystems of  society around politics, culture, the 
economy, religion and so forth. The latter refers to religion in everyday life, 
namely the secularization of  belief  and practice through democratization and 
commercialization. 
Political secularization is in fact the cornerstone of  the liberal approach to 
tolerance in which we are free to hold our private beliefs provided these do not 
interfere negatively with public life. This liberal solution has its historical roots 
in the Anglican settlement of  Richard Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity of  1593 and 
its political manifestation in John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Tolerance in 1689. It 
was reaffi rmed in the colony of  Virginia when the rejection of  an established 
church paved the way to the constitutional recognition of  secularization. 
In Europe, the legal division between church and state was originally a 
political solution to settle the confl icts between Catholics and Protestants. 
It is alleged that this settlement has broken down, because modern societies 
are typically multicultural, multiethnic and multifaith. Because religion often 
defi nes identity, it is diffi cult to sustain any simple division between the public 
and the private. Furthermore, these ethnoreligious identities are typically 
transnational and hence cannot be conveniently confi ned within the national 
boundaries of  the modern state. The eruption of  religions into the public 
domain means that the state, often reluctantly, clumsily and ineptly, enters into 
civil sphere with the management of  religions, especially where multicultural 
and multifaith communities threaten social harmony and liberal tolerance. 
When the diversity of  religions in society begins to disrupt civil harmony, 
states intervene either implicitly or explicitly in the regulation of  religious 
affairs, for example by banning religious symbols in state schools. Having 
recognized these challenges, it would be fundamentally mistaken to assume 
that secularization as the division between state and religion (or more precisely 
the neutrality of  the state towards religion) is no longer relevant. Indeed, it can 
be plausibly argued that in religiously diverse societies religions are best served 
by secularization that is the neutrality of  the state (An-Na’im, 2008).
If  political secularization refers to a macro-separation between church 
and state, then social secularization refers to the transformation of  
conventional forms of  religious vitality – church membership, belief  in 
God, religious experiences and acts of  devotion such as prayer, religious 
festivals, days of  abstinence and church attendance – by commercial values, 
institutions and practices. Sociologists of  religion who are now critical of  
the secularization thesis have pointed to the fact that there is little evidence 
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of  religious decline outside of  northern Europe. On the contrary, religion 
in the social sphere appears to be a lively and vital aspect of  ordinary life. 
However, while there has indeed been evidence of  religious revivalism, there has 
also been a commercialization and democratization of  religion in the social sphere 
that renders religion increasingly compatible with and an important part of  the 
world of  secular consumerism. Religion as consumption is a secular practice and 
hence the tension between religion and “the world” that was the basis of  Christian 
radicalism has largely disappeared – or at least that tension has been eroded. 
This aspect of  modern religious life provides a conceptually fruitful contrast 
to the role of  religion in the public domain of  politics – essentially the role 
of  Catholicism in Poland and in various South American contexts, radical 
Islam in global politics, the Jewish ultraorthodox movements in Israel, and the 
Moral Majority in America – and the social domain of  everyday life. In the 
social sphere, the market infl uences religion rather than vice versa. Religion, 
state and market may have become differentiated spheres, but they are also 
highly interconnected and furthermore it is the market which is increasingly 
shaping religion rather than religion shaping the market. In this respect, it is 
possible to defend a modifi ed version of  the secularization thesis by pointing to 
the various ways in which religion is infl uenced by secular consumerism.
While Casanova’s seminal work on public religions was about differentiation 
and deprivatization, this analysis of  commodifi cation is more specifi cally 
focused on the transformations of  the religious sphere by the values, practices 
and institutions of  the market. With differentiation and the transformation of  
churches into denominations, religions have to compete with each other for 
infl uence and for customers, but they also have to compete with other lifestyle 
choices. Following the insights of  the so-called economic interpretation of  
religion in the religious marketplace created by the separation of  church and 
state, religions are forced to sell their services in a competitive environment 
and hence they have adopted many of  the practices of  the secular market 
to win new customers and to maintain brand loyalty of  existing members 
(Warner, 2004). Although these marketing strategies are most obvious in the 
North American context with the growth of  the megachurch, similar 
developments can be seen in Asia among a diverse range of  religious traditions 
(Kitiarsa, 2008). Although Bryan Wilson has been consistently criticized 
by those sociologists who favor the idea of  “resacralization,” his analysis of  
commercial infl uences on religion, especially in the United States, can be 
sustained once we focus on the idea of  the religious consumer.
The notion that modernization involves secularization was closely 
connected in classical sociology with Max Weber’s sociology of  religion. 
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of  Capitalism Weber explored the unique 
relationship between the ascetic ethic of  the Protestant sects and modernity 
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(Weber, 2002). By contrast, the sociological tradition that we associate with 
Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss was an attempt not to study religions 
but an inquiry into the generic nature of  religion. Durkheim depended 
on missionary and administrative reports emerging from late nineteenth-
century colonialism to formulate a notion of  the “elementary forms” 
of  religion. The classical foundations of  the sociology of  religion in this 
interpretation were created by an inquiry into the cultural uniqueness of  the 
Protestant Reformation (Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch) and by an inquiry 
into the generic nature of  religion as a system of  elementary or “primitive” 
classifi cation (Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Robert Hertz). In the fi rst 
tradition, the scientifi c question was posed by the historical consequences of  
Protestantism on the rationalization of  society. In the second tradition, the 
issue was to understand how religion in some generic sense contributed to 
social classifi cation and hence to social life as such.
These two dimensions of  religion were to some extent refl ected in the 
very meaning of  “religion” (religio), which has two somewhat distinct roots. 
First, relegere from legere means to pull together, to harvest or to gather (in), and 
secondly, religare from ligare means to tie or to bind together. The fi rst meaning 
described the religious foundations of  any social group that is gathered 
together and the second pointed to the disciplines or moral principles that 
are necessary for controlling human beings and creating a disciplined soul. 
These two etymological roots of  the notion of  religion further elucidate the 
separation in Kant’s philosophical analysis between religion and morality. 
In Kant’s essay on religion – Religion within the Limits of  Pure Reason – there is 
a distinction between religion as cult (des blossen Cultus) in which the believer 
asks for favors from God through sacrifi ce to bring healing and wealth and 
religion as moral action (die Religion des guten Lebenswandels) that commands 
human beings through the discipline of  self  development rather than sacrifi ce 
to change behavior in order to lead better lives (Kant, 1960). Kant further 
elaborated on this point through an examination of  “refl ecting faith” that 
compels humans to strive for salvation through faith rather than through 
the possession of  religious knowledge or through exacting religious rituals. 
The implication of  Kant’s distinction was that Protestant Christianity 
was the only genuine “refl ecting faith” and therefore the model for an authentic 
religious life. Kant’s distinction was fundamentally about those religious 
injunctions that call human beings to moral action, demanding that humans 
assert their autonomy and responsibility. This philosophical distinction can 
be translated into the anthropological distinction between health and wealth 
cults, on the one hand, and austere, ascetic systems of  higher order religions 
on the other. To have autonomy, human beings need to act independently 
of  God and without the support of  ecclesiastical rituals and institutions. 
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In a paradoxical fashion, by calling upon people to embrace intellectual 
freedom and personal responsibility, Christianity implies the “death of  God” 
and hence the Christian faith is ultimately self-defeating. If  Christianity as a 
religion is successful, its adherents will no longer need it. Certainly the Kantian 
legacy had no need of  a personal God or a loving relationship with Jesus or 
any notion of  transcendence. A religion of  salvation had been replaced by the 
categorical imperative of  Kantian ethics.
These Kantian principles were eventually developed in The Sociology of  
Religion, where Weber distinguished between the religion of  the masses and 
the religion of  the virtuosi (Weber, 1996). While masses seek earthly comforts 
from religion, especially healing, the virtuosi fulfi ll the ethical demands of  
religion in search of  spiritual salvation or enlightenment. The religion of  
the masses requires charismatic fi gures to satisfy their mundane needs, and 
hence charisma is inevitably corrupted by the very demand for miracles 
and magical spectacles. Weber’s analysis of  the religious quest for salvation 
produced a theory of  the norms which govern the practical conduct of  life 
(Lebensführung). In his inquiry into religious conduct, Weber distinguished 
between a theodicy of  good fortune (Glück) and a theodicy of  suffering (Leid). 
In coming to terms with fortune and suffering, human beings project their 
conceptions of  their personal experiences beyond the everyday material 
world. It is these experiences of  fortune and suffering which undermine 
the rational or purposive categories of  pragmatic orientation to reality. 
There is no satisfactory rational explanation of  suffering in this world where 
chance rather than virtue dominates. However, it was primarily within the 
monotheistic and ascetic religions that the rationalization of  theodicy reached 
its ultimate fruition. The development of  the concept of  a universal God as 
the framework of  history and salvation produced a rational theodicy of  reality 
as such. In short, the legacy of  the Judeo-Christian world, based upon the 
notions of  ethical prophecy and monotheism, was crucial to the development 
of  a radical solution to theodicy in terms of  highly intellectual and systematic 
soteriologies. For example, the intellectual rationalism of  the Protestant sects 
was critical in pushing European civilization towards a pattern of  religious 
individualism involving strict norms of  personal discipline and conduct. 
However, the everyday needs for health and wealth which characterize the 
religious needs and orientation of  the disprivileged and the downtrodden were 
very different from the motivations that drove the elite virtuosi.
The Consumerization of  Religion
Weber’s sociology of  religion provides an adequate description of  a society 
in which the sacred world is still primarily vertical and in which the virtuosi 
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remain culturally and politically hegemonic. We will attempt here to provide 
a summary of  some of  the major changes that one can observe in religion 
in modern societies by taking a comparative perspective. Firstly, whereas the 
religious system of  communication in an age of  revelation was hierarchical, 
unitary and authoritative, the system of  communicative acts in a new media 
environment are horizontal, diverse and fragmented rather than unitary, the 
sources of  authority are devolved rather than centralized and the authority 
of  any message is negotiable and negotiated. The growth of  these diverse 
centers of  interpretation in a global communication system has produced a crisis 
of  authority in the formal system of  religious belief  and practice. In Islam, for 
example, there has been an infl ation of  sources of  authority since through some 
local and specifi c consensus almost any local teacher or mullah can issue a fatwa 
to guide a local community (Monshipouri, 2009; Volpi and Turner, 2007).
Secondly, the modern media contribute to a growing subjectivity and 
individualism that are very different from the rugged ascetic individualism of  
early Protestantism. The religious subjectivity of  the modern world is a facet 
of  the “expressive revolution” that had its roots in the student revolts and 
culture wars of  the 1960s (Parsons, 1967). In the new individualism, people 
invent their own religious ideas, giving rise to what we might call a “do-it-
yourself ” religiosity. The result has been a social revolution fl owing from both 
consumerism and individualism. As a result, “Capitalism’s success eroded class 
rivalries and replaced the activist and utopian mass politics of  the inter-war 
era with a more bloodless politics of  consumption and management. Goods 
not gods were what people wanted” (Mazower, 1999: 306). Religious lifestyles 
get modeled on consumer lifestyles in which people can try out religions 
rather like they try out a new fashion in consumer goods. In a consumer 
society, people want goods not gods, and to a large extent their desires have 
been satisfi ed by cheap money, easy mortgages and consumer credit. A new 
industry has emerged concerned with spiritual advice about how to cope with 
the modern world while remaining pious and pure. As a result, pious lifestyles 
are marketed by religious entrepreneurs who need to brand their products 
in the spiritual marketplace.
The consequence of  these developments is a growing division between 
“religion” and “spirituality” (Hunt, 2005). Globalization thus involves the 
spread of  personal spirituality and these spiritualities typically provide both 
practical guidance in the everyday world and subjective, personalized avenues 
to meaning. Some aspects of  the media and popular religion are explored 
by Adam Possamai in his chapter on “Jediism.” Such religious phenomena 
are often combined with therapeutic or healing services, or the promise of  
personal enhancement through meditation. While Protestant fundamentalism 
with its norms of  personal discipline appeals mostly to social groups that are 
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upwardly socially mobile, such as the lower middle-class and newly educated 
couples, spirituality is more closely associated with middle-class singles that 
have been thoroughly infl uenced by Western consumer values. Pentecostalism 
can also been seen as a global religious movement that offers “technologies 
of  the self ” and personal expressivity that are highly compatible with the 
spirit of  late capitalism (Martin, 2002). Whereas the traditionally religious 
fi nd meaning in existing mainstream denominational Christianity, spiritual 
people can construct their own religious lifestyles in a spiritual marketplace, 
and self-consciously avoid any commitment to organized religious institutions 
and can experiment with diverse and unorthodox philosophies and theologies 
(Bender, 2003). The new religions are also closely associated with themes of  
therapy, peace and self-help. Of  course the idea that religion, especially in the 
West, had become privatized was a common notion in sociology in the 1960s 
(Luckmann, 1967). However, these new forms of  subjectivity and privatism 
are no longer confi ned to Protestantism or the American middle classes; they 
now have global implications.
Historians might complain that these forms of  commercial religion could 
also be found in medieval Christian practice in which indulgences were sold to 
the faithful. These examples are telling, but in the Middle Ages the authority of  
the elite was not challenged either by commodifi cation or by the unorthodox 
beliefs of  the illiterate laity. In the modern world, universal literacy, the media 
and globalization have changed religious life. These commercial religious 
developments are no longer simply local cults, but burgeoning global popular 
religions carried by the internet, movies, rock music, popular television shows 
and “pulp fi ction.” In these pick ‘n’ mix religions, adherents borrow carelessly 
from a great range of  religious beliefs and practices. This development is one 
aspect of  “a new techno-mysticism most spectacularly presented to us in the 
use of  special effects in blockbuster fi lms” such as Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon 
and House of  Flying Daggers (Ward, 2006: 18). These phenomena have been 
regarded as aspects of  “new religious movements” that are, as we have seen, 
manifestations of  the spiritual marketplace (Beckford, 2003). These forms of  
spirituality tend to be highly individualistic, unorthodox in the sense that they 
follow no offi cial creed, characterized by their syncretism and have little or 
no connection with formal institutions such as churches, mosques or temples. 
They are post-institutional and in this sense they can be legitimately called 
“postmodern religions.” 
We live increasingly in a communication environment where images 
and symbols rather than the written word probably play an important role 
in interaction. This visual world is therefore iconic rather than literate and 
it requires new skills to interpret coded messages. These new skills emerge 
alongside new occupational structures and hierarchies that no longer duplicate 
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the traditional hierarchies of  the written word. It is also a new experimental 
context in which the iconic is frequently the iconoclastic as Madonna in her 
Catholic period switched to Rachel and for a while explored the Kabbalah 
(Hulsether, 2000). The new media world has emerged in parallel to a radical 
transformation of  Western capitalism from an industrial system with a 
dominant capitalist class of  industrialists to a fi nancial and communication 
capitalism with new fi nancial elites that are global (Epstein, 2005). We can 
interpret the globalization of  religion – especially in the globalization of  
religious sites on the internet and the globalization of  the religious publishing 
world (Stolow, 2010) – as the mirror image of  this fi nancialization of  capitalism 
as the next stage of  economic globalization.
Finally, we have described this combination of  self-help systems, 
subjectivity, devolved authority structures, iconic discourses and do-it-
yourself  theology an example of  “low intensity religion” (Turner, 2009b). 
It is a mobile spirituality that can be transported globally by mobile people 
to new sites where they can mix and match their religious or self-help needs 
without too much institutional constraint from hierarchical authorities. It is a 
religiosity that can travel without the encumbrance of  too much cultural and 
ritualized baggage. It is a low-emotion religion because modern conversions 
tend to be more like a change in consumer brands rather than a searching 
of  the soul. If  the new religious lifestyles give rise to emotions, these are 
packaged in ways that can be easily consumed. Perhaps the harbinger of  the 
new emotional packing of  mobile spirituality was the chat show of  Oprah 
Winfrey who brought a confessional culture on to the television screens not 
only in America but worldwide (Illouz, 2003).
Conclusion: The Structure of  this Volume
In summary, the general framework of  this book is organized around the 
issue of  how the state relates to religion(s) through various orientations that 
include active management strategies or liberal indifference or direct control. 
Secondly, we are concerned to understand how religion develops at the social 
level through the processes of  pietization and revival, and how those changes 
are infl uenced by consumerism and other secular forces. In other words, we 
are exploring two paradoxes. As religion (re)enters the public domain by 
so-called deprivatization, the state moves in to manage religions in the interests 
of  securitization. Secondly, as religious lifestyles become more pious, they can 
also become more dominated by consumerism.
The fi rst part of  this book explores various ways in which religion appears 
to leave the private sphere of  individual conscience and to enter the public 
domain, and how sometimes governments also work towards securitizing 
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the presence of  religion in the public sphere.  The case studies below are 
connected to the wider process of  global securitization.
Bryan S. Turner’s “Religion in Authoritarian States” explores the 
top-down approach of  this securitization process through a study of  
governmentality that aims to control religious tensions as they appear in 
the public sphere. As minority religious groups join the mainstream, Turner 
observes a process of  domestication that reduces these groups’ cultural 
distinctiveness. Focusing on various case studies, but most centrally on the 
Singaporean model, this chapter illustrates two important paradoxes. The 
fi rst is that economic forces create multinational societies, but political 
forces must create national communities. The second is that while secular 
societies like Singapore strive to separate religion (as a private matter 
of  the individual) from the public domain (of  politics and economics), 
government must attempt to manage religion.
Moving to a more liberal case study,  Jim Beckford observes with his “Religion 
in Prisons and in Partnership with the State” how the British state, even if  
constitutionally interlinked with two Christian churches, is also associated 
with other religious organizations in, for example, social welfare, education, 
healthcare, prisons and the armed forces. Compared to the United States and 
French cases, the approach of  the British state to religious diversity is more 
one of  a pragmatic adaptation, fi rst by continuing the long-term relationship 
with the Church of  England, other mainstream Christian churches and the 
Board of  Deputies of  British Jews, and secondly by widening its relationship 
with more recent religious groups. The basis of  cooperation between religious 
groups and the state is offi cially seen as a type of  partnership, but it needs to be 
underlined that this partnership is defi ned by the government. As researched 
by Beckford on faith communities, there is a new type of  state corporatism 
that is quite state centered. Religious organizations have diffi culties in working 
with state agencies, even to the point of  being faced with tensions and confl ict, 
and appear to be valued exclusively for instrumental reasons (e.g. utilizing the 
help provided to the community and dismissing the faith work central to these 
religious organizations).
In the Australian case study, Stephen Chavura’s “The Secularisation 
Thesis and the Secular State: Refl ections with Special Attention to Debates 
in Australia” refl ects on, among other things, the different meanings of  what 
a secular state is from country to country, but also from time to time. Although 
he agrees that in some ways, secularism is enforced through coercion, the 
case study in Australia is more refi ned than simply this. He traces the fi rst 
use of  the conception of  the secular by the Fathers of  Australian Federation 
(1901) who took secular to mean not nonreligious, but rather nonsectarian. 
According to him, while the Church of  England was never established 
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as the state church, there was always space for religious input in matters 
of  social policy, education, welfare and national ceremony. Australia has 
neither an established church nor a constitution that is strong on separating 
the church and the state, and thus Australia cannot be seen as a model of  
exclusive secularism where the government and its institutions are void of  
any religious presence.
Hasmath’s “Managing China’s Muslim Minorities: Migration, Labor 
and the Rise of  Ethnoreligious Consciousness among Uyghurs in Urban 
Xinjiang” underlines the fact that China is not as ethnically homogenous 
as one would think. Hasmath explores in this chapter the ethnic tension 
between the Muslim Uyghurs and the Hans (the national majority) and 
explores various periods of  “soft” and “hard” policies from the state to 
manage this Muslim minority. To understand the state approach to a religious 
minority, Hasmath studies the migratory and urbanization patterns in urban 
Xinjiang to confi rm this oppression of  a minority group by a state, but also 
how intense competition for resources, educational and labor market is also 
a strong factor in this ethnic confl ict.
Levy’s “Secularism, Religion and the Status Quo” brings us to Israel, 
which appears to be an exception to the secularization thesis, as this nation-
state refused to let religion die in the heyday of  secularization, by establishing 
Judaism as its major foundation. This specifi city is framed within the political 
principle of  the status quo emerging from a pact between the Zionist and 
the Jewish political elites which prevents the disentangling between state and 
religion and leads to a type of  semitheocratic state.
Porpora’s “The Tension between State and Religion in American 
Foreign Policy” crosses the Pacifi c to analyze 500 opinion pieces published 
in newspapers and magazines between August and October 2002. He 
discovers that it was mainly the religious sphere that was critical of  the war 
in Iraq on moral grounds, whereas the more mainstream and secular press 
focused more on pragmatics (e.g. would this war be another Vietnam and/
or exacerbate terrorism?). Although the state aims at securitizing religion, 
Porpora found that traditional and organized religion continues to pack a 
counterhegemonic punch.
Zrinščak’s “Church, State, and Society in Post-communist Europe” argues 
that although there is not one single European model of  church-state relations, 
there is nevertheless evidence of  a distinctive European dimension. He 
discovers that even in a post-communist environment pre-communist history 
is not the only salient element in the current church-state relationship; pre-
communist national founding myths and the perceived identity shared by the 
various populations are also present. This would explain the different church-
state arrangements between European post-communist countries.
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The second part of  this book observes how religions move from various 
forms of  piety towards a more consumerist approach, and this in relation with 
the state. 
Barbalet’s “Chinese Religion, Market Society and the State” gives another 
approach to the case study of  China by studying the growth of  certain religions 
such as the Buddhist and Daoist revivalist movements which attract overseas 
Chinese contributors to the capitalist economy of  the mainland. We discover 
in this chapter how the program of  temple rebuilding has been encouraged 
through donations made by overseas Chinese individuals and families. While 
this type of  family capitalism is not the only factor in the development of  the 
post-1978 Chinese market, it is surely an important one.
Sriprakash and Possamai’s “Hindu Normalization, Nationalism, and 
Consumer Mobilization” explores how Hindutva (loosely “Hindu-ness”), 
an ideology advocated by Hindu nationalist movements, exerts signifi cant 
infl uence in parliamentary politics and, arguably more insidiously, in social life 
in contemporary India. This religious and social movement is able to develop 
its relationship with the state though consuming practices. To understand this 
new type of  synergy between religion, state and consumerism, this chapter 
revises classical theories on consumption, especially the work of  Bourdieu and 
the Frankfurt School, to understand the specifi c relation between this fi eld in 
not only India, but also within its diaspora.
Yegenoglu’s “Clash of  Secularity and Religiosity: The Staging of  Secularism 
and Islam through the Icons of  Atatürk and the Veil in Turkey” studies how different 
groups are trying to assert themselves in the public spheres of  a consumerist 
culture. Whereas Muslim groups make their religion more visible, through the use 
of  the headscarf  for example, secularist groups are doing the same to make their 
politics visible as well, through the display of  Atatürk icons (e.g. posters, statues and 
even tattoos). Through these two different consuming paths, there is a complex 
interplay between the imaginary of  the past and the desire for a specifi c future that 
rests behind the discourse that registers Islam as a threat or danger.
Possamai’s “Gramsci, Jediism, the Standardization of  Popular Religion 
and the State” adapts Gramsci’s work on hegemony and popular religion 
to current fl uid religions. It also reworks the classical understanding of  the 
state to a transnational one that continues to operate its hegemony across 
nations. Gramsci thought that there were revolutionary elements in certain 
popular religions of  his time. Using Jediism as a case study, Possamai claims 
that this new form of  popular religion thriving on the internet, a space with 
no limitations or boundaries, does not have this revolutionary element. 
It is a paradox to discover that Jediism, this hyperreal religion inspired by the 
Star Wars franchise, is not attuned to fi ghting against any corrupted “empire,” 
but focuses only on the work of  the spiritual self.
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In the “Concluding Comments,” Michel’s “Concerning the Current 
Recompositions of  Religion and of  Politics” addresses these tensions between 
believers and the range of  public institutions that have been discussed in 
this book. He even wonders if  religion is still disappearing or endlessly 
reemerging. Taking into account the end of  the political utopia of  1989–92, 
it can be argued that the disenchantment of  the world today affects the 
political arena as well and as Certeau claims, when politics gives ground, 
the religious comes back. Michel underlines the strong fl uidity between 
religion, economy and politics and discovers a triple crisis that emerges from 
a political defi cit, explosion/inadequacy of  the supply of  meaning and the 
strong decrease/withdrawal of  credibility. These case studies illustrate a 
variety of  common patterns in different societies and in terms of  various 
religious traditions, while also paying attention to variations in relations 
between state and religion that are the product of  local circumstances. One 
conclusion is however unavoidable – the overriding importance of  religion 
in any understanding of  modern politics.
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Part I
FROM DEPRIVITIZATION 
TO SECURITIZATION

Chapter 1
RELIGION IN LIBERAL 
AND AUTHORITARIAN STATES1
Bryan S. Turner
The City University of  New York and University of  Western Sydney
Introduction: The Paradox of  the Politics and 
Economics of  Migration
Two aspects of  the modern liberal state can be considered basic conditions 
that infl uence the place of  religion in modern society. The fi rst is the problem 
of  national identity in the face of  cultural diversity. Most modern states are 
culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse. For most states, this diversity 
is a consequence of  massive migration, either historically or more recently. 
With the globalization of  the labor market, host societies have become more 
complex and diverse, and in addition they have become more diffi cult to 
govern. Singapore is an important Asian case where migration, before and 
after its independence, created a multicultural society; however, today it must 
deal with even more diversity. Like many other Asian societies, Singapore 
has a declining fertility rate despite all government attempts to correct that 
downward trend. As a result, the state must constantly seek to import labor, 
especially talented labor. With its current population at just over four million 
and with little opportunity to recover more usable land, the state has decided 
to increase its population to just over six million. Unless there are very direct 
controls on the ethnic composition of  migrants, economic openness inevitably 
results in greater ethnic diversity. At the same time, the state has an interest in 
protecting its own territorial sovereignty and in order to assert its sovereignty 
1 A version of  this chapter was originally published in Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir, 
Alexius A. Pereira and Bryan S. Turner, Muslims in Singapore (London: Routledge, 2009).
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over society, it must create the political myth of  a morally coherent and 
integrated society (Kamaludeen, Pereira and Turner, 2009). 
Benedict Anderson (1983) has famously written about how nation-states 
create “imagined communities” through the spread of  print media, and 
this mythical creation essentially involves the construction of  a nationalist 
ideology. Like other states, Singapore must fi nd ways of  projecting a common 
purpose around the state and the image of  a unifi ed national community. 
In particular, it must foster a vivid and meaningful sense of  what it is to be 
a “Singaporean,” rather than, for example, a Chinese person living on the 
island of  Singapore whose familial memories are more likely to be connected 
with mainland China. It must achieve a delicate balancing act between 
nationalism, internal harmony and openness to foreign talent by avoiding 
any impression that it favors one community over another. Therefore, the fi rst 
paradox is that economic forces create multinational societies, but political 
forces must create national communities. Sociologists occasionally refer to this 
nation-building activity of  the state in terms of  building the cultural fabric – 
the great arch – of  the society as the real foundation of  political power 
(Corrigan and Sayer, 1985). This paradox holds true for small countries such 
as Singapore, but it is also central to the recent migration and population 
dilemmas of  relatively large European societies such as Italy and the United 
Kingdom. In both societies, there is a rightwing opposition to migration, 
whereas with a declining and aging population these societies need to accept 
migrants to avoid a shrinking workforce.
The second paradox is that while secular societies like Singapore strive 
to separate religion (as a private matter of  the individual) from the public 
domain (of  politics and economics), governments must attempt to manage 
religions. Owing to the fi rst paradox, the government cannot ignore the fact 
that religious diversity without management will in all probability result in 
communal tensions, if  not in open social confl ict. Other things being equal, the 
practice of  religious piety will create a certain social distance between social 
groups and eventually these social divisions can harden into separate enclaves. 
These issues have dominated much of  American history and are probably 
more salient now than in the past. Following the work of  Robert Putnam 
(2000), we can argue that religious communities tend to build social bonding 
rather than social bridging. Other things being equal, piety movements will 
tend to reinforce exclusive tendencies and reinforce separate identities. The 
role of  the state is to manage such social processes in the interest of  creating 
social unity.  Where possible, it should seek to convince its citizens that such 
social harmony is not simply artifi cial. In their recent American Grace, Robert 
Putnam and David Campbell (2010) take an excessively optimistic view of  
the capacity of  American society to absorb religious diversity and proclaim 
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its national coherence. By contrast, resentment rather than grace appears to 
dominate religion and politics in the United States, especially after 9/11 and 
more recently after the credit crunch. The aggravated public debate about 
the proposal to build a Muslim cultural center in the vicinity of  the site of  
the Twin Towers at Ground Zero is simply one recent manifestation of  the 
problems of  Muslim integration. William E. Connolly (1995) has grasped this 
general sense of  resentment in his account of  the creation of  a fundamentalist 
ideology, the rise of  the Republican Right, the crisis of  a number of  foreign 
adventures from the Vietnam War to modern day Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Libya against the backdrop of  the transformation of  manufacturing industry 
and the fi nancialization of  American capitalism. For example, he argues that 
the Southern Baptist Church was originally consolidated through a shared 
sense of  betrayal and resentment. This combination of  military defeat, deep 
resentment against the outside world and aggressive moralization to overturn 
those evils forms the persistent basis of  American religious fundamentalism 
(Connolly, 2008). The political fundamentalism of  the South was part of  a 
constituency that felt under siege from middle-class feminism, the welfare 
program of  the Great Society, and more recently the election of  President 
Obama. This resentment has gathered momentum against migration, 
especially illegal migration across the Mexican border and specifi cally against 
the growth of  the Muslim population and what is seen to be the creeping 
threat of  the Shari’a.
These alienated sectors of  the blue-collar labor force, who have already been 
victims of  the rust belt and the internet bubble, have now been subjected to 
the housing market crisis, the liquidity crisis, the slide in the value of  the dollar, 
the banking meltdown, the economic recession and the legal scandals around 
mortgages and foreclosure. Tea Party politics might be suitably regarded as 
a contemporary example of  status politics and political conservatism, and as 
such it has a long tradition in American political culture such as the People’s 
Party of  the 1890s in its opposition to big government, east-coast intellectuals, 
and Washington politicians. The message of  the Tea Party is consistent with 
the basic elements of  conservative thought: promote lower personal taxation, 
smaller government, ownership of  guns, limited migration and more individual 
liberty. The title of  the “Tea Party Manifesto” by Dick Amery and Matt Kibbe 
is “Give us Liberty” (2010). The politics of  the Tea Party are a manifestation 
of  the paradox that I am describing in terms of  a tension between the politics 
of  the nation-state and the labor requirements of  economic growth.
Of  course, not all liberal democratic societies have the same public issues 
regarding religion, diversity and migration. The ways in which states manage 
religions will clearly differ according to their histories and social structures. 
Canada and the United States, while they share the same land mass, do not 
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share the same history with respect to slavery, migration and multiculturalism. 
America’s border with Mexico has produced a set of  somewhat specifi c 
conditions. The steady fl ow of  illegal Mexican migrants is fueling anti-
migrant xenophobia in states like Arizona and Nevada, whereas Canada has 
retained an openness to migration, taking 281,000 legal immigrants in 2010, 
the majority of  whom came from the Philippines, India and China. Canada 
has of  course had highly public contests with its Muslim culture following 
the failed experiment to develop Shari’a arbitration courts in Ontario in the 
late 1990s (Turner and Arslan, 2011). With a booming domestic economy 
and expanding energy industries, Canada has not been faced with a critical 
problem of  illegal immigration and has retained a much more positive view of  
multiculturalism, which was in any case a policy invented by Pierre Trudeau.
With its history of  slavery and racial confl ict, the United States has been the 
site of  communal tension and violence for the last two centuries. Clearly the 
scale of  racial confl ict in Singapore is vastly different, but the contradictory 
structure of  nationhood and open borders remains the same. Singapore has 
experienced racial and religious tensions in the past. There were riots in 1951 
over the religious identity of  Maria Hertog, a European girl who had been 
raised by a Malay family (Aljunied, 2009). The government has responded to 
this religious diversity by preventing religious labels from playing any overt 
public role. The Maintenance of  Religious Harmony Act of  1990 prevents 
the use of  religion for political ends. The state has also been willing to respond 
forcefully to eliminate any signs of  religious opposition to the government, 
exemplifi ed by its response to what it saw as a Marxist conspiracy among 
Catholic intellectuals in 1987. Twenty-two members of  Catholic Church 
organizations who had promoted awareness of  the plight of  foreign workers 
were arrested on the grounds that they were plotting a Marxist revolt against 
the state. These arrests were carried out under the Internal Security Act, but 
this blunt instrument was inappropriate in such a case. The Maintenance of  
Religious Harmony Act was designed to separate faith from social activism. 
However, the paradox is that in order to keep religion and politics apart, 
the state must actively intervene in civil society to guarantee that religious 
services – preaching, teaching, healing, praying and so forth – are compatible 
with public security, social stability and nationalist goals.
In the Singapore case, this “management of  religion” has two dimensions, 
each of  which is characterized by further ambiguities. The fi rst dimension 
is the unintended consequence of  creating religious enclaves. This outcome 
arises because the Singapore state categorically divides the population 
primarily into four distinct ethnic communities: Chinese, Malay, Indian 
and other. The consequence is that these ethnic identities inevitably play an 
important role in public life. Furthermore, since these ethnic categories are 
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also in practice religious categories, it means that religion is signifi cant in 
defi ning public identities. To illustrate this point, Malays are typically Muslim, 
Indians are typically Hindu and the Chinese are typically Buddhist, although 
there are a sizable number of  Chinese who are Christian. Thus, there is 
an offi cial ethnic defi nition of  groups despite the government’s attempts to 
break down the cultural division between various communities to foster the 
national identity of  being “Singaporean.” 
The second dimension is the specifi c management of  Islam in Singapore. 
This policy is seen as necessary because of  the long-standing “Malay problem,” 
namely the social and economic backwardness of  the Malay Singaporeans. 
Singapore’s government prides itself  on its technological rationality, ranging 
from economic and urban planning to its family and cultural policies. Thus, the 
state has a range of  strategies that are designed to “upgrade” its own population. 
These upgrading strategies include everything from health (mosquito control 
and encouraging weight control to prevent obesity) to automobile restrictions 
to education (including policies on “Religious Knowledge”). The Singaporean 
authorities have regarded individualism and “shapeless multiculturalism” 
as aspects of  Western decadence, contrasted with the moral superiority of  
Confucian Asia (Harvey, 2006). The upgrading therefore manifests itself  
through the self-assumed responsibility of  the state to intervene directly in 
the arenas of  religion, morals, reproduction and family life. Singapore’s 
strategies towards its Muslim population are encapsulated in Majlis Ugama 
Islam Singapura (MUIS, or the Islamic Religious Council of  Singapore) and 
its related policies of  improving Muslim education, modernizing the Shari’a 
and its courts, and seeking to regulate and improve Muslim family life. 
Although Singapore is a small island city-state in Southeast Asia 
surrounded by societies that have much larger populations and resources, 
it is a society that is highly instructive from a sociological point of  view. 
Singapore illustrates in clear terms the paradoxes of  free-market capitalism. 
While the dominant form of  global capitalism has been neoliberal, few 
Asian societies have simultaneously embraced deregulation in economics 
and liberalism in social life. The idea of  a harmonious society based on a 
strong state and Confucian values has continued to be more attractive than 
Western liberalism – in other words, the rule of  virtue rather than the rule 
of  law. Asian societies have generally sought to regulate family and religion 
in the interest of  social stability. The Singaporean experience shows that 
any society that wants to separate religion and politics (in order to guarantee 
freedom of  religious belief  and practice) must interfere systematically in 
society to manage religions. The success or failure of  these policies will have 
profound implications for the wealth and well-being of  its citizens and the 
regions that surround the island.
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Although Singapore has not as yet been the target of  a successful terrorist 
attack, there is considerable anxiety in the city-state that such an attack would 
have devastating social and economic consequences. It is also obvious that 
as a secular capitalist state, Singapore must be a potential target of  some 
signifi cance. Economically advanced societies can no longer rely on the 
conventional division between politics and religion and have entered into 
a new phase that will have to involve the direct management of  religions. 
In the current context of  global anxieties over security, liberal states have 
evolved from policies of  benign neglect towards religious belief  and racial 
identity to active management of  religious institutions. In practice, these 
new strategies are in fact concerned with “managing Muslims” under the 
umbrella of  social pluralism and multiculturalism. These developments can 
be understood in terms of  Michel Foucault’s concept of  “governmentality,” 
since managing religions is a recent adjunct of  the more general functions 
of  the administrative state (Foucault, 2000). Managing religions is important 
if  the state is to reassert its authority over civil society – especially over those 
religious institutions that seek to articulate an alternative vision of  power and 
truth – and if  it is to command the loyalty of  its citizens over and above other 
claims of  membership. 
Managing Religions 
I have argued that the modern state has a contradictory relationship with 
multiculturalism and migration on the one hand and to security and sovereignty 
on the other. Security would be relatively effective and inexpensive in a society 
where virtually all of  the citizens spoke the same language, practiced the 
same religion, adhered to the same dress code and supported the same cricket 
teams. The modern world is generally not like this. In a capitalist society 
in particular, the state seeks to encourage labor migration, porous political 
boundaries and minimal constraints on the fl exibility of  the labor market. At 
the same time, the state is under considerable pressure from economic elites to 
reduce the resistance of  labor to the destructive logic of  enterprise and capital 
accumulation. One solution to the resistance of  organized labor to structural 
change in the economy is to regulate trade unions, make strikes illegal and 
import foreign labor to reduce the unit costs of  production. Singapore has 
been remarkably successful in achieving these economic goals. Under Mrs 
Thatcher’s Conservative governments, similar inroads were made into the 
effectiveness of  trade unions in infl uencing wage levels and conditions of  
employment. However, the state also has an interest in sustaining its own 
sovereignty, and hence wants to create and impose a cultural and moral unity 
on society. The modern state is an administrative order that seeks to maximize 
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the social potential of  its population (hence it has an interest in supporting 
migration), but it also has an interest in the enforcement of  a particular type 
of  governmentality.
This contradiction means that we can expect state policies towards 
citizenship and migration to vacillate between treating migration 
and multiculturalism as aspects of  economic policy and constructing 
multiculturalism within a framework of  asserting national sovereignty. While 
some sociologists have noted that “we are all multicultural now” (Glazer, 
1997; Kymlicka, 1995), much of  the recent evidence from Western societies 
is that multiculturalism is in retreat because there is now a growing emphasis 
on security and careful regulation of  migration. More importantly, critics 
argue that multicultural policies often appear to have divided rather than 
united societies (Barry, 2001; Joppke, 2004; Levy, 2000). Recent political 
crises in the liberal democracies – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Australia – have only served to reinforce this 
critical standpoint. European societies have all faced this postwar cultural 
and ethnic fragmentation, but in Britain – given its imperial history – 
these social changes have been both rapid and profound. The history of  
Singapore is somewhat different. As an international port, it has always 
been a migrant society and its Chinese majority, although the political elite, 
are also a migrant community. Singapore has been largely successful in 
embracing multiculturalism – or multiracialism to use on its own terms – 
without jeopardizing the social supremacy of  the Chinese.
Theories of  multiculturalism have attempted to make a distinction between 
its social and cultural dimensions, thereby constructing four types, namely 
cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism, interactive pluralism and assimilation 
(Hartmann and Gerteis, 2005). This theory suggests that multiculturalism can 
involve a variety of  combinations, including a situation where social groups 
retain their internal solidarity, but the society as a whole is fragmented. This 
situation is often described in terms of  a system of  parallel communities. 
In this typology, social groups can be both in confl ict and in competitive 
relationships with each other. Assimilation is probably not strictly speaking 
a multicultural strategy, since it is based on the assumption that difference 
is harmful or at least undesirable and should be suppressed or suspended in 
the process of  assimilating foreigners into a host society. Finally, interactive 
multiculturalism celebrates differences, recognizes group rights and accepts 
principles of  recognition and reciprocity. Cosmopolitanism involves a 
distinctively normative vision of  this cultural diversity in which individual civil 
liberties are preserved (Appiah, 2006).
Typologies of  state responses to religion should be regarded as merely 
heuristic devices that are only more or less useful. The following typology 
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attempts to categorize government policies as either inclusive or exclusive. 
Obviously, any one government may have several policy strategies in place 
simultaneously, and these policies may not be necessarily compatible or 
coherent. Governments may try out several strategies over time depending 
on local circumstances and the changing nature of  state politics. The more 
extreme state policies might involve a form of  social quarantine resulting in 
the formation of  ghettos or parallel communities. These extreme forms of  
separation and exclusion would also include repatriation and expulsion on the 
one hand and extermination and ethnic cleansing on the other. 
Repatriation, denaturalization and the forceful expulsion of  minorities 
have unfortunately made up a common pattern of  political confl ict in Africa 
(Manby, 2009). Similarly, the laws that were enacted in Germany in the 1930s 
to declare that Jews were not citizens were in some sense extraordinary laws 
(Agamben, 1998). However, repatriation, expulsion or genocide constitute 
extreme strategies and are unlikely practices in democratic governments. 
In short, draconian policies of  repatriation, expulsion and genocide are 
incompatible with human rights legislation and would be diffi cult to 
implement because their very enactment would be likely to contradict the 
rules of  procedural justice in a functioning democracy. For similar reasons, 
the use of  “extraordinary rendition” by United States security agencies 
appears to contradict the principles of  the rule of  law upon which American 
democracy is based. 
Inclusive policies, although in some circumstances benign, can nevertheless 
be criticized as patronizing. Through an inclusive policy of  “adaptive 
upgrading,” I adopt a term from Talcott Parsons’s sociological theory of  
social systems (Parsons, 1999: 76) to suggest that some governments may 
adopt strategies to improve the education and social status of  migrants. They 
adopt these strategies with the view that such policies may help to bring them 
into the middle class and that the training of  their leadership will make them 
more moderate in political terms. Parsons defi ned “adaptive upgrading” 
as “the reevaluation of  the older, previously downgraded components to 
constitute assets from the point of  view of  the broader system” (1999: 76). 
The opposite strategy would be to downgrade or even to degrade a population 
by transforming it into a minority whose main function in society would be 
to provide manual labor and to undertake stigmatized services that the host 
population might reject. Degrading prevents a group from achieving even the 
minimum standards of  dignity and civility. Degrading creates an underclass 
and such policies would transform a minority into a “pariah group” in the 
long run (Weber, 1952: 3).
Integration and assimilation are well-known multicultural strategies 
that aim to bring a subordinate or minority group into the mainstream, 
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but with assimilation there is the implication that over time such minorities 
would abandon their cultural distinctiveness. These strategies are in effect 
strategies of  domestication. The opposite strategy – the creation of  an 
“enclave society” (Turner, 2007) – is to force minorities into segregated 
areas using physical impediments such as walls to stop the fl ow of  people. 
Perhaps the most encouraging strategy would be to embrace some form of  
cosmopolitanism that would integrate minorities without robbing them of  
their cultural distinctiveness. However, cosmopolitanism is ambiguous. It has 
been criticized by some as an elitist strategy that recognizes differences from 
a position of  privilege. Although recognition appears to be an essential step 
in the development of  cosmopolitanism as a moral attitude and as a strategy 
necessary for social harmony in complex multicultural societies, there are by 
that very fact ample opportunities for misrecognition and resentment. These 
various strategies can be summarized in this typology:
Table 1.1. Typology of  state management
Positive state policies Negative state policies
Inclusive policies Exclusive policies
Upgrading Downgrading or degrading
Integration/assimilation Enclavement
Cosmopolitanism Cultural indifference
Politics of  recognition Politics of  misrecognition
When we consider the relationship between the state and religion in 
any typology of  management strategies, we have also to keep in mind that 
“religion” may take many forms along a continuum from individualistic 
spirituality to collective expressions of  identity. One aspect of  my argument 
is that the modern eruption of  spirituality is unlikely to pose problems for 
the state, because it is by defi nition post-institutional and private. Religion 
may cause the state to intervene when it takes on a fundamentalist orientation 
involving a movement to increase conversions or when religion becomes 
largely equivalent to an ethnic identity. In short, it is mainly when religions 
become “public religions” that states are forced to respond with much more 
than mere indifference (Casanova, 1994).
Legal Regulation and the Quality of  Religious Services
My argument is that all states, with signifi cant variation of  course, are now 
involved in some form of  management of  religions. In this chapter, I shall 
simplify the picture by looking at the sharp contrast between liberal democratic 
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states and post-communist authoritarian ones. In the majority of  liberal 
democracies before 9/11, there was an inclusive laissez-faire policy in which 
the state guaranteed freedom of  conscience on the principle that religion is a 
private affair. The main exception has been the treatment of  so-called cults; 
states in liberal democracies have been forced to intervene in what they have 
seen to be problematic implications of  cultic groups for society. States tend to 
intervene when there is a perceived threat to minors, namely when children or 
the vulnerable are seen to be at risk from the evangelical activities of  cults. Such 
behavior – for example, conversion techniques – tends to be regarded as merely 
brainwashing and hence a basis for legal intervention. The classical example 
in the West would be the Moonies. With the development of  consumerism 
in both market and religion more recently, states more regularly intervene to 
ensure the quality of  the product, such as in the case of  Scientology in France. 
Liberal states nevertheless are slow to intervene and only reluctantly become 
active in religious management.
The management of  religion under communism comes in this typology 
under the category of  downgrading or degrading. Religion in general was 
regarded simply as a superstition from the feudal past and as a threat to the 
monopolistic role of  the Party. In the period of  the Cultural Revolution in 
China, Mao attempted to liquidate Confucianism as a feudal system and 
directly attacked the traditional customs of  fi lial piety. However, it is said 
that both Stalin and Mao came implicitly to support some aspects of  religion 
insofar as it could be useful in supporting or legitimating the Party. In Vietnam, 
Roman Catholicism was seen by the Party as a remnant of  French colonialism, 
and under American infl uence the Diem regime came to support Catholicism 
as a state religion against Buddhism. Despite these confl icts, it is possible to 
argue that Confucianism remained an offi cial ideology and its commitment 
to an orderly society often served Party objectives.
The traditional legal arrangements of  imperial China were based on 
Confucian values and can be described as a system of  moral “familialism.” This 
system involved unconditional fi lial piety, the welfare of  the dominant status 
group over the individual and a reverence for seniority. The “Confucianization of  
the law” meant that both judge and ruler drew directly from morality, especially 
where strictly juridical guidelines were absent or ambiguous. This traditional 
Confucian system promoted the idea of  rules of  law and virtue. The criminal 
law was the cornerstone of  this system, because it was the basis of  social 
control. This legal system broke down during the Cultural Revolution and 
one can interpret the post–Cultural Revolution period of  institution building 
and law reform as an attempt to prevent another relapse into the excesses of  
class struggle and generational confl ict. The 1999 National Plan for Managing 
Public Order sought to contain the growth of  criminal gangs, the production 
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of  fake agricultural goods, the proliferation of  cults, the emergence of  juvenile 
delinquency and to manage China’s fl oating, dislocated populations With 
these reforms, there has been a political emphasis on the need to combine 
rule of  law with the rule of  virtue. As an antidote to “blind Westernization,” 
Chinese citizens are called upon to embrace Confucian virtue in the form of  
the “four beautiful virtues” (si mei) of  beautiful thought, language, behavior 
and environment and the “four haves” (si you) of  consciousness, morality, 
culture and discipline.
China’s legal reforms and modernization are in many respects a reassertion 
of  traditional Confucian norms of  respect, duty and stability. This feature of  
traditional rule and the failures of  China’s criminal law institutions is perhaps 
nowhere better illustrated than in the Party’s response to the “Falun Gong 
problem.” Between 1949 and 1997, cults were regarded as secret societies and 
hence constructed by the political elite as counterrevolutionary movements. 
The current treatment of  Falun Gong continues a tradition of  such criticism 
and displays the worst aspects of  legal fl exibility in which policy needs replace 
legal procedure. The ethos of  “state instrumentalism” and the use of  the notion 
of  “social harm” give rise to considerable human rights abuses. The worst 
features of  state instrumentalism include detention without trial, extralegal 
detention and custody for investigation. These procedures are enforced on the 
basis of  the extrajudicial authority of  public agencies. 
Falun Gong (“Wheel of  Law”), which combines Buddhist-Daoist beliefs 
and traditional exercises, claimed the right to assemble to practice healing 
exercises in public spaces. Its founder Li Hongzhi was born in 1952 and 
embraced the teachings of  qigong at an early age. He established his own school 
of  traditional healing in 1992 and initially gained political approval for these 
practices. Falun Gong appealed to the powerless and the dispossessed, but when 
it was banned by the Ministry of  Civil Affairs in 1999, Falun Gong members 
often responded with acts of  civil disobedience. The authorities have responded 
with a mixture of  extrajudicial measures that amount to administrative 
discipline: hard labor for reeducation, “custody for repatriation,” detention 
for “further investigation,” loss of  jobs and so forth. The Chinese Communist 
Party has defi ned religious heresy as a crime and employed state institutions to 
reinforce “socialist spiritual civilization” against “feudal superstition” such as 
the beliefs and practices of  Falun Gong. On 12 July 2006 it was reported in the 
Canadian foreign policy newsletter Embassy that the Canadian government had 
announced its intention to investigate allegations that Falun Gong prisoners in 
Chinese jails were being murdered and their organs sold to transplant patients. 
One piece of  evidence is that prior to 1999 – when Falun Gong was banned – 
the state was harvesting organs from 1,600 prisoners executed each year. 
After 1999, there has been a rapid increase in organ transplants and it is 
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estimated that some 41,500 organ donors in that period are unaccounted for. 
If  these allegations prove to be true, the removal of  prisoner’s organs without 
consent will give “extrajudicial procedures” a new and sinister meaning.
Both Muslims and Buddhists in China have recently come to the attention 
of  the international media because their suppression has become more obvious 
and blatant. Some aspects of  this repression were evident during the Olympic 
Games and more recently, confl icts with Huigra in the Xinjiang province and 
with Buddhists in Tibet have raised issues about the failures of  citizenship and 
the erosion of  religious freedom. At present, the prospects for human rights 
in China are not promising. Merle Goldman’s analysis of  the erosion of  the 
achievements of  the new liberalism of  1997 to 1998 in From Comrade to Citizen 
(2005) is depressing reading. In reviewing China’s achievements, it is useful to 
make a comparison with the recent history of  Russia. 
Like China, Russia is faced with serious problems resulting from the 
alienation of  its Muslim population. With the collapse of  the Soviet empire 
in 1992, there was of  course considerable optimism about the prospects 
of  human rights improvements. However, in November 1994 President 
Yeltsin decided to attack the Chechen capital Grozny to crush the separatist 
movement of  Jokhar Dudayev. Human rights critics of  the war such as Sergei 
Kovalev, having been denounced as enemies of  Russia, predicted that the war 
would result in intolerance, revenge and civil violence (Gilligan, 2005). These 
criticisms became horribly true at the school massacre in Beslan in September 
2004. While Kovalev was highly critical of  the Chechen leadership, he argued 
that the second war in Chechnya allowed Vladimir Putin to consolidate his 
power. Putin, who has done much to curtail human rights, undermine foreign 
NGOs, silence opposition and restore centralized power, has enforced the 
ideology of  Russia as the Great Power and the doctrine of  derzhavnost, the 
view that the state is a superior mystical being that every citizen must serve 
without question. The good citizen is a derzhavnik who is indifferent to the fate 
of  other citizens and accepts state crimes as necessary and justifi ed. It has 
proved diffi cult to contain the confl ict in North Caucasus, where the violence 
has erupted in many provinces – Dagestan, Ingushetia and Karbardino-
Balkaria. Radical Islam has become increasingly important in these confl icts 
as the region has been opened up to Middle Eastern trade, pilgrimage and 
the internet (King and Menon, 2010). However, while Islam has become 
important in the contemporary confl ict, the region is an ancient location of  
opposition to the Russian state.
An equally appropriate example of  the differences between political and 
social secularization can be taken from the modern history of  the Russian 
Orthodox Church in relation to society and state. Although the church was 
severely repressed in the early years of  the Russian Revolution, the close 
 RELIGION IN LIBERAL AND AUTHORITARIAN STATES 37
relationship between Orthodoxy and nationalism meant that Orthodox 
Christianity could also play a useful role in secular Russian politics. Since 
the fall of  the Soviet system, the Orthodox Church has made an important 
comeback under the skilful political direction of  Patriarch Alexy II, who has 
forged a powerful alliance with both Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev 
(Garrad and Garrad, 2009). In 1983, the patriarch was successful in securing 
the return of  the Don Monastery in central Moscow to ecclesiastical use. 
In 1991, he managed to restore the veneration of  St Seraphim of  Sarov who, 
dying in 1833, was revered as a patriot by Tsar Nicholas II. The saint’s relics were 
restored to the Cathedral of  Sarov. In 1997, a law on the freedom of  religious 
conscience gave a privileged status to Orthodoxy, while Roman Catholicism 
has been politically marginalized. For obvious reasons, Islam and evangelical 
Protestantism have been the target of  much state intervention and have been 
suppressed when necessary. Under Medvedev, Orthodoxy has continued to 
prosper as an offi cial religion offering some degree of  spiritual and national 
legitimacy to the Party and the state. There is also a close relationship between 
the military and the Orthodox Church in that religious icons are used to bless 
warships and the patriarch offered a thanksgiving service on the anniversary 
of  the creation of  the Soviet nuclear arsenal. 
Although the public role of  Orthodoxy has been largely restored, the 
church’s infl uence is largely based on cultural nationalism rather than on 
its spiritual authority. Thus while some 80 percent of  Russians describe 
themselves as “Orthodox,” just over 40 percent call themselves “believers.” 
This relationship between the political and the social allows us to say that, 
while Orthodoxy is a powerful public religion and public space has been 
partially resacralized, Russian society remains secular. The same is true of  
modern China. While there is considerable evidence of  religious revival in 
both folk religion and the world religions, social surveys show that the Chinese 
population is predominantly secular (Yang, 2010). The legacy of  atheism and 
secularism from the past still has a hold over the everyday social world even 
when religion now plays a considerable part in a nationalist revival. Therefore, 
in any assessment of  the notion of  “a post-secular society” in both liberal and 
authoritarian states, we need to be careful about whether secularization refers 
to formal institutions at the political level or whether it refers to lived religion 
at the social level. It is my contention that the philosophical analysis of  the role 
of  religion by Habermas in public culture is very important, but it may tell us 
relatively little about how religion is embodied in the social world.
Many of  these issues are illustrated by the modern history of  Tibet. 
Tibetans have unusually high urban illiteracy rates and it is the Han migrants 
who benefi t most from Chinese economic investment. Tibetans have become 
an urban underclass, while those remaining in rural areas have suffered from 
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limited economic opportunities and rural poverty (Fischer, 2005). While there 
has been a signifi cant decline in the number of  Buddhist monks, some 1,550 
out of  1,886 monasteries have been rebuilt in eastern Tibetan areas (Kolas and 
Thowsen, 2005). However, Chinese promotion of  Buddhist sites in China may 
also be generally connected with the expansion of  what we might legitimately 
call “religious tourism.” This commercial development of  religious sites 
is common in China and more generally in Asia. This commodifi cation of  
religion is also consistent with greater state intervention in the management 
of  religion in China since the 1990s, and those groups that cannot achieve 
recognition from the state as a religion may attempt to fl ourish as cultural or 
tourist sites under the regulation of  local state agencies (Ashiwa and Wank, 
2006). In short, both Russia and China can be said to be engaging in a modest 
level of  “cultural upgrading” of  Buddhism and Orthodoxy in the interests 
of  their foreign relations. At the same time, they are engaged in degrading 
and exclusionary policies towards their Muslim minorities which are generally 
labeled as terrorist movements.
Conclusion
These authoritarian state examples probably confi rm the Western view that 
despite liberalization, state authorities often harass religious minorities because 
they are seen to be a challenge from within civil society to the authority of  the 
state. A similar story could be told about modern Vietnam where, despite 
the so-called Renovation Period, ethnic minorities in border areas are seen 
to be both backward and disruptive. The growth of  Protestant evangelism 
in these border areas of  Vietnam has been of  particular concern to the state. 
Although authoritarian states tend to suppress cults by forceful and violent 
means if  necessary, the commercial development of  religions in both China 
and Vietnam could offer an alternative strategy. One solution to the Tibet 
problem and to the Muslim threat for the Chinese authorities would be to 
commodify these religions, thereby developing Tibet into a tourist site – a 
religious Disneyland under the control of  the state. 
Although Western liberal critics are quick to demonstrate the shortcomings 
of  such authoritarian states, there is a reasonable concern that modern 
states could in general slide towards the “Singapore model” in which there 
is relatively tight and illiberal regulation of  religion in a period of  global 
securitization. However, the Singapore model does present a challenge to 
Western liberal views, especially to those positions that are inspired by the 
work of  John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas’s interpretation of  it. Western 
liberals argue that democracy and secularization (in the basic meaning of  the 
separation of  religion and politics) provide the best conditions within which 
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religious and sectarian confl ict can be avoided. One recent illustration of  this 
argument appears in Irfan Ahmad’s Islamism and Democracy in India (2009), 
where he shows how the original and radical version of  Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, 
which was founded in 1941 by Syed Abul Ala Maududi, has gradually evolved 
towards overt acceptance of  secular political values and institutions. His 
explanation is that, because the Indian Constitution guaranteed secularism 
and democracy, Jamaat leaders came to accept secular political institutions 
as their best defense against the violence being promoted by the anti-Muslim 
Hindutva. Even Indira Ghandi’s decision in 1975 to ban all opposition parties 
did not turn the Jamaat back to the position advocated by Maududi that 
Muslims should reject democracy as haram. A similar argument is presented in 
Mohammed Hafez’s Why Muslims Rebel (2003), in which he argues, comparing 
Egypt and Algeria, that representing repressive and authoritarian attempts 
to suppress radical religious groups is counterproductive, as they drive the 
moderates into the arms of  the radicals. 
These arguments provide comforting ammunition to secular liberals who 
want to protect the basic institutions and values of  liberal democracy as the 
best foundation for individual rights and tolerance. Against such examples, 
the “Singapore model” presents an important alternative. Singapore clearly 
has a history that is very different from either Russia or China, but it is equally 
and clearly different from Britain and America in its strategy. If  through 
careful and technical management of  religions, Singapore can successfully 
build a harmonious and successful modern society, then it provides an 
obvious contrast to laissez-faire traditions of  the liberal West. The paradox 
is, of  course, that Singapore represents a form of  “soft authoritarianism” that 
is grounded in the legality of  the state, but it is not the tolerance that liberals 
have admired and cherished.
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Chapter 2
RELIGION IN PRISONS AND IN 
PARTNERSHIP WITH THE STATE
James A. Beckford
University of  Warwick
Introduction
“Religion” and “state” are contested concepts. A particularly heated 
debate has been raging about these concepts for a decade or more among 
practitioners of  religious studies. On the one hand, the majority view is 
that the terms “religion” and “state” are diffi cult to defi ne but that they 
are in principle good enough for analytical purposes. On the other hand 
is the view of  a group of  self-styled critical theorists that both terms are 
illegitimate abstractions that mask ideological positions (Fitzgerald, 2000, 
2007; McCutcheon, 2003). 
I fi nd this debate intriguing, although it has very few implications for this 
chapter. This is because I choose to take a social constructionist approach 
to the sociological understanding of  religion (Beckford, 2003). This means 
that, instead of  using generic notions of  religion and the state that purport 
to be valid for all times and places, I prefer to focus on the social processes 
whereby the meanings of  these terms are generated, attributed, deployed 
and contested in particular social and cultural contexts. This allows me to 
work with rough and ready defi nitions that merely identify the outer limits 
of  common usage. For my purposes, then, religion has to do with beliefs, 
values, motivations, feelings, activities, normative codes, institutions and 
organizations that relate to claims about the ultimate signifi cance or perceived 
wholeness of  life. Loosely following Max Weber’s example, I understand states 
as formal political collectivities that successfully claim legitimacy over the 
exclusive exercise of  authority, backed by force if  necessary, in relation to all 
human activity in their territories.
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Relations between religions and states, understood in these terms, have 
historically run the full gamut of  positions between total inseparability and 
mutual exclusion. The Islamic Republic of  Iran represents an extreme position 
of  virtual identity between a religion and a state. The former communist 
regime of  Albania represents the opposite extreme, approximating to mutual 
exclusion between a state and all religions. Despite problems of  defi nition, all 
the states in the world can in principle be situated on this continuum between 
polar extremes.
The sociological importance of  relations between religions and states is 
refl ected in the fact that at least three specialist journals (The Journal of  Church 
and State; Religion, State and Society; and Religion-Staat-Gesellschaft) now deal with 
the topic. In addition, other journals and books continue to publish extensive 
analyses of  the religion-state nexus, beginning in the 1980s with Religion and 
the State (Wood, 1985) and Church-State Relations. Tensions and Transitions (Robbins 
and Robertson, 1987). One of  the most recent is Jonathan Fox’s A World Survey 
of  Religion and the State (2008). At the same time, studies of  the legal frameworks 
and regulatory mechanisms governing relations between religions and states, 
especially in the United States, add further complexity to the picture (Grim 
and Finke, 2006). Winnifred Sullivan’s The Impossibility of  Religious Freedom 
(2005) and Marci Hamilton’s God vs. the Gavel (2005) show just how contentious 
the picture can be. Meanwhile, there is extensive overlap with the much more 
voluminous literature on religion and politics.
One of  the most productive developments in this fi eld was the deployment 
of  a neoinstitutionalist approach (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Koenig, 2007). 
This refers to a loose set of  assumptions and questions about the capacity 
of  institutions to give cognitive and normative shape to social life. From this 
point of  view, a critical aspect of  relations between religions and states is how, 
over time, they have been molded into distinctive forms that are largely taken 
for granted and resilient. The focus of  this approach is on the ideas, routines, 
values, rules and laws that help to make particular relations between religions 
and states appear to be natural or normal. I shall refer to these phenomena as 
“institutional frameworks.” They simultaneously make certain things possible 
and other things virtually unthinkable. The advantage of  this perspective is 
that it facilitates comparisons of  the institutional frameworks that structure 
relations between religions and states in different countries.
This chapter has three main sections. The fi rst will outline a 
neoinstitutionalist perspective on questions about relations between states 
and religions in France, the United States and the United Kingdom. As 
Minkenberg (2002, 2003), Koenig (2007) and Bader (2007) have shown, 
the pattern of  religion-state relations remains impressively diverse even 
among the member states of  the European Union. Using evidence about 
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the different patterns of  spiritual and religious care that France, the 
United States and the United Kingdom provide for prisoners, I shall show 
that religion-state relations have a major impact on the offi cial recognition 
and resourcing of  religions in prison establishments. The chapter’s second 
section will develop this argument further with specifi c reference to the 
interest that recent British governments have shown in pursuing partnerships 
with faith communities and faith-based organizations at a time of  growing 
religious diversity. Since 1997 in particular, a wide range of  public policies 
have favored investment in not only consultation with faith communities 
but also investment in their capacity to act as partners with the state in the 
design and delivery of  services in relation to education, health, community 
cohesion and welfare. However, the fi nal section of  the chapter will challenge 
the idea that partnerships between the state and the “faith sector” of  British 
society have been unproblematic. It will also argue that claims about a 
resurgence of  religion in the public sphere tend to overlook the effect of  
government strategies for managing ethnic and religious diversity on the 
increased salience accorded to religion in public life.
The thread that runs through all three sections of  the chapter is the 
argument that relations between states and religions are much more complex 
than mere outworkings of  political and theological ideas. Religion-state 
relations are subtle and provisional outcomes of  the shifting interplay between 
many different interests and forces. The growth of  religious and ethnic 
diversity in liberal democracies since the mid-twentieth century has elicited 
policy responses which vary loosely with each country’s evolving framework 
of  religion-state relations. However, these frameworks do not determine the 
outcomes in a mechanical fashion (Bowen, 2007). Discussion of  religion in 
prisons and of  the British government’s strategies for entering into partnerships 
with religions for the sake of  achieving policy objectives will show how varied 
and paradoxical the nexus of  relations between states and religions can be.
Religious Diversity in the Context of  State-Religion Relations
(a) France
In constitutional terms, France is a secular republic, which in principle has 
had no formal links with any religion for more than one hundred years. The 
principle of  laïcité, or republican secularism, governs the public sphere in 
France and is particularly powerful in keeping religious infl uences out of  state 
institutions, especially state schools (Caron, 2007). Indeed, Jonathan Fox’s 
World Survey of  Religion and the State claims that “the French government tends 
to take a slightly negative view of  religion” (2008: 135) and that its position 
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is best categorized as “hostile” to religion. This is certainly the case with 
its heavy-handed “vigilance” against “cultic aberrations” (Beckford, 2004; 
Altglas, 2008). Nevertheless, the republic is constitutionally bound to respect 
its citizens’ freedom of  conscience and religion; Catholic culture remains 
active in the private lives of  large segments of  the population; and the state 
pays for the upkeep of  churches that existed before 1905. The presence of  
about half  a million Jews and 5 million Muslims also helps to ensure that 
religious organizations and activities continue to thrive in the communal and 
voluntary sectors of  French society. At the same time, central bureaucracies 
of  the French state are responsible for registering organizations that choose 
to be categorized as religious in order to benefi t from fi scal advantages. And 
even more surprisingly, there is no separation of  religion and the state in the 
Alsace-Moselle region of  eastern France on the border with Germany or in 
some of  France’s overseas territories. In short, the picture is mixed and even 
contradictory in some respects (Altglas, 2010), but no other state in Western 
Europe does more than France to distance itself  from religion (Bowen, 2007).
The French Republic’s response to religious diversity is distinctive and 
clear. Starting from the constitutional principle that the republic is unitary and 
secular (laïque), questions about religious diversity are virtually unthinkable in 
the state’s institutions. The state in France is more than neutral or evenhanded 
in matters of  religion: its laws and policies come close to excluding religion 
from most of  the public sphere. This means that the state is indifferent to 
the number or variety of  religions that operate in its territory, provided that 
the citizens who participate in these religions do not allow their religious 
commitments to interfere with their supposedly primary identifi cation with 
and loyalty to the republic. In other words, religions are largely confi ned to 
the spheres of  private life and voluntary associations. Citizens are free to give 
expression to religions in their private lives but not in areas of  public life that 
are the preserve of  the state. 
The boundary between religious activities and the republic is monitored 
and policed by two offi cial organizations. On the one hand, the Bureau des 
Cultes is responsible for administering the registration of  religious groups 
that choose to be incorporated under a law of  1901 and for overseeing the 
concordat with various religious communities that are still operative in the 
Alsace-Moselle region and in some overseas territories. On the other hand, 
the Interministerial Mission of  Vigilance and Struggle Against Cultic 
Aberrations (Mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte contre les 
dérives sectaires, or MIVILUDES) answers directly to the prime minister for 
coordinating the republic’s campaign to prevent sectarian or cultic groups 
from taking unfair advantage of  weak and vulnerable members or potential 
recruits. MIVILUDES’s attention has been focused in recent years on 
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allegations of  abuse allegedly perpetrated by unscrupulous groups – under the 
cover of  religion – in relation to the home schooling of  children, alternative 
therapies and vocational training (Altglas, 2010).1 Political support in France 
is extremely strong for the work of  MIVILUDES, which is often portrayed as 
a bulwark against irrationality or transnational conspiracies in the name of  
bogus religions to subvert the republic or simply to make immoral profi ts.
Against this background, agencies of  the French Republic have taken a 
variety of  positions but rarely recognize the existence of  religious or ethnic 
minorities. Questions concerning justice and equality in relation to minorities 
simply do not arise because public policies must be aimed at all citizens, who 
supposedly enjoy equal rights. Very few policies or programs deliberately or 
explicitly target minorities as such, although the growing body of  laws against 
discrimination – mostly in response to directives from the European Union – 
is beginning to change the picture. At the same time, the republic took the 
leading role in establishing regional and national structures that seek to 
coordinate and represent Muslims living in France. But this has much more to 
do with co-opting and integrating Muslims than with acknowledging that they 
might form intermediary bodies with political functions independent of  the 
state. Fears that religious “communalism” will corrode the republic’s integrity 
lie behind the unwillingness to regard the diversity of  religions in France as 
having implications for public policy. Instead, policy is framed in terms of  
concepts such as “young people from troubled neighbourhoods,”2 which 
attempt to naturalize controversial or constitutionally illicit social categories 
by referring to them by geographical location.
When it comes to the treatment of  religious minorities in French prisons, 
the prison service – l’Administration pénitentiaire – follows the pattern of  the 
republic’s other institutions by seeking to avoid giving the impression that it 
offi cially favors any religion. The Criminal Law recognizes the right of  France’s 
62,2523 inmates to practice their religions, but the prison service provides only 
meager resources or opportunities to facilitate this. Very few prison chaplains 
are employed by the state; most are volunteers. The space and time for 
collective worship are hard to fi nd. Chaplains and chaplaincy volunteers are 
 1 See the annual reports of  MIVILUDES and of  its predecessor MILS online at: http://
www.miviludes.gouv.fr/-Rapports-?iddiv=3 (accessed 17 June 2011).
 2 “Les jeunes des quartiers en diffi culté,” in the words of  the “Charte de la laïcité dans 
les services publics et autres avis,” Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, 31 January 2007. 
Online at: http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/074000341/0000.pdf  
(accessed 6 September 2009).
 3 L’Administration pénitentiaire, “Les chiffres clés de l’administration pénitentiaire au 
1er janvier 2009.” Online at: http://www.justice.gouv.fr/index.php?rubrique=10036&
ssrubrique=10041&article=17322  (accessed 10 January 2010).
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not well integrated into the structures of  management or support services. 
Responsibility for the recruitment, training, coordination and professional 
development of  chaplains is left mainly to religious organizations. And, 
despite the fact that Muslims are heavily overrepresented in the French prison 
population, provisions for their spiritual and religious care are rudimentary 
(Beckford, Joly and Khosrokhavar, 2005). For example, requests for halal 
diet often meet with the response that Muslim inmates should either choose 
vegetarian options or buy their own food in the prison shop. In part, this is 
because prison administrators tend to interpret the principle of  laïcité in the 
most restrictive fashion to mean that the republic should not accommodate for 
religious obligations or differences.
(b) USA
The celebrated First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents 
the federal state from showing favor towards any particular religion whilst 
at the same time protecting the right of  its citizens to express their religion 
(Greenawalt, 2006, 2008). The so-called wall of  separation between the state 
and religion is perhaps not as impassable as the fi gure of  speech implies, but 
continuous processes of  litigation have at least averted any signifi cant breaches 
or collapses. Nevertheless, while the level of  state “entanglement” in religion 
is unusually low in comparison with most other countries, Americans display 
exceptionally high levels of  commitment to religious beliefs, activities and 
organizations. In the United States, religious activity looms large in civil society; 
political activity gives ready expression to religious values; and the delivery of  
social welfare is entrusted in large part to religious organizations (Farnsley, 
2007). Not surprisingly, generations of  immigrants have successfully navigated 
their way into American society by participating in religious groups.
The constitution of  the United States may appear to resemble that of  France 
insofar as the federal state is required to show neutrality towards all religions 
and must not prevent its citizens from expressing their religious views. But in 
practice, the two systems of  “separation” produce quite different outcomes. 
The main purpose of  the separation of  religions from the state in France is 
to protect the state against the risk of  religious interference. By contrast, the 
separation in the United States serves primarily to protect religions against 
the risk that the state might try to co-opt or control them. These differences 
stem mainly from the two countries’ contrasting histories in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.
Against the background of  a powerful form of  civil religion and of  the 
prominent display of  religious symbols on banknotes and in prayers in 
Congress – to say nothing of  the carefully staged public demonstrations 
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of  the personal piety of  leading United States politicians – extensive legal 
and campaigning activities prevent individual states and the federal state 
from either backing or blocking any religions in particular. Admittedly, 
the boundary between “entanglement” and “separation” is permanently 
disputed territory in courts of  law, academic forums and the public square, 
but the First Amendment doctrines are rarely called into question. As a 
result, diversity in religion is widely acknowledged as a sign that United 
States citizens really are free to express their religions in private and public 
without fear of  interference from the state. Indeed, advocates of  theoretical 
positions allied to rational choice theory or subjective rationality attribute the 
vitality and diversity of  American religion to the lack of  state interference in 
religion (Finke, 1990; Stark and Finke, 2000). The only signifi cant constraints 
applied by the state to religious freedom arise from concerns phrased in 
terms of  public and national security. It is on these grounds that federal, 
state and local agencies have occasionally tried to stem the activities of  
minority movements such as Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Scientologists 
and the Nation of  Islam.
The United States Bureau of  Prisons (BOP), which is responsible for 
115 federal prisons and other correctional institutions but not for each state’s 
own prison system, is also bound to operate in accordance with a constitution 
that separates religions from the state. But the “free exercise” clause of  the First 
Amendment is also honored in such a way that a wide array of  statutory and 
voluntary provisions are made for the spiritual and religious care of  inmates. 
Roughly 250 chaplains are currently working in the BOP’s Religious Services 
Branch on full-time contracts, serving approximately 204,000 inmates.4 Many 
other chaplains and volunteers are provided by “religious contractors” and local 
religious groups. The principal justifi cation for this apparent entanglement of  
the state with religions is that, since inmates – like other “institutionalized 
persons” – are not able to exercise their right to practice religion by attending 
local places of  study or worship, the state must make suitable provisions on 
their behalf  (Dolan, 2008). But, in order to minimize the risk that the state 
could be accused of  unconstitutional entanglement with religions in prison, 
the provision of  facilities for religion is subject to stringent limits. For example, 
it must be strictly evenhanded between different religions; it must not breach 
security regulations; and “institutional chaplains” must make themselves 
 4 See http://www.bop.gov/about/index.jsp (accessed 11 June 2009). Only 12.5 percent 
of  the 1.6 million inmates held in the United States in 2007 were in the jurisdiction 
of  federal authorities. See also United States Department of  Justice, Office of  Justice 
Programs, Bureau of  Justice Statistics Bulletin: “Prison inmates at mid-year 2007.” 
Online at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf  accessed (11 June 2009).
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available to all prisoners. On the other hand, courts of  law have also imposed 
limits on the power of  prison authorities to deny the claims that prisoners make 
for the free exercise of  their religions (US Commission on Civil Rights, 2008). 
All these issues are subject to more or less continuous processes of  litigation 
that extend up to the United States Supreme Court on occasion (Hammond, 
Machacek and Mazur, 2004; Hamilton, 2005; Sullivan, 2009).5
(c) UK
The Anglican Church remains “established in law” in England, and the 
Presbyterian Church enjoys a similar legal status in Scotland. Although they 
are both “national churches” rather than “state churches,” their entanglement 
with the apparatus of  monarchy, parliament and state is close and complex. 
Publicly funded chaplaincies are central to the operation of  prisons, hospitals 
and military institutions in all four countries of  the United Kingdom: 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In addition, the British state 
has long maintained a “dual system” of  school-level education in which close 
to one quarter of  students are taught in schools owned and/or managed by 
religious – mostly Christian – organizations. Moreover, all state schools are 
required by law to teach religious education and to conduct a daily act of  
collective worship. The state also authorizes the clergy of  certain religious 
communities to solemnize marriages without the need for separate civil 
ceremonies. And broadcasting authorities are required by law not only to 
provide a certain amount of  religious programming but also to regulate 
the form and content of  advertising sponsored by religious organizations. 
Nevertheless, the level of  active participation in public or private religious 
activities in the United Kingdom is among the lowest in Western Europe, 
albeit with wide variations between different faith communities, ethnic 
groups, social classes, regions and generations.
In contrast to France and the United States, the British state is not 
only constitutionally intertwined with two Christian churches but is also 
associated at local, regional and national levels with many other religious 
organizations in fi elds such as social welfare (Beckford et al., 2006; Prochaska, 
2006), education, healthcare, prisons and the armed forces. In the absence 
of  a constitutional separation of  state and religions, British governments 
 5 The framework of  federal law includes the Civil Rights of  Institutionalized Persons 
Act (1980), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (1993, revoked in 1996), and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000). Leading cases include 
Employment Div. v. Smith US 872 (1990); City of  Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507, 532 (1997); 
and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 US 709 (2005).
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have discriminated against some religions and actively cooperated with 
others (Barker, 1987; Beckford, 1993). This uneven pattern is characteristic 
of  other European countries such as Andorra and Liechtenstein that fall 
into Fox’s (2008) category of  “historical or cultural state religion.” Some 
religious organizations can derive tax benefi ts from registration with the 
Charity Commission, while this privilege is denied to others. In addition, a 
category of  “religiously aggravated” offenses has been framed in criminal law 
and discrimination on the grounds of  religion in many spheres of  life now 
breaches civil law. 
Two developments that have occurred since the fi rst New Labour 
government took offi ce in 1997 indicate a new phase in relations between the 
British state and selected religions. The fi rst is the ideological commitment of  
successive governments to the promotion of  the value of  diversity in ethnicity 
and religion. But, following the violence of  11 September 2001 and 7 July 
2005, the emphasis of  government policies has shifted away from diversity 
for its own sake towards the need to ensure that diversity does not undermine 
social cohesion and “British identity” by engendering “parallel lives.” The 
ideological thrust is now towards making diversity in religion and other bases 
of  identity serve the overarching goal of  strengthening “Britishness.”
The second recent development is the policy of  fostering partnerships between 
the state and selected actors in civil society – so-called faith communities in 
particular (Beckford, 2010). In an extension of  Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal 
policy of  “rolling back the state” and privatizing wide swaths of  the public 
service, New Labour governments have sought to “outsource” many public 
functions to private or civil society organizations – but without necessarily 
relaxing the state’s oversight of  how these functions are carried out.6 It is 
particularly in the fi eld of  “urban governance” (Chapman, 2009) that the state 
has sought partners among religious organizations.
The British state’s current response to religious diversity is best characterized 
as a pragmatic adaptation of  the long-standing pattern of  cooperating with the 
Church of  England, other mainstream Christian churches and the Board of  
Deputies of  British Jews in the provision of  educational and welfare services. The 
selection of  religions and services has been widened in recent decades and the basis 
of  cooperation is now partnership, as defi ned by government (Beckford, 2010).
This pattern of  partnership between state and religions is particularly 
evident in the prisons of  England and Wales (Beckford and Gilliat, 1998).7 
 6 Hundreds of  quangos (quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations) have been 
created to monitor and regulate the performance of  its partners or service providers on 
behalf  of  government. Their official designation is “nondepartmental public body.”
 7 Scotland and Northern Ireland operate their own prison services.
52 RELIGION AND THE STATE
Christian chaplains have been an integral part of  these prisons for about 
two hundred years. Indeed, Christian theological ideas lie at the root of  the 
theory and the practice of  regimes such as solitary confi nement. All prisons 
in England and Wales are still required by law to have a Church of  England 
chaplain and such others as are necessary to meet the spiritual and religious 
needs of  inmates. There were about 200 Christian chaplains and 50 Muslim 
chaplains working full-time among the 84,000 inmates in 2010. Part-time and 
voluntary workers in prison chaplaincy numbered about 8,000. Chaplains 
were involved in a wide range of  activities including sentence planning, the 
preparation of  parole reports and participation in prison committees.
The chaplain general of  the Prison Service Chaplaincy is a senior 
Anglican priest. He is assisted by several assistant chaplains general and a 
Muslim adviser to the prison service. In addition, a chaplaincy council and 
a group of  faith advisers representing the major faith traditions in England 
and Wales act as further consultants and advisers. Under pressure from the 
representatives of  minority faiths, prison chaplaincies have responded to 
the growth of  religious diversity in the prison population since the 1980s 
by adopting aspects of  a multifaith ethos and by accommodating many of  
the demands for the offi cial recognition of  religiously based diets, forms 
of  clothing and festivals.
In short, France, the United States and the United Kingdom clearly 
display markedly different frameworks of  relations between the state and 
religions. Each of  these frameworks, in turn, gives rise to a distinctive way of  
framing and responding to religious diversity. Nowhere is the distinctiveness 
of  these processes of  framing religious diversity clearer than in the context of  
prisons. This is where the state really shows its hand when it comes to 
relations with religions.
The second section of  this chapter will now develop these points further 
by examining in detail the highly distinctive confi guration of  religion-state 
relations which has evolved over the long haul in England and Wales. It 
centers on cooperative partnerships between the state and what it identifi es 
as “the faith sector.”
Partnership between the British State 
and Faith Communities
Whereas the French and United States administrations are constitutionally obliged 
to avoid close relations with religions, no such legal provisions have ever deterred 
agencies of  the British state from “close encounters of  the religious kind.” Neither 
the French preoccupation with the evolution of  laïcité in the face of  religious 
diversity nor the American preoccupation with determining how reasonable the 
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state should be in its “reasonable accommodation” of  religious differences fi nds any 
echo in the United Kingdom. Instead, the United Kingdom seems to be heading 
in a completely different direction – towards ever closer forms of  partnership with 
faith communities in its cautious embrace of  diversity. 
The United Kingdom’s membership of  the European Union and the 
compatibility of  its laws with the provisions of  European treaties have 
strengthened notions of  citizenship, rights and equality. Nevertheless, the 
policies of  British governments of  all political complexions in the past few 
decades have continued to frame key issues in terms of  certain collective 
identities alongside notions of  individual rights. Categories of  gender, 
disability “race” and ethnicity have more recently been joined by religion 
as points of  reference in the framing of  public policies designed to promote 
equality and justice (Woodhead with Catto, 2009).8 Tony Blair’s vision for 
Britain in the late 1990s was as a “community of  communities.” Diversity of  
communities was celebrated as a vital force in British society. But following 
the terrorist attacks on the United States, Britain and Spain – as well as 
the violent disturbances that took place in some British cities in 2001 – the 
emphasis has shifted away from the celebration of  diversity for its own sake 
towards a more instrumental strategy of  harnessing diversity as a search for 
social cohesion (Home Offi ce, 2001). This does not amount to a wholesale 
abandonment of  multiculturalism (pace Joppke, 2004, 2009) but is rather 
a pragmatic response to the real and perceived threats from terrorism and 
“communal” tensions in areas of  deprivation. 
Instead of  encouraging unlimited diversity for its own sake, the current 
objective of  government policy is to ensure that “ethnic, religious or cultural 
differences do not defi ne people’s life chances and that people with different 
backgrounds work together to build a shared future” (Home Offi ce, 2004: 4). 
This statement implicitly acknowledges that diversity can be problematic. 
Indeed, a Home Offi ce (2004: 7) consultation document captured the new 
orientation as follows:
Respecting and valuing diversity is an essential part of  building a 
successful, integrated society. But respect for diversity must take place 
within a framework of  rights and responsibilities that are recognised by 
and apply to all – to abide by the law, to reject extremism and intolerance 
and make a positive contribution to UK society. One of  the results of  
this re-orientation of  policy is that applicants for British nationality now 
have to demonstrate their competence in the English language and their 
understanding of  “life in the UK.”
 8 For a critical assessment, see Baumann and Sunier (1995) and Baumann (1999).
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In terms of  government machinery, the Race, Cohesion and Faith Unit of  
the Department for Communities and Local Government takes the lead 
on questions concerning religious diversity. The title of  a research project 
sponsored by this unit indicates just how far the concepts of  ethnicity and 
religion are now confl ated: “Understanding Muslim ethnic communities.”9 
Each of  the reports on these communities emphasizes the need for policy to 
respond to the communities’ internal diversity.
Further attention is focused on ethnic and religious communities by the 
government’s strategy of  fostering partnerships with voluntary and communal 
associations that claim to represent these communities. Three examples 
include: 
The 2005 formation of  the Faith and Voluntary Sector Alliance for the  •
purpose of  making better use of  faith-based organizations in the delivery of  
local government services
The plan to integrate faith-based organizations into the strategies of  the  •
National Offender Management Service for reducing rates of  reoffending 
among youths and adults (NOMS, 2007)
The launch of  the Department for Communities and Local Government’s  •
detailed “framework for partnership in our multi-faith society” (DCLG, 
2008)
The term “partnership” recurs in offi cial documents about these, and other, 
schemes for harnessing the resources of  faith-based organizations to the 
achievement of  government policy objectives.10 I am tempted to categorize 
these schemes as evidence of  a new kind of  state corporatism. This is doubly 
ironic. First, the schemes involve the use of  voluntary resources in pursuit 
of  the state’s objectives. Secondly, they display a high degree of  dirigisme or 
state-centeredness, which is more characteristic of  the secular French Republic 
than of  the supposedly more devolved and pluralistic British regime. Indeed, 
the religious diversity of  the United Kingdom is conveniently packaged 
and smoothed over for government consumption by the United Kingdom 
 9 For reports on 13 “Muslim ethnic diaspora communities in England,” see http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100513032259/http://communities.gov.uk/
publications/communities/summarymuslimcommunity (accessed 24 August 2011).
10 For example, a report on faith schools published in 2007 by the Department for Children, 
Schools and Families highlighted “the very positive contribution which schools with a 
religious character make as valuable, engaged partners in the school system and in their 
local communities and beyond” (1). The report also drew attention to “the new duty on 
all maintained schools to promote community cohesion” (15) that was introduced by 
the Education and Inspections Act in 2006.
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Inter-Faith Network’s practice of  stipulating that there are fi ve major faiths 
and four minor faiths in the country. This reinforces the impression that a 
distinctive “faith sector” exists in the United Kingdom and that it consists 
exclusively of  the participants in the interfaith network. Indeed, government 
relies heavily on the United Kingdom Inter-Faith Network to be the 
gatekeeper of  suitable partners for the state.11 New or controversial religious 
movements are not among its member organizations.
Partnerships between the British state and religious organizations have 
a long history, especially in the fi elds of  education and prisons. But my 
argument is that relations between religions and the state have changed 
signifi cantly since the 1950s for two main reasons. One is the substantial 
growth of  religious diversity. The other is the slow crystallization of  laws 
and administrative procedures designed to promote equality of  opportunity 
and to penalize unjust discrimination on the grounds of  religion. The result 
of  this combination of  factors is that the privileges and priorities previously 
accorded only to mainstream Christian churches have largely given way 
to a marketized set of  relationships between the state as a purchaser and 
religious organizations as suppliers of  various religious goods and services. 
The ground for this development had been prepared in the early 1980s, when 
the Conservative governments of  Mrs Thatcher implemented neoliberal 
policies designed to contract out responsibility for the provision of  many 
state services – especially in the welfare sector – to private, profi t-seeking 
companies and to community and voluntary organizations. For a wide variety 
of  reasons, faith-based organizations took the opportunity to enter the market 
as contractors to the state in an increasingly mixed economy of  statutory and 
nonstatutory service providers. When the fi rst New Labour government came 
to power in 1997, faith-based organizations were particularly well placed 
to compete for contracts to deliver services that were then expected to be 
tailored to the personal needs and circumstances of  service users.
Unlike the United States, however, the British market for religious 
contractors is less than fully open; it is restricted to those suppliers who are 
able to meet the government’s contractual conditions. The state enters into 
contractual relations with religious organizations within a framework of  
equalities legislation. To complicate matters further, the inducements for 
faith-based organizations to enter this market have increased at a time when 
many of  them are struggling to fi nd enough members at the level of  local 
groups to carry out their own internal tasks (Cameron, 2003). As a result, the 
relationship between the state and faith-based organizations is not one of  equal 
11 “At the point at which it recognizes the need to engage with religions, therefore, the 
state can find interfaith mediating bodies very attractive.” (Weller, 2009: 76)
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power. The partnership is heavily one-sided in terms of  the power to specify 
tasks, conditions and rewards.12 But it also offers fi nancial rewards, a degree 
of  prestige and a heightened probability of  being appointed or co-opted to 
offi cial bodies such as Regional Assemblies, Regional Development Agencies 
and Local Strategic Partnerships (Church Urban Fund, 2006; Finneron, 2007). 
Specifi c schemes involving faith-based organizations in partnership with the 
British state include the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, the 
New Deal for Communities, regional Faith Forums, and the Faith Communities 
Capacity Building Fund.
In addition, special bodies have been formed for the purpose of  facilitating 
relations between faith-based organizations and the state. For example, 
the Muslim Contact Unit and the Muslim Safety Forum bring together 
representatives of  the Metropolitan Police Service and Muslims (Spalek, 
El Awa and McDonald, 2009). The Faith and Voluntary and Community 
Sector Alliance, hosted by the Ministry of  Justice, seeks to bring together a 
wide range of  groups working towards the reduction of  crime and recidivism.13 
The Charity Commission recently set up its own Faith and Social Cohesion 
Unit whose “aim is to enhance and advance high standards of  governance and 
accountability among faith-based groups, promote the benefi ts of  registering 
as a charity, and promote the valuable contribution these charities make to 
society.”14 In common with a growing number of  public bodies, the Charity 
Commission also has plans for a Faith Advisory Group. Meanwhile, the Faith 
Communities Consultative Council, chaired by a Minister at the Department 
for Communities and Local Government, has been acting since 2006 as an 
umbrella body for facilitating and monitoring consultation at all levels between 
government and faith communities.
In short, the closing decades of  the twentieth century and the opening 
decade of  the twenty-fi rst century marked a period of  progressively closer 
relations between the British state and the faith communities that comprise 
“the faith sector.” Contrary to the claims that successive British governments 
have tried to exclude religions – especially Christianity – from public life (Trigg, 
2007), faith communities have accepted invitations and inducements to enter 
into partnerships with the state in areas such as education, welfare services, 
12 This is not unique to faith-based organizations but is true for many community and 
voluntary organizations.  See Deakin (2001).
13 See http://noms.justice.gov.uk/about-us/working-with-partners/alliances/faith-
community-volun-alliance/ (accessed 6 May 2009).
14 “Faith in Focus: The Newsletter of  the Faith and Social Cohesion Unit” (London: 
The Charity Commission). Online at: http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Charity_
requirements_guidance/Specialist_guidance/Faith/faithnews2.aspx (accessed 24 
August 2011).
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community cohesion and the prevention of  terrorism. As I shall argue in the 
next section, these developments have strengthened the questionable claim 
that the United Kingdom has experienced a resurgence of  public religion.
Resurgence of  Public Religion?
The fact that recent governments in the United Kingdom have strengthened 
the policy of  entering into partnerships with faith-based organizations has led 
some commentators to employ celebratory – if  not triumphalist – expressions 
such as “the revival of  public religion” or “the return of  religion to the public 
sphere.” Indeed, some have gone so far as to speculate that secularism and 
secularity have been ousted by post-secularism and post-secularity (Beckford, 
2010). A variant interpretation in France is that advanced democracies have 
entered a phase of  “ultra modernity” in which secularism has itself  been 
secularized, thereby creating more space for religion in the public sphere 
(Willaime, 2006). The question for me is whether the evidence supports these 
contentions about the resurgence of  public religion in the United Kingdom.15 
On the one hand, there is no doubt that the British state has implemented many 
policies intended to foster partnerships with faith-based organizations. But, 
on the other, there are three reasons for doubting whether these partnerships 
necessarily refl ect a resurgence of  religion in the public sphere.
First, some religious organizations have readily acknowledged that working 
in partnership with agencies of  the state can be diffi cult. A particularly 
perceptive report by the Church of  England’s Commission on Urban 
Life and Faith (2006: 72) on “Faithful cities” concluded, for example, that 
government policy had not “provided a secure and consistent relationship 
between faith communities and government at all levels. There needs to be 
greater clarity over expectations in partnerships.” Even stronger criticisms of  
the very notion of  partnership emerged from a three-year study of  the results 
of  more than twenty years of  attempts to regenerate inner-city neighborhoods 
in Manchester and to deal effectively with their problems of  poverty (William 
Temple Foundation, 2003). It highlighted the feelings of  “disempowerment” 
expressed most clearly by those with direct responsibility for implementing 
central government policies for regeneration. “The focal point for this sense 
of  disempowerment was the concept of  partnership, but more especially 
the concept of  consultation. Ironically, these are the two cornerstones of  
New Labour’s regeneration policy designed to create empowerment and 
15 I make no comment here about the claims made for the upsurge of  religious organizations 
and activities in many other regions of  the world outside Western Europe. See, for 
example, Jenkins (2002), Juergensmeyer (2006) and Benthall (2008).
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participation” (William Temple Foundation, 2003: 57–8). Moreover, “there 
is growing evidence…that the faith sector is not necessarily willing or able to fulfi l the 
role expected of  it by government rhetoric” (emphasis in original). Indeed, a report 
two years later confi rmed that, against the background of  the “very high 
levels of  contribution made by faith-groups to wider society” (Baker and 
Skinner, 2005: 82), “the hope that there might be a distinctive language that 
churches could bring to the regeneration debate has proved…to be elusive.” 
Consequently, “gaps of  understanding and knowledge between faith and non-
faith-based sectors are wide and levels of  real communication poor” (Baker 
and Skinner, 2005: 86). Strong opposition to the government’s policies on 
partnership with faith-based organizations has also come from the British 
Humanist Association and the National Secular Society.
Second, while the opportunity for religious groups to enter into partnerships 
with the British state has undoubtedly helped to “normalize” relations with 
some relatively excluded communities, it has also aggravated tensions and 
confl icts in other cases. For example, a report by the Conservative think-
tank Policy Exchange (2007: 26) claims that competition for the resources 
that accompany partnerships has “created a fi erce competition” among 
contenders for offi cial recognition. It adds that “the shift at local level from 
secular to religious partners” has inspired some of  the new contenders for 
recognition to “challenge the dominance of  older, secular traditions,” thereby 
further fragmenting the already divided Muslim communities. Research by 
the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (2007) also showed that 
faith-based groups in rural areas felt marginalized by the government’s focus 
on social cohesion in urban areas. They also voiced the concern that groups 
belonging to the Christian majority faith might feel sidelined by the focus on 
minorities. A broader concern is that the state may be unwittingly fermenting 
divisions between faith-based organizations by framing policies in terms of  
generic partnerships with them, without taking full account of  their differences 
at the local level (Farnell and Ramsay, 2007: 15). Fear that the current policy of  
promoting “faith schools” within the state system of  education will reinforce 
already high levels of  segregation between faith communities in some localities 
also feeds into concerns about divisiveness.
Third, research on small faith-based organizations, especially in rural areas, 
has uncovered skepticism about the government’s “instrumentalist approach 
to the involvement of  faith-based organisations” because it allegedly failed 
to take account of  the “faith dimension of  their work” (NCVO, 2007: 20). 
There are echoes of  this view in other studies that have identifi ed a high risk 
of  “mission drift” among faith-based organizations that work in partnership 
with agencies of  the state. Allegations of  the government’s instrumentalism 
are widespread; and there are even suggestions that government is actually 
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suspicious of  faith itself  (Jochum, Pratten and Wilding, 2007: 21). The grounds 
for this suspicion rest on the dual accusations that in many settings faith-
based organizations have been “highly pernicious in their infl uence, siding 
with elites against the interests of  the poor and marginalised, stirring ethnic 
and religious divisions, and maintaining patriarchal social structures which 
oppress women and homosexuals” and that their own structures and cultures 
are rarely democratic (Jochum, Pratten and Wilding, 2007: 26). Indeed, some 
faith-based organizations struggle to conform to the legal requirement that 
services delivered to the public, with state funding, do not unfairly discriminate 
against people on the grounds of  ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender 
or disability.
It is certainly not diffi cult to understand the British government’s reasons 
for using faith-based organizations as partners or deliverers of  services in 
fi elds as diverse as welfare, health and education. The reasons are particularly 
cogent in the case of  services aimed at ethnic minorities and categories of  
such vulnerable people as refugees and asylum seekers, “rough sleepers” 
and released prisoners. Faith-based organizations with their own premises 
offer additional advantages as partners with the state. Their fi nancial and 
human resources as well as their educational and managerial structures 
and social networks are also part of  what many well-established faith-based 
organizations can bring to the partnership. Discourse about symbolic, human 
and social capital is common in this area. However, evidence that the British 
government’s hopes and expectations for partnership have been fulfi lled is not 
plentiful – and certainly not convincing enough to outweigh all the diffi culties 
that faith-based organizations and government departments have experienced 
in trying to work in partnership.
The British state now has substantial machinery for consulting with faith 
communities and for engaging them in a wide range of  schemes to promote 
social cohesion and to reduce inequalities. Is this evidence of  a “resurgence” 
of  faith in the public sphere? In my view, it signifi es the continuing contribution 
of  religious organizations and faith communities to civil society in the United 
Kingdom, not an upsurge or a resurgence. More importantly, the evidence also 
points to the growth of  an instrumental attitude (Farnell, 2009: 185) among 
policymakers to the capacity of  religious organizations to help government to 
achieve its policy objectives in the fi elds of  social cohesion, local governance, 
education and social welfare. In this context, religious organizations and 
faith communities are mainly valued for instrumental reasons – and not 
unreasonably, in view of  the contributions that they make towards day-to-day 
living in many localities. 
The pressure and the inducements to involve religious groups in 
partnerships with the British state have come from its agencies at national 
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and local levels.16 In part, this is because recent governments have followed 
ideological principles of  neoliberal communitarianism, which favor the 
strengthening of  the community and voluntary sectors of  civil society – 
and this includes religious groups. In other respects, the post-2001 focus 
on national security, the “war on terror” and the ethnoreligious tensions in 
certain British cities have also given a strong impetus to policies promoting 
social cohesion and partnerships between “communities” and state. 
Again, faith communities and religious organizations have been targeted 
as potential allies of  government. In short, expediency lies behind many 
of  the offi cial strategies and schemes for consulting and “using” faith or 
religion as a vehicle for the delivery of  government policies. The result is 
undoubtedly a higher public profi le for faith and religion – particularly 
in the sphere of  state-controlled institutions. In this sense, the salience 
of  public religion has increased. But I see no warrant for talking of  an 
independent resurgence or return of  religion elsewhere in British public 
life. Nor is there evidence that religious organizations have succeeded in 
exercising signifi cant infl uence over the shape or direction of  government 
policies. This is not to forget the limited success that religious lobbyists have 
achieved in obtaining exemption from legislation against discrimination in 
recent years (Sandberg and Doe, 2007).
Conclusions
This chapter’s arguments fall into three main parts. The fi rst is that France, the 
United States and the United Kingdom display differences not only between 
their constitutional frameworks for managing relations with religions but also 
between their respective responses to the growth of  religious diversity. These 
three states all subscribe to many of  the same international codes of  human 
rights and religious freedom, but their practical implementation of  the codes 
displays wide variations. This is clear in relation to their respective responses 
to the growing diversity of  religions and in terms of  the kind of  provisions that 
their prison systems make for inmates to practice religions. Admittedly, this is 
an unusual angle from which to approach questions about these relations, but 
it throws into sharp relief  the limits that states impose on the recognition and 
accommodation of  religious diversity.
16 “Thus, in contrast with the 1970s and much of  the 1980s, when many religious 
organisations and groups often felt frozen out from participation in local authority-
driven development, a situation has developed in which religious groups are being 
positively ‘wooed’ to join in partnership as part of  a new approach to the development 
of  local governance.” (Weller, 2009: 71)
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The second part of  my argument is not only that the British state’s response 
to the growth of  religious diversity differs sharply from that of  France and the 
United States, but also that recent British government policies have fostered 
increasingly close partnerships between the state and faith communities. In 
pursuit of  policy goals related to equality, social cohesion and national security, 
agencies of  the state routinely engage with selected religious partners. This 
helps to reinforce the differences between the United Kingdom and countries 
such as France and the United States, which maintain at least a constitutional 
separation between religion and the state.
The British state’s expedient use of  partnerships with faith communities may 
have boosted the impression that a resurgence of  religion was taking place in the 
public sphere and that the country was somehow becoming “post-secular.” But 
the third part of  my argument is that such an impression would be misleading. 
In fact, the heightened salience of  religion in the public sphere owes at least as 
much to government policies and strategies aimed at drawing faith communities 
into partnerships with the British state as to any signifi cant upsurge in religious 
convictions, consciousness or action. This suggests that the distinctive confi guration 
of  religion-state relations in Britain is not merely the backdrop to religious activity: 
it actually helps to shape the activity and its salience in public life.
References 
Altglas, Veronique. 2008. “French cult controversy at the turn of  the new millennium: Escalation, 
dissensions and new forms of  mobilisations across the battlefi  eld.” In Eileen V. Barker (ed), 
The Centrality of  Religion in Social Life: Essays in Honour of  James A. Beckford, 55–68. Aldershot: 
Ashgate.
. 2010. “Laïcité is what laïcité does: Rethinking the French cult controversy.” Current 
Sociology 58.3: 489–510. 
Bader, Veit. 2007. Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of  Religious Diversity. 
Amsterdam: University of  Amsterdam Press.
Baker, Chris and Hannah Skinner. 2005. Year Two. Telling the stories: How churches are contributing 
to social capital. Manchester: William Temple Foundation.
Barker, Eileen V. 1987. “The British right to discriminate.” In Thomas Robbins and Roland 
Robertson (eds), Church-State Relations, 269–80. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
Baumann, Gerd. 1999. The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic, and Religious 
Identities. London: Routledge.
Baumann, Gerd and Thijl Sunier (eds). 1995. Post-Migration Ethnicity: De-Essentializing 
Cohesion, Commitments and Comparison. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Beckford, James A. 1993. “States, governments and the management of  controversial new 
religious movements.” In Eileen V. Barker, James A. Beckford and Karel Dobbelaere 
(eds), Secularization, Rationalism and Sectarianism, 125–43. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
. 2003. Social Theory and Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 2004. “‘Laicité,’ ‘Dystopia,’ and the Reaction to New Religious Movements in 
France.” In James T. Richardson (ed.), Regulating Religion: Cases Studies from around the 
Globe, 27–40. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
62 RELIGION AND THE STATE
. 2010. “The uses of  religion in public institutions: the case of  prisons.” In 
Arie Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds), Exploring the Postsecular: 
The Religious, the Political and the Urban, 381–401. Leiden: Brill. 
Beckford, James A. and Sophie Gilliat. 1998. Religion in Prison: Equal Rites in a Multi-Faith 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beckford, James A., Richard Gale, David Owen, Ceri Peach and Paul Weller. 2006. Review of  
the Evidence Base on Faith Communities. London: Offi ce of  the Deputy Prime Minister. Online 
at: http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/review (accessed 
5 October 2011). 
Beckford, James A., Danièle Joly and Farhad Khosrokhavar. 2005. Muslims in Prison: 
Challenge and Change in Britain and France. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Benthall, Jonathan. 2008. Returning to Religion: Why a Secular Age is Haunted by Faith. London: 
I.B. Tauris.
Berger, Peter L., Grace Davie and Effi e Fokas. 2008. Religious America, Secular Europe? 
Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bowen, John. 2007. “A view from France on the internal complexity of  national models.” 
Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies 33.6: 1003–16.
Cameron, Helen. 2003. “The decline of  the Church in England as a local membership 
organization: Predicting the nature of  civil society in 2050.” In Grace Davie, Paul 
Heelas and Linda Woodhead (eds), Predicting Religion: Christian, Secular and Alternative 
Futures, 109–19. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Caron, Nathalie. 2007. “Laïcité and secular attitudes in France.” In Barry A. Kosmin and 
Ariela Keysar (eds), Secularism and Secularity, 113–24. Hartford, CT: Institute for the 
Study of  Secularism in Society and Culture.
Chapman, Rachael. 2009. “Faith and the voluntary sector in urban governance.” In Adam 
Dinham, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes (eds), Faith in the Public Realm, 203–22. 
Bristol: Policy Press. 
Church Urban Fund. 2006. Faithful Representation: Faith Representatives on Local Public Partnerships. 
London: Church Urban Fund.
Commission on Urban Life and Culture. 2006. Faithful Cities: A Call for Celebration, Vision and 
Justice. London: Church House Publishing and Methodist Publishing House. 
Deakin, Nicolas. 2001. In Search of  Civil Society. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Department for Children, Schools and Families. 2007. Faith in the System: The Role of  Schools 
with a Religious Character in English Education and Society. London: Department for Children, 
Schools and Families.
Department of  Communities and Local Government. 2008. Face to Face and Side by Side: 
A Framework for Partnership in Our Multi Faith Society. London: Department of  Communities 
and Local Government.
Dolan, Mary J. 2008. “Government-sponsored chaplains and crisis: Walking the fi ne line 
in disaster response and daily life.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 35 (Spring): 
505–46.
Farnell, Richard. 2009. “Faiths, government and regeneration: a contested discourse.” 
In Adam Dinham, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes (eds), Faith in the Public Realm, 
183–202. Bristol: Policy Press.
Farnell, Richard and Sally Ramsay. 2007. Faith in Lewisham. Coventry: Coventry 
University.
Farnsley, Arthur E. II. 2007. “Faith-based initiatives.” In James A. Beckford and N. J. 
Demerath (eds), The SAGE Handbook of  the Sociology of  Religion, 345–56 London: SAGE.
 RELIGION IN PRISONS AND IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE STATE 63
Finke, Roger. 1990. “Religious deregulation: Origins and consequences.” Journal of  Church 
and State 32.3: 609–26.
Finneron, Doreen. 2007. “Local governance, representation and faith-based organisations.” 
In Véronique Jochum, Belinda Pratten and Karl Wilding (eds), Faith and Voluntary Action, 
39–42. London: National Council for Voluntary Organizations.
Fitzgerald, Timothy. 2000. The Ideology of  Religious Studies. New York: Oxford University Press.
. 2007. Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical History of  Religion and Related 
Categories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fox, Jonathan. 2008. A World Survey of  Religion and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Greenawalt, Kent. 2006. Religion and the Constitution, Vol. 1: Free Exercise and Fairness. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
. 2008. Religion and the Constitution, Vol. 2: Establishment and Fairness. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Grim, Brian J. and Roger Finke. 2006. “International Religion Indexes: Government 
regulation, government favoritism, and social regulation of  religion.” Interdisciplinary 
Journal of  Research on Religion 2: 1–40.
Hammond, Phillip E., David W. Machacek and Eric M. Mazur. 2004. Religion on Trial: 
How Supreme Court Trends Threaten Freedom of  Conscience in America. Walnut Creek, CA: 
Altamira.
Hamilton, Marci. A. 2005. God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of  Law. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Home Offi ce. 2001. Community Cohesion: A Report of  the Independent Review Team. Under the 
chairmanship of  Ted Cantle. London: Home Offi ce.
. 2004. Strength in Diversity: Towards a Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy. Home 
Offi ce Consultation Paper. London: Home Offi ce Communications Directorate.
Jenkins, Phillip. 2002. The Next Christendom: The Coming of  Global Christianity. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Jochum, Véronique, Belinda Pratten and Karl Wilding. 2007. Faith and Voluntary Action: An 
Overview of  Current Evidence and Debates. London: National Council for Voluntary 
Organizations.
Joppke, Christian. 2004. “The retreat of  multiculturalism in the liberal state: Theory and 
policy.” British Journal of  Sociology 55.2: 237–57.
. 2009. “Limits of  integration policy: Britain and her Muslims.” Journal of  Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 35.3: 453–72.
Juergensmeyer, Mark (ed.) 2006. Religion in Global Civil Society. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Koenig, Matthias. 2007. “Europeanising the governance of  religious diversity: An 
institutionalist account of  Muslim struggles for public recognition.” Journal of  Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 33.6: 911–32.
McCutcheon, Russell T. 2003. The Discipline of  Religion: Structure, Meaning, Rhetoric. London: 
Routledge.
Minkenberg, Michael. 2002. “Religion and public policy. Institutional, cultural, and 
political impact on the shaping of  abortion policies in Western democracies.” 
Comparative Political Studies 35.2: 221–47.
. 2003. “The policy impact of  church-state relations: Family policy and abortion 
in Britain, France, and Germany.” West European Politics 26.1: 195–217.
64 RELIGION AND THE STATE
National Council for Voluntary Organizations. 2007. Faith and Voluntary Action. London: NCVO.
National Offender Management System. 2007. Believing We Can. Promoting the Contribution 
Faith-Based Organisations Can Make to Reducing Adult and Youth Re-offending. London: 
National Offender Management Service. 1–33.
Palmer, Susan J. 2008. “France’s ‘War on Sects’: A Post-9/11 Update.” Nova Religio 11.3: 
104–20. 
Policy Exchange. 2007. Living Apart Together. London: Policy Exchange. 1–99.
Powell, Walter W. and Paul J. DiMaggio. 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis. Chicago: University of  Chicago Press. 
Prochaska, Frank. 2006. Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: The Disinherited Spirit. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robbins, Thomas and Roland Robertson (eds). 1987. Church-State Relations: Tensions and 
Transitions. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
Sandberg, Russell and Norman Doe. 2007. “Religious exemption in discrimination law.” 
Cambridge Law Journal 66.2: 302–12.
Spalek, Basia, Salwa El Awa and Laura Z. McDonald. 2009. Police-Muslim Engagement and 
Partnerships for the Purpose of  Counter-terrorism: An Examination. Birmingham: University of  
Birmingham.
Stark, Rodney and Roger Finke. 2000. Acts of  Faith: Explaining the Human Side of  Religion. 
Berkeley, CA: University of  California Press.
Sullivan, Winnifred Fallers. 2005. The Impossibility of  Religious Freedom. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
. 2009. Prison Religion: Faith-Based Reform and the Constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Trigg, Roger. 2007. Religion in Public Life: Must Faith be Privatized? Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
US Commission on Civil Rights. 2008. Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison. Washington DC: 
United States Commission on Civil Rights.
Weller, Paul. 2009. “How participation changes things: ‘Inter-faith,’ ‘multi-faith’ and a new 
public imaginary.” In Adam Dinham, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes (eds), Faith 
in the Public Realm, 63–81. Bristol: Policy Press.
Willaime, Jean-Paul. 2006. “Religion in ultramodernity.” In James A. Beckford and John 
Walliss (eds), Theorising Religion. Classical and Contemporary Debates, 77–89. Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
William Temple Foundation. 2003. Regenerating Communities: A Theological and Strategic Critique. 
Manchester: William Temple Foundation.
Wood, James E. (ed.) 1985. Religion and the State: Essays in Honour of  Leo Pfeffer. Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press.
Woodhead, Linda with Rebecca Catto. 2009. “Religion or belief ”: Identifying issues and 
priorities. Research Report 48. London, Equality and Human Rights Commission. 
Online at: http://www. equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_fi les/research/research_
report_48__religion_ or_belief.pdf  (accessed 1 June 2010). 
Chapter 3
THE SECULARIZATION THESIS AND 
THE SECULAR STATE: REFLECTIONS 
WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO 
DEBATES IN AUSTRALIA1
Stephen Chavura
Macquarie University, Sydney
Introduction
Contrary to the modernist expectation that religion would recede from the 
public sphere, José Casanova has identifi ed a recent social and cultural shift 
that he calls the “deprivatization of  religion” or the rise of  “public religion.” In 
short, Casanova (1994: 65–6) describes “a process whereby religion abandons 
its assigned place in the private sphere and enters the undifferentiated public 
sphere of  civil society to take part in the ongoing process of  contestation, 
discursive legitimation, and redrawing the boundaries.”2 Refl ecting on similar 
phenomena, Jürgen Habermas (2008: 116) has recently observed that “Viewed 
in terms of  world history, Max Weber’s ‘Occidental Rationalism’ now appears 
to be the actual deviation.” Indeed “religious traditions appear to be sweeping 
away with undiminished strength the thresholds hitherto upheld between 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern societies…” While it would seem queer to say that 
there has been no secularization at all, religion has proven far more resilient 
 1 I wish to thank Eric Jones and Dr Ian Tregenza for reading various manuscripts of  
this chapter and offering valuable advice. The comments of  the anonymous reviewers 
were also challenging and constructive. I also acknowledge valuable conversations with 
Dr Bruce Kaye, Dr John Tate, Dr Greg Melleuish, Dr Steve Mutch, and Emeritus 
Professor Graham Maddox. The argument here does not necessarily represent anyone’s 
views but my own.
 2 See also Hanson (2006), Norris and Inglehart (2004) and Berger (1999).
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and adaptive than classical sociologists imagined. This chapter considers 
how political theorists can apply the lessons of  the secularization debate to 
the problem of  defi ning the secular state. Advocates of  political secularism 
have tended to assume a single model of  the secular state as the state and its 
institutions emptied or exclusive of religion. I show this by offering a case study on 
the debate on religion and politics that has been taking place in Australia since 
the mid-1990s. This view of  the secular as exclusive of religion has provoked 
critiques of  the secular state from both religious conservatives and social 
pluralists, the latter calling for a shift from the secular state to the pluralist 
state. Yet the argument of  this chapter is that this exclusive understanding of  
secularism is only one, and by no means the dominant, historical conception 
of  secularity to be found in European political traditions. Furthermore, I argue 
that the recovery of  the alternative conception of  the secular as a realm merely 
distinct from but not necessarily hostile to or suspicious of  religion is preferable 
to contemporary fundamentalist and pluralist movements to abandon the 
secular paradigm altogether.3 Notions of  the secular state, like the democratic 
state, should be clear enough to protect basic political goods yet open enough 
to allow the unique religious heritage and national character of  each state and 
citizen to express itself  in the public sphere. 
The Secularization Debate
Briefl y, the secularization thesis is the idea that with the progress of  modernity, 
loosely understood to be the rise of  the sovereign state, the progress of  
capitalism, and the advance of  the empirical sciences, religion would lose 
its relevance and eventually disappear in modernized countries. Yet its early 
advocates assumed the theory as a matter of  Enlightenment triumphalism, 
if  not mere prejudice, and the theory started to come under attack as soon 
as defenders started seriously to attempt to vindicate it empirically, exposing 
its weaknesses along with its strengths. Some attack the thesis, saying that 
there was never a golden age of  faith, thus the idea of  desacralization is 
inherently problematic (Stark, 1999; cf. Casanova, 1994: 16–17). Others 
say that secularization has occurred, but the nature of  actual secularization 
 3 The conception of  the secular as a realm exclusive of  religion is best captured by 
the rhetoric of  laïcité from the French Revolution to the present as well as the United 
States Supreme Court reading of  the “Establishment Clause,” post–World War II. 
This is very different from the idea of  the secular that was around Europe before the 
French Revolution and has remained in most European countries and Britain since the 
Revolution, which referred to a realm merely distinct from the religious, in that its aims 
were not identical to the aims of  the church, but saw value in the contribution religion 
could make to citizenship and was not opposed to partnership.
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is equivalent to the deinstitutionalization of  religion (Bouma, 2006: 5). 
Recently, Charles Taylor has argued that the nature of  secularization is 
simply that religion has shifted from the center or from the epistemically 
and socially given to the periphery. Put another way, religious adherence 
is merely one option among many, not even the default option, in modern 
societies (Taylor, 2007: 14).4 There is also the view that secularization has 
not occurred, but rather that the very opposite has occurred: religion has 
not only survived in most modernized countries but has undergone a revival 
in developing countries.5
This debate has largely been confi ned to sociologists, with occasional 
contributions by historians. Political scientists and theorists, on the other 
hand, have been more concerned with the nature of  the secular state. The 
two debates are very different. Sociologists must try to measure the religiosity 
of  a people, which is no easy task, if  it is even possible. Political scientists, 
on the other hand, try to examine how the state actually relates to religion 
as well as how it ought to. Although the sociological and political interests in 
the secular are different, they are not wholly unrelated and political science 
has certainly benefi tted from sociology. For example, we know from analysis 
of  constitutions and social behavior that a vigorous and healthy democracy 
is not incompatible with a religious populace or with a state that establishes a 
religion (Monsma and Soper, 1996; Fox, 2008). Very religious societies, such 
as the United States, can maintain their democracy over a long period of  
time and states with established religions such as England still have healthy 
multicultural democracies. Thus, the idea that religion and democracy are 
incompatible faces serious challenges from sociological analysis, or at the 
very least, sociology forces the claim to clarify itself  in the face of  obvious 
counterexamples. Another way that recent sociological analysis helps clarify 
the idea of  the secular state is in its potential in discouraging categorical 
assertions on exactly what the secular state is, as though the secular state 
is any less fl exible and ambiguous in its nature than the democratic state. 
One of  the great contributions of  recent analysis of  the manner in which 
states relate to religion is our awareness that individual states – especially 
liberal democratic states – have their own unique way of  relating to religion 
(Monsma and Soper, 1996; Fox, 2008: 136–9). Thus, any model of  the 
secular state is not likely perfectly to fi t all secular states. This should lead 
to modesty among political theorists so as not dogmatically to set out the 
 4 For an overview of  secularization theory from the nineteenth century to the present see 
McLeod (2000: 1–12).
 5 Casanova (1994), Huntington (1996), Berger (1999), Jenkins (2002, 2006, 2007), 
Hanson (2006), Fox (2008).
68 RELIGION AND THE STATE
minutiae of  the secular state without considering the plurality of  secular 
models now existing.
“Saeculum” in European History 
Notwithstanding the numerous uses of  “secular” throughout European history, 
Casanova is right to say that the very existence of  a secular realm involved 
dualistic conceptions of  reality. In fact, there was a double dualism: dualism 
“between” and dualism “within.” There was a dualism between this world 
(saeculum) and the other world, and a dualism within this world between secular 
institutions and religious institutions (Casanova, 1994: 15). J. G. A. Pocock 
has pointed out that saeculum, meaning, “age” or, in Christian terms, this age, as 
opposed to the nunc-stans, or God’s standpoint from eternity, carried implications 
of  temporality and fi nitude; thus the saeculum was in some respects “nonsacred 
because noneternal” (Pocock, 2003: 8). In the Bible there are several polarities 
that roughly equate to the sacred and secular distinction: the Israelites as 
God’s children as opposed to the nations; kingdoms of  exile as opposed to 
the Promised Land; those who walk in the light and those who walk in the 
darkness; this world and its things which are perishing and the eternal world 
to come. St Augustine divided people into citizens of  the civitas terrena and the 
civitas Dei. Those of  the former fi x their eyes on the things of  this world to 
satiate their earthly desires as ends in themselves, whereas those in the latter 
fi x their hope on God, considering all carnal things as merely a means to
 being able eternally to enjoy him.6 The dichotomy between two realms carried 
into the medieval tradition yet became hierarchical in subordinating secular 
politics and institutions to the church within this saeculum. Thus Pope Gelasius 
I in 494 AD drew a distinction between the auctoritas of  the priesthood and 
the potestas of  political government. Because of  the sacred nature of  autoritas, 
Gelasius could admonish Emperor Anastasius to “piously bow the neck to those 
who have charge of  divine affairs…” (Tierney, 1964: 13). In the thirteenth 
century, Aquinas (1988: 69) wrote that “The secular power is subject to the 
spiritual power as the body is subject to the soul.” The saeculum was distinct 
from the transcendent, but the two interacted, albeit on hierarchical terms. 
With the Protestant Reformation of  the sixteenth century, the distinction 
between the two realms was kept but different varieties of  Protestantism 
offered different models of  subordination. Because the clear subordination of  
the state to the church was removed, most Protestant models involved a fragile 
balance between the two institutions. Luther spoke of  the “Two Swords” 
 6 See, for example his City of  God against the Pagans, written from 417–426/7AD: I.1, I.25, 
X.3, XI.25, XIV.28, XIX.17.
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needed in this age: the spiritual sword of  the gospel to provide a means for 
salvation and the carnal sword of  the state and its legitimate use of  violence to 
preserve justice and peace (Luther, 1991). The state was no longer subordinate to 
the church but remained subordinate to the word of  God, obliging the magistrate 
to receive counsel from able preachers and theologians. With the Anabaptist 
radicals the saeculum was considered evil and its institutions of  little concern to the 
holy. The Schleitheim Articles of  1527 sought a total withdrawal from the saeculum, 
limiting its legitimate authority to the unregenerate children of  darkness. For 
the Anabaptists, there was to be no relationship or interaction at all between 
the sacred and the secular (Baylor, 1991: 175–8). The second generation of  
reformers based in Switzerland would offer separate models still. John Calvin 
presided over a system in Geneva where the church had full autonomy from 
the state whereas the Zurich theology of  Heinrich Bullinger and Peter Martyr 
Vermingli would encourage rulers to take charge of  the church and see that it 
was properly reformed. The Zurich theologians were deeply involved with the 
progress of  religious reform in England during the reign of  Edward VI (1547–53) 
and the early reign of  Elizabeth I (1558–1603), teaching both monarchs that 
part of  their offi ce was the cura religionis, or care for religion (Kirby, 2007). The 
English model that emerged from Henry VIII’s dispute with Rome, except for 
a brief  hiatus during the Catholic reign of  Mary I (1553–58), was of  the Royal 
Supremacy over both temporal and spiritual realms. The distinction between 
the secular and the sacred remained, but authority over institutions representing 
both realms was with the prince. This model had different results in different 
countries. In England, it led to an intense interest in the Church of  England, 
resulting in royally prescribed sermons, liturgies, dress and legitimate topics of  
theological discussion. The distinction between secular and religious institutions 
found its expression in all important European thinkers. Even a materialist 
theorist like Thomas Hobbes, who denied any transcendent interpretation of  an 
age to come, interpreting the Kingdom of  God as “a Civil Common-wealth…
wherein he [God] reigneth by his Vicar, or Lieutenant…” distinguished between 
the “secular” and “ecclesiastical.” For Hobbes, the distinction was between laws 
and institutions aiming at civil peace and those aimed at salvation.7 
In this tradition, things pertaining to the secular are not things pertaining 
to the sacred, yet the former did not exclude the latter from its sphere. For, 
despite the fact that politics was considered a sphere very distinct from the 
sacred, both Catholic and Protestant theology pressed the public religious 
duties of  the ruler for the cura religionis. Indeed, rulers obliged, seeing religion 
as essential to the general good and their own legitimacy. Although the sacred 
 7 For the quote see Hobbes (1991: 311); for Hobbes’ use of  “secular” see page 388 of  the 
same volume.
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and secular were distinguished, they were not divorced, though their marriage 
was not always smooth. Just as the epistemological categories of  faith and 
reason met and often overlapped in scholastic learning, so did state and church, 
the former still remaining secular.
It was only with the French Revolution and the thought of  the philosophes 
that the secular took an antireligious meaning. France did not go through a 
Protestant Reformation and thus the French experience of  religion was still 
of  an ancient, hierarchical, intolerant Catholic Church against which the 
philosophes and the Revolution defi ned themselves. The church tended to be 
seen as a rival to the new regime, either to be extinguished or functionalized 
into an apparatus of  the state. The program of  European secularization 
as conceived by theorists and administrators of  the Revolution was never 
permanently realized, yet its rhetoric of  “the absolute secularization of  the 
political” has remained with the modern French tradition of  laïcité as defended 
by French intellectuals and politicians (Fehér, 1990: 193–4; Bowen, 2007: 6–21). 
It was with the Revolution that the European tradition of  the secular as 
merely distinct from the religious seems to have been confronted with the very 
different notion of  the secular as exclusive of the religious. Although France’s 
secular tradition has never been a consistent nor a coherent one in practice, its 
narrators often describe it as a coherent tradition progressing over 200 years 
towards “the removal of  religion from the public sphere” (Bowen, 2007: 6). 
French secularism was very different to the secularization of  institutions in 
Germany and England during the second half  of  the nineteenth century, which 
was more a case of  removing privileges, disadvantages and inequalities rather 
than religion per se in public institutions and schools. Indeed, many public 
institutions in both Germany and England, though no longer committed to 
the social domination of  their national churches, remained strongly religious 
and yet secular in that they were not constitutionally bound to protect the 
exclusive hegemony of  the national religion in educational and political 
institutions (McLeod, 2000: 52–80).
The French tradition of  secularism seems to resonate in the post–World 
War II United States Supreme Court tradition of  interpreting the First 
Amendment “Establishment Clause.” In Everson v. Board of  Education (1947) 
the Establishment Clause was fi rst interpreted along the lines of  separation 
of  church and state, which itself  was interpreted as disallowing the state from 
offering any support or endorsement of  religion.8 This interpretation led 
to the banning of  school prayers with Engel v. Vitale (1962), the banning of  
devotional readings of  the Bible in class with Abington v. Schempp (1963), as well 
 8 On church-state issues in American jurisprudence see Eastland (1995), Patrick and 
Long (1999), Greenawalt (2006) and Davis (2010). 
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as the banning of  religious displays in schools with Stone v. Graham (1980). The 
1971 “Lemon Test,”9 which was supposed to function as the guideline for all 
legal decisions regarding the state and religion, had three criteria: 
1. The government’s action must have a secular legislative purpose.
2. The government’s action must not have the primary effect of  either 
advancing or inhibiting religion.
3. The government’s action must not result in “an excessive government 
entanglement” with religion.
The second criterion in the Lemon Test resulted in Judeo-Christian displays 
in public institutions being withdrawn owing to the commitment to religious 
neutrality.10 Despite the fact that the Lemon Test has in recent years been 
much relaxed in United States jurisprudence,11 its wider effect seems to be 
an impression in the minds of  secularists that secularism is a process of  
dereligionization. This understanding of  state secularism was later defended 
in the political philosophy of  John Rawls (1993) with emphasis in his later 
career on Public Reason as a monological discourse stripped of  appeal to 
comprehensive doctrines, including religion. If  the public realm is a realm 
fi lled only with Public Reason, then the public has no room for religion. 
Thus the secular has become redefi ned as a realm where religion can have 
no presence. This conception of  the secular as a realm exclusive of religion is 
strikingly different from the older European tradition, surviving in some states 
like England and Australia, of  the secular as a realm merely distinct from yet at 
the same time open to religion. The former cannot allow religion any infl uence 
 9 Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971).
10 In Torcaso v. Watkins (1961) Secular Humanism was recognized as a religion by the 
Supreme Court.
11 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relaxation of  the “Lemon Test” 
in United States constitutional law. Notwithstanding this, even though over the last 
20 years the funding received by religious institutions from the state has increased in 
range and amount, the Supreme Court has not deviated in principle from the fi rst 
rule of  the Lemon Test, that funding cannot have a religious purpose, interpreted as 
funding not going directly to a religious cause. Thus, state funding has found its way 
into the hands of  religious schools, but indirectly via grants for blind people to spend on 
higher education (in this case, theological) (Witters v. Washington Department of  Services for 
the Blind (1986)), confessional school students entitled to state-funded disability services 
(Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993)) and underprivileged children to spend 
on the private education of  their choice Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002). Most recently 
the Supreme Court has allowed school vouchers to be used at religious schools. See 
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn and Arizona Department of  Revenue v. 
Winn (2011).
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or presence within its realm, whereas the latter is open to the presence of  
religion so long as the ends of  the realm itself  remain secular and free from 
religious domination.
The Secular State
One of  the great contributions of  recent studies in religion and the state is 
to have shown the pluralist nature of  global state secularism, that is, religion 
and government have different relationships from state to state, even in 
so-called secular liberal democracies (Fox, 2008; Monsma and Soper, 1996). 
Despite this scholarship, much of  the contemporary debate on the secular 
state in politics still tends to be guided by the misconception that there is 
some single, clear and properly liberal democratic model of  the secular state 
that all too often is being subverted in the present political sphere. This 
form of  secularism tends to be of  the exclusive kind of  a realm emptied of  
or devoid of  religion. Thus secular lobbyists in Europe, the United States 
and Australia tend to lobby for the abolition of  policy and practices such as 
state aid to religious schools, religious education in state schools, exemptions 
from discrimination laws for religious institutions, tax exemptions for 
religious organizations, state-funded religious welfare services, the presence 
of  religious rites and symbols in state institutions, religious voices in public 
debate and clerics holding state offi ces as though such policy fl ows perforce 
from the mere notion of  the secular. 
The controversy over the secular state springs from the very nature of  the 
state itself. The normative nature of  much political analysis is rooted in the 
very nature of  the state as an institution which refers beyond itself  to another 
realm (the nation) upon which it seeks to impose some order according to 
certain ideals that defi ne the particular state. Let us take the classic defi nition 
of  the state found in Max Weber’s famous 1919 address, “The Profession 
and Vocation of  Politics,” which defi nes the state as “that human community 
which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of  legitimate physical violence within 
a certain territory…” (Weber, 1994: 310–11). Now, Weber admits that the 
monopoly of  legitimate violence is not the only way the state realizes its aims. 
Yet in every type of  state, whether it is democratic, socialist, liberal or, as is 
most common, a cluster of  these ideologies, the ideals that characterize the 
state are closely related to the coercive activity of  the state; that is, the rights 
and duties that give form to the welfare state, democratic state or the liberal 
state are maintained to a signifi cant extent by coercion. There are penalties 
for those who do not pay tax in any state, and the welfare state depends on 
this. Also, there are penalties for those who seek to undermine the democratic 
process through deliberately misinforming the public, misleading parliament, 
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or, in Australia, not voting. The same goes for the liberal state, whose individual 
rights are partially maintained through punishing those who fail their duties 
towards the rights-holders.
It is important to keep the nature of  the state in mind when contemplating 
the secular state for, given the coercive nature of  the state, in some way 
secularism will be enforced. Somehow, under a secular state, individuals 
(whether in the sphere of  government or citizens in general) are forced with 
the threat of  deprivation of  liberty to be secular. How does secularism relate 
to the state in this instance? Who is it enforced upon? Of  course the answers 
to these questions vary from state to state. Take three examples of  states which 
are either explicitly secular (Turkey), or at least generally considered to be so 
(United States and Australia). In Turkey, for example, there is a feeling among 
the cogoverning military elite that the secularization process begun by Atatürk 
after World War I is in perennial jeopardy owing to popular Islam, hence 
every measure to manage and control religion by enforcing the secular ideals 
of  Kemalism both on the political party system and on the citizens is pursued 
when possible. Thus, Article 24 of  the Turkish constitution bans the basing of  
“the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of  the state on 
religious tenets,” while Article 136 establishes the Department of  Religious 
Affairs, which operates according to “the principles of  secularism.” Mosques 
outside of  state-designated areas are illegal, many clerics are chosen and 
appointed by the state, traditional Muslim female headcoverings are banned 
in the civil service and in universities and there has recently been signifi cant 
tension between the secularist military and the Erdoğan government, 
commonly perceived by military elites as overly sympathetic towards Islam 
(Fox, 2008: 246–7; Fuller, 2008: 51–6, 70). In Turkey, the secularism of  the 
state regulates political parties, politicians and state institutions as much as it 
does the religious lives of  the citizens. 
In the United States, however, the situation is quite different, with secularism 
mainly restricted to civil institutions like the courts and schools. The Supreme 
Court defi nes separation of  church and state as the state neither helping nor 
hindering the program of  religion, that is, total indifference. At the same time, 
politicians are not discouraged from openly voting according to religious views 
and religious garb may be freely displayed. Yet religious symbols are often 
banned from schools and courthouses and although private prayer is allowed 
in schools, teachers are not allowed to organize or encourage it. Ironically, 
the United States has a strong rhetoric of  exclusive secularism and separation 
of  church and state but also an equally strong tradition of  civil religion with 
religious oaths, iconography and rhetoric infusing all levels of  politics. Thus, 
United States state secularism is imposed mainly on juristic and educational 
institutions, but hardly at all at the governmental and popular level. 
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In Australia, the situation is different still. Section 116 of  the constitution 
guarantees that there will be no established religion, that people can worship 
freely and that there will be no religious tests to enter the public service. The 
state fi nances religious schools and pays chaplains to enter schools to provide 
religious counsel. Prayers are recited at federal and state parliaments daily, 
the preamble to the constitution reads “humbly relying on the blessing of  
Almighty God,” and the Christian Democratic Party currently has two MPs 
in the New South Wales Legislative Council (Frame, 2006; Monsma and 
Soper, 1997: 87–119). There are no laws against religious displays or prayers 
in public schools, though these are not common except in holiday seasons, and 
religious chaplains are funded by the state. Australian secularism guarantees 
that the federal government will not coerce citizens to adhere to a particular 
religion, while at the same time funding all sorts of  religious enterprises at 
the federal, state and local levels of  government. Thus, we see that there are 
varieties of  state secularism that range from hostile management and control 
to liberal indifference and support. Indeed, the meaning of  the secular state 
varies from country to country and is more determined by national character 
and history than by abstract notions of  the secular (cf. Randell-Moon, 2009: 
327). However, as will be shown, the exclusive secularism of  laïcité as well as 
the United States Supreme Court tradition of  secularism and its philosophical 
defense by John Rawls has started to inform national debates on the relation 
between religion and the state outside those countries that practice it.12 This 
secularism is an abstract notion of  a realm devoid of  the religious which 
overrides any traditional place religion may have in society and the state. 
Although United States and French secularist rhetoric is being used in both 
Western and Islamic contexts, I will focus on the Western case, simply because 
the issues involved in bringing secularism to Islamic nations are so different 
from those of  the secular state in the West that they require a whole study 
in themselves. To mention a single example, to many postcolonial Muslim 
theocrats anything short of  a Shari’a state is a secular (godless) state. Thus, 
the state, no matter how accommodating to Islam in its policy and ceremony, 
remains thoroughly secular if  it is not a Shari’a state. This narrow defi nition 
of  the secular state as the non-Shari’a state is very different from Western 
defi nitions, making a discussion of  the secular state in both Western and Islamic 
contexts too large for this particular essay. Australia may be a helpful case 
study to evaluate the transplantation of  French and United States secularist 
rhetoric because it is typical both in its liberal democratic institutions and in its 
mildly religious population. It closely resembles European states in its political 
12 Indeed, Rawls himself  saw the Supreme Court as the “exemplar of  public reason” 
(1993: 231–40).
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institutions and broadly in its religious demographic. It also closely resembles 
the culture of  predominantly Anglophone liberal democracies like England, the 
United States, Canada and New Zealand, the latter three all sharing a British 
heritage as well as being multicultural societies with a bias towards Christianity 
of  the Catholic and Protestant varieties.13
The Australian Debate on the Secular State
Australia is commonly identifi ed by political scientists as possessing a secular 
state. But increasingly, this notion of  the secular state is being interpreted 
along the lines of  exclusive secularism espoused by the rhetoric of  laïcité 
and the United States Supreme Court. For example, in a recent symposium 
over the meaning and validity of  the concept of  the “Australian Settlement” 
Geoffrey Stokes recommended the addition of  “state secularism” to the terms 
and conditions of  the Australian Federation (Stokes, 2004). Stokes (11) defi nes 
“state secularism” as “a rejection of  religion or religious considerations in public 
affairs” and refers to “the constitutional reference to secularism” in s.116:
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any 
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the 
free exercise of  any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a 
qualifi cation for any offi ce or public trust under the Commonwealth.
The problem with Stokes’ interpretation of  s.116 is that the section does 
not support his notion of  exclusive state secularism; it says nothing about 
“a rejection of  religion or religious considerations in public affairs.” The 
most that can be said is that it prohibits consideration of  a citizen’s religious 
convictions as a qualifi cation for holding public offi ce. But this hardly entails a 
secularism prohibiting public policy informed by religious ideas or, to use the 
terminology of  John Rawls, “comprehensive doctrine” that is often read into 
the constitution (Rawls, 1993). Yet the Rawlsian position that the public sphere 
must be emptied of  all discourse other than Public Reason (by its very nature 
nonreligious) has become almost an assumed truth by many commentators 
of  religion and the state in Australia. Most recently, Anna Crabb documents 
the incline of  Christian discourse in no less than 2,422 speeches delivered 
by federal politicians from 2000–06. Her research shows that after 2001, the 
invocation of  Christian concepts and vocabulary spiked and reached a level 
13 Political sociologists often place Australia within the broad category of  liberal 
democracies such as states in Europe and the United States. See Huntington (1996) 
and Fox (2008).
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not seen since the sectarian debates of  the 1950s in Labor Party politics (Crabb, 
2009). Crabb goes on to say that such discourse “weakened adherence to 
Rawls’ liberal consensus (exclusion of  religious beliefs from the public forum) 
and normalized the use of  Christian terminology and ideas in Australian 
political discourse” (2009: 261). One could be forgiven for concluding after 
reading much of  the literature on religion and politics in Australia that part 
of  the Australian political settlement of  the early twentieth century involved 
adherence to late twentieth-century Rawlsian liberalism!
In her recent study Marion Maddox (2005) preserves much of  the debate 
during the Howard years on the nature of  the state’s relationship with religion. 
Her aim is to document “Howard’s assault on assumed separations…” (315, my 
italics). She lists some of  the following (311): 
1. Promoting the discrediting of  indigenous religion
2. Restricting the church’s ability to critique
3. Funding church agencies (faith-based social services)
4. Promoting conservative Christian schools
It is hard to deduce a single meaning for separationism from these examples 
of  its “assumed” violations. Elsewhere throughout the book, Marion Maddox 
cites other examples of  church-state boundary blurring. For example, Western 
Australia governor-general Michael Jeffrey’s frequent proclamations of  Jesus 
as “the greatest example of  leadership who ever lived” (M. Maddox, 2005: 
311) and parliamentary members’ private religious beliefs informing their 
policy are both cited as bringing church and state closer together (314). Marion 
Maddox’s analysis rightly judges any government attempt to silence religious 
critique as domination, but why is secularism or separationism violated with 
the funding of  conservative Christian schools or public servants espousing or 
following their religious beliefs in offi ce? Historically in Australia it has not 
been unusual for politicians to be informed by their religious convictions. 
Furthermore, the High Court has decided that there is no violation of  s.116 
of  the Australian constitution in publicly funded religious schools.14
An awareness of  the nonexclusive possibilities of  the secular is not lost 
on all commentators in the Australian debate, but it is often abandoned for 
an exclusivist agenda when the discussion turns towards policy critique and 
14 The notion that state funding of  religious schools is a violation of  s.116 of  the Australian 
constitution, which promises that there will be no law regarding the establishing of  any 
religion, was legally put to rest in the High Court of  Australia with the 1981 Defence of  
Government Schools (DOGS) case, where “establishment” was taken to mean setting 
up a state religion rather than merely supporting religion (Frame, 2006: 54–7).
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construction. Amanda Lohrey (2006: 42–3) states that “To be secular is not 
to be anti-religion, but to be anti-theocracy. Secular doesn’t mean without; it 
doesn’t mean empty. On the contrary, in the context of  liberal democracy it 
means multiple and diverse or, to pursue the special metaphor, ‘full.’” Then, 
following a discussion of  s.116, Lohrey offers a defi nition of  separationism in 
Australia: “…freedom of  religious observance and nondiscrimination on the 
basis of  religious faith” (42). This looks pretty faithful to the constitution. Yet 
when Lohrey goes on to identify several examples of  alleged “blurring” of  the 
boundaries between church and state, none of  them seem clearly to fl ow from 
her nonexclusivist discussion of  secularism or her defi nition of  separationism 
as religious freedom. Examples of  blurring the boundaries are:
Clerical calls to consider Christianity as a worthy candidate to fi ll the cultural  •
void created by secular, liberal democracy (36, 40)
Commending the life and teachings of  Jesus in the national values  •
debate (37)
The Christian Right’s attempt to court and cultivate a Christian constituency  •
amongst voters (39)
State funding of  religious schools (63) •
It is not clear how any of  these are violations of  Lohrey’s principle of  Australian 
secularism and hence “blurrings” of  the separation of  church and state. What 
they refl ect, however, is an exclusive secularism very reminiscent of  French 
laicist and United States secularist rhetoric that endeavors to remove religion 
from the public by ensuring that it does not inform public values via schools, 
infl uence the outcome of  democratic culture or receive public funding.
What seems to be happening in much of  the debate is that United States-
style Supreme Court secularism and the rhetoric of  laïcité is being seen as 
an exemplar against which Australia compares poorly. For example, former 
Australian Democrat senator Lyn Allison on numerous occasions accused 
the former Howard government of  breaching the separation of  church and 
state. Ultimately she defi nes closely along Rawlsian lines: “…self-identifi ed 
Christians should not make religiously motivated decisions for those who do 
not share their beliefs.”15 This is not an uncommon view amongst Australian 
politicians (M. Maddox, 2005: 62). For secularists like Allison, the whole political 
realm and its institutions must become completely emptied and divorced from 
15 See Lyn Allison, “The Role of  Religion in Australian Politics – Senator Allison Speaks 
to the Peaceful Pill Conference for Exist International” (5 November 2005). Online 
at: http://www.democrats.org.au/speeches/index.htm?speech_id=1731 (accessed 
20 June 2008).
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religion to be properly secular. In a senate speech on the separation of  church 
and state Allison listed three perceived violations:
Religious references in oaths and pledges •
Prayer before parliamentary sessions •
Advantages and exceptions for religious institutions • 16
Actually, none of  these need necessarily be religiously motivated. One could 
imagine approving of, say, prayers in parliament or religious oaths on the grounds 
that such ceremony accords with tradition or with the religious sentiments of  the 
majority of  Australians. In fact, there are documented examples of  such approval 
by atheists.17 Certainly advantages and exceptions to religious institutions require 
no religious justifi cation at all. Other instances of  Allison identifying church-state 
“entanglement” are the presence of  Catholics in the coalition, parliamentary prayer 
networks, the Lyons Forum, faith-based social services and individual politicians 
making policy informed by their religious convictions.18 The most profound 
problem with the debate on church and state in Australia is the obliviousness 
shown by many commentators to the plural, ambiguous and contested nature 
of  state secularism exercised by Western liberal democracies, which sustains the 
common but mistaken belief  that the secular state is the state that resembles France 
or the United States – the two most famous “showcase” secular states. This has led 
to two unhelpful tendencies in the Australian debate:
1.  Terms like “religion” and “establishment” are understood in light of  French 
laicist rhetoric or the post–World War II United States secularist tradition 
rather than according to a distinct Australian tradition which borrows both 
16 See Lyn Allison, “Separation of  Church and State: Speech Delivered to Parliament 
House, Canberra on 1 March 2006.” Online at: http://www.democrats.org.au/
motions/?id=11 (accessed 20 June 2008).
17 For example, at the 1998 Constitutional Convention, Pat O’Shane, who described herself  
as “probably the most committed atheist in the chamber” was happy to have the reference 
to Almighty God retained in the preamble because, she said, “I happen to respect the 
spiritual and religious beliefs of  my fellow Australians” (M. Maddox 2001a: 55). My point 
here is not to suggest that prayer for most people does not have a religious motivation but to 
show the limits of  religious motivation as a test for keeping religion out of  politics. Someone 
could be politically or practically motivated to have prayers in parliament. Alternatively, 
someone could be religiously motivated to keep religion out of  parliament. Motivation is 
itself  diffi cult to discern and it cannot be predicted that secular politics will fl ow from a 
secular motive or that a religious motive will result in distinctively religious politics.
18 See Lyn Allison, “Separating Church and State Conference 2006: Does God have 
a place in government?” Online at: http://www.democrats.org.au/speeches/index.
htm?speech_id=1861(accessed 20 June 2008).
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an appreciation for supporting religion as a social good from its British 
heritage and also a hostility to religious domination from the United States. 
Consequently, aspects of  Australian political culture that seem to run afoul 
of  the rhetoric and policy of  French laicism or many Supreme Court 
rulings are interpreted as violating secularism or the separation of  church 
and state.
2.  Analysts see that French and United States secularist rhetoric and 
policy is absent in Australia’s judicial and political history, concluding 
that there is no separationism in Australia or that Australia does not 
have a secular state.
On this second point, there are those who conclude that Australia has no 
separation of  church and state, at least nothing clearly defi ned and enshrined 
in the Commonwealth Constitution. Lyn Allison speaks of  the “absence 
of  formal separation of  church and state” in Australia.19 An Australian 
Democrats Discussion Paper released in October 2006 made the claim 
that “there is in fact no clearly articulated separation of  church and state in 
our Constitution.”20 Professor Graham Maddox writes similarly, “Australia 
has neither an established church nor a strongly entrenched constitutional 
separation of  church and state” (G. Maddox, 2007: 511). To return to 
Marion Maddox’s work, at no point does she say that certain events actually 
violate a legal separation of  church and state in Australia. Her more subtle 
claim is merely that certain “assumed separations” have been assaulted.21 
The conception of  secular as a place from which religion is excluded seems 
to inform contemporary activists of  secular politics. Steve Mutch (2010: 12–13) 
sums up the program of  political secularist organizations such as the Australia 
New Zealand Secular Association, the Republican Party of  Australia and the 
Secular Party of  Australia:
There are many…areas of  state regulation and funding that are central 
to any discussion of  a normative version of  separation. These include: 
offi cial recognition of  religious rituals, such as marriage celebration; 
religious inclusion on state occasions, such as parliamentary prayers or 
19 Allison, “The Role of  Religion in Australian Politics.”
20 See Separation of  Church and State: Politics, Religion, Policy and Law in Australia, Australian 
Democrats Discussion Paper, October 2006. Online at: http://www.democrats.org.au/
docs/2006/DiscussionPaper_SeparationChurchState_Oct2006.pdf  (accessed 17 June 
2011).
21 For an excellent and recent discussion on whether Australia has a separation of  church 
and state see M. Maddox (2009: 349–54).
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offi cial commemorations involving clergy; religious classes or displays of  
religious allegiance in state schools; religious displays in state buildings; the 
provision of  state services by religious organizations; religious vilifi cation 
laws; religious exemptions from employment, antidiscrimination, 
charitable collection or conscription laws; payments and access provided 
to clergy in offi cial capacities as prison or military or school chaplains; 
rating exemptions; and tax-deductible donations for church building 
funds, inter alia.
Mutch then lists other issues of  interest for “strict secularists” including 
banning ordained clergy in state offi ces and banning religious political parties. 
Mutch notes that these latter two regulations are the norm in Turkey, though 
precisely why Australia should be striving to imitate Turkish national politics is 
a question strict political secularists still need to address. Indeed, if  my analysis 
is correct and the idea of  the secular has various historical meanings and its 
political manifestation is different from state to state, than “the task of  achieving 
a generally accepted model” (Mutch, 2010: 17) is probably impossible and 
without clear justifi cation. 
Marion Maddox (2001b, 8; cf. Warhurst, 2008: 36–7) captures the essence 
of  much recent analysis of  religion and politics in Australia: 
The expectation underlying much public commentary is that, while 
Members and Senators may have religious beliefs, they should not 
exercise them politically; and the absence of  religious convictions from 
parliament is one safeguard of  the political process.
When faced with the concept of  the secular as a realm exclusive of  religion, 
religion becomes something to be rooted out from the public sphere. This 
has been the characteristic trait of  recent advocates of  a secular state in 
Australia.22 It has gotten to the stage where the Freedom of  Religion and Belief  
in the 21st Century. Discussion Paper put out by the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission in 2008 feels the need to discuss whether there is “a 
role for religious voices, alongside others in the policy debates of  the nation” 
22 A typical example is the Secular Party of  Australia, which seeks completely to remove 
religion from public institutions. Its website advocates the banning of  religious dress 
from public schools, reversing state funding of  religious schools, removing religious 
organizations from tax exemptions, removing religious references in the constitution 
and in public oaths – in the latter case unless specifically requested, and that public 
policy not be informed (“misled”) by “religiously inspired…prohibitions.” See http://
www.secular.org.au/mnu-policy-details (accessed 17 June 2011).
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(2008: 9). An amazing question, given that religious voices have always had a 
public presence in Australian policy debates! Arguably, exclusivist secularism 
was never the intention of  the Fathers of  Federation, who for the most part 
took secular at its most common nineteenth-century meaning as nonsectarian 
rather than nonreligious.23 The secular state was the state not constitutionally 
bound to defend the ecclesiastical hegemony of  any particular Christian 
religion or denomination. Although the framers of  s.116 lifted the language 
from the First Amendment, at that time the United States legislature did not 
interpret the First Amendment along the strict separationist lines that later 
came to characterize the Supreme Court from 1947 onwards (see Dreisbach, 
2010: 216). Thus, while the Church of  England was never established in 
Federated Australia, there was always space for religious input in matters of  
social policy, education, welfare and national ceremony. Australian secularism, 
like British secularism, has always been open; yet like America and unlike 
Britain, it has rejected ecclesiastical establishment.
The Australian debate on the place of  religion in the state highlights how 
contemporary critics of  religion and state interaction tend to draw upon a 
particular discourse of  the secular as a realm that excludes religion to give 
substance to their critiques. Objections to this conception of  the secular 
state as the state exclusive of  religion have led some activists and theorists in 
Australia and elsewhere to critique state secularism or to call for a paradigm 
shift from state secularism to state pluralism. It is these movements against the 
secular state that we will now consider.
Farewell to the Secular State? Conservatives and Pluralists
The meaning of  “secular” shifted in revolutionary France and then in the 
United States from being merely distinct from the religious to exclusive of  the 
religious. Thus, schools formerly could contain prayers and scripture classes 
and still be called secular in that their aim was not to secure salvation but to 
produce good citizens. Now with the exclusive meaning of  “secular,” scripture, 
prayers or even evidence of  a possible transcendent reality (intelligent design) 
are deemed intrusive. This has led to reaction against the secular state from 
several angles, most sensationally the Religious Right, but also the religious 
pluralists. The Religious Right is an umbrella term for organized groups 
in the United States and Australia who see the secular state as a threat to 
national religious heritage, religious freedom and morality. This would typify 
the Moral Majority movement of  the 1980s in the United States and the 
strong evangelical and conservative Catholic presence in Australian federal 
23 See Hughes (2003: 133), Frame (2006: 56–7) and Ely (1976: 88).
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politics, especially during the Howard period (1996–2007) (M. Maddox, 
2005; Martin, 1997; Lambert, 2008: 184–217). The Religious Right in the 
United States has not gone away; indeed, organizations like Focus on the 
Family and the Witherspoon Institute lobby for and defend a traditional 
Christian understanding of  the family, sexuality and the sanctity of  human 
life as well as religious freedom (against secularism and multiculturalism) 
and a reinvigorated grassroots democracy. Typically groups belonging to the 
Religious Right see their calling as restorative; that is, they seek to restore 
a traditional sense of  Christian nationhood, morality and the family. This 
manifests in campaigns to bring back prayer in schools, teach intelligent design 
in science classes, regulate or ban abortion, keep Christian iconography in 
public spaces and state institutions and outlaw same-sex marriage, to identify 
but a few of  their concerns. The Religious Right sees itself  as a counterforce 
to the perceived secular exclusion of  religion from public and civic life.
The pluralist movement, on the other hand, calls for a paradigm shift away 
from the secular state model altogether and towards a pluralist model more 
refl ective of  the fact of  religious pluralism (not secularism) that has emerged at 
the national level in modernized countries over the last generation. Pluralists 
begin by exposing several myths: 
1. The myth of  modernity as a force of  social secularization 
2. The myth that liberal states are, in fact, neutral towards religion
3. The myth that state recognition and even establishment of  religions is 
incompatible with democracy and liberalism
Pluralism raises objections against the model of  the secular state that 
implements a policy of  negative equality. In an effort to promote religious 
equality, it banishes or negates religion from the public sphere, ensuring 
everyone is equally without representation. Yet pluralists like Veit Bader 
(2003a: 6) argue that “To treat people fairly does not mean that we have 
to abstract from all their cultural and religious particularities but to take 
them into account in an evenhanded manner.” The pluralist model rejects 
both monistic establishmentarianism and exclusive state secularism. In their 
place, it suggests that a plurality of  national religions, probably the major 
ones and the major-minority ones, are recognized and institutionalized 
within the political system in the sense that their voice has a special and 
constitutional right to be heard (Bader, 2003b: 56). In the end, the polity is 
about preserving democracy, not suppressing religion (Bader, 1999: 602). In 
short, pluralists believe that the problem with exclusive secularism is that it 
militates against religion simply because it is not secular, rather than because 
it is especially and uniquely harmful to politics. If  the state and its institutions 
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are to refl ect the identities of  its citizens, then the pluralist state rather than 
the secular state is the most appropriate and legitimate type, given the fact 
of  social pluralism.
Both the Religious Right and pluralists critique the secular state, the latter 
declaring its illegitimacy and explicitly calling for a paradigm shift away from 
state secularism. Yet the secularism that these critics are responding to is 
an exclusive secularist rhetoric that seeks to shut out religion from civic life, 
leaving the alternative model of  open secularism that has typifi ed religion/
state relations in the United Kingdom, much of  Europe, Australia, and, to 
some extent, the United States, unscathed.
Rawlsian Secularism
Indeed, the idea of  a state emptied of  religion, a nation where religion is 
wholly confi ned to the private sphere with the exception of  occasional 
token ceremonial appearance is remarkably novel in most countries and 
its necessity is not obvious. Yet there are well-known arguments for 
the total exclusion of  religion from the public sphere. Take the most celebrated 
defense of  the exclusive secular state, John Rawls’ Political Liberalism (1993). 
The social fact giving occasion to Rawls’ theory is the “fact of  reasonable 
pluralism.” For Rawls, modern democratic societies contain numerous 
incompatible yet “reasonable” worldviews and religions, what Rawls calls 
“comprehensive doctrines.” Furthermore, this social pluralism is not a passing 
trend, “it is a permanent feature of  the public culture of  democracy” (36). In 
fact, any state that does not contain a plurality of  opposing ideas of  the good 
is probably undemocratic and illiberal, for homogeneity “can be maintained 
only by the oppressive use of  state power” (37). Now, what is the implication 
of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism for political philosophy? Rawls says that 
it is Public Reason. Essentially, Public Reason is a method of  dialogue that 
is based on “appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms 
of  reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of  
science when these are not controversial” (224). Yet this common reason 
turns out to be rather narrow upon closer analysis. In this way, public servants 
and citizens are prohibited from appealing to their comprehensive doctrines 
when formulating or interpreting policy and law. Utilitarianism, Marxism 
and natural law theories are excluded owing to their dependence on broad 
metaphysical conceptions of  human nature, agency and the good, not to 
mention various strands of  liberalism which count on contested theories such 
as value pluralism and varieties of  perfectionism. Indeed, even private citizens 
must be able to give a public answer if  they are called to vote on “fundamental 
political questions” (219). 
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The Rawlsian state is one where religion is almost wholly confi ned 
to the private sphere, where the state and its institutions are devoid of  
religious discourse and input. Rawls’ followers have taken the logic even 
further, ruling out not only nonpublic reasons for actions with political 
consequences but also nonpublic motives. Robert Audi (2000: 96) 
recommends a “principle of  secular motivation” whereby one has an “obligation 
to abstain from advocacy or support of  a law or public policy that restricts 
human conduct, unless in advocating or supporting it one is suffi ciently 
motivated by (normatively) adequate secular reason.” Indeed, as shown 
above in the discussion of  recent Australian debates on the nature of  state 
secularism, Rawls’ philosophy has become the de facto norm against which 
various constitutions and institutions are measured. But must the secular 
state be the exclusive Rawlsian state? Must the secular state be emptied 
of  religion, as opposed to its aims being merely nonreligious yet open to 
the presence and contribution of  organized religion? Perhaps the answer 
is contained in the overall question Rawls’ political liberalism seeks to 
address: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just 
society of  free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (xviii). For 
Rawls, if  comprehensive doctrines, even reasonable ones, get a foothold in 
public institutions, then sectarian strife at the political and social level will 
ensue (38, 129). Now this may be the case in countries with vital religious 
animosities and hostilities, where participation in government is simply 
seen as an opportunity to suppress all religious opposition, or states where 
the presence of  any religious group in the institutions of  state is perceived 
by others as a threat justifying sectarian violence. But how reasonable is this 
justifi cation in the context of  modernized liberal democracies which tend 
not to be characterized by deep religious division and animosity and which 
allow citizens to participate in the process of  government and not to be 
helplessly dominated by religious interests? 
Liberalism has never been a single coherent tradition and certainly 
cannot be reduced to a single principle of  avoiding controversial 
comprehensive doctrines as justifi cations for restraint, as Audi wishes to do 
(2000: 67). It will frequently be the case in a liberal democracy that citizens 
will fi nd themselves forced to suffer decisions whose justifi cations they do 
not accept and, furthermore, think only the irrational or indoctrinated 
could possibly accept: welfare, free-markets, unilateral divorce, abortion, 
indigenous land rights, affi rmative action, privatization or socialization of  
industries and utilities, national responses to climate change, to name but 
a few. Our most important political concepts, including freedom, equality, 
justice and democracy are complex, normative and in W. G. Gallie’s 
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(1955–56) words, “essentially contestable.” Once one starts inquiring into 
the meaning of  the essential concepts of  liberal democracy, one sees the 
futility in demanding a polity based only upon noncontroversial concepts. 
Historically, liberal democracy has not sought to liberate people from being 
subject to arguments they fi nd misguided or alienating by exorcising such 
arguments from the public and political sphere; it liberates people by giving 
them the opportunity to speak out and become active in promoting their 
alternative conception. In other words, there is a danger in much debate on 
the place of  religion in the public square that democracy as a preservative 
against alienation is being marginalized. If  it is impossible to legislate and 
govern in a single discourse with which all citizens can identify, the best 
remedy against resentment may well be the democratic right of  all citizens 
to voice their comprehensive doctrines in the public square. Possibly, as 
Habermas (2008: 131) says, “Secular citizens or those of  other religious 
persuasions can also learn something from religious contributions…” One 
may object and say that such a model could only beget confl ict. First, as 
pointed out earlier, this has not been borne out by the history of  modern 
liberal democracy. Second, surely the absence of  confl ict or tension in the 
political realm is as much indicative of  illiberal and undemocratic coercion 
as the absence of  reasonable pluralism in the civil sphere. Given the fact of  
social pluralism – indeed, the fact that there are numerous worldviews that 
cannot be reduced to a single principle, which are very often incompatible 
with one another, and, as Habermas (2008: 135) points out, whose lack 
of  universal adherence “cannot be resolved at the cognitive level” – 
how could a monological public discourse possibly refl ect and represent 
citizens so divided? The impulse of  much recent liberalism to impose a 
single logic to public dialogue seeks to overcome irresolvable difference 
by disallowing all but one voice. Admittedly, the rest may participate, but 
only if  they are able to mimic the voice of  Public Reason.24 The business 
of  the liberal state is not to overcome or transcend dialogical confl ict but 
to try to manage it and ensure that it does not undermine the essentials of  
the liberal democratic order. We deal with pluralism not by removing all 
reasons except Public Reason, but by allowing all voices to be heard and 
potentially become effective, in dialogue with the fundamental principles of  
liberalism: democracy perfects liberalism, and vice versa.25
24 See Nicholas Wolterstorff ’s discussion (Audi and Wolterstorff, 1997: 105) of  how Rawls’ 
Public Reason violates the conscience of  the deeply religious and forces an “impious” 
divorce between the believer’s religious worldview and his public voice. 
25 On the notion of  religious freedom within the context of  broadly accepted social 
norms – “managed pluralism” – see Nikolas K. Gvosdev (2010).
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Restoring the Secular State
The exclusive secular state cannot be justifi ed in modernized societies by 
appealing to a perpetual threat of  confl ict or minority alienation.26 In this 
sense, a public sphere emptied of  religion is simply unnecessary and – given 
the fact that in most, if  not all, stable modernized societies the public sphere 
is not emptied of  religion – any call for exclusive secularism of  the public 
needs justifi cation.27
There is good political reason to reject the legitimacy of  exclusive 
secularism, and this has to do with citizenship. As Wayne Hudson has pointed 
out, citizenship is multilevel, heterogeneous and differential. That is, there can 
be levels of  citizenship from national, transnational and global, as well as dual 
citizenship between states, representing a plurality of  attributes such as race 
and gender (2003: 425–6). The complex nature of  citizenship has implications 
for the religion-state debate (426):
Once citizenship is approached in this broad way, and not reduced to 
matters of  immigration and passports…it makes sense to refer to religious 
citizenship as one of  the citizenships persons might attract.
Furthermore, as Raymond Plant has said, “If  religious beliefs are identity-
creating in much the same way as gender and race, these beliefs and their 
content will be likely to dominate over all other considerations…” (2001: 302). 
Hudson believes that the secular conception of  society and state commonly 
used when describing liberal democracies simply does not refl ect the pluralistic 
nature of  citizens, hence a shift from “secular” to “pluralist” needs to take 
place when nations consider their identity (429). Yet, if  my distinction between 
exclusive and open secularism holds, there is no necessary contradiction 
between a nation seeing itself  as pluralist, or, more realistically (for example, 
European states, Australia and New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Canada), pluralist with an overwhelming Christian majority 
and at the same time having a secular state. So long as the religious identity 
26 The research of  Tariq Modood in the 1990s showed that secularism rather than religious 
establishmentarianism was seen as threatening to British Muslims. Thus, for secularists 
to justify their stance by appealing to a disaffected religious minority is seriously flawed; 
indeed, religious minorities, by their very nature, are skeptical about the legitimacy of  a 
religionless public space. See Modood (1994) cited in Monsma and Soper (1997: 133), 
Modood (1997) and Ahdar (1998–9: 467).
27 Fox (2008) in his survey of  175 constitutions and governments concludes that only the 
United States has full separation of  religion and state. However, as pointed out above, 
the United States has a strong civil religion which shows no sign of  decline.
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of  the citizens as individuals and the nation as a whole is not excluded from 
the public sphere simply because it is religious, there is no contradiction. 
This is, of  course, Hudson and Bader’s problem with the current exclusivist 
secular discourse, for within this discourse “many writers on politics assume 
that religion has no legitimate political role” (Hudson, 2003: 425). In this 
way, religious monists and exclusive secularists fall into the same trap, that is, 
imposing a rigid model of  religion-state interaction (or noninteraction) that 
does not refl ect actual practice, national identity, and recognition of  the unique 
contribution of  long-standing historical religions. Both religious monism and 
contemporary exclusive secularism fail the test of  representation. Making a 
single religion an element or condition of  citizenship fails religious minorities 
and nonadherents in their quest for representation qua religious minorities 
or nonadherents. Equally though, completely emptying religion from the 
rights of  citizenship – political activity, education, offi ce holding in politics – 
makes the citizen completely unrecognizable to the religious self; that is, the 
individual, biographical, situated self  has little in common with the citizen he 
or she is urged to be. Consequently, in both models, when the individual is 
confronted with the citizen, he or she is confronted with a stranger.
Contrary to the pluralist response to secularism, the solution to the 
increasingly alienating nature of  contemporary secularism need not be to 
shift the paradigm away from secularism but to restore the historical concept 
of  the secular as a realm distinct from rather than exclusive of  religion. The 
traditional conception of  inclusive secularism is arguably more amenable to 
liberal democracy than exclusive secularism. At the very least, it has been 
shown that not only is religion, even established religion, not necessarily 
harmful to liberal democracy, it can actually facilitate it through programs 
of  social welfare, not to mention the democratic nature of  many churches 
providing a good training ground for civic participation.28 The secular state 
need not be the state devoid of  religion, but it must be the state which refuses 
to coerce with regard to religion. If  the essence of  the state is to coerce, 
then the state separated from religion is the state which does not coerce 
religious adherence or nonadherence. This means that any state which 
has religious freedom ought to be considered at least minimally secular, 
for its coercive activity does not adopt a religious agenda of  salvation or 
adherence to dogma or religious practice. Indeed, when examining states 
whose constitutions explicitly endorse secularism, we see that its meaning 
is not stable but almost always involves religious freedom, though in some 
instances restricting religious involvement in politics and state funding of  
28 See Smidt (2003), Bellah et al. (1996), Campbell (2004), and Faith and International Affairs 
(2009).
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religious institutions.29 Most states could probably be considered secular by 
the most minimum standard of  allowing religious freedom. Thus we can 
sensibly speak of  secular Christian, secular Muslim and secular Jewish states, 
that is, states that may favor a particular religion, offi cially or not, based 
on national history and demographic, yet allow lawful freedom of  dissent. 
Although the idea of  a Christian or Islamic secular state may be questioned 
by some advocates of  religious equality (Randell-Moon, 2009), it may well 
be possible to give all religions some sort of  representation without denying 
the special status of  distinctive religious heritages which all countries 
possess. Any call for “exclusive” secularism in terms of  removing religious 
iconography from institutions, outlawing religious political parties, removing 
public expressions of  religion, may in fact be justifi ed, but not by appealing to 
the ideal of  “the secular state.” Other considerations such as the potential of  
national confl ict as well as the nature of  the political parties themselves may 
well justify state regulation of  religion within the public sphere. This would 
obviously apply to countries with deep and violent sectarian animosities or 
with militant religious movements seeking control.
Conclusion
The global persistence of  religion at the social and political level has led 
sociologists to scrutinize the secularization thesis and to refi ne it to refl ect the 
complex nature of  religion and society in the modern world. The sociological 
debate has not gone unnoticed by political scientists, who have mapped the 
relationship between religion and the state both nationally and globally. The 
two lessons to be learned from this literature are that, fi rst, secularization at 
the level of  individual religiosity, though doubtlessly occurring, has been 
exaggerated, and that second, there is no universal model of  state interaction 
with religion that can be called the secular state model. This lesson still needs to 
be learned, for as shown with the Australian case study, many commentators 
see the secular state as a simple model of  exclusive secularism where the 
29 See, for example, the following constitutions explicitly referring to their states as 
“secular states/republics”: Angola (Art. 8); Benin (Title I, Arts 2, 10, 14); Burkina 
Faso (Art. 31) (see Fox, 2008: 273); Cameroon (Preamble); Cape Verde (Art. 48); 
Chad (Arts 1, 14); Ethiopia (Art. 11); Gabonese Republic (Art. 2); Second Republic 
of  Gambia (see the theological Preamble as well as Art. 1); Second Republic of  
Guinea (Preamble, Art. 1); Liberia (see theological Preamble as well as Art. 14); Mali 
(Preamble, Arts 4, 18, 25); Namibia (Preamble, Arts 10, 20, 21); Cuba (Art. 8); India 
(Preamble); Japan (Art. 20); South Korea (Arts 19, 20); Kyrgyz Republic (Arts 1, 
15, 16); Tajikistan (Arts 1, 8, 26) (see Fox, 2008: 174–5); Turkmenistan (Arts 1, 11); 
Albania (Art. 7); Azerbaijan (Arts 7, 18).
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government and its institutions are emptied of  any religious presence. This 
model of  the secular state as the state devoid of  religion is unnecessary in most 
liberal democracies. The result has been attacks against the secular state from 
various parties dissatisfi ed with its hostility towards or suspicion of  religion. 
Conceptual and practical problems with state secularism can be solved within 
the secular paradigm, though through restoring a notion of  the secular as a 
realm open to religion but not open to the state becoming a function by which 
a particular religion may dominate citizens. The secularity of  the state – its 
exclusiveness or inclusiveness – is something to be determined by numerous 
factors including national character, political stability, and abstract political 
ideas. Because national character and politics vary from country to country, the 
extent of  religious involvement in the state and vice versa will vary from country 
to country. The lesson is that just because one state does not practice the United 
States model of  state indifference or the French model of  laïcité does not mean 
that it is not a secular state. If  we acknowledge a historic and still-practiced 
tradition of  “secular” as merely a realm distinct from the religious, whose aims are 
not religious but not necessarily opposed to or incompatible with religion, then 
the thinnest meaning of  the secular state is simply a state that does not coerce 
religious adherence, a state that is not merely a function of  organized religion. 
Whether the state goes beyond this is to be determined by time and place.
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Chapter 4
SECULARISM, RELIGION 
AND THE STATUS QUO1
Gal Levy
The Open University of  Israel and New York University Tel Aviv
The secularity of  a Zionist ought to be different than that of  a simple 
non-Zionist, in as much as the religiosity of  a Zionist is different than 
that of  a non-Zionist.
—David Ben-Gurion2
Introduction
Israel, it is commonly thought, is an emblematic case of  confl ation of  state 
and religion seen, and now even designated by law, as a Jewish and democratic 
state. It might therefore be totally inadequate to question the state-religion 
relationship in Israel within the framework of  the secularization thesis. Yet, 
although Israel is not a typical Western democracy built upon the separation 
of  church and state, its modernistic features as well as its democratic 
procedures are required by the state to adhere to the principle of  separation, 
even if  at the end the state renounces its relevance to the Israeli context. An 
apt example to this duality is the relation of  the state to religions other than 
Judaism. As amply shown by Karayanni (2006), the very defi nition of  the state 
as Jewish entails relegating all religious affairs of  non-Jewish communities to 
the private realm, presumably a de facto separation of  state and church. Still, 
defi ning this situation in terms of  separation is rather misleading. Not only 
1 I would like to thank Shlomo Fischer, Hanna Herzog and Dana Kaplan for their 
insightful reading of  this text. 
2 David Ben-Gurion, cited in Elam (2001: 74).
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is the conception of  state-church relations embedded in a Christian world 
history (Asad, 1993; Haynes, 2009: 1051), it is also the case that in Israel 
the idea of  an established rabbinate as the institution analogous to church 
has come to existence based on the ideas of  nationhood and statehood. 
Suffi ce to say that while in European-Christian history the modern state rose 
against a politicized church, Zionist nationalism gave birth to a politicized, 
institutionalized Jewish religion. This entanglement of  nationality, religiosity 
and citizenship in a Jewish and democratic state has defi nitely determined the 
Israeli road to secularization, an idea that recently surfaced in the Israeli 
political debate.
In this chapter, I ask what happened to state secularism in light of  recent 
interest in secularization in Israel. Whereas the state-religion relationship 
is mostly viewed in isolation, I seek to place it within the dual context of  
citizenship and ethnicity and to examine it in relation to the elusive boundary 
between state and society (Mitchell, 1991). By focusing on the ethnicized 
relationship between state and society in Israel and on the social boundaries 
that cut across the Israeli citizenship, I propose to elucidate why secularization 
in Israel has been forestalled and why, despite the prominence of  religious 
politics, secularization remains a marginal political issue. I fi nd the recent 
turn to secularization a signifi cant contribution to and turning point in the 
discussion of  state and religion in Israel. Yet I suggest that the ensuing debate 
is still missing a signifi cant aspect, namely explanation of  the persistence of  
the status quo as the conceptual framework that organizes and normalizes 
the relationship between state and religion. I therefore revisit the concept 
of  the status quo, thus reexamining its power in rendering the question of  
secularization apolitical. I propose this in order to better account for why 
secularism fails to attract political agency and who beyond “the religious” 
enjoys the persistence of  the status quo. 
In Israel, the state-religion relationship has been a matter of  continuous 
debate (Smooha, 1978; Cohen and Susser, 2000; Shafi r and Peled, 2002), 
and Israelis frequently experience disputes on this subject, often culminating 
in physical violence. So the question of  why secularization has rarely posed 
a political problem for most Israelis still calls for an answer (Elam, 2000; 
Shenhav, 2007: 23). In the 1950s and 1960s, secularization was a marginal 
political issue and similarly of  a minor academic concern. This contradicted 
the fact that at that time, the heyday of  the modernization paradigm, 
(structuralist-functionalist) sociologists and anthropologists recorded religious 
diversifi cation at the societal level and the centrality of  religious politics at the 
state level (e.g. Shokeid, 2001: 22). Secularization was generally seen as an 
ideological or cultural problem rather than as a theoretical or normative issue 
for social scientists to address. Moreover, it was assumed that Zionist ideology 
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was capable of  absorbing this (dysfunctional) tension between the secular and 
the religious by molding a relatively cohesive Jewish-Zionist national society 
(Elam, 2000: 74).3 
Interestingly, secularization has also remained low on the agenda of  the 
school of  critical sociology that has emerged since the 1980s (Ram, 1995). 
Religion and secularization were seen as surrogates to other, more germane 
political concerns, especially the Arab-Israeli confl ict and intra-Israeli ethnicity 
(Smooha, 1978). Concurrently, a new generation of  political scientists, 
mostly sympathetic to the Zionist-religious outlook, sought to understand 
and restore the allegedly failed consociational order as the framework for 
managing the state-religion relationship (Cohen and Susser, 2000; Cohen 
and Rynhold, 2005). Only recently has the question of  secularization 
resurfaced and become a matter for political and scholarly debate (e.g. Elam, 
2000; Levy, 2007; Shenhav, 2007; Ram, 2008). Two political developments 
may be considered responsible for this: the expansion of  Jewish settlement in 
the occupied territories led by ultranationalist religious Zionists (Eisenstadt, 
2008: 212–3) and the political ascendance of  Jewish ultraorthodox ethnic 
political parties (Peled, 1998). Still, the ensuing debate was limited in scope 
and failed to transcend what seemed to be the Zionist imperative, namely 
accommodating the relationship between state and religion within the 
confi nes of  the status quo. In other words, secularization has still remained a 
nonissue in both political and academic debates.
To explain why secularization was a nonissue and how recent concerns 
may or may not be refl ected the political sphere, I aim to unpack the concept 
of  the status quo and reframe it in the context of  citizenship and ethnicity. 
I intend to transcend the debate over the status quo as a particular mechanism 
that characterizes the (exclusively Jewish) consociational model (Cohen and 
Susser, 2000), and present it as a discursive articulation of  the conundrum of  a 
Jewish and democratic state. Thus I refrain from seeing the status quo arrangement 
as obsolete, as occasionally argued. Rather, it is the debate over secularization 
3 In retrospect, the anthropologist Shokeid (2001: 21) writes: “Sociologists, and later the 
anthropologists, who entered immigrant settlements, often encountered ‘traditional’ 
systems of  belief  that conflicted with the structure of  the social institutions and the 
norms of  behaviour to which the immigrants were expected to conform… Unlike 
the sociologists, the anthropologists, for example, were well aware of  the centrality of  
religion in the life of  immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. They did not assume it 
was a passing phenomenon destined to disappear with the adoption of  modernity. The 
anthropologists’ research methods brought them into close contact with the religious 
domain in the immigrants’ life. They spent long hours in their company, in the villages 
and development towns. Staying there during the Sabbath and the holidays, they could 
not ignore the impact of  synagogue life.”
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as a sociopolitical phenomenon that was rendered obsolete, leaving religion as 
a powerful mechanism of  social differentiation that undermines the concept 
of  a secularized Israeli citizenship. 
The Return of  Religion? A Theoretical Prelude 
The status quo – a shorthand term to describe the sociopolitical arrangement 
of  state-religion relations in Israel – has never stopped occupying the minds of  
Israelis. In recent years, debates were seen and occasionally framed within the 
context of  the global phenomenon of  the “return of  religion.” One famous 
thesis is José Casanova’s “deprivatization” thesis, emphasizing the (renewed) 
role of  religion in the public domain. Other theses have focused on religious 
revival in the social sphere and still others have focused on how religion has 
been infl uenced by consumerism and how this led to the commodifi cation of  
religious practices (see this volume’s introduction). While these phenomena 
are evident to various degrees in Israel, some even leaving an imprint on 
the public sphere (see Goodman and Yonah, 2004; Ben-Porat and Feniger, 
2009), religion in Israel is mostly seen through its value to Zionist ideology 
and its impact on politics. Indeed, politicized religion engendered anticlerical 
sentiments amongst the Jewish middle class. This heated political debate 
won a spectacular 15 out of  120 parliamentary seats for Shinui, a previously 
minor anticlerical party, at its peak in the 2003 elections. Interestingly, by the 
following elections in 2006 this party had evaporated. In 2009, the slump by 
the remaining liberal party, Meretz, to a meager three seats left the political 
arena to the religious parties. Against this backdrop and in light of  the constant 
centrality of  politicized religion in the debate over the future of  the occupied 
territories, two answers were proposed to the question of  whether Israel ought, 
or could be, secularized. 
Not long after modernization theory came under attack, secularization as 
both a theoretical matter and a social judgment was revisited from two related 
perspectives. The post-Zionist school repudiated modernization theory for 
its ideological assumptions regarding the inevitability of  secularization 
(Kimmerling, 1999; Ram, 2008). In this view, premised on criticism of  
modernist linear perception of  social progress, anticipation of  the demise 
of  religion was not merely theoretically fl awed. Rather, it overlooked the 
interests that had kept religion alive. As Ram (2008: 71) concludes: “the 
separation of  state and synagogue in Israel is stalled not because of  the power 
of  the ‘old’ synagogue but, on the contrary, because of  the ‘new state and 
its dominant [Jewish] ethnicity.” The postcolonial critique followed suit in 
rejecting idealizations of  the state as a fair agent of  modernization. Adopting 
a post-secular outlook, it also asked to be rid of  the invariably hierarchical 
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presuppositions of  the post-Zionist stance (Goodman and Yonah, 2004; 
Shenhav, 2008). Driven by a multiculturalist agenda, it called to abandon 
binary conceptions of  social identities that unjustifi ably sever the secular 
discourse from the religious one. Instead, postcolonialists seek to treat more 
sensibly the value of  religion in the eyes of  modern men and women and to 
refrain from presupposing the need to remove religion in order to make room 
for a more equitable society (Goodman and Yonah, 2004: 23; Shenhav, 2007, 
2008). For them, the need for a post-secular perspective is ontological as well 
as epistemological (Shenhav, 2007: 25). 
Both critiques agree that the rise of  religion in Israeli politics since the early 
1970s can be attributed to the political demise of  the Labor Party (Eisenstadt, 
2008: 210) that reinforced the interconnection between nationalism and 
religiosity. Subsequently, Mizrahi (Oriental) Jews, religious Zionists and non-
Zionists, and the Arab-Palestinian citizens have risen to center stage. These 
new political forces perhaps did not change the foundational (im)balance 
of  power in Israeli society. But this shift did accentuate the historic pivotal 
role of  religion in creating and maintaining social hierarchies (Levy, 2002; 
Shenhav, 2006). Equally, it uncovered the democratizing effect of  religion, 
which has become a vehicle for nonhegemonic groups to bring to the fore 
their own conceptions of  the secular and the sacred (Levy and Emmerich, 
2001; Goodman and Yonah, 2004: 23; Eisenstadt, 2008: 210; Jamal, 2009: 
1144). In both critiques, it was agreed that secularization is not bound to 
happen, whether because it is ontologically impossible (Shenhav, 2008), 
politically undesirable (Ram, 2008) or simply infeasible (Kimmerling, 1999). 
What was missing from the theory, though, was a satisfactory response to the 
need to create and maintain a secularized space where a civic conception of  
citizenship would emerge (Turner, 2001: 132). 
Whether one considers positively the deprivatization of  religion (Goodman 
and Yonah, 2004; Shenhav, 2008) as marking the voice of  the unaffi liated (Rose, 
1996: 343) or if  one’s concern is privatizing religion to make a much-needed 
secular space for the middle class (Ram, 2008), the concept of  secularization 
needs to be unpacked. If, as Turner posits, religion “is assumed to contain the 
seeds of  social life as such” (2009: 194), my endeavor is to explore how the 
uneven spread of  modernity and hence secularization yielded a conception 
of  a Jewish and democratic state in which secularism is absent from the public 
debate. I therefore see the “problem of  secularization” in Israel as a fl awed 
process of  differentiation (Casanova, 1994), impaired by the entanglement 
of  ethnicity and citizenship. In this respect, the status quo may be seen as an 
exceptional way to bypass the imperative to differentiate the religious from 
the secular. Yet, rejecting understandings as a unitary concept or social 
institution, the status quo is not merely the incarnation of  a successful (or 
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failed) consociational democratic order (Cohen and Susser, 2000; Cohen 
and Rynhold, 2005). Nor is it an ideological vehicle for politicians, secular 
or religious, to gain political power (Elam, 2000). I follow and expand Boas 
(2002: 107) in understanding the status quo as a mechanism of  “quasi-
mythic presence in the interrelationship between religious and secular,” and a 
determinant of  social categorizations. Alluding to three historical moments – 
refl ecting the citizenship stories of  Mizrahim, Arabs and immigrants from 
the Former Soviet Union – I propose to show the status quo “at work” and 
so to point out how the status quo functions as it becomes a “taken-for-
granted” descriptor of  social reality; it becomes this descriptor fi rst in the 
categorization processes of  the marginalized and second in inscribing in the 
minds of  Israelis the inevitability of  the status quo as the only solution to 
the tension between state and religion. I will thus demonstrate how the status 
quo and hence religion differentiates between citizens and how it precludes 
the discourse of  secularization from public debate. Israel is an exemplar of  a 
state which is at once religiously ethnocentric and democratic. Therefore, it 
may also serve as a case in point for exploring the interrelationship between 
secularization and desecularization as a determinant of  the extent of  social 
and political freedoms in contemporary states where the boundary between 
the sacred and secular is blurred and the extant social structure is changing 
(McLennan, 2007: 864).
The Status Quo and the History of  the State-Religion 
Relationship 
The origins of  the status quo, it is commonly argued, lie in a letter from David 
Ben-Gurion, then chair of  the Zionist executive committee in Palestine, to the 
anti-Zionist ultraorthodox Jewish leadership that set the terms of  agreement 
on how to maintain Jewish life in the Jewish state’s public sphere in exchange 
for the latter’s political support in the partition plan that would resolve the 
Zionist quest for a state. It is of  little signifi cance whether this was the true 
intent of  the letter or that its principles have no legal bearing. Eventually, 
this “compromise” had been reinforced by a pact within the Zionist and 
Jewish political elite that was seen as a manifestation of  a consociational 
democratic order (Friedman, 1990: 47–8; Cohen and Susser, 2000: 18; 
Elam, 2001: 83–4; Boas, 2002: 107; Corinaldi, 2003: 290). In contemporary 
Israel, the status quo letter is considered an inspiration to legislation on the 
scope and limits of  the freedom of  religion and consciousness (Corinaldi, 
2003; Ram, 2008). Thus, consecutive coalition agreements reiterated these 
principles comprising the status quo, which include keeping public kitchens 
kosher and the Sabbath as the offi cial rest day, but more importantly securing 
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the autonomy of  religious education and forming a religious monopoly in 
personal status law (Radai, 2005: 80; Ram, 2008; Jamal, 2009: 1158).4 Over 
the years, the status quo has become a cardinal political issue, a target for 
political and legal dispute from the liberal inclining political parties and 
even more from feminist activists, who remain its most vociferous contesters 
(Elam, 2001: 103–4; Boas, 2002: 109). To date, despite signifi cant shifts in 
the makeup and content of  the public sphere, the status quo is still seen 
as a pillar of  a Jewish consensus (Fogiel-Bijaoui, 2003; Corinaldi, 2003; 
Karayanni, 2006; Jamal, 2009). This chapter seeks to answer the question 
of  why this is so. 
While many deliberations on ethnic relations acknowledge the affi liation 
between ethnicity and religiosity, rarely has this relation been observed from the 
perspective of  the sociology of  religion. My second question, then, is how the 
state-religion relationship confl ict is implicated in the ethnic one. This question 
is especially called for in the context of  contemporary scholarship that sees 
the prevalence of  ethnicity in the lives of  Israelis. My analysis of  educational 
history has led me to see Israeli society as an ethnicized society, where issues 
of  confl ict and control are readily explained in terms of  “ethnic differences” 
(Levy, 2005: 280; Herzog, 1985). Shafi r and Peled (2002) also contend that 
Israeli citizenship is ethnicized, or predominately ethnorepublican. Indeed, 
Israelis consider their citizenship as being predominantly ethnic, identifying 
themselves primarily as Arabs or Jews, before they indicate a common Israeli 
identity (Levy, 2005: 273; Ram, 2008: 67). Still, issues pertaining to religiosity 
have remained confi ned to an ethnic-free zone. For example, an early critical 
analysis of  social confl icts in Israel pertinently differentiated the religious-
secular divide from the intra-Jewish ethnic schism, designating to each a varied 
degree of  resolvability. The Arab-Jewish divide was considered as yet another 
confl ict (Smooha, 1978). This theoretical segregation has changed, especially 
after the rise in 1984 of  Shas, a Mizrahi ethnic and religiously ultraorthodox 
political party that confl ated religious and ethnic agendas (Peled, 1998). Since 
then, these social schisms have evolved into an explicitly overlapping confl ict 
over culture and power that in recent elections have played a signifi cant role 
in determining the voting pattern of  the non-Arab constituency (Peled, 1998; 
Shalev and Kis, 1999; Shalev and Levy, 2004). With a parallel rise of  Islamism 
amongst the Arab electorate (Ali, 2004), no longer were the politics of  religion 
seen as divorced from ethnic and ethnonational politics.
4 Paradoxically or not, the latter principle is not as controversial as it looks. Secular leaders 
such as Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir reiterated a Zionist interest in the governance of  
religious law in marriage and divorce as a means to maintain a unified Jewish people 
(Elam, 2001: 71, 127–8).
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Yet it is not my intent to focus on recent moments of  confl ation of  ethnicity 
and religiosity. Such a focus may lead to an erroneous impression that this 
overlap bears upon mainly, if  not merely, Arab-Jewish dynamics (Kimmerling, 
1999; Ram, 2008; Jamal, 2009: 1158) or that it is nothing but a manifestation 
of  sheer political manipulation, as is occasionally portrayed in public debates. 
Instead of  clinging to the anecdotal, as do contemporary critics, we need to 
see the dynamics of  religiosity and secularity as particular manifestations of  
acts of  categorization (Boas, 2002; Goodman and Yonah, 2004; Goodman 
and Fisher, 2004; Shenhav, 2007, 2008). So what calls for an explanation is 
how the status quo shapes the contours of  citizenship and ethnicity, within and 
without Jewish society. 
In asking why the status quo prevails and how it shapes citizenship, I thus 
refrain from seeing it as a political compromise to ameliorate the tension 
either between a Jewish and democratic state (e.g. Gavison, 1998: 217; but 
see Elam, 2001: 65–81) or between secularism and religiousness (Cohen 
and Rynhold, 2005: 728). Instead, I seek to understand the endurance of  
the status quo in relation to processes of  ethnicization. Following Mitchell 
(1991), I claim the status quo is another mechanism of  the elusive boundary 
between state and society and it delineates ethnicized boundaries that 
are at once drawing the limits of  secularization. Thus, beyond delimiting 
secular freedoms in the public sphere (e.g. by imposing the kosher diet or 
limiting public transportation), it legitimizes an ethnic-Jewish conception of  
Israeli citizenship and naturalizes its supremacy over territorially bounded 
conceptions of  citizenship (e.g. Weiss, 2002). In this sense, the status quo 
and ethnicization work hand in hand to impact the contours of  citizenship 
beyond any institutional (state-religion separation) or political (consociational 
democracy) arrangements. Paradoxically, this elusiveness also allows a 
relatively high maneuverability for secularism at the societal level without 
impinging its endurance at the state level. Each of  the following three 
citizenship tales bears evidence of  these processes. Combined, they are meant 
to show the status quo’s foundational role in drawing social boundaries and 
rendering the concept of  a Jewish and democratic state irrevocable in the minds 
of  Israelis, both Jews and Arabs. 
Secularization and Beyond?
When José Casanova challenged the “old” secularization thesis, he did not 
consider the secularization theory redundant. He argued for three distinct 
meanings of  secularization as a concept: “differentiation of  the secular 
spheres from religious institutions and norms...a decline of  religious beliefs 
and practices, and...marginalization of  religion to a privatized sphere” 
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(Casanova, 1994: 211). By seeing and theoretically identifying deprivatization 
as an acute social phenomenon, Casanova in fact reapproved the usefulness 
of  a theory of  secularization, rendering it readily applicable to the study of  
particular processes of  secularization and desecularization. In this way, he 
sought to “rethink systematically the relationship of  religion and modernity, 
and the possible roles religions may play in the public sphere of  modern 
societies” (ibid.). 
Currently, it is hardly questioned that religion plays various roles in the 
political, social and economic spheres of  contemporary societies (Haynes, 
2009: 1042). However, this is not necessarily due to a “return to the sacred,” 
nor a testimony to the withering away of  religion in earlier phases of  
modernization (Demerath, 2007: 57; see also this chapter’s introduction). 
In fact, as modernization spread unevenly throughout societies, religion 
became only partly privatized, making space for new forms of  both public 
and private religiosity. Likewise, secularization was neither universal nor 
total (Fox, 2005: 297) and is better understood in its relation to sacralization 
(Demerath, 2007), or further as pertaining to culture at large (see Bruce 2006). 
Thus, the dialectics of  secularization and sacralization have yielded several 
paradoxes (Demerath, 2007: 67–9) and new forms of  religiosity. In recent 
years, these processes have also become implicated in globalization, where 
globalization seems to replace modernization as their determinant (Beyer, 
2007: 99). Globalization, though not necessarily the reason for the changing 
relations of  secularism and religion, contributes to the deprivatization of  
religion, to its diversifi cation and primarily to the prominence of  consumerism 
and securitization in redefi ning the relationship between states, religions and 
societies (Beckford and Demerath, 2007: 7–8). 
Contemporary studies show that Israelis become more religious (Levy 
et al., 2004), and that religiosity plays a signifi cant role in public life, 
primarily in the context of  the relationship between religion and nationalism 
(Goodman and Yonah, 2004; Jamal, 2009; Sorek and Ceobanu, 2009), 
in light of  reconfi gurations in the politics of  religion (Peled, 1998; Cohen 
and Susser, 2000; Ali, 2004) or by generating new forms of  consumerism 
(Ben-Porat and Feniger, 2009). Similarly, the class-biased privatization of  
religion has bearings on the politicization of  religion and on the particular 
role of  the middle class in challenging the monopolistic power of  religious 
orthodoxy (Levy, 2007). These aspects of  (de)secularization notwithstanding, 
my interest is in secularization as differentiation. I particularly refrain 
from asking whether or not there is, or was, a decline in religious beliefs in 
Israeli society, or to what extent religion has been privatized. This aspect of  
differentiation is what Casanova refers to as the historical process, whereby 
the (medievalist) dualistic structure of  “this world” and the “other world” 
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is replaced by “only one single ‘this world,’ the secular one, within which 
religion will have to fi nd its own place” (Casanova, 1994: 15). In “this world,” 
a new conception of  citizenship was bound to emerge. 
In today’s “this world” religion has found a place, though it is a different 
place than that which modernists like Talcott Parsons assigned to it (Turner, 
2001: 133). Instead of  being completely privatized, it reappeared on center 
stage (McLennan, 2007). To some extent, post-secularism is a timely 
corrective, required after the “signifi cance of  religion used for political ends 
has...grown the world over” (Habermas, 2006: 2) and inasmuch as religion 
played a greater political role in the state and the public sphere (ibid.: 3). 
Habermas’s conception of  civil society has shifted, acknowledging a need 
to make a space for the religious person to partake in the public debate 
(McLennan, 2007: 866; also Habermas, 2010). This does not obviate his 
secularism (Habermas, 2006: 19), but many of  the post-secular moves are 
“much easier said than done” (McLennan, 2007: 859). Finally, religion and 
secularity changed indeed, but, to cite Bruce (2006), occasionally they are 
simply formed differently. 
Finally, if  the myth of  secularization is rightly to be dismissed, this does not 
necessarily mean that the secularization project is or ought to be done away with 
(Bruce, 2006: 45). Indeed, as the dialectics of  secularization and sacralization 
manifest themselves in contemporary social, economic and political dynamics, 
differentiation (Casanova, 1994) is an even greater challenge, particularly 
with relation to determining the scope and depth of  citizenship. In Israel, a 
narrow conception of  secularization as differentiation resulted in a differential 
structure of  sovereignty based on the concept of  mamlakhtiyut (see below). 
It was therefore not surprising that the Israeli notion of  a consociational 
democracy (Cohen and Susser, 2000) was not a comprehensive order and was 
in fact an exclusive “Jewish consociation” (Jamal, 2009: 1162). Driven also 
by intra-Jewish ethnic stratifi cation, this order reinforced a hierarchical order 
of  citizenship, sandwiching Mizrahi Jews between the Ashkenazi hegemonic 
elite and the excluded Arab citizenry (Shafi r and Peled, 2002). It is to these 
dynamics that my discussion now turns.
1. Mizrahim and the Zionist-modernist order
Like many of  his contemporaries, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt was a true believer 
in the powers of  the modern state. Long before he developed the concept 
of  “multiple modernities” to overcome the drawbacks of  the modernization 
thesis, he became a prominent speaker of  Jewish nation-building qua 
modernization.5 In his view, founded on the structuralist-functionalist school, 
failed secularization was regarded as a social problem that would hinder 
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modernization (see also Goodman and Fisher, 2004: 353). In a monograph 
published in 1947 focused on what would become Israel’s major challenge 
in the years to come, the absorption of  immigration, Eisenstadt foresaw the 
failure of  Israel’s modernization. His analysis was premised empirically on 
examining the problems of  Oriental Jews in British mandate Palestine as 
epitomizing the future failed adjustment of  non-European Jews to modernity 
(Levy, 2002). Theoretically, his foresight relied on the determinative 
presuppositions of  the modernization approach, particularly its tendency to 
depoliticize social problems. Especially, this approach relinquished political 
and class determinants to social marginality, offering instead cultural 
explanatory factors that held the new immigrants themselves responsible 
for their maladjustment to society (Ram, 1995). Conceptually, Eisenstadt’s 
analysis adhered to a common distinction at the time between an “immigrant” 
and “Oleh,” the latter term replacing the Hebrew word for immigrant with 
a concept that bears theological and ideological meanings (Levy, 2002). 
Interestingly, this distinction made use of  a religious discourse in distinguishing 
the “Oleh,” a self-motivated modern pioneer, from the “immigrant,” a passive 
adherent to messianic fatalism. In other words, while the Ashkenazi (European 
Jews) were “making Alyia,” as active agents, Mizrahi immigrants were passively 
(and reluctantly) drawn to confront modernity.
Until the late 1970s it had been the mainstay of  Israeli public and 
academic discourses, in explaining away the failed integration of  Mizrahim, 
to label them “traditionalists” or in other words, religious (Ram, 2008: 68). 
Even when a new generation of  scholars rose to defy the culturalistic view, 
proposing materialistic reasons instead and reproblematizing the social 
categories of  “pre-modern” or “primitive,” the question of  religiosity had 
remained unasked (Smooha, 1978; Swirski, 1981). While recognizing power 
relations as an explanatory factor in forestalling the modernization of  the 
Mizrahim, hardly anyone asked why they were all “religious.” Of  course, 
not “all” were religious. This is exactly the point: this discourse had left 
little room for presenting or representing the Mizrahim otherwise. As early 
as the 1940s, religiosity was attached to ethnicity (Levy, 2002; Shenhav, 
2006). Following the eruption of  confl icts over the education of  Yemenite 
children in the transitory camps in the early 1950s –  what came to be known 
as “the struggle over education” – a Judicial Commission of  Inquiry was 
set up to inquire into allegations of  religious and antireligious coercion in 
5 Any attempt to encompass Eisenstadt’s work will do him injustice. His idea of  “multiple 
modernities” (Eisenstadt, 2000) became useful in explicating uneven and indeterminate 
processes of  secularization. I restrict myself  to what I believe is his earliest work (Eisenstadt, 
1947) which was only a precursor to his voluminous work on nation-building.
104 RELIGION AND THE STATE
the camps (Zameret, 2002). In its conclusions, the commission adopted a 
“compromise” between the political parties over the backs of  the Yemenite 
immigrant children, who were sent en masse to religious schools. This not 
only paved the way for the deepening of  an ethnic division of  education, 
but further entrenched ethnicity and religion. When a new state education 
system was founded in 1953, this compromise normalized the separation 
between religious and nonreligious schools (Levy, 2002), consigning the idea 
of  a secular state to an uncertain future (Swirski, 1999). It also determined 
the view that to be Mizrahi was to be religious. Mizrahi Jews did not simply 
fail to modernize. They were confi ned to the quarters of  religion, not meant 
to secularize (Levy, 2002; also cf. Shenhav, 2006: 77; Shenhav, 2007: 3). 
Some three and half  decades later in 1984, Mizrahi Jews reclaimed their 
citizenship by vehemently supporting an ultraorthodox religious ethnic party, 
Shas, that defi ed the monopoly held by Ashkenazi Jews on who is designated 
a Zionist, an Israeli, a Jew. For many Mizrahim at this point adhering to the 
status quo proved to be unavoidable, because beyond ensuring the political 
power of  religion, it supported their becoming Israelis merely by being Jews 
(Peled, 1998; Levy and Emmerich, 2001).
2. Israeli-Arabs and the military administration
The second story is more easily argued, even though its relation to the status quo 
is less obvious. It is not diffi cult to view the Palestinians who remained within the 
borders of  the newly self-declared Israeli state as ethnonationals. The distinction 
between them and Jewish-Israelis was made all the more marked after the state 
imposed military administration upon the Arab-populated areas (1950–66), 
which implied a curtailed type of  citizenship (Lustick, 1980; Levy, 2005). Thus, 
against an ideal of  a territorially bounded state, a particular designated Arab 
space had been created within which a new Arab-Palestinian society had 
emerged. The limits on movement, employment and political mobilization 
restricted the processes of  proletarianization and urbanization and hence 
delimited the modernization of  the Arab society. Its members were therefore 
destined to be the drawers of  water and hewers of  wood for the rising Jewish 
middle class (Rosenfeld and Carmi, 1976). The opportunity to modernize came 
only in 1966, when the struggle against the military administration resulted in 
its disbandment. The Palestinians gained more than formal political rights, as 
the new freedoms materialized in the organization of  new political leadership 
and the time became ripe for claiming their citizenship rights (Peled, 1992). 
These changes were refl ected in a new reform in Arab education that eventually 
delineated the limits of  Arabs’ inclusion in the Israeli state and society.
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In 1972, state offi cials became concerned with the increasing alienation 
of  Arab pupils from the state and sought new ways to tackle this issue (Peres 
and Yuval-Davis, 1969; Al-Haj, 1995: 139). A short report on “Basic trends 
in Arab education” summed up the work of  the Ministry of  Education 
on this matter and drew new guidelines for an educational policy that 
emphasized the need to strengthen the Arab pupils’ identifi cation with the 
state. Its importance, according to sociologist of  Arab education Majid 
Al-Haj (1995: 140), “lies in the very fact that for the fi rst time wide public 
attention was given to the uniqueness of  Arab education and the need to 
formulate particular aims for the Arab pupils.” Still, the report was rejected 
and severely criticized by Arab leaders for creating a “‘unique Israeli Arab’ 
divorced from his [sic] genuine national and cultural roots” (Al-Haj, 1995: 
140; Mar’i, 1978: 53; Levy, 2005: 282). Yet this is also where its greater 
signifi cance lay. The need to defi ne “who is an Arab (Israeli)?” was crucial. 
The new educational goals refl ected this ambiguous new social category of  
“Israeli-Arabs” which was, on the one hand, meant to include the Arabs 
within the Israeli citizenry and distinguish them from the Palestinians in 
the recently occupied Palestinian territories and on the other hand meant 
to distinguish them from the Jewish citizens by culturally designating them 
as Arabs and Muslims (Levy, 2005: 283). 
“Israeli-Arab” citizens could neither become fully integrated as citizens 
nor be recognized as national-Palestinians (Jamal, 2009: 1162), yet the 
political demand was that they should become Israelis in their own right 
(Karayani, 2007: 49). But inasmuch as their ethnicization as “Arabs” 
was carved deep into the conception of  Israeli citizenship which in turn 
was imbued with Jewish meaning (Peled, 1992; Ram, 2008; Jamal, 2009: 
1158), the state could not play a neutral liberal hand (Karaynai, 2007: 50). 
Indeed, state institutions became proactive in favoring certain Arab groups 
over others. Ironically or not, occasionally this implied cooperating with 
Islamists against the rise of  a more nationalistically oriented, yet secular and 
democratic leadership. This was the case in Yaffa, where the municipality 
sought to undermine the establishment of  an Arab democratic school at 
the cost of  supporting the Islamist movement (Levy and Massalha, 2010). 
In the end, Arab citizens, as with veiled Muslim women in liberal contexts, 
felt safer in their religious identity and have forsaken their secular one in 
order to maintain their place within the Israeli democracy. Paradoxically, 
as Karayanni (2007) demonstrated (and as is often evidenced in public 
debates), the Palestinian citizens may benefi t from supporting the 
continuation of  the status quo that justifi es redrawing the boundaries that 
separate and distinguish them from the Jewish society. 
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3. Non-Jewish Russians in a Zionist state
In Israeli public and academic discourses, both the stories of  the Mizrahim 
and the Palestinians are conveniently framed within the tale of  “belated 
modernization.” The case of  the “Russians” may be considered within an 
almost opposite framework. Comprising over one million immigrants from 
all republics of  the Former Soviet Union, the Russian immigration, now 
distinguished according to the immigrants’ European or Asian origins, was 
commonly hailed for its highly educated and modern characteristics and 
hence for its qualitative contribution to society. Indeed, this immigration 
had a major impact on all spheres of  life and has also induced contest. One 
criticism immediately following the opening of  the Former Soviet Union for 
immigration (and waning soon after) was typically voiced by Mizrahi activists. 
These activists feared that the “Russians” would tip the balance against the 
Mizrahim just as they were making inroads into the echelons of  power, as 
had happened in the 1970s. A second line of  disapproval refl ected concerns 
about the growing numbers (up to  one-third) of  “non-Jewish” immigrants, 
who were still eligible returnees by the Law of  Return. This latter criticism 
coincided with discontent regarding the inclination of  the new immigrants to 
refute the Zionist diktat to assimilate in the Hebrew culture by holding on to 
their own language and culture (cf. Yonah, 2005: 130). Concerns about the 
lack of  Jewish biological and cultural roots, which the state seemingly seeks 
to bypass in order to allow the integration of  these immigrants into society, 
become implicated in societal approaches that defy the attempt to separate 
ethnicity from religion. 
Since its legislation (before there was even an effective citizenship law), 
the Law of  Return (1950) was a matter of  political debate (Elam, 2001) that 
brought the government (not for the fi rst time) to the verge of  a crisis in 1970. 
Following a High Court of  Justice ruling in favor of  an Israeli navy offi cer 
who demanded to register his children as Jewish nationals despite their being 
born to a non-Jewish mother (on the Shalit affair, see Hofnung, 1996), the Law 
of  Return was amended in two seemingly opposing ways. On the one hand, 
the law included the Jewish principle of  maternal lineage in determining 
“who is (an eligible) Jew?,” thus solidifying the role of  religion in determining 
who is an eligible “returnee.” On the other, the law extended the right of  return 
to third generation siblings of  Jews, despite their failing the religious criteria. 
It is no secret that the legislators had their eyes on the Soviet Union, where 
hundreds of  thousands of  Jews disconnected from their Jewish ancestry due 
to mixed marriages (Weiss, 2002: 94) made a reservoir of  potential returnees. 
In due time, about a third of  the “Russian” immigrants were “non-Jews.” Yet 
as one commentator observed, these immigrants were also non-Arab, which 
 SECULARISM, RELIGION AND THE STATUS QUO 107
counts far more in Zionist eyes (Lustick, 1999). Indeed, not being a “kosher” 
Jew was a minor imperfection vis-à-vis being Arab, but a drawback within 
Jewish society (Yelenevskaya and Fialkova, 2004).
When the 1989 immigration began, “ethnicity” rather than “religion” seemed 
to dictate its course in the Israeli society. For many Israelis, it was reminiscent 
of  the early 1970s, when Israel welcomed hundreds of  thousands of  Jewish 
immigrants from the Soviet Union and offered them considerable economic 
benefi ts. This generosity was one trigger in the rise of  the Israeli Black Panthers, 
who organized to fi ght the struggle of  the Mizrahi lower class and for whom 
these benefi ts epitomized the state’s continuous indifference to the fate of  the 
Mizrahim when they were making headway to center stage (Bernstein, 1984: 
132). Almost two decades later in the late 1980s as Shas was rising to prominence, 
a new wave of  “Russians” was welcomed as fi lling the dwindling ranks of  the 
old elite, that is, (re)shifting the ethnic balance from Mizrahi to Ashkenazi 
Jews.6 Against this shift, the terminology of  modernization was evoked once 
more as the Russians’ education was contrasted with the “primitivism” and lack 
of  modernity of  the Mizrahim (Shumsky, 2002; Yelenevskaya and Fialkova, 
2004). This immigration was extolled for its scientifi c promise and economic 
contribution, but no less importantly for its potentiality to reshape Israeli culture 
(Kalekin-Fishman, 2004: 255; Smooha, 2008).
Ultimately, the Russians did not easily assimilate into the Ashkenazi society 
(Shumsky, 2002). Nor did they align with the Mizrahim, whose neighbors they 
became and with whom they competed in the secondary labor market. Two 
cultural markers played a signifi cant role in their relative seclusion within their 
new society. First, by rejecting the Zionist cultural homogeneity they retained 
their mother tongue and culture and also created their own educational 
enclaves, mainly in major cities (Kalekin-Fishman, 2004: 260). Secondly, by 
holding on to their nonreligious and especially nonkosher dietary, they broke 
with the tacit agreement to maintain the public sphere ostensibly Jewish 
(Ben-Porat and Feniger, 2009). In the context of  the 1990s, this enhanced 
a newly emerging image of  a multicultural society and a new secularized 
conception of  the public sphere (Yonah and Shenhav, 2005; Ram, 2008), 
which was amplifi ed by Tel Aviv becoming globally renowned for its young, 
“club culture.” “Russian” thus was a “tainted” category, not only in terms 
of  not being properly “Jewish.” Its “problem” for Israeli society was its 
conspicuous atheism that further accentuated the possibility for a secularized 
public sphere against the ambiguous secularism of  Zionism. 
6 Kalekin-Fishman (2004: 249) mentions, matter-of-factly, that a “veiled motivation was 
the desire to repair the balance between the Sephardi [read: Mizrahi] population and 
the population that claimed Ashkenazi ancestry.”
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The “Russians” placed the state in a political strait, between its commitment 
to the status quo and the need to address the immigrants’ concerns. 
Paradoxically, this extended the state’s intervention in religion. While the 
question of  burial was resolved by allowing for noncongregational cemeteries, 
the issue of  marriage remained moot in the absence of  civil marriages in 
Israel. The state set up special rabbinical courts, which were deeply involved in 
a process of  mass religious conversion (Goodman, 2008: 381). Their practice 
exposed the duality of  the concept of  “absorption of  immigration,” namely 
the will to preserve a model of  citizenship based on modernity, secularity 
and Western-ness coupled with the need to mobilize Judaism as the core 
component of  the national and civic identity. Put differently, lacking other 
means to distinguish the “Russian non-Jews” from other non-Jews, the state 
conveniently resorted to the rabbinical courts to do this classifi cation work for 
it. However, this came at a price: deepening the division between Arabs and 
Jews, but also cutting through the “Jewish society,” which was becoming even 
more ethnicized. The contrast in the experiences of  Ethiopian and Russian 
immigrants in these courts is telling. As Goodman (2008) shows, immigrants 
from Ethiopia who arrived parallel to the great immigration from the FSU, 
being considered dubious Jews, were being forced to convert, whereas Russian 
non-Jews could convert by free will at their own convenience – mainly 
when seeking marriage (Gitelman, 2004: 97–8). The naturalization of  new 
immigrants also proved to be subdued by “religion” and by reinforcing ethnic 
boundaries within society. 
Back to Now
Can these stories of  Mizrahi Jews, Arabs and Russians be woven into one 
history of  state and religion? What do they teach us about what the status quo 
means contemporarily? How do they inform us about the failure to open up a 
secularized space and allow a conception of  inclusive citizenship to emerge? 
And above all, can these citizenship stories explicate why secularization has 
remained apolitical for most Israelis? In my fi nal analysis, I propose to read 
them as relating to contemporary manifestations of  the politics of  religion. 
Specifi cally, I explore the “old consociational order,” which dominated 
through the hegemony of  the Labor Party (1930s–70s) and reexamine the 
dynamics of  the status quo in light of  its demise. Under this hegemonic 
order, acts of  naming and practices of  categorization created “ethnicities” 
while determining also “who is a Jew?” Still, these acts delineate the limits of  
Israeli citizenship and reveal the elusive ways in which the state constitutes 
itself  as distinct from society (Mitchell, 1991: 78). The status quo is, then, one 
effect of  the relation between state and society which, I argue, is responsible 
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for “produc[ing] abstract citizens for a state which is, as idea, everywhere yet 
nowhere” (Lloyd and Thomas, 1998: 125). To put this slightly differently, the 
production of  abstract citizens has been represented and maintained by an 
exclusively Jewish consociational democratic order (Cohen and Susser, 2004) 
that at once symbolized a compromise between state and religion and their 
seeming separation and the predominance of  the Ashkenazi middle class over 
the Mizrahi lower class (Levy, 2002). In this sense, the mythical notion of  
the status quo (Boas, 2002: 113) has been more than a consensual political 
mechanism. As our stories show, the status quo became implicated in an 
ethnicized discourse of  citizenship. This, I argue, undermines the claims of  
the Jewish and democratic state to be at once particularistic and universalistic 
and still be seen as a legitimate representative of  society as a whole (compare 
Lloyd and Thomas, 1998: 5). I conclude, then, by discussing the ethnic aspects 
of  the old consociational order and pointing out its limitations in becoming a 
democratic order. 
The debate over the status quo has usually been ethnically blind (as it was 
gender blind (Boas, 2002)). However, ethnicity and class impacted signifi cantly 
on rendering the status quo a constitutive factor of  Israel’s state-religion order. 
Yigal Elam, in his meticulous history of  the status quo, understood it as the 
perimeter, the bounded outer surface within which the struggle over state and 
religion takes place, but of  which no one really wants to dispose (Elam, 2000: 
96). Contrary to typical advocates of  the status quo (Cohen and Susser, 2000; 
Cohen and Rynhold, 2005: 728; and of  course Gavison and Medan, n.d.), what 
Elam proposed was to see the status quo not simply as the best (or least worse) 
compromise the Israeli society could or should achieve. Rather, he claimed, 
the status quo is the most that the political elites of  either side were willing 
to have (see also Kimmerling, 1999; Ram, 2008; Shenhav, 2007). Anything 
more would be unbearable for either the seculars or the religious. Or, put in 
the context of  the secularization thesis, the failure to differentiate “the other 
worldly” from “this worldly” was neither a political mishap, nor an expression 
of  lack of  political power or legitimacy to act upon this issue. For both political 
elites, transcending the perimeter would undermine their representative status 
in the eyes of  each respective constituency and in society at large.7 Thus 
(and here the citizenship stories I have outlined take Elam’s observation a 
7 Elam offers several examples of  this, including, on one side, Ben-Gurion’s refusal to 
abandon religious personal law, and on the other, the religious parties’ failure to propose 
a religiously acceptable Sabbath law for a Jewish state. Interestingly, Rabbi Wasserman 
(2002: 297) similarly demonstrates how the status quo serves the religious leadership 
by allowing the rabbinical elite to dissociate itself  from the religious political one, thus 
enlarging their room for maneuver in the political arena. 
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step further), instead of  seeing the “seculars” and the “religious” as adversaries 
in a struggle over state and religion, we should ask how the status quo became 
a common ground for these political sides to gain control over the state, for 
whom, and at whose expense. The citizenship (hi)stories of  the marginalized 
show the status quo as a determinant of  social boundaries and as preempting 
a social secular consciousness of  the citizens to be. 
The status quo is all but static. Over the years the secular and the religious 
have pulled and pushed it, tallying victories and losses both big and small. 
It became a source of  power, primarily for the religious parties but also for 
its rivals (for one, see in Levy, 2007). Yet in recent decades, its power seemed 
to wither away and its political pillar, the National Religious Party (NRP), 
gradually dissipated, receiving its fi nal blow during the term of  the 18th Knesset 
when it ceased to exist even by name. Ever since the political “upheaval” 
of  1977, when the Likud toppled Labor using the support of  the Mizrahi 
working class, the NRP has been losing its pivotal role as a mediator of  a dual 
tension: between the religious (the ultraorthodox segment to their right) and 
the secular (Labor and its socialist allies to the left) and between the Ashkenazi 
middle class and the Mizrahi working class. The dual role of  religious Zionism 
had been built steadily since the early days of  Zionism and revealed itself  in 
the fi eld of  education (Swirski, 1999; Levy, 2002). In the 1920s, the Zionist 
religious movement had taken over religious education in an attempt to contain 
the more religiously extreme anti-Zionist ultraorthodoxy. Later, in the 1950s, 
the dominant labor party (Mapai) again co-opted the Zionist religious parties 
(that merged in 1956 to create the NRP), this time to contain the Mizrahim, 
who immigrated en masse, threatening to tip the demographic balance against 
the Ashkenazim. 
This partnership, known as the “historical alliance” between Labor and 
religious-Zionism, forged the status quo. Both parties, whose political fl ag 
and ideology was mamlakhtiyut 8, surfaced as the moderate, rational factors 
capable of  appeasing the tension between state and religion. This was made 
evident in the “struggle over education,” which brought the yishuv’s partisan 
educational order to an end but left intact the religious factions’ control 
over education. This revealed two underpinnings of  the new state order and 
of  the evolving conception of  Israeli citizenship. First, that the “historical 
alliance” was based on a partnership that was not solely ideological (Zionist) 
or political but also class motivated. This alliance was led by the rising state-
made Jewish middle class, both religious and nonreligious (see Rosenfeld 
and Carmi, 1976), vis-à-vis the emerging (Jewish) proletariat that was 
8 This term, which translates to kingdomship, was imbued with a strong ideology of  étatisme 
and social unity at all cost. 
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typically Mizrahi. More importantly, it evolved against what had been seen 
and sociologically defi ned as an emotional, irrational and messianic type of  
Zionism, represented by Mizrahi Jews (Eisenstadt, 1947; Shenhav, 2006). 
Secondly, the replacement of  the yishuv’s school system with a bifurcated 
religious/nonreligious one confi rmed that the religious schism was not the 
major source of  fear for the political elites. Rather, the division of  power and 
of  spheres of  infl uence between Labor and the NRP reinforced a consensus 
between these parties that Jewishness would remain constitutive in the 
Zionist conception of  Israeli citizenship. Alas, this conception was imbued 
with Ashkenazi symbols of  pioneering that had left the Mizrahi immigrants 
secluded from the Zionist, modernist ethos (Shafi r and Peled, 2002). In 
the 1970s the Mizrahim turned away from the hegemonic conceptions of  
nationalism and Zionism, thus marking the decline of  the old Ashkenazi-
religious alliance and setting the stage for a new state-religion alliance to 
appear. From the 1980s, Shas led this new ethnoreligious partnership that 
further reinforced the place of  the status quo.9 
The changes in the interrelationship between the Mizrahim and the state 
were not strictly political or educational. They were taking place as the rise 
of  the Israeli Black Panthers (1970–71) threatened to destabilize the social 
order and the Israeli economy was in transition to a market-based economy 
(Shalev, 1999). In this historical context of  the aftermath of  the 1967 war, 
the social boundaries between Jews and Arabs were redefi ned and the 
conception of  Israeli citizenship remolded once more. Then, when the 
military administration within Israel had been removed only to be restored 
in the newly occupied territories, a new social marker was drawn along the 
Green Line (the pre-1967 armistice border). Put differently, while the political 
successors and offspring of  the Zionist religious movement were exerting all 
effort to blur the Green Line – “for the Land and the Lord” (Lustick, 1988) – 
the Green Line was integral to the Palestinians’ very identity. The Palestinian 
workers from the occupied territories were entering the Israeli labor market 
but remained “the enemy,” while those who resided within the Green Line 
were required to see themselves as Israelis. Citizenship became meaningful 
for the Palestinians in Israel, and a way to become active members in society. 
But this upgrade in their citizenship status could not be unrestricted. This 
again rendered the continuation of  the status quo pertinent, not only for 
9 Interestingly, this centrality of  Shas and of  the ultraorthodox Jewish parties in this new 
alliance brought about an attempt to create a counteralliance. In 2001 Shinui, the most 
vocal anticlerical Ashkenazi middle-class party, collaborated with the NRP, the Jewish 
Orthodox religious party, to propose a new basic law that would determine Israel’s 
character as a Zionist, Jewish and democratic state. Maybe its most salient uniqueness 
was that this alliance was ostensibly non-Mizrahi (see Levy, 2007).  
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the sake of  maintaining the boundary between Jews and Arabs (as who was 
a Jew was still more important than who was an Israeli). The fate of  the Black 
Panthers was telling; any attempt to turn it into a class-based struggle for 
both Palestinian and Jewish workers had been curtailed and delegitimized as 
opposing the national imperative and unity (Bernstein, 1984). Moreover, as 
the Mizrahim were stepping towards center stage, their Jewishness became 
an indispensible asset and their political move to the right and to the religious 
parties therefore became inevitable. Religion had again become the common 
denominator for politicians, now mostly from the right and from the ethno-
religious political parties. These politicians sought to reiterate the centrality, 
indeed the supremacy of  the status quo in maintaining the social order. 
As argued before, Shas was the centerpiece of  this new order. 
Soon after Shas bloomed in the political arena as the new pivotal party 
determining the fates of  ruling coalitions, the infl ux of  immigrants from 
the Former Soviet Union threatened to undermine, if  not overthrow, the 
enduring status quo. The “Russian” immigration was ostensibly nonreligious 
(as well as partly non-Jewish) (Goldstein and Gitelman, 2005: 251). Had it 
collaborated with the anticlerical forces, it would minimize the political clout 
of  “the religious.” However, the political trajectory of  this new electorate was 
different, and not only did it not eventually topple the “religious” parties, it 
practically reinforced the importance of  religion as a marker of  citizenship. 
In the political arena, this was made evident by the eventual demise of  the 
“Russian ethnic parties” that, at one point, seemed to form a counterethnic, 
counterreligious political force.
The “problem” of  the “Russian immigration” was of  a dual nature. One 
question was whether this immigration would integrate into society and into 
the existing political and social order. Since many of  the immigrants were 
pushed out of  Russia rather than pulled by their Zionist zeal, it was feared 
that their preference for holding on to their own language and culture would 
also imply their preclusion from the main quarters of  society. Apparently, this 
fear was allayed as the new immigrants proved to be secular but ideologically 
right wing (Shalev and Levy, 2005: 181; Goldstein and Gitelman, 2005: 249). 
The second question concerned non-Jewish immigrants. Conversion was not 
a mass solution, but rather a personal one limited to those who were willing to 
undergo conversion. Consequently, the “Russian immigration” has retained 
a considerable non-Jewish component, contributing to the reluctance of  its 
majority to conform in keeping the public sphere seemingly Jewish. One 
major example is the fl ourishing of  nonkosher butcheries and supermarkets 
that previously were kept from the public eye (Ben-Porat and Feinger, 2008). 
This occasionally confl icted with the religious feelings of  peripheral Mizrahim, 
contributing to the accentuation of  “religion” as the dividing line. In this 
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sense, the emerging animosity between “Russians” and Mizrahim, especially 
where the latter were drawn to Shas and “back to religion,” was not simply 
an extension of  xenophobic inclinations from the “old” homeland (Shumsky, 
2002; Caneti-Nisim et al., 2006). It was “Israeli-made” racism that fueled the 
ethnicization of  citizenship. The following story testifi es to how far this went. 
The entrenchment of  religiosity, ethnicity and nationalism had taken a 
somewhat surprising turn in the West Bank Jewish settlement of  Nokdim. 
Recently, the members of  this mixed religious-secular community of  mostly 
immigrants from the Russian republics decided to bar non-Jewish Russian-
Israelis from owning houses in the settlement for, to cite Nokdim’s secretary: 
If  you accept 10 families in which the mother isn’t Jewish, then soon 
there will be 30 children, and tomorrow your son could fall in love with 
the good-looking girl next door. It’s a real problem. (Levinson, 2010)
Accentuating a general hardline right-wing position amongst this constituency, 
another speaker did not hesitate in comparing these Israeli citizens to terrorists, 
adding that,
We have to separate ourselves from the gentiles in commerce and 
everything else – particularly when it comes to living with them. It could 
lead to assimilation or idol worship; it opens the door to all kinds of  
trouble. They might lead us into committing offenses that Jews normally 
don’t do, like idolatry and incest and all kinds of  other perversions. 
(Levinson, 2010)
Conclusion
The relationship between state and religion in Israel is embedded in every 
aspect of  social life and as such, religion matters beyond its institutional 
arrangements and the political agreements that it entails. There is no 
disputing the impact of  religion on, say, the fate of  the Israeli-Palestinian 
confl ict, the future of  labor-migrants or even the content of  heritage studies 
at elementary school. Yet it is its presence in the mundane and quotidian 
aspects of  Israeli lives (Karrayani, 2007) that renders the debate over whether 
and how the interrelationship between state, nationalism and religion should 
be understood as complex and confl ictive. Indeed, as shown here, the very 
questions of  who the Israelis are – Mizrahim, Arabs or Russians – and hence 
of  what Israeli society is, are determined by the interplay of  modernization, 
secularization/desecularization and ethnicization. It is in this sense that the 
status quo becomes not merely a political mechanism delimiting the extent of  
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state-religion relationship or determining the particular makeup of  the political 
alliance that supports it (Cohen and Susser, 2000: 18). What makes the status 
quo germane and practically indispensable is that it defi nes for many Israelis 
their social order, or the perimeter beyond the scope of  which religion should 
not be questioned (Elam, 2000). In closing I intend to revisit this observation 
by relating it to the interplay between ethnicity, citizenship and religion.
Maybe the most perplexing aspect of  the status quo is the discrepancy 
between its formal characteristics – mainly the absence of  civil marriages 
and, in general, the precedence of  “personal law” over a statist conception 
of  “territorial law” in all related matters – and the façade of  a Westernized, 
secularized public sphere. In light of  the prominence of  “religious politics” 
manifested in the salience of  religious political parties and in the visibility 
of  “religious issues,” it is striking that no major force seeks to politicize the 
concept of  secularization. Regarding the marginalized groups of  Arabs, 
Mizrahim and Russians, I argue that the entrenchment of  the status quo in 
processes and practices of  ethnic categorization in the sense of  implicating 
nationalism, ethnicity and religion in these groups’ conceptions of  citizenship 
gave them a vested interest in its continuation. These processes, elevating 
the existence of  the status quo to a point of  indisputability, eventually caused 
the nonreligious elites and their constituencies to lose interest in changing the 
status quo. In other words, it is commonly suggested that “religion” is intrinsic 
to the identity of  ethnic and lower-class categories, whether as a result of  
their being “traditionalists” as more conservative sociologists tend to argue or 
being marked as “religious” through practices of  “religionization” as critical 
observers claim (Levy and Emmerich, 2001; Shenhav, 2006). However, what 
is neglected is that a similar interest in the continuation of  the status quo that 
pertains to the ethnic (Ashkenazi) and national (Jewish) identity of  the middle 
class prevents them from being the vanguard of  secularization. 
Secularizing the state is not equivalent to secularizing the public sphere, 
which occurs as part of  everyday consumerism and in line with the rise of  
new cosmopolitan lifestyles (Ben-Porat and Feniger, 2009; Kaplan, 2011). In 
fi nal analysis, what the “seculars” fear is the loss of  Israel’s Jewish identity, 
were they to follow the logic of  secularization and require from the state 
and from themselves to be rid of  the ethnic elements – both Jewish and 
Ashkenazi – of  Israeli citizenship. If  the state were to disengage from its 
Jewish component, “secular” Jews would fear being submerged in an Orient 
that still haunts them. Had Israel given the Palestinian citizens “full and 
equal rights,” as recently contended by Shlomo Avineri (2010), a left-
leaning political theorist, there would be no escape from Israel’s eventually 
becoming “Falastin.” This fear echoes and reinforces an “internal fear” that 
resonated in the roar of  the crowd in 1999: “Anything but Shas” (Shalev and 
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Levy, 2005: 181). At that time, when the option of  a political partnership 
between the purportedly all-encompassing “One Israel” political alliance 
and Shas was within reach, the Ashkenazi middle-class supporters of  “One 
Israel” seemed to prefer revitalizing the “old” consociational order with the 
(by then) ultranationalistic right-wing National Religious Party. Shas was 
declined as a legitimate partner, despite its supporting a peaceful resolution 
of  the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. In other words, neither the possibility of  
peace nor the opportunity to redefi ne the relationship between state and 
religion were worth the price of  unraveling the elusiveness of  the status quo 
and ridding the Israeli citizenship of  its ethnic array.
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Chapter 5
MANAGING CHINA’S MUSLIM 
MINORITIES: MIGRATION, LABOR 
AND THE RISE OF ETHNORELIGIOUS 
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG UYGHURS 
IN URBAN XINJIANG
Reza Hasmath
University of  Western Sydney
Introduction
Although China is commonly perceived as being ethnically homogenous, 
nearly 9 percent of  the total population consists of  ethnic minorities whose 
importance for China’s long-term development is disproportionate to their 
numbers. Among the estimated 106.4 million ethnic minorities, the majority 
have traditionally concentrated in the resource-rich western areas of  the 
nation (NBS/EAC, 2003). Foremost among these areas is the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in China’s northwest – occupying one-
sixth of  the country’s total land mass and holding one of  the nation’s largest 
and most strategically important natural gas and oil reserves1 – where nearly 
8.4 million Uyghurs,2 a Turkic, mostly Sunni-Muslim ethnic minority,3 reside 
in the majority.4
 1 The issue of  energy is not negligible in discussions about ethnoreligious relations 
in Xinjiang. Given the region’s rich energy resources and geographical positioning, 
Xinjiang has become indispensible as a distributor of  oil and natural gas to energy-
guzzling Central Asia and the surrounding Chinese provinces.
 2 Islamic identity among Uyghurs is older than the concept of  Uyghurs as an ethnic 
minority group. As a result, it has historically been a common habit among Uyghurs 
(and non-Uyghurs alike) to confl ate “Uyghur” with “Muslim,” and to ascertain that 
all “Muslim Uyghurs” are united as Muslims. This is not entirely accurate. Although 
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Tensions between Muslim Uyghurs and Han Chinese (the national 
majority) have dominated discussions in the region as a result of  historical 
and contemporary incidents between both groups. For instance, during the 
Gulja Incident during the Muslim holy month of  Ramadan in February 
1997, a series of  riots and demonstrations occurred due to crackdowns by 
Chinese authorities on traditional Uyghur culture, including most notably 
the banning of  traditional social gatherings (meshrep). More recently in July 
2009, violent riots in the region’s capital, Urumqi, resulted in 197 Uyghur 
and Han deaths and 1,721 injured (Hao et al., 2009). In general, contributing 
factors behind Muslim Uyghur-Han Chinese tensions revolve around policies 
that limit religious practice or aim to phase out Uyghur language instruction 
in schools. For example, public sector employees are not allowed to wear 
Islamic head scarves or coverings (including the doppa cap for males), nor fast 
during Ramadan.5 Individuals under the age of  18 are not allowed to enter 
religious places such as mosques or pray in schools.6 The study of  the Koran 
is only allowed in designated government schools, and Imams cannot teach 
the Koran in private. There are documented accounts by Muslim Uyghurs 
who report that government informers regularly attend their prayer services 
in local mosques, especially the Friday sermon (see Fuller and Lipman, 2004). 
 Islam is a common marker of  Uyghur identity, a common cultural heritage, diet 
and language are other salient markers as well. Moreover, there are competing Sufi 
and non-Sufi factions, and linguistic discrepancies among this minority nationality. 
Notwithstanding, the increasing arrival and presence of  Hans in Xinjiang have only 
intensified closer linkages between Islam and Uyghur identity to the point they are 
often seen as synonymous on the ground.
 3 While there is a lively scholarly debate on the utility of  using the terms “ethnic 
minorities,” “ethnic groups” (zuqun) and “minority nationalities” (shaoshu minzu) in 
P. R. China (see Ma, 2001), until academic consensus is reached, and for the purposes 
of  this chapter, the three terms will be used with a similar intentionality. 
 4 Islam in Xinjiang has been infl uenced by the region’s proximity to Central Asia. Islam 
entered Xinjiang from central Asia in the tenth century. By the mid-fi fteenth century 
the Turkic speakers of  the Tarim basin oases had almost universally converted to Islam 
(Fuller and Lipman, 2004).
 5 All Communist Party members and employees on the state payroll, Uyghurs inclusive, 
cannot attend prayers of  religious practices. 
 6 This can potentially lead to a process of  deculturalization by depriving youths 
grounding in Muslim Uyghur traditional community values. Put another way, the 
distance from Islam at a young age may encourage more Uyghurs to adopt the 
secular ideology of  the Chinese state rather than to practice Islam from the age of  
18 onwards. The effects on this policy, coupled with the growing numerical presence 
of  non-Muslim Han Chinese, has lead many older Muslim Uyghurs to worry that 
their offspring will be drawn away from their ancestral faith by the attraction of  Han 
materialism (see Fuller and Lipman, 2004).
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Furthermore, Chinese authorities have slowly phased out the use of  the 
Uyghur language in the majority of  schools and universities, leaving Mandarin 
Chinese as the main mode of  instruction.7 As one Uyghur woman commented 
in the aftermath of  the July 2009 riots, Hans “don’t respect our lifestyle... we 
want our dignity” (Wong, 2009). 
The state’s response to potential outbursts of  Muslim Uyghur dissent has 
consisted of  periods of  “soft” and “hard” policies. Clarke (2010) characterizes 
the “soft” approach to acquiesce the Muslim Uyghur population as relative 
tolerance of  institutionalized Islam, viz. state funding of  the Chinese Islamic 
Association, and the building and upkeep of  mosques. There are over twenty 
thousand mosques in Xinjiang reported by the Information Offi ce of  the State 
Council (2000), which makes this endeavor relatively signifi cant. The “hard” 
approach is illustrated by “re-educating” and “reforming” religious leaders8 
and clamping down on “illegal” mosque construction when the state perceives 
them to be a threat to security.
Coiled within this unnerving interaction between Muslim Uyghurs and 
Hans, commentators have noted there is a growing rise of  ethnoreligious 
consciousness among Muslim Uyghurs which often revolves around 
highlighting differences to Hans.9 As Gladney (1996) argues, Muslim Uyghurs 
are subscribing to certain identities under highly contextualized moments of  
social relations. That is, the close link between Islam and Uyghur identity 
has meant that any shifts by state authorities in regulating religious practice 
via varying “soft” or “hard” policies has been a source of  contention for 
Muslim Uyghurs who believe it is a attack on their personal identity. From 
the state’s perspective, a heightened religious consciousness among Muslim 
Uyghurs, if  not adequately managed, can lead to dissent in this strategically 
 7 State authorities generally respond that the shift to a near-universal use of  Mandarin 
Chinese in schools and universities is to ensure that Uyghurs can compete on equal 
footing with Hans in the labor market, and relatedly to maximize their educational 
potential.
 8 The goal of  “reeducation” is to ensure that religious leaders do not advocate Islamic 
“fundamentalism” or “radicalism” as defi ned by the state or forge connections between 
Muslims in China and elsewhere. 
 9 For example, many Uyghurs attend mosque on Friday as a means of  reinforcing the 
distinctiveness of  the Uyghur community (see Fuller and Lipman, 2004). In addition, 
since Islamic diet requires meat to be prepared in accordance to religious practice, and it 
strictly prohibits the consumption of  pork – a staple among Hans – there is the potential 
for reduced social interactions between Muslim Uyghurs and Hans. Perhaps the most 
culpable barrier for Muslim Uyghur interactions with Hans is the institutionalization 
of  ethnic groups by the CPC itself. The offi cial system of  categorization constantly 
reminds Uyghurs that they are members of  a fi xed and specifi c ethnic group differing 
from the dominant majority Hans.
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important area of  China. Finley (2007: 628) goes a step further than Gladney, 
specifi cally outlining three ways Uyghur ethnoreligious consciousness 
manifests on the ground: (1) daily repetition of  negative stereotypes of  Han 
Chinese; (2) symbolic, spatial and social segregation from Han Chinese; and 
(3) dissemination of  alternative representations of  Han/Uyghur as colonizer/
colonized through the medium of  popular Uyghur song. By utilizing these 
strategies, Muslim Uyghurs seemingly create a discourse that rejects national 
unity and reemphasizes Uyghur cultural and social differences from Hans. 
Of  course, those “same differences apparently did not prevent Uyghurs from 
interacting with the Han in the past... nor do those differences stop Uyghurs 
from interacting with Han Chinese in the present context when it suits them 
to do so” (Smith, 2002: 156). 
While the studies cited thus far correctly attribute cultural repression as the 
main culprit behind the rise of  ethnoreligious consciousness among Uyghurs, 
the State Ethnic Minorities Commissioner suggests an alternative explanation, 
arguing that the increased minority migration to urban areas is the main reason 
behind the “disrupted social harmony” between Muslim Uyghurs and Hans 
(see Mittenhal, 2002). While increased numbers of  Uyghur and Han migrants 
are heading into Xinjiang’s cities, pushed by demographic pressures and pulled 
by economic structural transformations, the commissioner’s comments are 
worth exploring. Are the burgeoning numbers of  Uyghur migrants entering 
Xinjiang’s urban entities potentially creating new social mosaics to such an 
extent that they are the main source of  increased levels of  ethnoreligious 
consciousness? Put another way, what contributory roles do socioeconomic 
factors such as labor shares and sectoral distribution in major occupational 
categories and the likewise growing Han migration have on ethnoreligious 
consciousness among Uyghurs?
The aim of  this chapter is thus to examine the potential role of  increasing 
migration on the management of  Muslim Uyghur and Han Chinese interactions 
in urban Xinjiang. The fi rst section will provide a brief  contextualization 
of  Uyghur and Han presence in Xinjiang, followed by a discussion of  the 
spatial inequalities indicative of  urbanization patterns that favor Han internal 
migrants. The chapter will proceed to describe Xinjiang’s division of  labor 
and subsequently the potential linkages social stratifi cation has for the rise of  
contemporary ethnoreligious consciousness among the Uyghur population.
Migratory and Urbanization Patterns 
Before Xinjiang was annexed in 1760 by the Qing Dynasty, the region 
never constituted a single polity but rather was crisscrossed by fl uid borders 
and contested by innumerable warlords and imperial powers including the 
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Mongol, Russian and British empires.10 In 1884, a weakened Qing empire 
converted Xinjiang to provincial status, shifting the capital from Ili to 
Urumqi. After the Qing Dynasty was replaced by the Republic of  China 
in 1912, two short-lived Eastern Turkestan republics were established until 
September 1949, where the Communist Party of  China (CPC) proclaimed it 
“liberated” the region. By October 1955 it established the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region.11 
After “liberation” the CPC instituted a program of  resettlement of  Hans 
to “rusticate” urban youths and integrate the non-Han population into China 
proper. As a result, Xinjiang’s Han population has increased steadily, save for 
a rapid leap between 1958 and 1960 – the period of  the Great Leap Forward 
and ensuing calamitous Great Leap famine that killed roughly 30 million. The 
sudden escalation of  Han residents during this period has two primary causes. 
First, unsustainable expansion of  industry and accompanying urbanization 
and second, Xinjiang did not suffer severe food shortages during this time and 
therefore received an infl ux of  internal migrants from other parts of  China in 
search of  food (Pannell and Ma, 1997). In aggregate terms, between 1953 and 
2000 the Han Chinese population increased their share of  the region’s total 
population from 6.1 percent to 40.6 percent. 
The Chinese have historically controlled Xinjiang through the construction 
of  garrisons and urban settlements (Gaubatz, 1996; Van Wie Davis, 2008). 
In this tradition, the CPC have continued to use these methods of  control 
in tandem with agricultural settlements in the form of  the still very active 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) established in 1954 
and originally created to employ demobilized troops. The XPCC is one of  
Xinjiang’s three main administrative organs which operates as an autonomous 
society with its own public security and judicial organs. In 1996 it was elevated 
to the same political status as the Xinjiang government (see Seymour, 2000 
for further details). One of  the practical consequences of  consolidating power 
through this administrative setup is that it places Muslim Uyghurs in structural 
competition with other minority groups, retaining executive power in the 
hands of  predominantly Han upper-level offi cials (see Millward and Tursun, 
2004). For example, the XPCC currently reserves approximately 800 of  840 
civil servant job openings for Han Chinese.
10 Uyghurs and Hans generally disagree on which group has a legitimate historical claim 
to the region. Uyghurs assert that they are indigenous to the area, whereas Chinese 
authorities consider Xinjiang to have belonged to China since the Han Dynasty (202 
BC–220 AD).
11 This was a renunciation of  the earlier CPC 1934 Basic Law, which stipulated the right of  
all national minorities to separate from China and to create their own autonomous state.
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Xinjiang’s Hans have a tendency to settle in wealthier urban areas, while 
Uyghurs tend to constitute the majority in rural areas or the poorer urban 
areas of  southern Xinjiang (see Cao, 2010). Offi cially, 80.8 percent of  Uyghurs 
reside in rural areas, in comparison to 46.4 percent for Hans; 9 percent and 
10.1 percent of  Uyghurs live in the town and city, with a corresponding fi gure 
of  13.0 percent and 40.6 percent for the Han population (calculated using 
NBS/EAC, 2003).12 The strong Han presence in cities encourages claims 
that a form of  internal Han colonization through encirclement or population 
swamping is taking place in the region – a matter that will be explored in 
further depth in a later section. Fueling this claim are statistics that indicate 
that between 1991 and 2000, Han presence in Xinjiang’s urban areas increased 
at a positive rate of  about 2 percent, almost the inverse of  the corresponding 
rate for Uyghurs, −1.9 percent. Moreover, as Table 5.1 suggests, between 
1991 and 2000 Uyghurs’ share of  the urban population declined signifi cantly 
in nearly all major cities, except for Kashgar and Hotan, both of  which are 
located in the penurious south and whose economies are highly dependent 
upon agriculture.
The urban percentage changes for Han and Uyghur form mirror images. 
Han markedly increased in proportion in major cities, by over 5 percent in 
Korla, Aksu, Hami, Turpan, Bortala and Yi’ning. Korla, whose economy is 
buttressed by the oil and gas industries, is one of  the three main centers of  
production in Xinjiang (the other two being Urumqi and Karamay). Aksu, 
Xinjiang’s third biggest city, witnessed the most dramatic change to ethnic 
population distribution. In this city Han increased their population by 127,824 
between 1991 and 2000. The corresponding fi gure for Uyghurs was only 
31,012 (NBS/EAC, 2003). Aksu, despite being in the poorer Tarim basin, 
generates far more industrial activity than Kashgar or Khotan. Furthermore, 
it has a large, mainly Han XPCC presence, and is a destination for many 
interprovincial migrants. The only exception to mounting sinifi cation of  the 
cities is Altay in the far north. Altay is in a county with a relatively low per 
capita GDP (approximately 4,000 RMB, or ~590 USD) so it may not attract 
many interprovincial Hans. 
12 The legacy of  the hukou (household registration) system, instituted since 1958, must 
be factored in to the creation of  this demographic urban-rural discrepancy among 
Uyghurs. According to the hukou system, all individuals must be registered in the 
locale where they commonly reside – categorized further as either “nonagricultural” 
(urban) or “agricultural” (rural) – whereby entitlements such as housing, education and 
employment rights are administered accordingly. As a consequence, the hukou system 
has to a great extent controlled the mobility of  rural to urban migration (see Wu and 
Treiman, 2004 for further details).
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From another standpoint, the birth rate among Hans (1.5 percent) in 
Xinjiang is quite low in comparison to Uyghurs (4.3 percent) (Xinjiang Statistical 
Yearbook, 2001). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the increase in the Han 
urban population principally results from increased Han internal migration. 
The Han bias in urbanization is a key demographic and development 
issue within Xinjiang. As Hasmath and Hsu (2007) argue in the case of  the 
Tibet Autonomous Region, the urgent development issue for minorities is 
not population dominance but access to the privileged trappings of  urban 
development – the locus of  economic and political power. In the context of  
Xinjiang, regional and ethnic inequality is worsening as demonstrated in the 
next section despite its GDP per capita ranking twelfth among China’s 31 
provinces and regions in 2000. The Han population is disproportionately 
concentrated in locations where average income is highest. There is a clear 
and signifi cant correlation between GDP per capita and the proportion of  
Han residents as Tables 5.2 and 5.3 attest. In fact, every percentage point 
increase in the non-Han share of  the population is associated with an expected 
Table 5.1. Uyghur and Han population shares in Xinjiang’s major cities, 1991–2000
Uyghurs Hans
1991
(%)
2000
(%)
Change
(%)
1991
(%)
2000
(%)
Change
(%)
Urumqi 12.43 12.79 0.37 72.88 75.30 2.42
Karamay 15.27 13.78 −1.49 75.97 78.07 2.10
Shihezi 1.04 1.20 0.15 95.50 94.53 −0.98
Kuitun 0.28 0.47 0.19 95.43 94.62 −0.81
Yi’ning 51.29 45.54 −5.75 32.11 38.77 6.66
Tacheng 3.64 3.19 −0.44 64.02 63.73 −0.29
Altay 2.63 2.80 0.17 59.60 54.55 −5.06
Bortala 19.17 15.44 −3.74 61.01 67.97 6.95
Changji 3.13 2.87 −0.26 75.85 77.46 1.61
Turpan 72.67 70.38 −2.30 19.48 21.95 2.47
Hami 26.17 21.19 −4.98 65.94 71.73 5.79
Korla 32.29 26.36 −5.92 64.52 69.84 5.33
Aksu 46.01 38.07 −7.93 52.73 60.06 7.33
Artush 81.76 79.75 −2.01 6.22 8.10 1.88
Kashgar 74.89 77.36 2.47 24.02 21.78 −2.24
Hotan 81.06 82.40 1.34 18.60 17.01 −1.60
Source: Calculated using NBS/EAC (2003).
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decrease in GDP per capita of  44 RMB (~6.50 USD) (see Wiemer, 2004 for 
calculations).
Economic Situation 
The division of  labor in Xinjiang is greatly shaped by migration and 
urbanization patterns. In particular the oasis settlements where the majority 
of  Muslim Uyghurs reside, land is scarce and the small plots cultivated are 
insuffi cient to satisfy subsistence needs and provide work to all the available 
labor force in the household (Beller-Hann, 1997). As elsewhere in China 
following the advent of  the rural responsibility system, the agriculture sector 
was unable to absorb surplus labor. In addition, due to a lack of  markets, 
infrastructure and the high dispersion of  the population, rural industrial and 
transport activities are very limited. Whereas 26 percent of  China’s township 
and village enterprises (TVEs) involve industry or transport, the corresponding 
fi gure for Xinjiang TVEs is 8.6 percent (Sautman, 2000).
The economic structural forces underlying urbanization can be illustrated by 
comparing GDP to labor share ratios. These indicate the relative productivity 
of  labor within different industries in terms of  its value-added contribution to 
GDP. Table 5.2 illustrates the labor shares (percentage of  employed persons) 
and GDP to labor share ratios in the primary, secondary and tertiary industries. 
Table 5.2. Labor shares and GDP/labor share ratios 
(in parentheses), 2000
Primary Secondary Tertiary
XUAR 55.90
(0.34)
13.60
(3.10)
30.50
(1.27)
China 50.00
(0.31)
21.40
(2.39)
28.60
(1.17)
Source: Calculated using Xinjiang Population Census 2000 (2002).
Table 5.3. Sectoral distribution by ethnicity, 2000
Uyghurs Hans Other
Primary 59.87 25.13 15.00
Secondary 18.16 75.61 6.24
Tertiary 25.56 62.62 11.81
Source: Calculated using Xinjiang Population Census 2000 
(2002).
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What is observed is that the GDP/labor share ratio is highest in the secondary 
industry, which – it should be noted – generally has higher capital inputs. Thus, 
the relative GDP contribution of  one worker in this industry is higher than in 
the primary and tertiary industries. The value added contribution includes 
wages and profi ts. In short, the high secondary and tertiary ratios refl ect the 
relatively high salary levels in these industries (approximately 14,000 RMB 
(2,070 USD) per annum). These are more than double the primary industry 
(approximately 6,500 RMB (960 USD) per annum), which has particularly 
low remuneration (Sautman, 2000). In Xinjiang, the secondary and tertiary 
industries are more productive than in China as a whole – a gauge of  the 
relative structural dominance of  these industries in Xinjiang’s economic 
development.
The critical issue here is that while Uyghurs have a saturated concentration 
in primary industries, Hans dominate the secondary and tertiary industries 
(see Table 5.3). Put another way, key strategic resources of  the region such 
as electricity, gas and water are managed and concentrated by Han Chinese 
(odds ratio: 0.06).13 The types and quality of  jobs Uyghurs receive are crucial 
to understanding this stratifi cation. Hans have moved into the private sector – 
where minorities are not faring well – as the formal urban state and collective 
sector diminishes in economic importance. Note that total employment in 
work units has slumped drastically in a background where the total number 
of  Xinjiang inhabitants of  working age has grown. In 2000, 2,762,260 were 
“formal employees” and 4,175,900 were “urban individuals” or “rural laborers” 
(Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2001). The minority share of  employment in local 
state-owned units (40.7 percent in 1991; 43.2 percent in 1996) greatly outweighs 
their share of  employment in central state-owned units (9.4 percent in 1991; 
10.5 percent in 1996) (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 1992, 1997). Offi cial statistics 
in later years do not differentiate minority share by these divisions. However, 
such fi gures, ignored in debates on internal Han colonialism in Xinjiang, are 
a strong sign of  unequal distribution of  political power. Note also that in the 
secondary sector – industry – there has been a decrease of  1 percent of  minority 
participation and a negligible increase (0.3 percent) in construction. Most 
noteworthy is the labor force shift to the tertiary sector, especially wholesale 
and retail trade and the decrease in importance of  the secondary sector.
Many of  the Han Chinese interprovincial migrants are spontaneous, not 
part of  state-directed population transfers. Their presence within urban areas 
and within high-status, high-paying occupations (defi ned in this instance as 
above the average annual wage of  10,278 RMB (1,517 USD)) contributes 
13 Unlike measures of  difference, odd ratios are not influenced by ceiling and floor 
effects.
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to the perception of  urban Xinjiang being an internal Han colony. As 
Table 5.4 illustrates, Hans are overrepresented in high-status and high-paying 
occupations where over 25 percent of  the Han working population reside, 
in comparison to 9 percent for Uyghurs. On the other hand, Uyghurs are 
overrepresented in agriculture where over 80 percent of  the group’s working 
population is presently (odds ratio: 4.66).
The transformation from a state-planned to market-based economy during 
the 1980s and early 1990s slowly created an ownership structure in Xinjiang 
that shifted towards the private sector (see Dreyer 2000 for further details). 
Table 5.4. Occupation sector concentration and odds ratios by Uyghur and Han 
population in Xinjiang, 2000
Occupational sector Uyghur
%
Han
%
Odds ratios 
(Uyghur/Han)*
H
ig
h
-s
ta
tu
s,
 h
ig
h
-p
ay
in
g
 o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s Banking, security and insurance 0.06 0.52 0.43
Scientifi c research and technical 
services
3.33 3.80 0.77
Electricity, gas and water 0.43 1.76 0.06
Public management and social 
organization
2.54 4.84 0.28
Health, social securities and social 
welfare
0.04 0.46 0.01
Education and culture, sports and 
entertainment
2.09 4.84 0.08
Geologic prospecting and 
management of  water conservance
0.51 6.92 0.01
Restaurant and retail trade 4.04 12.83 0.10
L
o
w
-s
ta
tu
s,
 l
o
w
-
p
ay
in
g
 o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
s Other professions 0.39 1.13 0.12
Real estate 0.26 1.48 0.03
Transport, storage and post 1.26 5.51 0.05
Manufacturing 3.79 12.80 0.09
Mining 0.39 2.28 0.03
Construction 0.27 0.97 0.08
Farming, forestry and animal 80.60 37.32 4.66
Source: Calculated using NBS/EAC (2003).
* The odds ratios compare the odds of  working in an occupational sector [p(outcome) / 
(1–p(outcome)] for Uyghurs (numerator) and Hans (denominator). An odds ratio value of  1 thus 
indicates group equity; an odds ratio value that is > 1 indicates that Uyghurs are more likely to 
work in that particular occupational sector; conversely, an odds ratio value that is < 1 indicates 
that Uyghurs are less likely to work in the respected occupational sector. Occupational Catego-
ries set by the National Bureau of  Statistics. 
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While the private sector is relatively weak in Xinjiang compared to other 
western provinces, its importance has grown rapidly, accounting for about 
20 percent of  the region’s total GDP in 2003. Between 1995 and 2002, the 
urban state sector in Xinjiang shed 884,000 jobs and its share in overall urban 
employment dropped from 80.6 percent to 59.0 percent. In contrast, Xinjiang’s 
total number of  getihu (private businesses with fewer than eight employees) and 
siying qiye (more than eight employees) has burgeoned. By December 2003, 
Xinjiang had 36,617 siying qiye employing 491,657 persons. This amounted 
to a rise of  31.1 percent and 27 percent respectively over the previous year. 
The number of  getihu also increased over the same 12 months to 449,911 
(4.2 percent increase), employing some 706,556 persons (7.7 percent increase). 
Muslim Uyghurs are faring relatively poorly in the private sector and 
are far less inclined towards self-employment than Han. The private sector 
attracts many Han internal migrants, as does the XPCC. For this reason, 
some commentators have recommended that reducing the size of  the XPCC 
would also reduce pressure on local employment by cutting down on the 
large population of  itinerant Han migrant workers (see Vicziany and Zhang, 
2004). While this recommendation could potentially be fruitful, deeper 
processes linked to the marketization of  the economy and social networks that 
manufacture social exclusion must be fully factored in any recommendations 
for change as the following sections suggest. 
Marketization and the Rise of  Ethnoreligious Consciousness
The current migration, urbanization and economic patterns may lead one to 
reasonably conclude that there is a growing internal Han colony in Xinjiang’s 
political economy (see Sautman, 2000). To attribute this reality entirely to 
state policy may not be entirely accurate. State policy does not wholeheartedly 
perpetuate a cultural division of  labor, notwithstanding XPCC civil servant 
hiring practices. Indeed, there are numerous preferential policies in hiring 
and promotion, school admissions, the fi nancing and taxation of  businesses 
which, at least as to higher-status, high-paying occupations, ultimately benefi t 
Muslim Uyghurs. Moreover, when both Uyghurs and Hans are abundant in 
low-status, low-paying occupations (91 and 75 percent respectively), the lack 
of  a cultural division of  labor diminishes ethnoreligious solidarity. Arguably, 
what is increasing ethnoreligious solidarity and consciousness among Uyghurs 
in particular are the effects of  the marketization of  an emerging capitalist 
economy in Xinjiang.14 
14 The same operations can potentially be used to understand contemporary Buddhist 
and Daoist revivalism as discussed in Barbalet’s chapter. 
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As Hasmath’s (2011) research in Beijing illustrates, in spite of  having 
higher educational attainment, minority nationalities generally have lower 
employment rates and wages than their Han counterparts. Hans seemingly 
tend to use their social connections to fi nd occupational opportunities in the 
capital city in greater instances than minorities – two-thirds of  all positions 
found by Hans were found in this fashion, whereas the corresponding fi gure 
for minority nationalities were one-twelfth of  all positions found. Similar 
processes are at work in Xinjiang. Under a socialist mode of  production, the 
state was compelled to integrate Uyghurs and was able to accomplish this task 
by providing “iron rice bowl” jobs (tie fan wan) in state-owned and collective-
owned enterprises.15 Essentially, in Xinjiang as well as the rest of  China, there 
was an institutional system of  “organized dependence” (Walder, 1986) whereby 
the individual was tied to his or her work unit for life in exchange for secure 
employment irrespective of  ethnicity. However, by the late 1980s and early 
1990s after nearly a decade of  market reforms, the job assignment system was 
abandoned. Individuals were subsequently urged to create jobs for themselves 
and seek employment in an emerging private sector. In fact, as noted earlier, 
most new acts of  hiring in Xinjiang now occur in the private sector, rendering 
government preferential policies too weak to control occupational stratifi cation 
(see Iredale et al., 2001 for further discussion). A 2001 high-level investigation 
report of  the Xinjiang CPC Committee candidly disclosed that
the strategy of  choosing from both sides [Han and Uyghurs] in hiring 
has been challenged following the establishment and perfecting of  
the market economic system…the power of  intervention of  the 
government has continuously decreased…and the diffi culty of  fi nding 
a job for minority labourers have become bigger...and implementing 
equal opportunities measures have become less practicable… (Quoted 
in Becquelin, 2004: 375)
Both Hans and Muslim Uyghurs rely on group networks, particularly strong 
ties (relatives, distant family or close friends), for information on job openings 
(see Ma and Xiang, 1998; Hasmath, 2011). Specifi cally, native-place or local-
origin networks are in operation.16 In effect, such networks embed labor 
15 Although the state provided secure employment for one’s working life, it was quite 
common for many to be severely underemployed both in SOEs and COEs. That is, 
there was an underutilization of  labor on two fronts (1) an individual’s high skills may 
not match their occupational tasks, which often occurred since the labor market did not 
clear using wage adjustments; and, (2) an overstaffing of  employees at SOEs and COEs 
(see Hasmath, 2011).
16 That is, continuous social ties originally forged among Han or Muslim Uyghur members 
from their “home locality” carrying over to their “host locality.”
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market behavior to the degree that it ultimately produces sectoral group 
divisions. As demonstrated earlier in Table 5.4, Uyghurs have a tendency to 
skew towards low-status, low-paying positions particularly in the service sector 
while Hans occupy positions in high-wage-labor, capital-intensive industries. 
The internal group division may run deeper. For instance, many Uyghurs 
only conduct business with fellow Uyghurs and vice versa (see Gilley, 2001). 
Unfortunately, such behavior signifi cantly reduces both sides’ incomes, and 
unequally affects Uyghurs in a worst-off  manner, given the tendency for 
the group to be in lower status and lower paying occupations. Suffi ce to 
say, the partitioning of  the political economy as a result of  loosened market 
forces and migration patterns creates spatial divisions. Uyghurs reside in 
relatively closed ethnic communities and on the whole only interact with 
Han in the economic sphere (see Cao, 2010 for further discussion). Their 
living conditions are also poorer than those of  Han as a result of  earning 
lower incomes and paying lower rents.
Two classic sociological theories may provide guidance in further analyzing 
this situation. Split labor market theory argues that ethnic antagonism 
emerges when two or more ethnoracially distinct groups of  workers compete 
for the same jobs. Job competition thus leads to friction between, and hence 
the political crystallization of, a particular group (see Bonacich, 1972; Wilson, 
1980). Conversely, labor segmentation theory can potentially illustrate capital’s 
exploitation of  ethnic group divisions for economic gain (see Reich et al., 
1973). Contrary to neoclassical economic theories that suggest the existence of  
a unifi ed market for labor whereby varying wages and occupational outcomes 
arise from individual differences in human capital, labor market segmentation 
theory points out that the labor market is not perfect. Institutions such as 
professional associations, unions or government agencies may interfere to 
produce varying results for workers with the same human capital. 
An argument can be held using both theories that within China’s transitional 
economy, social actors negotiate the antagonism between planned and 
market economy through the use of  social capital to obtain employment. As 
urbanization continues apace in Xinjiang, market relations are precipitating 
an urban sectoral division of  labor. Consequently, despite the counterclaims 
of  an internal Han colonialism, affi rmative action state policy is becoming 
ineffective in controlling occupational stratifi cation – skewing high-status, 
high-wage positions for Han dominance. Since occupational stratifi cation 
in the case of  urban Xinjiang does involve competition between Hans and 
Muslim Uyghurs to the exclusion of  one group from the rewards of  material 
development, there is a strong potential for increased intergroup tension. In 
short, the current labor market processes – involving agency (social capital, 
labor movement) and structure (market and reforming socialist institutions) – 
are shaping a split and segmented labor market in Xinjiang, which in the 
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case of  Muslim Uyghurs mainly contributes to heightened ethnoreligious 
consciousness. Instances such as the Gulja Incident or the riots in July 2009 
are a manifestation and expression of  an acute ethnoreligious consciousness 
stemming from Muslim Uyghurs current economic reality. 
Conclusion
The consequences of  heightened ethnoreligious consciousness created by a 
split and segmented labor market can be understood in twofold. The fi rst treats 
the Muslim Uyghur situation in Xinjiang as a struggle between the dominant 
state and the oppressed minority group. The second attributes group confl ict to 
intense competition for resources, educational and labor market opportunities. 
As Schein (2000) notes, the Chinese state is often conceived of  as much stronger 
than society. Under this guise, minority nationality issues are often treated as 
identity struggles in which the state is usually confl ated with the Han majority 
and minorities with “civil society.” The material dimensions of  confl ict, while 
recognized, are attributed to the colonizing intentions or inadequacies of  the 
state (see Moneyhon, 2004). Everyday social processes such as discrimination, 
ethnic divisions of  labor and migration are given short shrift. This chapter has 
sought to go beyond the common people versus the state model through which 
center-periphery relations in China are often conceived.
Instead, the chapter has contended that the political economy is the context 
within which to understand the new urban formations of  post-reform China. 
Institutional changes have loosened peasants from their enforced tie to the land 
of  their birth and given freer rein to private enterprises in spite the continuation 
of  the hukou system. This has brought about migration to cities of  burgeoning 
numbers of  Han and Uyghurs. Amid such threatening developments, migrants 
rely upon their group or hometown connections to gain an entry on urban life. 
Social processes like invidious discrimination and exploitation of  laborers have 
greater range of  movement within such a structure. They therefore sharpen 
divisions of  labor and capital, perpetuating sociocultural segregation in the urban 
milieu. As the chapter suggests, intergroup tension and a rise of  ethnoreligious 
consciousness in the case of  Muslim Uyghurs ensue as the group’s job options 
are limited to low-status and low-paying positions. 
One cannot escape the idea that tensions between Muslim Uyghurs and 
Han Chinese is not simply a reaction against the state. On the one hand, 
Muslim Uyghur resentment is directed at what is perceived to be a largely 
Han state – indeed Han cadres outnumber minority cadres in Xinjiang. 
On the other hand, underlying tensions are reproduced by unregulated 
labor markets and the ensuing inter- and intragroup competition and living 
conditions under which Xinjiang’s Uyghur poor subsist. A Uyghur muezzin 
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who had fought in the “Three District Army” in 1944 framed his resentment 
this decade as such:
The “Open Door” policy and “Develop the West” policy mean less work 
for Uyghurs. They are just abolishing the Uyghurs now. Even buildings 
(like my house) are not in the Uyghur style. All the market now is doing is 
letting more Hans come from neidi (inner land) and they’re taking all the 
jobs. (Quoted in Millward and Tursun, 2004: 82)
Paradoxically, the same segregated and segmented labor markets bind Muslim 
Uyghurs together and arguably form part and parcel of  the recent surge in 
Uyghur ethnoreligious consciousness. 
Ironically, economic incentives continue to be one of  the main tools 
Chinese authorities use to manage the Muslim Uyghur population, in spite of  
their poor economic performance in the labor market compared to Hans. The 
underlying idea behind authorities’ strong belief  in this strategy is that Muslim 
Uyghurs primarily want a comfortable economic life for themselves and their 
offspring – a reasonable premise for any group. However, complications arise – 
in spite of  improved labor market performances among Uyghurs since market 
reforms – as this reality has not come to pass when using Han experiences as 
a gauge for success, which the majority of  Muslim Uyghurs seemingly use as a 
yardstick. Muslim Uyghurs continue to watch the better paying jobs go to Han 
Chinese while the more labor-intensive, poorer paying positions are given to 
Uyghurs. Until this situation has been corrected in the labor market, Uyghur 
ethnoreligious consciousness will be acute and Muslim Uyghur-Han Chinese 
confl ict will continue to play a signifi cant role in the history of  Xinjiang.
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Chapter 6
THE TENSION BETWEEN STATE 
AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY
Douglas Porpora
Drexel University, Philadelphia
This chapter calls attention to four post-9/11 episodes involving religion and 
United States foreign policy in an attempt to show the need for greater nuance in our 
understanding of  the relation between religion and state. A number of  observations 
will be drawn from these four cases. For example, it will be seen that at least in 
the United States, religion is neither entirely privatized nor entirely commodifi ed 
and that traditional organized religion continues to pack a counterhegemonic 
punch. However, it will further be seen that this counterhegemonic face of  religion 
fi nds only little voice in the American public sphere, which remains more open 
to conservative and – in the current case – imperial deployments of  religion. 
It thus also becomes clear from the cases exhibited that how religion surfaces in 
the public sphere is not simply an inexorable effect of  modernity but rather the 
result of  contestation (see the contributions in Smith, 2003 for a similar line of  
argument based on other cases). Finally, in the cases under consideration here, 
there is a stark indication of  what may be lost when we lose religion entirely from 
the public sphere: the loss also of  a distinctly moral appraisal of  state matters 
that properly should be appraised morally. Thus, for all the unhelpful moralism 
traditional religion brings to politics, it may also be that when the public square 
is entirely naked religiously (Neuhaus, 1986), it ends up morally naked as well.
The Privatization and Commodifi cation of  Religion
In all four of  the cases to be considered, the backdrop is the privatization 
and commodifi cation of  religion. Although arguably the privatization and 
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commodifi cation of  religion are two analytically separate phenomena, they are 
sometimes viewed together, with the commodifi cation of  religion regarded as a 
consequence of  religion’s privatization. Both together are sometimes presumed 
to be the fallout of  a worldwide, historical trend toward secularization.  
The secularization thesis is the idea going back at least to Weber (1946) 
that with modernity, the world is becoming increasingly “disenchanted,” 
less oriented toward otherworldly explanations, forces and values. In this 
sense, secularization refers to the diminution of  a religious mentality 
or what the French Annales School would call a mentalité (Swatos and 
Christiano, 1999).  
It is not, however, just a religious mentality that is considered to be 
lost with secularization but also the sway or provenance of  religion over 
society at large. It was Parsons (1977) who argued that with increasing 
modernity, society becomes increasingly differentiated so that many aspects 
of  public life – like politics and the economy – become ever more detached 
from religion. Instead, religious governance retreats to private life (Berger, 
1967; Luckmann, 1967, 1996, 1997). This retreat of  religion to the private 
sphere is what is meant by the privatization of  religion. Religion no longer 
governs communal matters in the public sphere but becomes a private 
matter, characterized, as Luckmann puts it, by syncretism, low levels of  
transcendence and a “commercialized, cultic milieu.”
The new, basically de-institutionalized privatized social form of  religion 
seemed to be relying on an open market of  diffuse, syncretistic packages 
of  meaning, typically connected to low levels of  transcendence and 
produced in a partly or fully commercialized cultic milieu. The new 
situation permitted, even encouraged individual bricolage. Relying for 
its essential legitimations upon the modern myth of  the autonomous 
individual, it had a pronounced elective affi nity for the sacralization of  
subjectivisms. (Luckmann, 1996: 73)
For Luckmann, then, the privatization of  religion coincides with greater 
subjectivism on the religious front. People individually and syncretistically put 
together their own religions, much like Sheila in Habits of  the Heart (Bellah 
et al., 1984). That subjectivism in turn seems to encourage cliental forms of  
religion organized around “minor charismatics, commercialized enterprises 
in astrology, the consciousness-expanding line and the like” (Luckmann, 1996: 
73). Thus, along with the privatization of  religion, we get a commodifi cation 
of  religion organized around an ethic of  self-fulfi llment. Like Zizek (2009) 
after him, Luckmann is particularly critical of  the consumerist tendencies 
within the New Age movement.
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The New Age movement lays stress on the spiritual development of  each 
individual. Sometimes it revives elements of  older religious traditions that 
were canonized and that it interprets in unorthodox (often far-fetched) 
ways. It collects abundant psychological, therapeutic, magic, marginally 
scientifi c and older esoteric materials, repackages them, and offers them 
for individual consumption and further private syncretism. . . This allows 
for the formation of  commercially exploitable cultic milieu. (Luckmann, 
1996: 75)
Missing, Luckmann argues, from religious forms organized around individual 
self-fulfi llment is both a moral purview greater than the individual self  and 
commonly accepted ways of  addressing macro-social matters of  a moral 
nature. In effect, morality, too, like religion becomes privatized.
The institutionalization of  rules of  conduct, enforceable by the 
apparatus of  the public agents of  an (increasingly secular) political 
system, legalized but potentially also de-moralized these rules 
(“norms”). The “upper reaches” of  morals, those which legitimated 
the meaning of  the rules of  conduct by reference to a transcendent 
universe, remained in close attachment to the sacred universes and 
mundane institutions of  religion. In the long process of  functional 
differentiation of  the political, legal and economic functions of  social 
life, religious institutions too were increasingly defi ned as their special 
function, the individual soul in its relation to a sacred level of  reality. 
The social reach and infl uence of  religious institutions began to 
shrink, and so did the social reach and infl uence of  the legitimatory 
level of  morals. (Luckmann, 1996: 79)
As Luckmann describes this process, it all seems rather inexorable. That 
judgment, however, is too hasty. For all her privatized, syncretistic religion, 
even the eponymous Sheila of  Habits lives by a code that is deeply moral 
(see McGuire’s 2008 defence of  Sheilaism). Similarly, here in this chapter, 
we will observe more complexity across the terrain of  United States foreign 
policy debate. To be sure, we will see the contraction of  religion’s social 
reach and the demoralization it leaves behind. Contrariwise, however, we will 
see two counterphenomena. First, for better or worse, religion remains an 
important resource for American political integration that continues to 
rally Americans in such times as war. Second, the very demoralization of  
politics left in religion’s wake is made more visible by the contrastingly strong 
moral critiques of  hegemonic politics emanating from the still far from dead 
organized religions in America. Finally, in these and other ways we will see 
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that the privatization of  religion is not an inexorable product of  social forces 
but contested by active agents.
Four Post-9/11 Cases of  Religion and the American 
State in International Politics 
The fi rst episode begins immediately with 9/11. It is former president George 
W. Bush’s explicit use of  religious language to frame the war on terror and 
eventually the attack on Iraq.
Such use of  religious language may come as no surprise. It exemplifi es what 
many believe is the problem that results when religion intrudes into politics, 
and it seems to befi t the image of  America as the religiously exceptional place 
it is – at least in comparison with a more secularized Europe and Australia.
However, the conventional image of  religious America misunderstands 
the place of  religion in America and overstates it. And we must beware of  
drawing too totalizing a view of  religion’s role in politics from George Bush’s 
use of  it. Instead, in the second and third episodes to be recounted, we will 
observe religion in a counterhegemonic role.
The second episode is how the American public sphere went on to 
debate the post-9/11 attack on Iraq. In that discussion, we observe how 
moral considerations seem to be limited to religious sources, illustrating the 
privatization of  morality that accompanies the privatization of  religion but 
also the persistence in America of  an organized religious sphere that escapes 
privatization and commercialization. 
The third episode is the discussion in the American public sphere following 
the revelations about Abu Ghraib. In this extreme case, the secular American 
public sphere did voice more moral content, but it was still subdued in 
comparison with offi cial religious reaction and very mixed with the logic of  
instrumental rationality.
Together, the second and third episodes suggest the problem at the macro-
level when religion becomes privatized. With the privatization of  morality that 
accompanies the privatization of  religion, society seems to lose the ability to 
deliberate morally about matters that actually are moral in nature. Although 
at the micro-level one need not be religious in order to be moral, the evidence 
here suggests otherwise at the macro-level.
The fi nal episode is the fl ap during the 2008 presidential election over 
candidate Barack Obama’s pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright. It is a case in 
which what was again a largely secularized American public sphere confronted 
a form of  religion it could not grasp, one not interpretable as a private lifestyle, 
namely, an African American liberationist form of  religion that packed a highly 
critical, political edge. It exemplifi es something to which Bryan Turner refers, 
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namely the disciplining of  religion into something politically safe and anemic, 
although carried out by the media rather than government. In Foucauldian 
language, it was an exercise in governmentality (see Burchell et al., 1991).
The Response of  the Bush Administration to 9/11
We begin with President Bush’s response to the 9/11 attacks. That response 
must be understood against the backdrop of  political realism, which dominates 
elite opinion both in the academy and government, not just internationally 
but even in the United States (Hollis and Smith, 1990). 
Realism is a kind of  liberal, secular, enlightenment view, according to which 
it is virtually a moral principle to exclude moral principles from the conduct 
or analysis of  foreign affairs. Instead, each nation is to pursue its own self-
interest without couching those pursuits within a larger cosmic framework. 
Often, of  course, when faced with the task of  rallying their nations against 
external threats, political leaders do resort to grander language. Within the 
cosmopolitan West, however, including the United States, the strong tradition 
of  political realism has generally held such rhetoric in check. Thus, realism 
in effect ideologically enforces the differentiation between politics on the one 
hand and religion and morality on the other.
Knowledge of  this realist background is required to understand the 
audacity and offense of  Bush’s declaration to the West Point cadets in his 
June 2002 address to them: “And America will call evil by its name.” This 
declaration repudiated – consciously and deliberately so – the entire Western, 
cosmopolitan, political culture of  realism. It was the return of  good and, 
especially, evil in Bush’s language that was simultaneously a scandal to 
European and American liberals and an inspiration to the neoconservatives in 
America that Ronald Reagan had left behind.
From the beginning, Bush framed the 9/11 attacks and the American 
response to them in mythic terms. In the opening remarks of  his 9/11 speech, 
Bush observed that “our way of  life, our very freedom” had come under 
attack. Yet, just moments later, Bush explained that it was not only the American 
way of  life and American freedom that had been attacked. Instead, according 
to Bush, “America was targeted for attack because we [Americans] are the 
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” Attacked in other 
words was not just America and American freedom but what America stands 
for – freedom itself. 
Bush’s remark might be dismissed as the usual bombast of  American 
exceptionalism, except that it is bombast Americans believe and that such 
bombast accordingly functioned – at least for the American listener – to 
elevate the 9/11 attacks and the American response to a mythic register. 
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In particular, Bush’s remarks presume – and invite his American listeners to 
remember that they too presume – that unlike any other country, America is 
iconic. America stands for something. America, in the American mind, stands 
for freedom. It is as if  America is itself  the very incarnation of  freedom in 
the world, a light shining into what otherwise would be darkness. It follows 
that any attack on America is necessarily lifted to a sacred plane. Thus, by 
the end of  the 9/11 speech, the segue is complete and Bush is able to usher 
his listeners forward to defend not just America but “freedom and all that is 
good and just in our world.” 
As in his remarks to the cadets at West Point, Bush’s post-9/11 speeches 
continued to invoke the language of  good and evil. For example, the language 
again surfaced in Bush’s 2002 State of  the Union Address, where the world 
fi rst learned of  “an axis of  evil.” Evil now was no longer just shadowy. Evil, 
we now learned, also had a place – or places – where it materialized and took 
shape, where it could more easily be targeted for attack. And Iraq, of  course, 
would subsequently become that target.
It was not always the binary opposition between good and evil that Bush 
invoked. At other times, the opposing forces represented on the one side 
“civilization,” “order,” “freedom” and “law,” with “tyranny,” “terror,” “fear” 
and “chaos” on the other side. Always, however, the struggle was depicted as 
Manichean and apocalyptic.
It was not just religious rhetoric that was operative here. Behind it, within the 
neoconservative sector of  the Bush administration, there was also a genuine 
religious worldview of  an imperialistic nature. As John McCain put it in one of  
his debates with Barack Obama, “America is the greatest force for good in the 
world.” That viewpoint was certainly held by the neoconservatives in Bush’s 
cabinet, who let it be known early on that “this force for good” would no longer 
be stymied by the putative laws or norms of  what Condoleezza Rice (2000) 
called an “illusory international community.” Consequently, within the Bush 
administration there was not only a willingness but even an outright eagerness 
to wage war unilaterally without United Nations authorization. The attack 
on Iraq was actually to be the fi rst step in which the world’s only remaining 
superpower consolidated what was to be a “new American Century,” that is, a 
new world order in which not the United Nations but America and American 
goodness would preside (see Kagan et al., 2000).
The rhetoric invoked by Bush arguably represents the kind of  civil 
religion described by Bellah (1967). It is religion nonetheless, functioning as 
functionalists thought religion should function in the public sphere – to bind 
a society around common courses of  action. The persistence of  this form 
accordingly seems to indicate a continuing need – at least in America – for the 
kind of  integration nonprivatized religion is ideally suited to supply.
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The Debate about Iraq 
The moral rhetoric expressed by the Project for a New American Century might 
have been anathema to political realist sensibility but the objective was not, 
at least once purged of  religious sentiment. According to realism, nations 
should pursue their national interests, conceptualized especially in terms of  
power. Thus, if  the world’s only remaining superpower had the chance to 
establish its hegemony over the world, why should that superpower have 
forgone it? There might have been normative (i.e. legal or moral) reasons 
why not, but for realism, legal and moral considerations do not signify. Thus, 
it was perhaps no aberration that the attack on Iraq drew the support of  
arch-realist Henry Kissinger.
What should be the response when a nation, in this case the world’s 
only superpower, proposes to attack another sovereign nation without 
provocation and in defi ance of  international law? At the time, the attack 
was condemned worldwide, but on what grounds? It was illegal, but if  
it could do otherwise, why should a superpower accede to legality? Why 
not just return the answer the Athenians gave the Melians during the 
Peloponnesian War: “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer 
what they must” (Thucydides, 2009).
Ultimately, the only answer to Athenian realism is a moral one and it is 
important to know what remains today of  moral discourse about such macro-
moral matters. To fi nd out how the American public sphere morally debated 
the proposed attack on Iraq is something my colleagues and I set out to 
determine. How did an exceptionally religious and moralistic nation debate as 
morally grave a matter as preemptive war?
To investigate the question, we looked at multiple sectors of  the 
American public sphere, among them the internet and the opinion pages 
of  newspapers and news magazines. We looked specifi cally at the period 
between 15 August and 15 October 2002. These two months were pivotal. 
Late August was when the Bush administration abandoned months of  dark 
hints and fi nally admitted publicly that it sought to replace Saddam Hussein, 
by force if  necessary. Mid-October was when the United States Congress 
formally authorized Bush to do so. The public debate in between was thus 
particularly consequential.
One part of  our study (e.g. see Nikolaev and Porpora, 2007) examined all 
the 500 opinion pieces written during this period in 26 newspapers and news 
magazines that employed the words “Iraq” and “war.” The 26 sources we 
examined spanned the political spectrum from left to right, including the six 
elite publications, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science 
Monitor, the Wall Street Journal, Time Magazine and Newsweek. 
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We looked not just at secular publications but at religious ones as well. 
Only one of  the conservative religious publications we examined, Christianity 
Today, commented on the war during this period. On the left, however, there 
were three: the Jewish Tikkun, the Protestant Christian Century, and the Catholic 
Commonweal.
Our unit of  analysis was the individual opinion piece, and we coded each 
at both a macro- and micro-level, the macro-level referring to the piece as 
a whole and the micro-level to discrete argumentative points raised within 
(see Van Dijk, 1985 for the distinction). At the macro-level, we coded for the 
piece’s orientation toward war (for, against or neutral) and whether or not its 
argument overall was moral in nature. 
Aside from the argument type as a whole, we also coded the more specifi c, 
micro-level argumentative points that might be raised in the course of  a piece. 
In all, we identifi ed 56 such points. Over half  of  the pieces contained at least 
two. These included the widely cited points raised by the Bush administration: 
That Saddam had weapons of  mass destruction, that Saddam was evil, etc. 
Counterpoints often raised were that the United States had other options 
besides war or that hostilities with Iraq would distract the United States from 
the war on terrorism. A common worry, quite prescient as it turned out, was 
that the Bush administration did not have adequate postwar plans.
Basically, coding was done by having a graduate student read through the 
pieces and mark an X next to a checklist of  the 56 points if  and when one 
appeared in a text. To prepare the student to do so, we went over the codes 
and then practiced on a sample. To insure interrater reliability, we examined 
consistency among a random sample of  50 pieces in the corpus, co-coded by 
two different readers. 
At the macro-level, reliability was 86 percent for whether or not a piece was 
for or against the war and 98 percent for whether or not the overall argument 
was moral in nature. Reliability was also generally high in percentage terms at 
the micro-level, with only one of  the 56 points falling below 80 percent. Besides 
percent agreement, we also calculated reliability controlling for chance using 
Krippendorf ’s α. Because of  the way most of  the variables were distributed – 
i.e. highly skewed with few occurrences of  each – reliability controlling for 
chance often dropped. For the majority, however, α remained above  5.0, and 
we did not do any analysis with points having reliability below α = 4.0, which 
for such data is considered at least fair (see Neuendorf, 2002).
A number of  interesting patterns surfaced in our study. For example, the 
power of  the presidency to set the agenda of  debate is very evident. Thus, 
across the board almost half  the pieces referenced the Bush administration’s 
rationales for war: weapons of  mass destruction, Saddam’s ties to terrorism, 
the brutality of  his regime and Saddam’s general embodiment of  evil. These 
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concerns often had to be addressed even by pieces opposed to war (on agenda 
setting, see Lukes, 2004).
Of  more direct relevance to this volume was the almost complete 
marginalization of  specifi cally moral reasoning to the periphery – both left and 
right – and particularly to religious outlets. It was almost as if  a religiously naked 
public square was required to be morally naked as well. At the elite center of  debate, 
a privatization of  morality did seem to follow the privatization of  religion.
Overall, across the spectrum, fewer than 20 percent of  pieces made 
arguments for or against war that were as a whole moral or legal in nature. In 
the elite press, these were most frequent in the right leaning opinion pages of  
the Wall Street Journal and least frequently in the New York Times (10 percent). 
A majority of  these pieces were pro-war, with only about 6 percent offering 
principled moral or legal arguments against war. 
Against war, micro-points of  principle, that is, legal or moral points, were 
sparse in the elite press. The war’s immorality, for example, was suggested 
by only 2 out of  239 pieces in the elite press and not at all by the secular left. 
In contrast, among the 12 pieces in the publications of  the religious left, 4 – 
or one third – declared outright that the proposed attack would be immoral 
(a statistically signifi cant result; in fact, despite the small number of  religious 
cases, the effect sizes were all suffi ciently large that all differences were 
statistically signifi cant at the 0.05 level or, often, well below). 
That without United Nations authorization the proposed attack would be 
internationally illegal was mentioned by Only 3 percent of  the pieces in the 
elite press and only a little over 10 percent of  the pieces in the mainstream 
press beyond the elite organs. The 24 pieces in the secular left totally ignored 
the point. In contrast, it was again predominantly in the religious press that 
the matter of  international legality found a hearing, mentioned by a full third 
of  the pieces.
Again, in four out of  12 opinion pieces in the religious press, it was pointed 
out that as an attack on Iraq would be unprovoked, it would be an aggressive 
action. The aggressiveness of  the action was likewise pointed out by four pieces 
in the elite press. But in the elite press, that would be four out 239 pieces. 
Again, the effect size of  this difference is highly signifi cant statistically.
Forty-two percent of  the religious pieces worried about the danger to Iraqi 
civilians. Here, the religious left was joined by the secular left, which also 
mentioned the danger in 22 percent of  its 24 pieces. In contrast, concern for 
Iraqi civilians was cited by only 7 percent of  the pieces in the elite press.
The most comprehensive framework for the moral evaluation of  armed 
confl ict is the Just War Theory (JWT). Although it goes back to Roman 
thought, it reached its fullest development in Roman Catholic theology, where 
a distinction was made between Jus ad Bellum – the just or moral reasons for 
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going to war – and Jus in Bellum, which concerns the moral conduct of  war. 
It was used by Francesca de Vittoria, for example, to condemn the Spanish 
conquest of  America. According to the Jus ad Bellum criteria, a war is justly 
waged only if, among other things, it is a last resort; done for a just cause, 
most particularly self-defense from an external attack; and right intention, 
which is only for the sake of  the just cause rather than ulterior motives such 
as material gain. 
Today, because it brings together coherently so many of  the moral factors 
that bear on the justice of  warfare, JWT has become the main way to judge 
the ethics of  warfare even among secular theorists (see, for example, Walzer, 
2000). It is thus another measure of  the privatization of  morality how rarely 
JWT surfaced in the debate outside of  religious sources. Consider for a moment 
the debate in online discussion groups. Between August and October 2002, the 
period of  study, online discussion groups hosted some 57,000 threads on the 
prospective attack on Iraq. In that corpus, the phrase just war appeared just 200 
times and JWT itself  only 20 – mostly in religious forums.
Back on the opinion pages of  the press, JWT was cited by 67 percent of  
the pieces in the religious publications, including the Jewish Tikkun and in the 
conservative Christianity Today. Almost all the pieces citing JWT considered the 
proposed attack unethical, 42 percent of  the religious pieces overall. 
Again, however, outside of  the religious press, JWT was hardly mentioned – 
in the elite press by only 1 percent of  the pieces. Again, it might be objected that 
JWT is an intrinsically religious approach unfamiliar to many. But what then is 
the alternative? Secular, communitarian arguments about traditional American 
values were hardly mentioned either (on communitarianism, see, for example, 
Etzioni, 2004). The point here is that whatever moral considerations one might 
imagine in connection with the attack on Iraq, they were marginalized in the 
American public sphere to the right and left but mostly to the religious sphere. 
It was mostly the religious sphere in other words that carried on national self-
critique of  a specifi cally moral nature. The mainstream and particularly elite 
press focused on pragmatics: Would this venture be another Vietnam, would 
it exacerbate terrorism?
Although there is little space to go into it, the marginalization of  morality 
was not simply quantitative. It was qualitative as well. In the form of  arguments 
made in the mainstream and particularly elite press, a defi nite moral muting 
could be observed (see Porpora and Nikolaev, 2008).
In fact, at the center of  the secular American public sphere, moral 
arguments were frequently disguised as prudential arguments as if  there 
were embarrassment or unease about straight-out moral argument. On close 
reading, for example, if  American mainstream pundits commended morality 
and legality, they were careful to do so not as ends in themselves but more as 
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instrumental means to maintain America’s good image or moral authority. 
John Kerry was a master of  this technique:
For the American people to accept the legitimacy of  this confl ict and 
give their consent to it, the Bush administration must fi rst present 
detailed evidence of  the threat of  Iraq’s weapons of  mass destruction 
and then prove that all other avenues of  protecting our nation’s security 
interests have been exhausted. Exhaustion of  remedies is critical to 
winning the consent of  a civilized people in the decision to go to war. 
And consent, as we have learned before, is essential to carrying out the 
mission… Legitimacy in the conduct of  war, among our people, and 
our allies, is not a waste of  time, but an essential foundation of  success. 
(Kerry, 2002)
On one, perhaps the most natural reading, Kerry is offering moral counsel; he 
is detailing the moral criteria that would make for a legitimate war. He speaks 
in moralistic language of  “legitimacy” and the demands of  “civilization” and 
of  “a civilized people.” Even the notion of  “consent” has moral weight. 
Kerry’s logic, however, is actually prudential, for he instrumentalizes the moral 
criteria he cites. What Kerry technically argues is that the administration 
should observe moral standards not for the sake of  what is right or good but 
in order to gain the consent of  the American people. It is signifi cant perhaps 
that Kerry speaks twice of  what has “legitimacy” as opposed to what is 
“legitimate,” lexically suggesting almost that for the purposes of  “winning…
consent,” appearance matters more than reality. Consent then itself  also is 
instrumentalized. It too is not to be pursued as a moral end in itself  but, rather, 
because it is the means to an end, mission success. Logically, mission success is 
the ultimate goal with legitimacy and consent demoted to instrumental goals. 
Although a strong aura of  moral counsel remains, through instrumentalization 
morality has actually been subordinated to prudence. 
Is it Kerry’s belief  that naked moral argument is unseemly in the American 
public sphere, or just less compelling than argument based on national self-
interest? Either way, the prevalence of  such form bespeaks a public sphere in 
which moral discourse has lost its standing.
In the secular mainstream, the moral muting took other forms as well, 
particularly the form linguists call mitigation or downgrading. In one such 
instance of  mitigation, an obligatory moral requirement was downgraded by 
reframing it as an optional matter of  mere prudence. Specifi cally, in opposition 
to the war, the American elite press clamored not for United Nations approval 
but rather for international support, approval being a legal requirement and 
support merely a contingency of  prudence. 
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Commentary on the Abu Ghraib Scandal
The secular American public sphere seems not completely closed to moral 
consideration of  macro-moral issues. However, it took the revelations of  torture 
at Abu Ghraib to elicit specifi cally moral outrage, the Washington Post calling the 
interrogation techniques “shocking” and “reprehensible” and the New York Times 
describing them as “horrifi c,” “inhumane” or at least “morally dubious.” 
However, in the case of  Abu Ghraib as well the elite press tended to 
subordinate morality to self-interest. Thus, in several editorials, the Times’ 
emphasis was on Abu Ghraib as “a gratuitous propaganda victory” for 
America’s enemies. Similarly, David Ignatius in the Post worried that the war 
was “unraveling in ways that could harm America’s interests for a generation.” 
For example, consider more closely the following argument against torture 
offered by Eugene Robinson in the Washington Post:
Look at the big picture: This is a wholesale trashing of  our own ideals, 
an abandonment of  the rule of  law. It’s already a huge scandal in the rest 
of  the world, undoubtedly creating more enemies of  the United States 
than it has taken out of  circulation. And it was the White House that 
set this policy, not a bunch of  poorly trained reservists at Abu Ghraib. 
(Robinson, 2005)
Robinson’s piece seems morally hard hitting. In referring to our ideals, 
Robinson makes a moral communitarian argument. He then goes on to cite a 
legal argument. Yet what is striking about the argument and what it shares with 
many such arguments in the elite press is the way it fails to rest with a moral 
condemnation. Instead, Robinson ends the argument by appeal to prudential 
concerns – how the policy is a scandal creating rather than eliminating enemies 
for the United States. Coming at the end as it does, the prudential point assumes 
greater weight rhetorically than the moral points that preceded it. It is again as 
if  Robinson does not fully trust a secularized American audience to respond to 
considerations that are purely moral, which again connotes a public sphere in 
which specifi cally moral discourse has lost its standing. 
Contrast Robinson’s mixed messages with the purely principled declarations of  
the religious opposition. “Torture is a moral issue,” wrote the National Religious 
Campaign Against Torture (2006). “Nothing less is at stake in the torture abuse 
crisis than the soul of  our nation.” According to Rabbis for Human Rights 
(2006), “Jewish tradition teaches that human beings are created in God’s image, 
and obliges us to protect human life and dignity.” For their part, the United States 
Catholic Bishops (2007) specifi cally rejected “a morality based on the attitude that 
‘desperate times call for desperate measures’ or ‘the end justifi es the means.’”
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Again, it certainly ought not to be necessary to be religious in order to 
be moral, and the presence of  some moral critique also in the secular left 
demonstrates as much. Further, many religious people in America, especially, 
it seems, Evangelicals and Catholics, are actually quite okay with torture 
(Gilgoff, 2009). At the macro-level, however, it was again from the religious 
sources that the strongest moral critiques consistently came. 
The Flap Over Reverend Jeremiah Wright 
As a number of  pieces in this volume suggest, with the privatization of  religion 
as far along as it is, religion largely functions as a private lifestyle choice. 
However, the privatization of  religion is not entirely an inexorable result of  
modernization but the effect also of  active agency. There are those who want 
to keep religion so safely contained in the private sphere (see Smith, 2003). 
That agential containment of  religion is what happened during the last 
United States presidential election in the case of  Barack Obama’s pastor, 
Reverend Jeremiah Wright. Briefl y, while Obama was campaigning for the 
nomination of  the Democratic Party, commentators on the conservative 
Fox News disclosed that the pastor of  Obama’s church was given to radical 
diatribes against America. On 16 September 2001, for example, the Sunday 
after 9/11, Jeremiah Wright told his congregation “We bombed Hiroshima, 
we bombed Nagasaki, and we nuked far more than the thousands in 
New York and the Pentagon, and we never batted an eye… The stuff  we have 
done overseas is now brought right back to our own front yards. America’s 
chickens are coming home to roost.”
In another sermon, Wright objected to being asked to sing God Bless America. 
“No, no, no,” he declaimed, “God damn America, that’s in the Bible for killing 
innocent people. God damn America for treating our citizens as less than human. 
God damn America for as long as she acts like she is God and she is supreme.”
Within the mainstream secular American public sphere, Wright’s 
commentary was beyond the pale. For weeks, the media endlessly looped 
YouTube snippets featuring “God damn America” and “The chickens coming 
home to roost.” Between 18 March and 15 June, the Washington Post published 
29 articles featuring Jeremiah Wright – 22 news stories and 7 opinion pieces. 
From 19 March to 5 June, the New York Times published 24 news stories 
and 9 opinion pieces in which Wright is prominently mentioned (a total of  
32 articles). In this corpus, these are the words used (in descending order of  
frequency) by journalists to describe Reverend Dr Jeremiah A. Wright, Jr, who 
holds master’s degrees from Howard University and the University of  Chicago 
Divinity School and a doctorate from United Theological Seminary: incendiary 
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(10), controversial (9), racist (9), infl ammatory (4), radical (3), provocative (2), explosive 
(2), anti-American (2), bombastic (2), paranoid (2), learned (2). In part, white America, 
statelier in its religious practice, was unused to the more fl amboyant African 
American style of  preaching. In part as well, Reverend Wright could ham it 
up a bit on camera. At times, in fact, he even managed to turn the tables on 
his interviewers, interrogating them instead. 
Mostly, however, what the media refl ected was offense at the content of  
Wright’s message. There was a perplexed offense at this kind of  intrusion of  
religion into politics, a religious intrusion that castigated America. From the 
perspective of  liberal, white opinion in America, Bush’s invocation of  religious 
language might have been in bad taste, but there nevertheless was widespread 
agreement even among liberals that, as John McCain put it, “America is the 
greatest force for good in the world.” 
Americans are prone to a kind of  nation worship that might be considered 
idolatrous by all the so-called religions of  the book: Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam. By the same token, Wright’s prophetic critique of  America was from 
the perspective of  nation worship itself  idolatrous. Accordingly, in the manner 
Foucault calls governmentality, Wright was ideologically disciplined and with 
Wright, incidentally, Barack Obama too. Thus, on 29 April 2008, Obama 
publicly repudiated his pastor.
Conclusion
The relation between religion and state refl ects the state of  religion at the current 
time. In America, the state of  religion is complex, as is the relation between 
religion and the state. As is well known, in comparison with Western Europe, 
Australia and Japan, the United States is religiously exceptional. It is religiously 
exceptional in being still largely religious and being religious in complex ways. 
The majority of  Americans say religion is important in their lives, and a large 
percentage at least report attending religious services regularly. 
For all its religiosity, religion in the United States has not been immune 
to privatization. Yet, although the New Age and kindred movements have 
certainly made inroads within the United States as in Europe, religion in the 
United States has tended to be privatized in a more straightforwardly religious 
and less commodifi ed way. A very great percentage of  America’s religious 
holds very theologically conservative views. Over 40 percent  reject the concept 
of  evolution in favor of  a literal reading of  the creation story in Genesis. The 
focus of  such conservative religion is, as Luckmann suggests, the salvation in 
the next life of  the individual soul. Although there is now evidence of  profound 
change among the youngest cohort of  Evangelicals (Sullivan, 2010), issues of  
social justice have not been on the Evangelical agenda. 
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The privatization of  religion in America shows up clearly in public sphere 
debates. There, as in other industrialized countries, the norm is for discussion 
to be entirely secular. What is striking about such privatization, however, is an 
effect that has been little noted aside from Luckmann’s discussion. Luckmann 
specifi cally suggests that one consequence of  religious privatization will be a 
corresponding privatization of  morality. 
Up until now, Luckmann’s prediction has received little attention and 
accordingly little empirical validation. In two of  the cases examined here, 
however – the public sphere debate about Iraq and the commentary on the 
torture of  prisoners at Abu Ghraib – a privatization of  morality is clearly to 
be observed. If  any state actions at all have a moral bearing, the list should 
certainly include unprovoked attack on another sovereign state and the torture 
or inhumane treatment of  prisoners. In terms of  JWT alone, the fi rst is a 
fl agrant violation of  Jus ad Bellum criteria and the latter of  criteria for Jus in 
Bellum. Yet in the entire secularized portion of  discussion about these issues in 
the American public sphere, moral – or even legal – deliberation was sparse. 
And when there was moral commentary in the secularized portion of  the 
debate, it was frequently muted or disguised as prudential commentary. If  it 
matters that states direct themselves in moral ways, then such privatization of  
morality ought to be of  signifi cant concern.
The privatization of  morality in secularized discussion of  state behavior 
shows up more clearly when contrasted with the comparative density of  moral 
commentary emanating from the religious sector. What also shows up thereby 
are the limits of  religion’s privatization. Put somewhat paradoxically, we might 
conclude that while society privatizes religion, not all religion is privatized. 
Indeed, even outside the examples examined here, America in particular is 
known for the intrusion of  religion into public sphere debate. Usually, that 
intrusion is associated with right-wing religious sentiment, resisting, among 
other things, gay marriage, abortion and the teaching of  evolution in public 
schools. Here as well in the example of  Bush’s war rhetoric, we could observe 
in America the remaining power of  at least a dilute civil religion that takes 
something beyond a privatized commodifi ed form. 
It was, however, in the religious resistance to the American state’s treatment 
of  prisoners and its attack on Iraq that we saw something else. We saw in the 
fi rst place continuing in the modern era a strong moral sensibility that is not 
privatized. More, insofar as that sensibility happens to have been a religious 
one, we saw, secondly, evidence that at least in America, there is an important 
strand of  religion that has escaped privatization and commodifi cation.
We could see as much in the controversy over Reverend Wright and again, 
something more. The liberation theology represented by Reverend Wright 
was again, neither privatized nor commodifi ed. It was instead a strong, 
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counterhegemonic commentary on the state. The “more” we saw in this 
case was that the exclusion from the public sphere of  such commentary is 
not something necessarily impersonal and inexorable. On the contrary, it 
was effected by human agents, anxious to avoid any hint of  national self-
condemnation. The signifi cance of  such fact is that what human agency 
endeavors to exclude can also by human agency be reincluded. The future 
trajectory of  religion thus remains indeterminate.
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Chapter 7
CHURCH, STATE AND SOCIETY 
IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE
Siniša Zrinščak
University of  Zagreb
Introduction 
The collapse of  communism is most usually symbolically equated with the fall of  
the Berlin Wall in 1989 (about twenty years ago), although in some countries it is 
reckoned a bit later.1 But the term “post-communist Europe” is not an adequate one 
for variety of  reasons. Two of  these reasons are worth mentioning in connection 
with the content of  this chapter. First, the term simply acknowledges that some 
countries have a communist past, but does not say anything about the main 
features their new social orders have developed during years of  post-communist 
transformation. Second, there are numerous post-communist countries,2 countries 
which range from the center of  the continent through the southeast to Eastern 
Europe, or from the Czech Republic and Slovenia through Macedonia and 
Albania to Ukraine and Moldova. These are countries with different histories, 
 1 This chapter was written on the basis of  work done in the research project Religion 
and Values Central and Eastern Research Network (REVACERN) from 2007 to 2009, 
funded by the European Union and coordinated by the University of  Szeged, Hungary. 
For more details about the project, see http://www.revacern.eu/. Previous versions of  
this chapter were presented at the first International Sociological Association Forum 
on Sociology: “Sociological Research and Public Debate” (Barcelona, 2008), at the 
conference “Religion and the State: Regional and Global Perspective” (Sydney, 2009), 
and in Zrinščak (2009a and 2009b). 
 2 The number of  post-communist countries in Europe is higher than the number of  Western 
European countries: there are 22 post-communist countries which are members of  the 
Council of  Europe, the largest pan-European organization. For details see: http://www.
coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (last accessed 5 October 2011).
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social and cultural specifi cities and social development possibilities with, in a word, 
profound social differences despite 45 (or, in the case of  the majority of  ex-Soviet 
Union states, 70) years of  common past. Therefore, the term “post-communist 
Europe” used in this chapter is simply a technical one. In addition, the chapter 
covers only part of  post-communist Europe: countries that joined the European 
Union in 2004 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) or in 
2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and one country which is set to become the twenty 
eight member state of  the European Union in July 2013 (Croatia). 
Finally and most crucially, the main argument of  this chapter is that issues 
and dilemmas concerning church-state relations are basically the same in “new” 
European Union member states and in “old” European Union member states. 
Post-communist states – at least those analyzed in this chapter – after years of  
transformation to pluralist democracy and market economy and particularly 
transformation connected with European Union membership do not represent 
any special case in terms of  church-state relations, a view that might differ 
signifi cantly from Western European analysis. Besides, there are considerable 
differences among the countries analyzed; post-communist countries should 
not be seen as a homogenized case regarding their church-state relations. Still, 
there are many issues present both in Western and Eastern Europe concerning 
these relations, which are of  sociological interest and should be analyzed via a 
comparative perspective of  church-state relations in Europe in general. 
Therefore, this chapter paper will: 
give an overview of  church-state relations in Eastern and Western Europe; •
give a sociological religious portrait of  particular countries concerning social  •
expectations concerning church-state relations; and
analyze main issues and dilemmas in church-state relations, point out  •
possible explanations and suggest directions for future research. 
Comparative Framework: Church and State 
in Western Europe
This chapter concerns issues and dilemmas which are basically the same in “old” 
and “new” European Union member states. This argument is present in the 
available literature and is widely shared by different authors, although mainly 
those writing from legal points of  view. Interestingly, church-state relations are 
principally a domain for lawyers rather than sociologists,3 but what is of  more 
 3 Although there are some notable exceptions (Beckford and Richardson, 2007; 
Richardson, 2004, 2006, 2009; Shterin and Richardson, 2000, 2002; Berger, Davie 
and Fokas, 2008; Doe, 2004, etc.) a similar observation has recently been made by 
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interest is that there is not much cooperation between these two scientifi c 
perspectives. More specifi cally, sociological literature speaks about church and state 
but primarily approaches them from different angles, researching the position of  
minority religions or religious education issues. These are certainly very promising 
approaches, but other aspects of  church-state relations present in the literature 
written by other experts should be brought into the general discussion.
Church-state relations in Western Europe, i.e. “old” European Union 
members with much longer democratic histories, can serve as a comparative 
framework for studying church-state relations in post-communist Europe. 
Authors basically agree that three different models are distinguished (Ferrari, 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Torfs, 2007; Robbers, 2005). The fi rst type can be 
found in countries with state or national church, such as England, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, etc. France is well known as an unique country based on 
a strict separation model, although similar models (at least concerning legal 
separation rather than a general social attitude toward religion) can be found 
in the Netherlands and in Ireland. The majority of  European countries 
fall into the third category, usually called the cooperative model, which is 
characterized by constitutional separation of  church and state coupled with 
mutual cooperation based on agreements between state and different (usually 
historically dominant) religions that have important and offi cially recognized/
supported social tasks and signifi cance. In the case of  the Catholic Church, 
these agreements (concordat in some cases) have been negotiated and signed 
between the Holy See and the respective countries.
Models speak little about the details and actual positions of  different 
religions in any particular country. Deeper and more specifi c analysis can 
reveal details about the social position of  minority religions, the concrete 
exercise of  religious rights and religious freedom, norms guaranteed by 
constitutions or international agreements (e.g. Richardson, 2004). In addition, 
two questions of  particular interest arise. First, are there any commonalities in 
terms of  church-state relations which can be found among different European 
countries. More precisely, can we speak at least partly about an emerging 
European model of  church-state relations, particularly keeping in mind the 
Europeanization process, or deepening of  European Union integration? 
Second, and in connection with the fi rst question, in which directions are 
church-state relations developing? 
 M. Koenig (2009: 298): “Church-state relations [is] a topic that had for a very long 
time been left to historians and legal scholars.” Similarly: “There has been very little 
sociological commentary on the various definitions and conceptions of  religion found 
in law. This is despite the obvious sociological importance a legal definition of  religion 
has” (Sandberg, 2008: 157). 
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Although legal authors agree that there is no single European model of  
church-state relations, some of  them nevertheless argue over evidence of  a 
distinctive European dimension. Torf  (2007) distinguishes between level A, the 
very basic level present in all European countries visible in the attribution of  
religious freedom to all religious groups and level B, which concerns the typical 
European leveling of  support to some religious groups which consequently 
receive a kind of  privileged treatment. Robbers (2005), particularly examining 
European Union laws, acknowledges the European Union’s neutrality in relation 
to religious and philosophical issues but also its basic respect of  religious needs 
and churches’ right to self-determination. Still, history and traditions are very 
present and infl uence the persistence of  different models despite countervailing 
tendencies. As has been pointed out by Madeley (2003: 2, 9), the “hand of  
history” is extremely visible because religions deeply infl uenced the creation of  
modern European nations and states. All this suggests a possible answer to the 
second question. There is a trend toward disestablishment. One commonly cited 
example is the Swedish Church, which changed its status in 2000 and has since 
then no longer been the state but the “folk” church (Gustafsson, 2003; Edgardh 
and Pettersson, 2010). Though it is not possible to argue about disestablishment 
on the basis of  this single example, additional support can be found (in terms 
of  recognition and support by the state) in debates about similar possible moves 
in several other countries. In these countries, changes from confessional to 
nonconfessional school education and more equal rights for minority religions 
have also been obtained. Disestablishment is in fact another reason for Ferrari 
(2008) to argue about the emergence of  the common European trend. 
At the same time, contrary tendencies are also noted. Some European 
countries have become very restrictive toward a wide range of  minority 
religions (Richardson and Introvigne, 2001) and debates about the positions 
of  Islam and its public role have become very intense (Casanova, 2007, 
2008). There are arguments about antidisestablishmentarianism (Madeley, 
2003: 17), the surge of  religious persecution (Robbins, 2003) and the rise 
of  government regulation over religion (Fox, 2009, 2010). Even though 
they seem oppositional, all these briefl y presented viewpoints are of  
interest and should not be analyzed separately. Contradictory tendencies 
all constitute social reality. Sociological research should rely on all of  them. 
Moreover, viewpoints on religion and state differ according to theoretical 
and ideological standpoints and it is common to fi nd in the literature the 
same reality completely differently analyzed by different authors. Even the 
different offi cial treatment of  the issue of  religious rights (and consequently 
that of  church-state relations) by international organizations is noted. As 
argued by Richardson and Garay (2004), the European Court of  Human 
Rights demonstrates its authority concerning religious rights to the 
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majority of  post-communist countries (like Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and 
other post-Soviet states), even while it retains its traditional deference to 
original member states of  the European Union. 
Church and State in Post-communism
Church-state relations faced different challenges and passed through different 
phases after the fall of  communism. The fi rst years of  the post-communist 
period brought a general embracing of  religious freedom which was extended 
equally to traditional and minority religions and created a space for new 
religions to enter previously closed and hostile religious societies. However, 
traditional churches and conservative parties found it unjustifi ed to grant the 
same privileges to traditional churches (which had suffered during the years 
of  communism) and newly arrived religions, some of  which (it has been 
argued by those who opposed equal treatment of  different religions) possessed 
“suspicious” features. Yet this kind of  social reaction was very different in 
Russia and some other post-Soviet states, which have on record very inimical 
and completely antidemocratic treatment of  minority and nontraditional 
religions (Barker, 1997; Shterin and Richardson, 1998, 2000) than in the 
majority of  other post-communist countries. These countries actually have 
become more or less similar to the majority of  Western European countries 
in their differential treatment of  different religions whilst coping more or 
less successfully with demands for religious freedom. The tension between a 
differential treatment and striving toward religious freedom for all different 
religions is in a fact a major similarity between Western and Eastern European 
countries. Still, many authors point to the fact that although these latter 
countries do not follow the restrictive “Russian pattern” of  dealing with 
nontraditional religions, they nevertheless have (serious) problems dealing with 
religious pluralism (e.g. Črnič, 2007; Sarkissian, 2009; Borowik, 2006; Tomka 
and Yurash, 2006; Révay and Tomka, 2006, 2007; Kuburić and Moe, 2006).
Taking into account all available research on a number of  post-communist 
states, I am extending the argument about the common European trend 
according to literature present in Western Europe to Central Eastern Europe and 
exemplifi ed in essential principles: “substantial respect of  individual religious 
freedom, guarantee of  the autonomy and, in particular, the self-administration 
of  the religious denominations, and selective collaboration of  the states with 
the churches” (Ferrari, 2003a: 171–8; 2003c: 421; 2008: 110). The argument 
is based and  should be underlined on the notion of  separation of  church and 
state, which is the constitutional norm prevailing in post-communist countries. 
It basically means a distinction between the areas which belong to the state 
and those which belong to the church, thus denoting a mutual respect of  
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their mutual autonomy. As outlined by Ferrari, the separation does not mean 
that the state does not have the right to help religious communities by its 
own resources in various forms of  cooperation between states and different 
religious communities. Still, and crucially, the cooperation is selective in 
both Western and Central Eastern European countries and concerns mainly 
traditional religious communities, eliding the rights and social possibilities 
of  different, usually minority, religions. The selectivity has stricter or looser 
ways of  manifesting in different countries. The crucial questions concern the 
meaning of  a constitutional or legal provision of  the “separation” and of  the 
“equality” of  all religions before law and how different religions (different 
sizes, different histories, different attitudes toward societies) should be treated 
following these legal requirements. One of  the underlying theories in most 
sociological papers, usually not explicitly stated, is the “human rights approach” 
which indicates that, if  there are stipulations of  “separation” and “equality” 
and if  basic international and European documents guarantee equality 
based on beliefs, then selectivity (or selective cooperation between state and 
some religions) is not justifi ed. The reality does not support this approach; 
as in Western Europe, post-communist Europe balances between religious 
freedom and a two (or three) tier system which ascribes different rights and 
different privileges to different religious communities. A summary of  different 
aspects of  church-state relations in post-communist countries is presented in 
Table 7.1.
Socioreligious Profi le of  Post-communist Europe
Historical legacy, both in terms of  the communist past and of  longer overall 
social development, is the factor infl uencing development of  church-state 
relations in post-communism. However, these relations are shaped inside 
very concrete historical circumstances and consequently inside very concrete 
socioreligious landscapes. In researching the socioreligious background of  
church-state relations, there are several facts already pointed out in sociological 
research that have to be put together in order to understand the rather complex 
image of  religious changes in post-communism. First, the trend of  revitalization 
was widely acknowledged and discussed. Measured by different indicators, the 
revitalization of  religion was a part of  overall social changes in all countries, 
although to different extents and in different timeframes. However, a distinction 
should be made between the revitalization visible in the public appearance and 
role of  religion (mainly regarding traditional churches, but after some time also 
newly arrived religions) and the revitalization visible in the rise of  individual 
religiosity according to different indicators (like belonging, church participation, 
belief  in God and particularly behavioral consequences of  religious believing). 
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The newly acquired public role of  religion has not always developed in parallel 
with the rising of  individual religiosity. Second, and in connection with the 
previous statement, revitalization is not the sole factor able to explain religious 
changes in post-communism. There are other important factors (ethnic, cultural, 
political) that have infl uenced religious changes, and even a lot of  secularizing 
tendencies (both those inherited from the secular past and those connected with 
the “Westernization” of  post-communist countries). Thus, another increasingly 
posed question is whether the revitalization was just a feature of  the dissolution 
of  communism and the rise of  new democratic and market-oriented societies, 
which today (slowly but in some countries very visibly) gives way to “natural,” 
“European” secularization and moreover, European secularism. Third, all these 
issues have to be put in a specifi c national context, as among post-communist 
countries there have been those with high religiosity (like Romania and Poland) 
and those with low religiosity (like the Czech Republic and former East Germany). 
Fourth, the specifi city of  the national context has been further underlined by the 
strong links between religious and ethnic belonging throughout Eastern Europe, 
the most prominent examples being in cases of  war and of  dissolution of  former 
federal states, as in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. 
This chapter will contextualize and briefl y discuss levels of  as well as trends 
in religiosity in the countries analyzed. Data presented comes from the Aufbruch 
research project carried out in 1997 and 2007.4 This international project’s aim 
was to examine the position of  religions and churches in transitional countries 
during communism and after the fall of  the Berlin Wall. It was a cross-sectional 
and longitudinal study comprised of  quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Questionnaire surveys, the quantitative part of  the project, were designed to 
investigate value systems and religious orientation in these countries. In both 
years a questionnaire survey was conducted, but some new questions were added 
in 2007. A representative sampling was made in each of  the countries. In 1997 
ten ex-communist countries were involved – Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia and East Germany – 
and in 2007 the survey was extended to Moldavia, Belarus, Serbia and Bulgaria.
Belonging to religious community5 was a majority orientation in a majority 
of  countries in 2007, except in the Czech Republic where less than 20 percent 
 4 For more information about the research and about results see Tomka and Zulehner 
(2008). I personally was able to access the data through my participation in the 
REVACERN research project (see note 1), and would like to thank Professor A. Máté 
Tóth for this opportunity. 
 5 It should be noted that the wording of  this question could generate misunderstandings. 
For example, “belonging to religious community” and “belonging to church” have 
different meanings in the Croatian language; questions about belonging to community 
can result in lower percentages than those about actually belonging to different 
confessional groups. See also Ančić (2011: 6) and Tomka (2006). 
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of  respondents expressed belonging and in Hungary, where belonging was 
at the level of  about 50 percent. Two Orthodox countries, Bulgaria and 
Romania, have exceptionally high belonging, followed by Poland, Croatia and 
Slovakia. Comparison to 1997 reveals contradictory tendencies: a small rise in 
Slovakia, a stable situation in Romania and a fall of  around 7.0–8.5 percent in 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
Religious self-identifi cation represents a partly different picture from the 
one based on confessional belonging. It is expected in sociological research to 
have a difference between confessional and religious identifi cation and to have 
a lower level of  religious identifi cation than of  confessional identifi cation. 
However, comparing the 2007 versions of  Figures 7.1 and 7.2 shows very 
different situations. In Croatia and Hungary, there is no difference between 
confessional and religious identifi cation (of  course, in line with the fact that 
we counted in the category of  religious people those who identifi ed themselves 
Figure 7.1. Belonging to a religious community: “yes” responses (%)
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as very religious and also those who identifi ed themselves as to some extent 
religious). In other countries, the difference is quite signifi cant, the highest 
difference (almost double) being in Slovakia. It is rather unusual in sociological 
research to fi nd a higher religious identifi cation in comparison to confessional 
identifi cation, as we did in the Czech Republic (though the difference was 
not so signifi cant). It is interesting to note that the same tendency was already 
noted for Russia, which was partly explained by the role of  public religion 
in a specifi c post-communist context, not performed exclusively by specifi c 
religious communities. A considerable part of  population wants to be religious 
and supports its public appearance but does not trust and belong to any 
religious community (Agadjanin, 2001). If  this tendency were to continue in 
the future, it would need to be further analyzed in the context of  different 
meanings of  “believing” and “belonging” in different European countries 
(Davie, 2000). The comparison between 1997 and 2007 also shows another 
important tendency: a stable situation or even rise of  religious identifi cation 
particularly marked in Slovakia and Romania.
As expected, participation at services is lower than other dimensions 
of  religiosity in the majority of  countries. The exception is Poland with a 
very high participation rate, followed by Romania, Slovakia and Croatia. 
Of  particular interest is Bulgaria, with a much lower participation rate in 
comparison to other religiosity indicators (particularly “belonging to the 
religious community”). Romania also has a lower participation rate in contrast 
to the very high religiosity indicators in the country, which can be an indication 
of  the “Orthodox specifi cities” of  these two countries. In sum, religiosity is 
markedly present in countries analyzed, though there are signifi cant differences 
among them. In terms of  religious changes in the period 1997–2007, they can 
be confi rmed, although an overall stability has still been more present than 
Figure 7.3. Participation at services – at least once a month or more often (%)
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any clear revitalization or secularization tendencies.6 Grouping of  countries 
is extremely diffi cult as there are different values of  different indicators, 
but based on the similar analysis of  the same pool of  data there are some 
consistent groupings (Ančić, 2011). Concerning religious belonging, one group 
forms Romania, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and Croatia with the highest level, 
Slovenia and Hungary form the middle group, and the third and lowest level 
is occupied by the Czech Republic. Concerning religious self-identifi cation, 
Romania, Poland and Croatia form the group with the highest religiosity, the 
Czech Republic is again the country with the lowest religiosity and this time 
we can put Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia in the middle group. 
Church-State Relations: Social Expectations
Studies about church-state relations do not usually talk about people’s social 
expectations. They take legal points of  view focusing on constitutional or other 
legal provisions, rights and obligations or sociological points of  view focusing 
on the position and rights of  all religions. But as history is considerably present 
in contemporary church-state relations in Europe and as religions still have 
considerable social signifi cance and perform important social tasks, it is of  
interest to take into consideration what the public thinks about and expects from 
churches, particularly traditional ones.7 Thus, it is necessary to complement 
the socioreligious images of  countries with public social expectations which 
in fact considerably shape the social role of  religions and which consequently 
illuminate relevant issues for church-state relations.
According to the data presented in Table 7.2, respondents in a majority 
of  countries are satisfi ed with the level of  publicity of  big Christian churches, 
as they opted for the answer “quite appropriate” publicity. However, there 
are considerable differences between countries. In some countries, there is 
a substantial number of  people who think that churches acquired too much 
publicity. Croatian, Polish and Slovenian respondents tend to think that churches 
gain too much publicity, as to a lesser extent do the Slovakian public, while in 
Bulgaria and Romania one third of  people (or more) think quite the opposite. 
Although in Croatia, Poland and Slovenia there are similar proportions of  those 
who think that churches acquired too much publicity, the proportion was higher 
in 2007 than in 1997 in Croatia and Slovenia and much lower in 2007 than 
 6 Stability is for example the main conclusion about concluded reason for religious 
changes in Croatia, drawn from the European Value Survey data 1999 and 2008 
analysis (Črpić and Zrinščak, 2010). 
 7 It should be noted that the analysis here is restricted by the type of  data available from 
the Aufbruch research project.   
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in 1997 in Poland. Starting from an assumption that the 1990s were years of  
acquiring this publicity in comparison to the communist years, the situation 
in Croatia and Slovenia requires deeper analysis. The general opinion about 
public presence of  churches in countries seems also to not be in line with the 
general level of  religiosity or with secularization or revitalization tendencies in 
respective countries.
A similar picture transpires from the answers (not presented here in detail) 
to the question of  whether the public is satisfi ed with the general development 
of  big Christian churches in the last ten years. A substantial majority in almost 
all countries opted for the middle position – neither unsatisfi ed nor satisfi ed – 
followed by those who opted for the satisfi ed position. The middle position got 
a bit less support in 2007 than in 1997.
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show interesting views on the role of  churches in 
contemporary societies. First, it is discernable that generally, the social role of  
churches is not seen to be in contradiction to the development of  democracy, 
although there are some divisions in this view. Disagreement is particularly 
high in Slovenia and the Czech Republic and agreement exceptionally high 
in Romania, followed by Poland and Bulgaria. Further, agreement is much 
higher in 2007 than in 1997 in Romania and Poland. This is of  particular 
interest, as religion (and particularly the Catholic Church) was a crucial 
factor in the democratization of  previous communist states (Casanova, 
2001). It is clear that support is higher in all countries concerning economic 
development and the possible ethical role of  religion than it is concerning 
the case of  democratic development, even though there is still a high level of  
rejection in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. This level of  support obviously 
refl ects transitional economic problems (like the rise of  unemployment and 
poverty) and widespread opinions that the economic development during 
Table 7.2. “Do you think that, during the last decade, the big Christian churches 
acquired too much or not enough publicity?” (%)
Country Too much Quite appropriate Not enough
1997 2007 1997 2007 1997 2007
Bulgaria 7.4 50.3 42.3
Croatia 38.1 44.1 45.1 41.4 16.7 14.5
Poland 67.6 45.8 26.9 45.9 5.5 8.3
Romania 28.0 16.2 40.3 50.6 31.7 33.3
Slovakia 32.4 32.7 53.7 57.8 13.9 9.4
Slovenia 37.6 43.1 48.6 46.5 13.8 10.4
Czech R. 14.5 19.8 65.3 62.5 20.1 17.7
Hungary 23.2 19.5 56.3 61.8 20.5 18.6
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1990s was not in accordance with ethical principles and thus only widened 
social inequalities. Opinions welcoming the role of  churches in disputed 
aspects of  social development are also visible from other survey questions 
and can partly explain the relatively high social support of  the social role of  
churches in some countries. 
The 2007 questionnaire (in contrast to the 1997 questionnaire) included 
many new questions about the social role of  churches, including the three 
presented in Table 7.5. General support for at least the fi rst two categories 
(“Europe needs Christianity to preserve social spirit needs” and “Christianity 
strengthens freedom in Europe”) is considerable, with the notable exceptions 
of  Slovenia and the Czech Republic. In Croatia, Slovakia and Hungary less 
than half  of  the population show their support, while in other countries 
Table 7.3. “For strengthening democracy is it important to ensure that churches 
would have a role to play?” (%)
Country Disagree Neither agree, 
nor disagree
Agree
1997 2007 1997 2007 1997 2007
Bulgaria 18.4 34.5 47.1
Croatia 34.0 38.1 32.6 26.1 33.4 35.8
Poland 34.7 27.3 31.6 22.7 33.7 50.1
Romania 19.3 9.8 29.3 17.8 51.4 72.4
Slovakia 27.0 33.3 34.7 31.3 38.3 35.4
Slovenia 27.0 58.7 27.2 24.3 27.9 17.0
Czech Republic 40.7 52.7 31.4 26.2 27.9 21.1
Hungary 30.3 35.0 27.8 27.6 41.8 37.4
Table 7.4. “For the economic development of  our country, is it important to follow 
the moral principles of  religion?” (%)
Country Disagree Neither agree, 
nor disagree
Agree
1997 2007 1997 2007 1997 2007
Bulgaria 15.8 30.1 54.1
Croatia 35.1 28.1 32.1 27.6 32.9 44.4
Poland 26.0 18.3 28.4 20.6 45.7 61.1
Romania 20.6 4.7 26.7 17.4 52.7 78.0
Slovakia 34.0 28.3 34.0 30.9 32.1 40.7
Slovenia 50.6 47.7 26.8 29.5 22.6 22.7
Czech Republic 45.8 42.7 29.4 30.6 24.8 26.7
Hungary 34.1 29.3 28.2 25.8 37.6 45.0
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popular support is quite high. However, divisions clearly exist regarding 
mentioning God in the European Constitution: high support (more than 
50 percent) is visible only in Romania and Poland, with a little less than  50 
percent in Bulgaria. It is obvious that the support expressed for the general 
role of  churches in Europe is not extended to the political realm (the issue of  
God in the European Constitution). 
This last hypothesis is further justifi ed by a series of  questions (not 
shown here in the tables) which measured attitudes toward particular 
social and religious roles of  churches, such as to educate and raise people 
in faith, to support and foster relations between people, to alleviate social 
needs, to teach people to be more attentive to each other, to participate 
in public life, to strengthen the national spirit, to support morality, to 
reconcile people with each other, to take an offi cial position on important 
social issues and to teach people to help the needy. These statements can 
be classifi ed as religious (e.g. to educate people in faith), moral-social (e.g. 
to foster relations or to teach people to be more attentive), and as more 
social-political (to alleviate social needs or to take an offi cial position). 
The answers show that, in these fi rst two general issues, support of  church 
involvement is particularly high in almost all countries, ranging usually 
from 60–90 percent. In the last group of  (sociopolitical) issues, support is a 
bit lower, but in the majority of  countries it is still above 50 percent. In line 
with that, the offi cial participation of  churches in public life is supported, 
though not unanimously. Concerning all of  the above classifi ed issues, 
two countries stand out as exceptions: Slovenia and Romania. In Slovenia 
support is the lowest, while in Romania it is the highest.  
Table 7.5. Attitudes to the general role of  churches in Europe – those who agree 
(%) (2007)
Country Europe needs 
Christianity to 
preserve social 
spirit needs
Christianity 
strengthens 
freedom in 
Europe
God should have 
been mentioned 
in the European 
Constitution
Bulgaria 63.6 64.2 46.0
Croatia 43.0 49.5 33.1
Poland 59.3 66.5 53.2
Romania 75.2 80.0 66.2
Slovakia 46.4 48.9 38.2
Slovenia 19.5 24.1 15.8
Czech Republic 24.6 30.9 9.3
Hungary 48.7 49.4 26.5
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Figure 7.4. “Is it appropriate when the big Christian churches deal with…?” – “yes” 
responses (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Rom Bul Pol Slk Hun Cro Cze Slv
Social differences Same-sex marriage Extramarital sex
Unemployment Abortion Gypsies
Politics of the goverment
Figure 7.5. “Is it appropriate when the big Christian churches deal with…?” – “yes” 
responses for all countries (%) (except Bulgaria in 1997)
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Acceptance of  the voice of  big Christian churches depends on the issue at 
stake, but ranges from general acceptance (about 50 percent or more) in most 
cases to general nonacceptance in the case of  the politics of  the government 
(Figures 7.4 and 7.5). Of  particular interest is that the level of  acceptance is 
much the same in, for example, the cases of  unemployment and abortion, 
which are very different issues. Moral statements about issues of  sexuality 
usually provoke opposing attitudes and heated social debates. The highest 
acceptance rate concerns growing social differences, showing that this is the 
most pressing social issue in all post-communist societies. Although the picture 
is not unambiguous, there is a general acceptance of  churches’ authority, but 
not at the levels of  politics.
The crucial insight into the role of  churches in post-communist societies 
comes from the questions (Figure 7.6) about church institutions like 
kindergartens, schools, retirement homes, hospitals, unions and media: do 
we have too little of  them or too many? Do we want to have them or not? 
Most importantly, who should fi nance them? These questions also illustrate 
respondents’ views on the ability of  state and different private institutions 
(profi t or nonprofi t) in satisfying their social needs.
These results show that there is, in general, very high acceptance of  different 
church institutions, particularly kindergartens, retirement homes and hospitals 
and less acceptance in the case of  schools. Obviously, there is much space 
for church-owned institutions in connection with unfavorable social situations 
Figure 7.6. “Would you say that the churches and religious communities still have 
too little, or already have too many, of  the following institutions?” – “already too 
many” responses (%) (2007)
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and particularly with the lack of  social services governments have been able 
to provide. The least acceptance is for unions and media, although in that last 
case acceptance differs much between countries, ranging from 89.4 percent 
in Bulgaria to only 28.2 percent in Slovenia. Slovenia is the country with 
the lowest acceptance regarding all issues. Also concerning all these issues, 
the Czech Republic is not similar to Slovenia (as it is in the other previously 
analyzed questions) but to countries with generally higher acceptance rates. 
Data from Table 7.6 indicates different views about donations to churches, 
which is demonstrated by the majority of  answers being affi rmative in Croatia, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia, whilst not in other countries. However, 
donations to churches also depend on the specifi c system of  fi nancing of  
churches in respective countries, which is not further elaborated on. Age 
differences are visible in a sense that in all countries, the elderly support the 
church through donations more than their younger counterparts. Concerning 
the religious self-estimation, more religious obviously support the most, while in 
general in more religious countries (Croatia, Poland and Romania) even those 
who are partly religious or to some extent nonreligious support considerably. 
That points to the importance of  the general religious climate in a given 
society, or to the general role of  a (dominant) church that obviously has a 
considerable social role beyond a purely religious one. Concerning the gender 
differences, women in general support more, although there are differences 
that can be explained by the particular situations of  different countries. 
Readiness to pay regular contributions to churches is not supported by a 
majority, except in Romania. Even in the more religious Poland and Croatia, 
readiness is expressed by less than 50 percent of  respondents. Obviously, there 
are many reasons for this, and the economic situation is the most important 
one: even before the 2009–10 economic crisis, the post-communist countries 
were still catching up very slowly to Western Europe’s economic level, meaning 
that a considerable proportion of  their populations suffer rather poor living 
conditions. There are age differences, but they are not as consistent as they 
were in the question about donations to religious communities (Table 7.6). The 
individual level of  religiosity has a considerable impact and in terms of  gender, 
women are more ready to give money than men. Interestingly, readiness to 
pay was higher in 1997, particularly in Croatia, Poland and Slovenia. 
Although it is not easy to draw any conclusion as different issues provoke 
different viewpoints, some patterns of  responses are still detectable among 
countries. Romania, Poland and (to a lesser extent) Bulgaria are countries in 
which approval of  the public and social role of  churches is the highest. It can 
be even said that Romania is a unique case, with particularly high approval 
of  religious infl uence in all social issues. Slovenia and the Czech Republic are 
at the other end of  the spectrum, though we can observe signifi cant approval 
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of  church ownership of  social institutions in the Czech Republic. Croatia, 
Slovakia, Hungary and (again to a lesser extent) Bulgaria occupy the middle 
of  the spectrum. This grouping is similar to the previous analysis (same pool of  
data), which also detected three groups of  countries (Ančić, 2011). The highest 
social expectations from religion are to be found in Romania and Poland. The 
second group consists of  Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Croatia, while the 
lowest approval is noted in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. However, the 
factorial analysis extracted two factors, the fi rst one being the sociocultural 
role of  religion and the second one being the sociopolitical role of  religion 
(Ančić, 2011).8 Respondents from Romania and Poland are more in favor of  a 
sociocultural role of  religion, respondents in Bulgaria and Croatia are against 
it and Slovaks and Hungarians are in between.9 Concerning the sociopolitical 
role, it is widely accepted in Romania, less accepted in Bulgaria and least 
accepted in Slovakia, Croatia, Poland and Hungary. 
Religion, Church-State and Public Social Expectations: 
Concluding Notes
The main aim of  this chapter was to give an overview of  the development 
of  church-state relations in Western and Central Eastern Europe and to 
demonstrate that there is no unique post-communist case. Post-communist 
countries differ greatly from each other (concerning both legal arrangements 
and sociological profi les). The above analysis shows that there are, in fact, 
not many differences between Western and Central Eastern (post-communist) 
countries as they face a very similar problem: how to balance historically 
shaped church-state relations that favored traditional churches with the rising 
of  religious (and in general, sociocultural) pluralism.10 As in Western Europe, 
there are different ways of  dealing with pluralism and of  rearranging church-
state relations after the collapse of  communism (Table 7.1). 
The principal concern of  this chapter is whether there has been a connection 
between the religious profi le of  countries and their church-state relations and 
 8 Sociocultural factors consist of  items such as: “religion can give spiritual comfort, 
reconcile people, support morality, support relations between people,” etc., while the 
sociopolitical factor refers to participation in public life, holding of  official positions on 
important social issues and strengthening of  the national spirit (Ančić, 2011). 
 9 It is very important to recognize that these factors do not operate in Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic, probably due to a very low acceptance of  analyzed items in these two 
countries.
10 Though this chapter analyzes mainly Central Eastern European countries, this claim 
is based on the available literature about Western Europe, partly presented in the 
subchapter “Comparative Framework: Church and State in Western Europe.”
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indeed, between church-state relations and public expectations about the 
social role of  religions. The main argument is that public social expectation 
is the relevant factor for studying church-state relations and that this factor 
has been neglected so far in sociological studies. The analysis confi rmed 
these assumptions to a great extent. It is observable that there is no clear link 
between a simple account of  religiosity and church-state relations. However, if  
Table 7.1 is to be read in light of  responses about religiosity, then even though 
the simple link is missing, one can conclude that there has been slightly stronger 
restriction and state involvement in countries with higher religiosity (with the 
notable exception of  Bulgaria, although despite a lower level of  religiosity there 
is a high confessional belonging in Bulgaria). Social expectations make the 
picture a bit more consistent as in general, higher religiosity also means higher 
social expectations and higher social involvement of  traditional churches. Two 
things are important here. The fi rst is that in the majority of  countries the public 
(according to survey results) welcomes the social role of  religion (particularly 
that of  big Christian churches) and moreover, that this role embraces the 
strengthening of  democracy across different governmental issues and the church 
ownership of  different social institutions.11 Simply, the signifi cance of  the social 
role of  big churches is evident and is the factor that greatly infl uences church-
state relations. Second, there are notable differences among post-communist 
countries. The Slovenian and Czech respondents are much more against the 
social role of  religion (particularly of  traditional religions), and these are at the 
same time countries in which differences between religions with privileges and 
religions without privileges are not so large. In terms of  church-state relations, 
Hungary is similar to these two countries and is always somewhere in the middle 
in terms of  social expectations. Slovakia and Croatia are countries with high or 
moderate religiosity, moderate social expectations and (consequently) countries 
that approve the signifi cant role of  traditional religions and allow these religions 
moderate social involvement. Poland is also a country with moderate state 
involvement, but with a more signifi cant role for traditional churches. Bulgaria 
and Romania have many similarities in terms of  higher state involvement, higher 
social expectations and somewhat higher restrictions toward nontraditional 
religions, although Bulgaria is a country where religiosity is high on the basis of  
confessional belonging and lower on the basis of  religious self-identifi cation. As 
underlined several times in the chapter, Romania is a country with exceptionally 
high religiosity considering all indicators. Bulgaria and Romania are also 
Orthodox countries in which state involvement in religious matters is historically 
11 The role of  churches in the welfare field has been an important aspect of  the development 
of  modern European societies, and despite the secularization process, remains of  continuing 
importance (Van Kersbergen and Kremer, 2008; Opielka, 2008; Van Kersbergen and 
Manow, 2009). This analysis is yet to be done for Central Eastern European countries.
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higher than in Catholic or Protestant countries. That points to other social and 
cultural factors that are relevant for the creating and sustaining of  church-state 
relations, which are not elaborated in this chapter.
As the intention of  the chapter was also to introduce post-communist church-
state relations to the general discussion about church and state, this last section will 
briefl y discuss the fi ndings in the context of  possible future research. Namely, there 
are at least two visible contradictions in church-state relations in many European 
countries, post-communist countries included. They are normatively and at least 
ideologically devoted to concepts of  “separation,” “neutrality” and “equality,” 
but at the same time continue with the different regulation of  different religions. 
Secondly, there are marked differences between countries that at the ideological or 
normative levels supposedly follow the same or very similar principles. Historical 
infl uence, as already explained, is one of  main reasons for this phenomenon 
(Madeley, 2003; Ferrari, 2008; Casanova, 2008). Still, the question remains as to 
why the histories continue to be so powerful with respect to rapid social changes in 
contemporary societies. Gunn (2006) underlined that it is not only history per se 
but perceived national identity or founding myth that country has about itself. 
Thus, I hypothesize, the differences among these countries cannot be 
explained simply by their histories and different legal systems and 
cultures, but also by understanding the “founding myths” and the 
“perceived identities” that are widely (and naively) shared by the 
populations… Those who are responsible for regulating religion…will 
often see “neutrality,” “equality” and “nondiscrimination” not through 
some relatively “objective” lens, but through the rose-colored glasses of  
the founding myths and perceived identities. (Gunn, 2006: 37) 
That fact is also underlined by other authors, like Casanova (2007, 2008) 
who points to how collective European identity has been questioned and 
shaken by the role of  Islam and other immigrant religions which increasingly 
infl uence contemporary Europe. Similarly, Hervieu-Léger (2006) emphasizes 
the importance of  historical and religious context for current European public 
debates on social and ethical issues, claiming that although religious institutions 
lose power, symbolic structures they shape have a remarkable capacity to 
infl uence the local culture. This indicates a need to complement studies of  
church-state relations with more general studies about the challenges of  
identity construction in contemporary social processes and the contemporary 
social signifi cance of  religion beyond the secularization trend and debates. 
This is an approach that is very relevant for both Western and Eastern 
Europe. However, in an account of  religious development in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), Borowik (2007) listed fi ve reasons for distinguishing CEE 
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from the rest of  Europe when discussing the role of  religion: (1) Christianity 
arrived later here than in the West; (2) this is the area of  parallel existence of  
Latin and Orthodox Christianity; (3) religion was consolidated at the same 
time as and was an important factor in nation and state-building processes; 
(4) CEE felt the infl uence of  strong antireligious and antidemocratic communism; 
and (5) religion is a part of  the total social transformation after the collapse of  
communism. It is not certain to what degree these reasons distinguish Eastern 
Europe from the West, but reasons 3, 4 and 5 explain the importance of  religion 
to the post-communist region for state- and nation-building (Zrinščak, 2002, 
2006; Marinović, Jerolimov and Zrinščak, 2006). That means that for historical 
reasons, religion is in Central Eastern Europe far more involved in contemporary 
social processes in comparison to Western Europe, although recent developments 
in different Western European countries might suggest that differences between 
Western and Eastern Europe are not so profound. 
Another important issue that has to be further researched is the connection 
between church-state relations – or, more clearly, church-state separation – and 
democratic development. This question has dominated sociological research in 
post-communism, as the issue of  minority religion has been studied from the point 
of  view of  both separation provisions and human rights and religious freedom 
provisions. Without going into detail, it can be said that the connection exists 
but is not particularly strong. Fox (2008b) found that state religious exclusivity is 
connected to poor human rights records, but that this relationship is weaker for 
Western democracies and that the reason might be a high respect for human rights 
in liberal Western Europe irrespective of  church-state relations. Similarly, Stepan 
(2001: 222) argues that the construction and reconstruction of  tolerance, not the 
conceptual separation of  church and state, infl uences democratic development 
and religious freedom in Europe. Furthermore, the degree of  separation of  state 
and churches at least in Europe does not have any signifi cant infl uence on religious 
vitality (Pollack and Pickel, 2009). However, people expect much from churches and 
although there are normative expectations that churches should respect functional 
differentiation in modern societies (Pollack and Pickel, 2009), the situation has 
been (as explained in this chapter) extremely complicated. Simply, three concepts 
are crucial and should be further researched in relation to each other: “church-
state,” “public social  expectations” and “religion and identity formation.”
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FROM PIETISM TO CONSUMERISM

Chapter 8
CHINESE RELIGION, MARKET 
SOCIETY AND THE STATE
Jack Barbalet
Hong Kong Baptist University
Introduction
The familiar discussion of  the nexus between religion and economy has 
emblematic representation in Max Weber’s classic account of  the elective 
affi nity between Calvinism and the spirit of  modern capitalism (Weber, 1991). 
Weber’s demonstration of  the supportive role of  religious belief  for capitalistic 
development is reversed, however, in his treatment of  the history of  China 
in which it is argued that Confucianism and Daoism had a compelling 
restraining impact on economic rationalization (Weber, 1964). This reversal 
has an additional dimension, insofar as an unintended consequence of  
the development of  an expanding market economy and concomitant 
industrialization in China since the Deng Xiaoping reforms in 1978 has been 
to provide a space for religious expression unprecedented since the advent 
of  the communist regime in 1949, and possibly even before this time given 
the predominantly negative policies toward religion by the state during the 
republican period from 1912. Indeed, since the onset of  the reform period 
in the 1980s there has been not only more evidence of  religious commitment 
and activity in both rural and urban areas but also changes in the nature of  
individual religions and in the numbers of  religious adherents.
The most striking religious changes in the People’s Republic of  China 
(PRC) over the last 25 or so years have been twofold. The fi rst consists of  
the reforms in both Buddhism and Daoism, especially in outreach and 
growth in the numbers of  temples, priests and adherents or participants, 
which have largely been state sponsored or supported. The second is that 
the Christian presence in China and its diversity has signifi cantly expanded. 
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However, apart from the permissive and regulatory role of  the state in each 
of  these developments, these trends do not point in the same direction. 
A good deal has been written about the growth of  Christianity in China, but 
it is possibly the least understood of  these changes. Much of  the Christian 
expansion is in the PRC’s rural sector (Huang and Yang, 2005) and while the 
Protestantism that is currently growing in major cities may be seen by some 
of  its adherents as supportive, even expressive of  a free market economy, a 
more comprehensive profi le of  Chinese Christianity suggests a tendency to 
social and economic conservatism. 
It will be shown in the discussion below that a revival of  Buddhism and 
Daoism, which on the surface appears even less remotely connected with the 
promotion of  market economy in the PRC than Christianity, is an important 
mechanism in the provision of  investment required for economic development 
in China. This is because the growth of  Buddhism and Daoism both attract 
and are fueled by overseas Chinese contributors to the mainland economy. 
The capacity of  the overseas Chinese to invest in the PRC derives from their 
success in business, commerce and fi nance in East and Southeast Asia. This 
development raises doubts concerning Weber’s account of  the negative impact 
of  Confucian and Daoist orientations for capitalistic activity. This is because 
the overseas Chinese population that has been economically successful is 
generally endowed with the traditional Confucian and Daoist outlook Weber 
saw as responsible for inhibiting the development of  capitalistic orientations 
and practices. Both of  these aspects of  the relationship between Chinese 
capitalism and Chinese religion shall be discussed in what follows. While these 
issues arise through the historical recentness of  China’s embrace of  a market 
economy, it should not be assumed that its principles are entirely foreign to 
China, a matter raised in the following section.
Laissez-Faire and Daoism: Wu Wei
Joseph Needham, the distinguished author of  the multivolumed Science and 
Civilization in China (1954–2004), famously demonstrated that practically every 
signifi cant invention in human history originated in China: not only gunpowder 
and printing but also alcohol, ball bearings, the magnetic compass, paper, 
toilet paper, the stirrup, the toothbrush and so on. Not only physical but also 
social technologies can be sourced to Chinese origins. While no Needham-
like fi gure has yet written Social Science and Civilization in China, it can be shown 
that the concept of  a laissez-faire instrument of  Chinese political economy, 
for instance, was not only clearly articulated 100 years before Christ but also 
that the Chinese doctrine of  laissez-faire was self-consciously borrowed by 
the eighteenth-century French economist, François Quesnay, in development 
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of  his physiocratic theory (Gerlach, 2005; Hudson, 1961: 322–6; Reichwein, 
1968: 99–110). Anticipating Adam Smith by 1,850 years, the great Han 
Dynasty historian Sima Qian wrote:
There must be farmers to produce food, men to extract the wealth of  
mountains and marshes, artisans to produce these things and merchants 
to circulate them. There is no need to wait for government orders: each 
man will play his part, doing his best to get what he desires… When all 
work willingly at their trades, just as water fl ows ceaselessly downhill day 
and night, things will appear unsought and people will produce them 
without being asked. For clearly this accords with the Way and is in 
keeping with nature. (Chien, 1979: 411)
It is evident within this passage that the conceptual root of  the economic notion 
of  laissez-faire reported here, directed against feudal practices of  interference, 
is Daoist. 
The water metaphor contained in the passage above is characteristic of  the 
principal Daoist texts dating from the third century BC, namely the Daode jing 
(sometimes referred to as the Laozi after its putative author) and the Zhuangzi. 
But more important in demonstrating the Daoist nature of  Sima Qian’s 
discussion is the way in which the passage above expresses the key Daoist 
principle of  wu wei. Wu wei can be translated as “doing less” or “noncoercive 
action.” The passage above from Sima Qian paraphrases sections of  the Daode 
jing in showing that the performance of  trade and the division of  labor occur 
in the absence of  government engagement which itself  indicates that “this 
accords with the Way [or Dao]” and in doing so is consonant with nature: 
It is simply in doing things non-coercively (wuwei) that everything is 
governed properly…do things non-coercively (wuwei) and the common 
people will develop along their own lines. (Ames and Hall, 2003: 
82, 166)
The point of  these passages from the Laozi – and also those from Sima Qian – 
is that a state that practices wu wei does less, yet everything is accomplished in 
accordance with the needs of  the state. 
It is not necessary, of  course, to go back to the Han Dynasty to locate 
evidence of  pre-1978 Chinese inclinations to laissez-faire or market capitalism. 
Well before China embraced a market economy in the 1980s, southern 
Chinese migrants in East and Southeast Asia from the mid-nineteenth century 
and throughout the twentieth century were successfully engaged in capitalist 
activities. It will be shown below that the capitalism of  the overseas Chinese, 
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ironically, has been an instrumental factor in the more recent development of  
a capital market in the PRC, with the help of  the Chinese state. It will also be 
shown that Daoism continues to play a role in Chinese capitalist success, as 
it did in the formulation of  laissez-faire doctrine during the Han Dynasty. It 
might be mentioned parenthetically that in the PRC today, there is continuing 
application of  Daoist principles to analysis of  economic development. Since 
2000 there have appeared in Chinese social science and Party journals a number 
of  articles in which Daoist concepts, especially wu wei and related notions, 
are applied to understanding the development and operation of  China’s 
market economy (see Barbalet, 2011). Given the continuing importance of  
Daoism to Chinese self-understanding of  markets and to an account of  the 
Chinese economy, it is necessary to mention a number of  issues relating to the 
distinctive features of  Chinese religion.
Chinese Religion
It is often noted in indicating the complexity of  Chinese traditions that 
Daoism, for instance, is both a religion and philosophy. We shall return to this 
distinction below. Before doing so, however, it is important to understand 
that the concepts of  both religion and philosophy were until recently unknown 
to Chinese language and culture. The current Chinese term for religion, jiao, is 
an abbreviation of  a word imported at the beginning of  the twentieth century 
from Japanese and sinicized as zong jiao. An earlier Chinese term, san jiao, 
used from the ninth century to refer to Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism 
collectively, means not “three religions” but “three teachings” (Sun, 2005: 
232–3; see also Ashiwa and Wank, 2009: 9). The Chinese term for philosophy, 
zhexue, is also a Japanese invention created at the end of  the nineteenth century 
by combining the Chinese characters for wisdom (zhe) and study (xue). Before 
this innovation there was instead only study of  the canon or great books (jing 
xue) and the traditions of  the masters (zi xue) (Yijie, 2007: 33–4). Daoism, then, 
offers a way of  seeing the world as a means of  being in it – it is one teaching 
(yi jiao) and the texts of  Daoism, for instance the Laozi and Zhuangzi and their 
purported authors, can be objects of  study (jing xue). Daoism as a “religion” 
and “philosophy” in this sense, then, refers only to the fact that it is a pedagogic 
practice and that the practice is associated with books that can be the objects 
of  contemplation, refl ection and commentary. 
At the present time in the PRC, Daoism may increasingly appear to be 
like a religion in the Western sense because it is increasingly transformed 
by regulation, training, professionalization and outreach that derive from 
modern political requirements and cultural transformations (Yang, 2005; 
Dean, 2009). The philological asides of  the previous paragraph help make 
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sense of  the commonplace observation that the notion of  “Chinese religion” 
presents certain problems of  specifi cation and classifi cation because an 
understanding of  religion in the Western sense – of  focus on a deity, a 
sacred-profane dichotomy, transcendence and so on – is not readily located 
in the Chinese cases. The asides also lead us to other aspects of  Chinese 
tradition in addition to the modernizing forces to which Daoism and 
Buddhism are today subjected, which are themselves suggestive of  certain 
limits on how far these “teachings” can go in becoming religions in the 
Western sense. For the sake of  making the argument it is necessary, though, 
in spite of  what has been written above, to refer to Chinese “religion” in 
order to more clearly indicate the nature and context of  these cultural 
practices and patterns of  thought.
In an important sense, Chinese religion and European religion can be 
regarded as practically opposites. Chinese religion has always been polytheistic 
and nonexclusive, whereas European religion is monotheistic and exclusive. 
In China, priests and what would pass in the Western sense as clergy have 
traditionally been small in number and poorly organized (Yang, 1961: 307–27). 
Unlike Western religion, Chinese religion has historically failed to provide social 
services or education (Yang, 1961: 335–9), although this is subject to modest 
change today (Yang and Wei, 2005: 69–70; Lang, Chan and Ragvald, 2005: 
163). Chinese religious nonexclusivity and therefore the absence of  exclusive 
patronage has contributed to the organizational weakness of  Chinese religion, 
whereas Western religious exclusivity has led to a disciplined clergy and well-
organized laity. Marcel Granet summarizes the Chinese case:
The Chinese are not divided up into followers of  one or another of  the 
three faiths; in circumstances fi xed by tradition they appeal at the same 
time to Buddhist or Taoist priests, even to [Confucian] literati or offi cials. 
Not only do they never submit to a dogmatic parti pris, but when they 
have recourse to specialists, they do not show towards them the veneration 
of  the sort due to members of  a clergy. (Granet, 1975: 144)
A fi nal striking difference to be mentioned here between Chinese religion and 
European religion is their relationship with the political state. The Chinese 
state – imperial and republican as well as communist – has always constituted a 
powerful force over and against organized (perhaps it is more accurate to say in 
light of  the above remarks, disorganized) religion, and the Chinese tradition 
is one of  political dominance over and control of  religion (Yang, 1961: 180–217). 
While there have been periods of  state patronage, the typical orientation 
of  the state towards religion since the early Ming Dynasty in the fourteenth 
century has been a mix of  regulation and prohibition (Brook, 2009). The early 
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history of  Christianity, on the other hand, prior to the Reformation, was of  
a continentally organized church empire against small and divided secular 
governments. Against this background, the politically instrumental utility of  
national Protestant churches to European states provided reform churches 
with a power which they may still call upon and exercise in defense of  their 
own independence. 
The image of  the weakness of  Chinese religion created in the preceding 
paragraph relates to its organizational capacities, but a further characteristic 
of  Chinese religion that requires special consideration is its enduring cultural 
presence and force. Before pursuing this theme, however, it is necessary to 
say something about Confucianism, which has so far been ignored. Western 
commentators have frequently regarded Confucianism as a religion even though 
the absence of  religious consciousness with regard to it on the part of  adherents 
suggests that the appellation is misplaced. Indeed, the failed attempt to establish 
a Confucian religion during the republican period for largely political reasons 
(Yang, 1961: 355–8; Sun, 2005: 234–6) suggests the artifi ciality and misleading 
nature of  the idea that Confucianism is a religion in any meaningful sense. 
This is not to say that there are not elements of  Confucianism that arguably 
possess religious qualities, such as self-cultivation productive of  social order or 
harmony expressed in a clear ethical code through a positive orientation to 
ritual practices (see Yang, 1961: 244–77). Perhaps more important than the 
observer ascribed as opposed to adherent experienced religious characteristics 
of  Confucianism is its long-standing and complex relationship, since the ninth 
century, of  opposition and creative engagement with both Buddhism and 
Daoism, that has seen each contest, adapt to and mimic aspects of  the others 
over a long period of  Chinese history.
The last point above can be taken to imply that Confucianism, Buddhism 
and Daoism have changed through their mutual interactions. Of  course, 
such interactions are not the only sources of  change, but they do suggest 
that not one of  these three traditions can be regarded as entirely unitary 
entities when considered over historical time. The point has been made that 
Confucianism, for instance, is “not one philosophy, but many” and that while 
“Neo-Confucianism, a movement dating from the late T’ang…is not only 
signifi cantly different from what went before, (it is) very far from a unifi ed 
philosophy itself ” (Nivison, 1959: 4). Daoism even more than Confucianism 
can be seen as a single label that covers a number of  quite different movements 
and purposes. In a seminal paper that has become the source of  much 
controversy, Herrlee Creel has shown that Daoism is in effect three, not one 
set of  principles and practices (Creel, 1977). 
Creel distinguishes “contemplative” and “purposive” Daoism associated 
respectively with the Zhuangzi and the Daode jing, one cultivating an understanding 
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of  the Dao or Way to achieve inner strength and the other to achieve a means 
of  power and kingly council (Creel, 1977: 4–6). At an historically later period, 
a set of  practices and doctrines were consolidated into a movement that 
went on to manifest variant and divergent forms, but with the continuing 
purpose of  attaining immortality for its practitioners, which amalgamated 
elements of  folk immortality cults, Buddhist organizational forms and the 
Daoist name (Creel, 1977: 7–8). Creel names this third type of  Daoism not 
“religious” Daoism but Hsien Daoism – hsien being an immortal – because 
the “immortality in question was a perpetuation of  the physical body” (Creel, 
1977: 7). The means used to achieve everlasting life or at least extraordinary 
longevity included drugs and alchemic practices, breath control and 
gymnastics, dietary management and macrobiotics, moral (Confucian) 
virtue, sexual techniques, magical rites and charms and talismans – 
all of  which are opposed or ridiculed in the Zhuangzi and the Daode jing 
(Creel, 1977: 8–9). The important point, which it is not Creel’s purpose 
to make, is that irrespective of  their logical and historical relationship the 
anarchistic contemplative Daoism which promotes inner self-cultivation, the 
instrumentally purposive Daoism which navigates social and political power 
and the curative and restorative Hsien Daoism which extends and improves 
life and living have all been contemporaneously available for nearly two 
thousand years within the Chinese cultural framework of  doctrinal and 
practical nonexclusivity.
The characteristic organizational weakness of  Chinese religion, for want 
of  a better term, belies its enduring cultural presence and power. The real 
strength of  Chinese religion arguably derives from what C. K. Yang, following 
Durkheim, calls its “diffused” form (Yang, 1961: 296–300). A religion is 
diffused when its outlook and concepts are insinuated in and dispersed through 
secular social institutions and in that sense are a part of  those institutions. 
Yang reserves this concept for his discussion of  folk religions and especially 
ancestor worship, neither of  which have the benefi t of  organized sanction 
or rationale. But Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism (in each of  its three 
forms) have a continuing diffused, that is noninstitutional representation in 
many aspects of  Chinese life and culture. In the domain of  self-cultivation, 
for instance, Confucian and Daoist concepts are essential for understanding 
Chinese practices; in business, military strategy and environmental policy 
purposive Daoist concepts predominate; in medical and health matters 
and in the rhythm of  mundane life, Hsien Daoist rituals prevail; and so on. 
These and related traditions are diffused through Chinese culture and many 
of  their key concepts are given representation in the Chinese language itself. 
The signifi cance of  the cognitive framework of  Chinese religions will be 
taken up below. 
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State Management of  Religion and the Market Economy 
in China Since 1978
Twenty-fi rst century China can justifi ably be seen as a site of  religious 
effervescence. In addition to the appreciable rise in Christianity there have 
also emerged new religious movements, the best known being Falun Gong 
(Ownby, 2004). Alongside these changes and arguably more important for an 
understanding of  current political and economic developments in the PRC is 
a revival of  Buddhism and Daoism, a signifi cant aspect of  which includes the 
rebuilding of  damaged or destroyed temples. The activity of  temple rebuilding 
is state sponsored, privately funded and quite central to the ongoing expansion 
of  economic development. 
As a large proportion of  temples in China were traditionally communal 
property, it was not unusual even in imperial times for them to be put to 
nonreligious use as the need arose, a process hastened with the formation of  
the republic in 1912 and secular modernization that continued after 1949 
with the establishment of  the PRC (see Yang, 1961: 326, 368). It has been 
estimated that by the end of  the republican period half  of  China’s local 
temples had been destroyed, and that during the period of  the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–76) tens of  thousands of  the remaining Buddhist, Daoist 
and other temples were destroyed as part of  active antireligious campaigns 
(Goossaert, 2003). In contrast to the events of  the 1960s and 1970s in the 
PRC, there has emerged from the early 1980s a new tolerance toward 
religion. The third constitution of  the PRC promulgated in 1978 introduced 
limited guarantees of  religious freedom. Such freedoms have been extended 
in Article 36 of  the subsequent 1982 constitution, which remains current. 
Article 36 indicates a move from state prohibition to state regulation of  
religion; it declares that while religions are not to “engage in activities that 
disrupt public order, impair the health of  citizens or interfere with the 
educational system of  the state” the state shall “protect normal religious 
activities.” What these normal activities might be are not specifi ed except in 
the negative case as indicated. This qualifi ed relaxation of  overall hostility 
towards religion from the late 1970s has accelerated to a positive acceptance 
of  aspects of  religion in particular religions so that by the mid-1990s there 
have been permitted, even encouraged, large-scale and vigorous efforts 
at restoration and refurbishment of  temples and other religious buildings 
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. By 1996, for instance, 1,722 
Daoist temples had been restored and opened (Dean, 2009: 193). 
The new qualifi ed acceptance of  religion in the PRC is an aspect of  a 
broader liberalization that has accompanied China’s incorporation into the 
international capitalist economy and its entry on to the world political stage. 
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While state suppression of  religious movements such as Falun Gong (Tong, 
2009) and the smaller Dongfang Shandian (Eastern Lightning) continues in the 
PRC (Dunn, 2009), the constitutional guarantees of  freedom of  religious belief  
and practice are given meaningful expression for Buddhist, Daoist, Catholic, 
Protestant and Islamic organizations that are affi liated with the state-controlled 
umbrella bodies (see Yang, 2007: 636–8). A link between China’s religious 
liberalization, especially the rebuilding of  Buddhist and Daoist temples, and 
the development – indeed exuberant blossoming – of  a market economy in 
the PRC is to be found in a further and connected dimension of  government 
reorientation since the mid-1980s, namely a reversal in attitude to the Chinese 
Diaspora. Temple rebuilding attracts overseas Chinese investment. There is a 
new motto for capital acquisition given voice by local government in the PRC: 
“Build the religious stage to sing the economic opera” (Yang, 2006: 109).
The changing offi cial attitude in the PRC to the overseas Chinese is central 
for an understanding of  both the revival of  religion and the development 
of  a capital market. From Liberation (1949) up until the immediate post–
Cultural Revolution period, the Chinese political leadership entertained 
a thorough and intense suspicion of  the overseas Chinese. As the PRC 
has joined the globalized international market, the economic skills of  the 
overseas Chinese and their capacity to provide investment capital that had 
earlier led to their stigmatization as “Capitalist Roaders” have been evaluated 
positively by offi cial forces in the PRC since the 1980s. Those skills and that 
capacity are now seriously sought by the Chinese market economy. Indeed, 
since the 1980s there has been much offi cial encouragement of  overseas 
Chinese to invest in the PRC. One means of  attracting overseas Chinese 
investment has been through the temple door. After opening its borders as 
a consequence of  the Deng Xiaoping reforms, the PRC has facilitated visits 
by signifi cant numbers of  overseas Chinese persons who since liberalization 
have returned to family home sites in the PRC for religious and mortuary 
rituals (Fan, 2003; Lai, 2003). The program of  temple rebuilding mentioned 
above has coincidentally and conjointly been encouraged enormously 
through donations made by overseas Chinese individuals and families (Yang 
and Wei, 2005: 71–2, 86; Lang, Chan and Ragvald, 2005: 157–9). In this 
way, the erstwhile “Capitalist Roaders” are led to occupy an important place 
in the course of  Chinese economic development (Maddison, 2007: 172–3; 
Redding, 1993: 231ff.). Indeed, up to the mid-1990s overseas Chinese 
investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore contributed 75 percent 
of  foreign capital to China, and if  other overseas Chinese are included the 
fi gure goes up to 85 percent, amounting to approximately US$200 billion 
(Hamilton, 2006; Redding, 1995; Sen, 2001: 3).  
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Capitalism, China and Max Weber
It is not simply the magnitude of  growth and strength of  China’s market 
economy that is so impressive, but also that it erupted against all expectations. 
It could be argued, of  course, that in effectively abandoning socialism, 
embracing the market and joining capitalist globalization, China’s economic 
growth was inevitable. The limitations of  this argument can partly be seen in 
India’s failure to enjoy Chinese levels of  economic expansion. It is important 
to notice, as mentioned above, that during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century mercantile and fi nancial dynasties were formed within overseas 
Chinese communities, demonstrating the way in which market opportunities 
could be realized by persons who adhered to Chinese religions. Nevertheless, 
in an argument that continues to hold the attention of  many sociologists, Max 
Weber insisted that traditional Chinese religions and the familial commitments 
associated with them are antithetical to the development of  capitalism (Weber, 
1964). However, in the face of  recent Chinese economic success in both 
overseas Chinese populations and in the post-1978 PRC, the task must be to 
explain afresh how Chinese religion and associated family structure might be 
related to capitalist development. 
Weber’s characterization of  Chinese religion in The Religion of  China is 
to demonstrate the cultural basis of  a failure in Imperial China to develop 
rational or modern industrial capitalism. Weber holds that traditional Chinese 
values in the form of  Confucianism promoted an orientation of  talent to 
state service, to scholarly pursuits that tended to preserve tradition and at the 
same time to dissuade thinkers from innovation. Confucianism, according to 
Weber, generates a rationalism that leads persons to adjust to the world rather 
than encouraging them to change it (Weber, 1964: 248). Daoism, Weber says, 
promotes an orientation to simplicity in life and harmony with nature. Both of  
these philosophies or religions are held to discourage capitalistic accumulation 
and profi t seeking. While this broad characterization of  Chinese traditional 
values is more or less descriptively accurate for the period covered by Weber’s 
study, it is quite a different matter to claim that these values were causally 
implicated in the failure to develop industrial capitalism in Imperial China. 
Indeed, it is likely that the key inhibiting constraints on Chinese economic 
development were not cultural. John Hall, for instance, has shown that 
at crucial times in its long history the imperial Chinese state chose to limit 
capitalism even as it developed for political reasons (Hall, 1986: 33–57). In 
more directly addressing Weber’s concern regarding the absence in China 
of  the development of  industrial capitalism, Mark Elvin (1973: 286–315, 
1983) argues that a failure to continue an historically established pattern 
of  innovation necessary for industrialization, which occurred around 1820 
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through an insuffi ciency of  demand – what he calls a “high-level equilibrium 
trap” – inhibited capitalist industrialization in China.
Evidence of  both political and economic structural limitations challenge the 
adequacy of  Weber’s argument that “rational entrepreneurial capitalism…has 
been handicapped [in China]…by the lack of  a particular mentality” (Weber, 
1964: 104). It is not, however, the purpose here to claim that consideration of  
Confucianism and Daoism is irrelevant to an understanding of  economic 
processes and especially entrepreneurial activity in Chinese cultural areas. But it is 
important to recognize, contrary to Weber’s approach, that the social consequences 
of  culture, and values in particular, are not internal to the culture or values 
themselves but are contextually effective. Therefore, the relationship between any 
given value set and economic outcomes for those holding them may vary with 
changing opportunities and constraints. While Weber attributes Chinese petty 
bourgeois hoarding to Confucian notions of  thrift, for instance, there is no way 
of  knowing whether his theory-laden proposition implies a spurious relationship 
without fi rst paying attention to the constraints on opportunities for consumption 
or investment, which Weber fails to do (Weber, 1964: 245). 
Weber’s inclination to treat institutions in terms of  what he sees as the values 
inherent in them has led to serious misunderstanding concerning the function 
of  key institutions, including the family. In the Protestant Ethic, for instance, 
Weber writes that Protestant vocation or calling generates emotional detachment 
and depersonalizes family relations, thus early modern European entrepreneurs 
are presented as individuals free of  family ties and traditional obligations. This 
perspective on the family is more forcefully stated in his later studies, especially 
in The Religion of  China (Weber, 1964: 237, 240–1, 244), where it is argued that 
family and community are sources of  traditional constraint that inhibit the 
capitalist ethos of  profi t making for its own sake as a result of  religious values. 
This argument is seriously mistaken, however, both for Western capitalism and 
Chinese capitalism. Before considering Chinese religion and capitalism, it is 
necessary to say something about the family in capitalist development. This is 
because the motor of  economic growth is familial capitalism rather than socially 
isolated individuals imbued with self-possessed acquisitiveness in both Europe 
and in the Chinese diaspora from the nineteenth century.
Family as a Resource for Capitalist Development
The unit of  enterprise and the major proximate sources of  commercial and 
business attainment in early modern Europe was not the individual entrepreneur 
free of  family responsibility and commitment, but rather individuals who were 
economically enriched by kinship networks and marital alliances who thereby 
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had immediate access to reputation, credit and uniquely reliable associates 
(Grassby, 2000). The pattern of  European familial capitalism persisted into 
the nineteenth century (Farrell, 1993; Scranton, 1983) and continued even to 
the twentieth century, even though by this time national markets for long-term 
investment were functioning (Postan, 1935: 5–6) thus rendering family credit 
less important. Writing in the early 1970s, Maurice Zeitlin indicated that in 
spite of  the widespread belief  concerning managerial control, the majority of  
fi rms in the United States, for instance, continued at that time to be subject 
to family control and that a large number of  the fi nancial institutions that 
controlled fi rms which were not directly owned by families were themselves 
family owned and controlled (Zeitlin, 1974). A more recent study suggests 
that the incidence of  family ownership in the United States may be as high as 
80 percent and possibly rising (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999; 
see also Church, 1993). 
This brief  excursion into Western familial capitalism has the purpose of  
suggesting that examination of  the role of  the Chinese family in capitalist 
enterprise, which a number of  studies of  both overseas and mainland Chinese 
business have focused upon (Redding, 1993; Whyte, 1996), is not to highlight 
an exceptional Chinese contribution to a course of  capitalist development but 
to indicate a neglected but signifi cant aspect of  the sociology of  capitalism 
in general. The resources appropriate to capitalistic market production 
and exchange include fi nancial credit, business information and know-how, 
reputation for reliability, able associates, trustworthy and low-cost workers 
and translocal networks. Strong kinship and marital alliances supply these 
resources in abundance. 
Indeed, the signifi cance of  the family for economic activity is demonstrated 
in consideration of  employment costs. Economic theories understand labor 
costs in terms of  supply and demand for skills and effort capacities. Quality 
labor, though, is not simply at the top end of  these latter factors but imbued 
with what John Stuart Mill calls “moral qualities” (Mill, 1940: 110–11). Quality 
labor, then, can be trusted to work at a high level of  effi ciency with relatively 
little supervision whatever its skill or effort capacity. The preparedness of  
employers to pay above the market rate for workers with these moral qualities 
is addressed by effi ciency wage theory. Family labor, though, simply reverses 
effi ciency wage theory because quality labor is not only effi ciently selected 
through family relations but in family enterprises is frequently paid well below 
market rates without risking labor turnover, sabotage or shirking. The role of  
wives working for low or no wages in family fi rms as business managers or 
accountants is well known in the West and has recently been demonstrated 
for family enterprises in the PRC’s private sector (Goodman, 2004, 2007; 
Tsai, 2007: 112–14). This is not to say that ineffi ciency and nepotism cannot 
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occur in family fi rms (see Redding, 1993: 133–4), but that familial capitalism 
is not necessarily nonrational, as Weber maintains. Indeed, the application of  
transaction cost analysis and agency contract theory to family enterprises 
identifi es the aspects of  and conditions under which familial capitalism may 
operate at high levels of  market rationality (Pollak, 1985; Steier, 2003).
Chinese families, because they are constituted by transgenerational and 
lateral networks, are particularly adept at providing the resources for or means 
of  capitalistic agency (Goody, 1996: 151–61; Whyte, 1996: 9–13). Differences 
between Chinese and Western families in business derive from cultural 
differences – much is made, for instance, of  the Confucian basis of  Chinese 
family structure and practices – but there are also highly salient contingent 
differences. Gordon Redding, for instance, notes:
The environments in which [overseas Chinese business families] are 
accustomed to operate have not been notable for their hospitality to 
business enterprises or to Chinese entrepreneurs. Such entrepreneurs 
have developed a well-justifi ed wariness in the face of  offi cialdom and 
a well-honed set of  defensive weapons to ensure their survival in an 
uncertain world. (Redding, 1993: 4) 
These learned characteristics are particularly useful when operating within the 
orbit of  the capricious administration of  the PRC. While familial capitalism 
is not necessarily the only factor in the development of  post-1978 Chinese 
market capitalism, it is an important one (Whyte, 1996: 9).
Action: Opportunity Structures and Resources
As indicated above, Chinese families are an effi cient basis of  the provision 
of  means for engaging in capitalist activity by reducing the transaction costs 
of  credit and fi nance and by lowering the agency costs of  management, 
administration and labor. It will be shown here that Chinese religion is 
particularly important in effectively increasing the opportunities for applying 
those means in money making. But this requires a very different approach 
than Weber’s to both religion and action. 
The close fi t between Weber’s sociology of  religion and his theory of  action 
is readily located in The Protestant Ethic, for instance: Weber approaches religion 
by identifying the values implicit in religious doctrine as a primary source 
in the social actor’s construction of  meaning which in turn is generative of  
individual motivation or the orientation of  action. But the understanding of  
action in terms of  values as the basis of  motive raises a number of  problems, 
not the least of  which are that effective values are more likely to be the 
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outcomes of  actions rather than their antecedents and motives are largely 
inaccessible and frequently innumerable for any given action (Barbalet, 2009). 
Much more important for understanding action are two factors which Weber 
tends to neglect. While he notes in the General Economic History that “rational 
capitalism…is organized with a view to market opportunities” (Weber, 1981: 
334), Weber tends to have very little to say about structures of  opportunities 
for action (Barbalet, 2008: 218–19, 221) and he also tends to ignore the means 
required for the achievement of  opportunities (Barbalet, 2008: 123–5). If  
we think of  capitalism in terms of  opportunities for money making through 
market exchanges and the particular resources required to take advantage 
of  or to mobilize for those opportunities, then a general form of  motivation 
can be simply assumed and individual motives cease to be of  theoretical 
interest in understanding economic action. If  we think of  action in terms of  
opportunities and resources or means then the family, for instance, can be seen 
as one source of  the means required for market exchanges as indicated above 
and perception of  opportunities can be treated as part of  a cultural-cognitive 
apparatus within which religion may play a role. 
The apprehension of  novel opportunities for profi t making – through the 
discovery of  a market niche, for instance, or a new way of  deploying existing 
resources – is widely recognized as fundamental for market success under 
capitalist conditions. The concept of  opportunity structure therefore addresses 
the question of  the potential for new profi t generation and the expansion of  
the market and economic activity. The signifi cance of  opportunity structures 
is understood in practice by all economic actors. However, theoretical 
discussion of  opportunity has been marred by naturalistic and individualistic 
assumptions. For instance, in his important statement of  the theory of  the 
entrepreneur, Joseph Schumpeter regards opportunities or what he calls 
“possibilities” as something that are “offered by the surrounding world” 
and are simply “always present” (Schumpeter, 2008: 79, 88). Schumpeter’s 
supposition that there is no need for a mechanism to generate or realize manifest 
opportunities from latent “possibilities” is a refl ection of  his conceptualization 
of  entrepreneurship in terms of  individual will and motivation (Schumpeter, 
2008: 93–4). While more recent studies have focused on the entrepreneur’s 
characteristically astute grasp of  opportunities, their theoretical framework 
continues to assume that individual mental processes of  cognition are suffi cient 
bases of  explanation (Mitchell et al., 2002; Shane, 2004). The approach 
proposed here, on the other hand, places the perception of  opportunities not 
in individual cognitive psychological processes but in cultural apparatuses, 
including religious frameworks. 
While opportunities may be latent in existing arrangements, as Schumpeter 
holds, opportunities are necessarily prospective – not material – realities and 
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become manifest only when they are taken. Opportunity structures therefore 
only exist as hypotheses or as constructed or discovered possibilities dependent 
on a particular conjectural perception. Like all perception, the involvement 
of  anticipation and therefore emotion and imagination are central to the 
formation of  opportunity structures, including those for profi t making. 
Religion may play a role here if  religion is part of  a cultural apparatus that 
contributes to the notional location or formation of  opportunities for profi t 
making. Whether Protestantism, for instance, can be part of  such a cultural 
apparatus must be a matter for empirical investigation. Because religious 
dissenters, as critics of  an established order, may possess novel cognitive 
orientations or capacities, it is possible that if  they are business orientated 
they could perceive opportunities for profi t making that may not otherwise 
be visible. The difference between this argument and Weber’s is large. It is 
not that Protestantism leads to a capitalistic ethic but that should Protestants 
be capitalistically involved, then their religion, not as a set of  values but as 
a culturally provided cognitive framework, may generate a perception of  
opportunity for profi t through affective and imaginative appraisal of  future 
prospects irrespective of  whatever motive may direct them to profi t making.
Weber implicitly and unintentionally raises the question of  opportunity in 
a way compatible with the manner it is set out here. Toward the end of  The 
Religion of  China he says enigmatically in the context of  his preceding remarks 
that “The Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, probably more 
capable than the Japanese, of  assimilating capitalism which has technically 
and economically been fully developed in the modern cultural area” (Weber, 
1964: 248). How they might achieve this Weber does not say, apart from a 
suggestion that cultural osmosis may be the mechanism – he refers to Canton 
(now Guangzhou) as one place it has happened because of  the large numbers 
of  foreigners there (Weber, 1964: 242). It must be noted, though, that in a 
slightly later work Weber claims that the Japanese are more likely than the 
Chinese to “take over capitalism as an artefact from the outside” (Weber, 
1960: 275). Given Weber’s insistence on the incongruity of  the values of  
Chinese religion and capitalism – in which the motive for profi t making as 
an end in itself  in market exchanges cannot be deduced from the values of  
Chinese religious ethics – it is ironic that the cognitive structure of  Chinese 
religions can function as instruments in expanding the horizon of  capitalistic 
opportunities, as indicated below.
Chinese Religion and Expanding Opportunity Structures
It was mentioned above that Chinese religions cohabit within a polytheistic 
culture of  nonexclusivity. It is feasible to suppose that this nonexclusivity has 
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played a role in the advancement of  China’s post-1978 market economy 
insofar as the mindset of  religious nonexclusivity is part of  a cultural 
apparatus which, in the context of  market exchanges, encourages the 
perception and apprehension of  opportunities which may otherwise not be 
apparent. Because of  the lateral elective cognitive mobility available within 
the Chinese religious universe, which is an aspect of  religious nonexclusivity, 
there is an increased likelihood of  a sharpened awareness of  an expanding 
range of  possible opportunities in any given situation. But within the 
lattice of  Chinese religious nonexclusivity, the different religions do not 
equally play a role in encouraging an expanding appreciation of  market 
opportunities. Therefore, it is necessary to give consideration to the different 
capacities of  Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism to contribute to the 
likely apprehension of  market opportunities.
Chinese Buddhism comprises a number of  different “schools” but is unifi ed 
in being “this worldly” (Mahayana) rather than “other-worldly” (Theravada) in 
its concerns (Liu, 2008: 218–9). Chinese Buddhist acceptance of  performance 
of  mundane activities in achieving nonattachment or nonselfhood (the 
absence of  enduring identity) in renunciation of  the world and profi t seeking 
within it contributes to a cognitive apparatus that limits rather than expands 
the optional set within an opportunity structure. The general and therefore 
potentially transferable ethical prescriptions of  Buddhism similarly offer no 
encouragement that it might cognitively support an expansive opportunity 
structure. Buddhist ethics assume the impossibility through moral regulation 
of  improvement of  a social order comprising persons with human desires 
and interests. The affective or emotional direction of  Buddhism, therefore, is 
disengagement from and aversion to this-worldly economic action.
Confucianism, in emphasizing a “middle way” (zhong yong) approach 
to life and conduct, encourages neutrality, stability and avoiding extreme 
positions. This has the effect of  confi ning the appreciation of  opportunities to 
a limited range of  prospects and stabilizing rather than radically expanding 
the optional set within an opportunity structure. Because Confucianism 
is restricted to precedent and has a this-worldly orientation – it both faces 
the past and is realist – it tends to be restrictive of  imagination. At the same 
time, however, the Confucian understanding of  fate does include a signifi cant 
agentic element: persons establish their own fate by planning ahead, applying 
their best abilities and taking responsibility for their own actions. According 
to Confucian teaching, the controlling capacity of  fate is not at the level of  
the selection and execution of  a course of  action but in whether such actions 
might succeed or fail (Yang, 1961: 229, 272–3). Thus fate, rather than another 
human agent, is responsible for the success or failure of  a given person’s 
action. On balance, then, and especially relative to Buddhism, Confucianism 
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tends to cognitively expand rather than contract the optional set of  any given 
opportunity structure.
The presentation of  Daoism in Weber’s Religion of  China emphasizes 
what he sees as three essential qualities: its mysticism (Weber, 1964: 180–8), 
its focus on macrobiotics and immortality (Weber, 1964: 191, 204) and 
its traditionalism – “more traditionalist than orthodox Confucianism” – 
predicated on the use of  magical techniques (Weber, 1964: 205). In his account, 
Weber confuses and confl ates what were earlier in this chapter distinguished 
as contemplative, purposive and Hsien Daoisms, rendering his globalizing 
assessment unsustainable. Weber’s claim that the Laozi or Daode jing contains 
an exposition of  “contemplative mysticism” (Weber, 1964: 186) refl ects what 
has been described as an antagonistic Confucian interpretation (Hansen, 
1992: 7) widely accepted by the Christian missionaries who wrote many of  
the sources Weber drew upon. Indeed, one scholarly assessment is that the 
leading Daoist ideas are “more intellectual than mystical” (Granet, quoted in 
Creel, 1970: 15), although there is no consensus about this in the literature. 
While some scholars insist on the mystical nature of  Daode jing (Schwartz, 
1985) others see it as an antimystical and naturalistic or protoscientifi c work 
(Needham, 1956; Moeller, 2006; see also Lau, 1963: xxxviii–xli). The principle 
text of  Daoism, Daode jing, while appearing to some as a set of  mystical poems 
is at the same time readily seen as a handbook of  statecraft, with a purpose 
of  political counsel and kingly advice anticipating Machiavelli’s The Prince. 
Indeed, the politically instrumental orientation of  the text is demonstrated 
throughout a third-century commentary by Wang Bi (1999), a work which 
continues to inform the Chinese understanding of  the Daode jing. Neither 
is it possible to show that Daode jing or Zhuangzi advocate magical means 
or are necessarily traditionalist. Traditional thought and practice, rather, 
are vulnerable to a key deconstructive tendency within purposive Daoism 
(Needham, 1956: 33–164). These are the inherent attributes of  Daoism that 
positively encourage nonexclusivity and an experimental expansion of  the 
optional set within any given opportunity structure. These latter are achieved 
through development and promotion of  the concept and practice of  what 
might be described as “paradoxical integration.” 
Paradoxical integration entails that opposite elements of  a thing are 
interdependent and mutually supportive, best represented in the relationship 
between yin and yang. The opposition between elements of  a paradoxical 
integration is not contradictory in the Western sense that one element eliminates 
the other, but rather is held to give rise to generative relationships of  a number 
of  types between opposites. Daode jing is a veritable handbook of  paradoxical 
integration, with more than forty percent of  the text occupied with examples 
and expositions of  paradoxical integration. Thus, according to the Daode jing, 
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opposites are held to be mutually productive of  each other, for instance, that in 
order to achieve a purpose its opposite must be attempted, that a thing seems 
to be quite other than it is, and so on (Ames and Hall, 2003: 80, 133, 140–41). 
The Daoist notions of  strength in weakness and advantage in threat or danger 
generate perceptions of  opportunities in market engagements which might 
otherwise not materialize. 
Daoism has been relatively neglected in considerations of  Chinese religion, 
probably because it is institutionally weaker than Buddhism. The diffuse nature 
of  Chinese religion, however, means that its importance and infl uence cannot 
be measured by the number of  its supporters but by the pervasiveness of  its 
concepts. The conventional approach of  associating overseas Chinese business 
success with Confucian principles, for example, is based on the assumption that 
Chinese family dynamics are Confucian (Haley, Haley and Tan, 2004; Haley, 
Tan and Haley, 1998; Redding, 1993; Whyte, 1996). There is more than an 
element of  truth in this supposition, even though it neglects the importance of  
Daoist ideas concerning family and marital relations. These ideas round out 
and strengthen Confucian precepts associated with the durability of  Chinese 
families, especially in terms of  Daoist encouragement of  discovering “the 
natural” course in relationships and in emphasizing the importance of  the 
feminine and therefore encouraging a certain type of  regard for women.
Conclusion
Chinese religion and China’s market economy can be seen as mutually 
supportive in a number of  ways. First, the revival of  Buddhism and Daoism in 
post-1978 China has been a conduit for investment in the market economy of  
the PRC from the Chinese diaspora. Second, the success of  overseas Chinese 
since the nineteenth century in capitalist ventures in East and Southeast Asia 
suggests a positive relationship between market rationality on the one hand 
and Chinese religion and family on the other that raises questions concerning 
the received Weberian perspective. Third, an approach to religion as part of  a 
cultural apparatus instrumental in the apprehension of  opportunity structures 
for capitalistic activity is outlined in the chapter, which indicates the signifi cance 
of  Chinese religious nonexclusivity in general and Daoism in particular for 
successful market engagements through opportunity perceptiveness.
Throughout the chapter, the signifi cance of  the relationship between the 
political state and religion has been indicated. The long historical relationship 
in China between the state and religion has been characterized as one of  
state regulation of  religion moderated by brief  interspersed episodes of  
patronage or prohibition. Regulatory relations have frequently included 
co-option of  religious forces for state purposes. This is demonstrated in 
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the present post-1978 period by the state sponsored but privately funded 
program of  temple restoration that is a conduit for capital investment in the 
PRC by overseas Chinese. 
In contrasting Chinese and Western religion it was shown above that a 
Chinese term for religion, zong jiao, was invented in the nineteenth century 
because none had previously existed. Religion in the modern Western sense of  
a belief  system supported by doctrine, organization and leadership has simply 
been absent in Chinese society. Chinese traditions of  temples, ritual practices 
and ceremonial practitioners relate to local communities and the rhythms of  
their needs in multifunctional spaces in which liturgy has little salience and 
performative elements prevail. In this context the introduction of  a concept 
of  “religion” as a system of  belief  carried by a congregation organized by 
a professional clergy challenges traditional community rituals and practices 
by separating out “superstition” and also “culture” from “religion” to the 
detriment of  the traditional forms (Ashiwa and Wank, 2009: 9–12; Dean, 2009: 
188–91). Thus, the nineteenth-century invention of  Chinese religion, which 
Weber draw upon and contributed to, in this sense was a further instrument 
of  state regulation in the service of  modernization.  
An aspect of  Chinese religion, to use the term on notice, which has remained 
more or less outside the reach of  state regulation and control, is referred to 
above as its “diffused” aspects. This includes the conceptual and dispositional 
elements of  a cultural legacy that exist in language and idiom. This aspect 
of  Chinese religion is signal in the acumen of  Chinese business in generating 
an expansive opportunity structure necessary for market engagement, as 
indicated in discussion above.
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Chapter 9
HINDU NORMALIZATION, 
NATIONALISM AND CONSUMER 
MOBILIZATION
Arathi Sriprakash and Adam Possamai
University of  Western Sydney
This book has sought to map some of  the relationships between religion, the 
state and advanced capitalism in different political and social arenas across 
the globe. In India, accelerated and uneven modernization following the 
nation’s economic liberalization in the early 1990s provides an interesting 
context to examine these relationships, specifi cally given the signifi cant 
rise of  Hindu nationalism in this period. Hindutva (loosely “Hindu-ness”), 
an ideology advocated by Hindu nationalist movements, exerts signifi cant 
infl uence in parliamentary politics and arguably more insidiously, in social life 
in contemporary India. Although it has been argued that modernization and 
associated secular practices have repressed religion from public life, since the 
1980s we have seen a deprivatization process of  religion in many places in the 
world (Casanova, 2006). This chapter follows on this perspective and discusses 
the ways religious expression may adapt to and diffuse through public spaces 
and practices of  modernity with regards to the political projects of  Hindutva 
and consumer mobilization more specifi cally.
We consider the ways Hindu assertion diffuses through the consumption 
of  information, images, sounds and goods. The saturation of  popular media 
and consumer practices with Hindu cultural markers has in many ways 
constructed forms of  “Hinduness” as “Indianess,” particularly among the 
urban middle classes. Through the construction of  a Hindu normalcy, the 
operation of  power with nonhegemonic and non-Hindu groups is made less 
visible and thus unchallenged. In the second half  of  the chapter we take up 
this concern in the context of  development activities in India, particularly 
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fundraising efforts that have involved Indian diasporic networks. We explore 
how Hindu nationalism has emerged in some philanthropic efforts with 
disturbing consequences. We also consider the ways philanthropies appeal to 
the diasporic “donor-consumer” by constructing a homogenous, culturally 
unifi ed Indian nation, making religion (and Hindu dominance) less explicit. 
Through this imagination of  India and its “development,” the relations of  
power, particularly around religion, caste and class, once again risk being 
unchallenged.
Religion in Consumer Society 
Consumption has always been part of  social practice. Consumption for leisure 
and lifestyle has opened out as a social practice beyond the dominant classes 
since hyperindustrialization has taken place in many societies. In present times 
of  mass consumption, consumer society presents itself  as all-inclusive with 
access for groups across social and economic hierarchies. Indeed, for Bauman 
(1998), a “normal life” in a consumer society is the life of  consumerism, which 
involves making choices among all the displayed opportunities. A “happy life” 
is then defi ned as taking as many of  these opportunities as possible. The poor 
in consumer society are not necessarily those who do not have shelter but are 
those ones who have no access to a normal or “happy” life. This is to be a 
consumer manqué, as Bauman (1998: 38) explains:
In a society of  consumers, it is above all the inadequacy of  the person 
as a consumer that leads to social degradation and “internal exile.” It is 
this inadequacy, this inability to acquit oneself  of  the consumer’s duties, 
that turns into bitterness at being left behind, disinherited or degraded, 
shut off  or excluded from the social feast to which others gained entry. 
Overcoming that consumer inadequacy is likely to be seen as the only 
remedy – the sole exit from a humiliating plight.
Consumer culture is the outcome of  the massive expansion of  the production 
of  capitalist commodity. The outburst of  the capitalist system has created a 
vast reservoir of  consumer goods and sites for purchase and consumption to 
be “enjoyed” by the various classes of  our society. This has lead to growing 
dependence on mass leisure and consumption activities. Some view this as 
leading to more egalitarianism and individual freedom (e.g. Certeau, 1988) and 
others see it as an increase in the ideological and seductive manipulation of  
the masses by the dominant class (e.g. the Frankfurt School and the American 
New Left). This manipulation would distract the masses from considering an 
alternative to our society, which could improve our social relations.
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Religion takes an interesting role in contemporary consumer societies. 
Religious groups produce commodities, or put positive values in some 
commodities, that can be bought by the religious consumer. Some groups 
are more involved in consumer activity than others and practices can 
vary from Hare Krishna devotees selling books or food at a university 
campus to Christian shops selling books and other artifacts to the Church 
of  Scientology charging fees for each level of  spiritual development or to 
New Age shops offering goods that can help the spiritual actor on his or her 
quest. It cannot be claimed that religion has always been protected from 
consumer culture until now – one might be familiar with the narrative of  
Jesus protesting against the merchants in the temple. However, what is of  
contemporary relevance is the way in which religion has been seemingly 
immersed into consumer cultures; a cause for some to celebrate and others 
to resist. It would now appear that for a group to spread its beliefs and 
values, the group has to speak a language that the majority of  people can 
understand: that of  consumption. For example, some Christian evangelical 
groups are producing cultural artifacts (e.g. movies, computer games, pop 
music...) to promote their faith in consumer society and are also preventing 
contraliteralist Christian artifacts (e.g. stories promoting evolutionism) from 
entering the same social and cultural space (Possamai, 2005).
Postwar consumer culture has dominated Western lifestyles with 
mass-produced commodities. This culture, instead of  building a sense of  
belonging for groups – e.g. class, subcultures, political parties – appears to 
create a fragmented society in which religion is only one part. Indeed, in this 
consuming world, the individual becomes his or her own authority; the late 
modern person in the West no longer tolerates being told what to believe and 
what to do. Consumer choice is not limited to shopping but is extended to 
education, health, politics and religion. People are now “free to choose” and 
the market culture might be turning us into consumers rather than citizens 
(Lyon, 2002: 12). The consumer is faced with a proliferation of  “spiritual/
religious/philosophical knowledges,” which they research and experience. 
However, as Davie (2000: 172) underlines, when it comes to consumption and 
monastic discipline for example, people choose what they like from the rigors 
of  the order (e.g. listening to Gregorian chants) but rarely embrace the whole 
ascetic discipline.
In a recent book by Carrette and King (2005), the coagulation between 
religion and consumption is characterized in a very negative light, as 
exemplifi ed by this quote:
Today in most British cities you will fi nd old church buildings that have 
been sold off  to become business offi ces, supermarkets, public houses, 
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nightclubs and private apartments. However, it is not primarily the sale 
of  buildings that we are concerned with here, but rather of  the “cultural 
capital” of  the religious for the purposes of  consumption and corporate 
gain. From the branding of  perfumes using ancient Asian concepts and the 
idea of  the spiritual (“Samsara” perfume, “Zen” deodorant, “Spiritual” 
body-spray) to clothe the product in an aura of  mystical authenticity, to 
the promotion of  management courses offering “spiritual techniques” 
for the enhancement of  one’s work productivity and corporate business-
effi ciency, the sanitised religiosity of  “the spiritual” sells. (Carette and 
King, 2005: 16)
In this perspective, “spirituality is turned into a product or a kind of  brand 
name for the meaning of  life” (Carette and King, 2005: 53). Moving beyond 
this characterization, are we interested in the relationship between religion, 
consumerism and the state? Is the state simply a structure that overtly regulates 
religious citizens to be consumers, or could there be other, perhaps less visible 
social relations at work?
Analyses of  religion, consumerism and the state in Western societies have 
shown how religion has been dedifferentiated in the public sphere through 
market forces that are increasingly unregulated by the state. Religion has been 
deprivatized (Casanova, 2006) and has appeared as a social force on the same 
footing as other social forces (e.g. political parties, unions etc.). Following this 
line of  thinking, Beaumont (2008a, 2008b) recently studied the deprivatization 
of  religion as an outcome of  the development of  neoliberalism in a Western 
context. With the rolling back of  the neoliberal state from its welfare activities 
in several domains in public life, faith-based organizations have increased their 
penetration in the public sphere. We see, for example, the prevalence of  faith-
based organizations running facilities and programs targeting urban poverty. 
This has reached a turning point in which we fi nd politicians, social activists 
and commentators claiming that some religious organizations are better 
equipped for such actions than the current welfare state. With the advent of  
neoliberalism, faith-based organizations changed from simply offering charity 
work to being strong actors in the provision of  welfare and social services. We 
have thus seen the potential deprivatization of  faith-based organization in the 
public sphere. It becomes clear in this case that the advent of  the neoliberal 
state has had the unintended consequence of  partly bringing religion back 
into the public sphere.
But how do we understand the interaction between religion and 
market forces that are buoying consumer societies beyond the Eurocentric 
perspective, which has had a long history of  demarcating the church-state 
relation? Gopalakrishnan (2006) has provided an interesting argument in his 
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work on Hindutva and neoliberalism in contemporary India. He analyzes the 
political project of  Hindutva, an expression of  “Hindu-ness” that has been 
a considerable force in India’s social history since the nineteenth century. 
As an assertion of  cultural nationalism, Hindutva confi gures the “origins” 
of  India as a Hindu civilization. Gopalakrishnan sets out to understand 
the resonances and tensions between Indian neoliberalism and Hindutva 
as political projects that have had a near simultaneous rise in infl uence 
in India since the late 1980s. He argues that Hindutva and neoliberalism 
share “similar visions of  the relationship between the state, society and the 
individual” (2805), despite tendencies to view religious-oriented projects and 
market-oriented values as incompatible. 
Gopalakrishnan begins by examining the ways in which both Hindutva 
and neoliberal discourses reduce social processes to individual choices and 
decisions. For the former, society is shaped by the choices of  Hindu morality, 
values, character; discourses which individualize actions and thereby elide social 
power relations (such as caste, class or gender). This, as Gopalakrishnan argues, 
resonates with neoliberal technologies (for instance, of  “consumer choice” 
gestured to above) that presume social behavior as “voluntary transactions 
between rational, utility-maximizing individuals” (2805). The construction of  
social processes as individual, autonomous human action means that problems 
or divisions in society are also seen to be addressed by attending to the self. 
For example, a Hindutva narrative suggests “harmony” in society is achieved 
through “harmony” in the human body. For neoliberalism, marketized forms 
of  civil action enable people to help society by helping themselves (i.e. self-
esteem movements for social good, or appeals to help the national economy 
through consumer activity).
Key to the interests of  our chapter is Gopalakrishnan’s discussion of  how 
Indian neoliberalism and Hindutva both take up in their political projects 
the rhetoric of  transformation and a “new society.” This was nowhere more 
apparent than in the Hindu-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s glossy, forward-
looking election slogan of  “India Shining” in 2004. Driving the rhetoric of  
social transformation are the core principles of  each project – Hindu rule and 
dharma in Hindutva and the market in neoliberal discourse. As an example, 
Gopalakrishnan quotes the BJP’s 1998 election manifesto, which states the 
party’s vision of  “the world’s oldest cradle of  civilisation transform itself  
yet again into a benign global power, contributing her material, intellectual, 
cultural and spiritual energies…to save the world from the gathering 
civilisational crisis” (2805). Working in parallel to this is the transformational 
agenda of  Indian neoliberalism. Neoliberal discourses invoke the utopian 
market, underscoring “notions of  a new, ‘developed’ and wealthy society” 
(2805) with modern, urban consumer tastes and practices. 
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Gopalakrishnan’s analysis provides a way of  thinking about how religious 
expression (and in this case religious-political projects) can adapt to market 
technologies in India. We began this section by describing the ways in which 
pervasive consumer cultures normalize consumer identity. As religious 
expression fi nds ways of  adapting to market technologies, we might expect to 
see the normalization of  religious-consumer identities. In the next part of  this 
chapter we explore how social forces around Hindu-nationalism have been 
mobilized through consumer activity in India. Our main point of  interest is 
to consider the ways in which consumption of  “Hinduism” has constructed 
a Hindu-normative India despite the country’s religious and social diversity – 
arguably to the disadvantage of  already marginalized groups.
Consumer Mobilization and Hindu Normalization
The religious, linguistic and cultural heterogeneity of  the modern Indian 
nation is well known. It has been argued that earlier communities in India 
had, as Kaviraj (1992: 26) noted, “fuzzy boundaries.” This was partly because 
religion, caste and endogamous groups were based on social principals not 
primarily tied to territory, but also partly because “traditional communities, 
unlike modern ones, are not enumerated.” It has been argued the notion of  
“Hindu community,” “Hindu-ness” and a “Hindu way of  life” were reifi ed 
under colonial rule. Basu (2008) suggests the discursive construction and 
enumeration of  a unitary “Hindu people” in the colonial state involved the 
consolidation of  a single Hindu identity that made eight centuries of  Islamic 
culture invisible. Richard King (1999) argued in his paper “Orientalism and 
the Modern Myth of  ‘Hinduism’” that “Hinduism” as a single world religion 
is itself  a nineteenth-century construction and that the present-day usage 
of  “Hinduism” has emerged from colonial representations of  the general 
features of  Indian society rather than of  a single religion. Further, there 
have been various attempts by Hindu leaders themselves to eradicate “folk” 
remnants of  Hinduism such as ritualistic healing and communication with 
the dead (Sinha, 2005). The construction and “normalization” of  Hinduism 
and Hindu-ness in India has a longer history than the contemporary contexts 
we examine below. 
The notion of  a singular, unifying “Hinduism” is widely mobilized by 
Hindu nationalist movements. In the postcolonial democratic state, Hindu 
nationalism and associated Hindutva ideologies were institutionalized through 
the formation of  political organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Rao (2004) examines 
how these political parties have circumvented constitutional commitments 
to secularism, which promotes the separation of  politics and religion. When 
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accused of  spreading communal bigotry, such parties argue that “Hinduism/
Hindutva is not a religion but ‘a way of  life’” and in doing so advance a Hindu 
majoritarian reading of  secularism (Rao, 2004: 394). The BJP has forged a 
powerful role in national politics in India, seeking to protect Hindu interests 
in a religiously diverse landscape. The party was elected to power in 1998 
and served until 2004. It currently holds power in fi ve states. The political-
economic conjuncture in which the strengthening of  Hindu nationalism 
occurred was marked by signifi cant market reforms and expansion of  media 
and communications. 
The opening up of  India’s economy in 1991 saw the increased participation 
of  the country in global markets, the expansion of  electronic media, the 
growth of  the middle classes, and associated consumer-oriented practices. In 
the popular imagination, India had arrived on the world stage. This saw the 
emergence of  what Hansen (1999) called a “double discourse” in the Hindu 
nationalist movement: national pride in the country’s upward trajectory was 
coupled with self-depreciation of  India’s capitulation to external interests, 
goods and values. Bose (2009) notes that this double discourse “catered to a 
growing middle class which was anxious to integrate into the global economy 
without losing their cultural integrity” (Bose, 2009: 25). The maintenance of  
this integrity occurred through the relocation and reconstitution of  Hindu 
discourses, images and practices into modern ideals of  consumption. In 
neoliberal India, pietism and consumerism were not always constructed in 
opposition to each other. 
Indeed, there has been signifi cant research and commentary on the ways 
in which consumer goods and mass media have transmitted, constituted and 
reinforced both Hindu religiosity and Hindu nationalist ideology in India 
(cf. Johnson, 2000; Page and Crawley, 2001; Rajagopal, 2001). Murty (2009) 
provides a detailed analysis of  the ways in which Hindutva ideologies found 
expression in Indian popular cinema from 1990–2003, a time when Hindu 
nationalism gained particular momentum in the political arena. Arvind 
Rajagopal’s (2000) book Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping 
of  the Public in India explored the expanding consumption of  television image and 
narrative and its production of  a Hindu national imagination. State-broadcast 
television enabled far-reaching communication across a society “beset by deep 
economic and cultural cleavages” (Rajagopal, 2000: 119). But for the Indian 
state, the new visibility of  audience ratings, popularity and profi ts also meant 
“the gap between state pronouncements and public sentiments acquired 
unprecedented salience” (ibid.: 119). Rajagopal focused his analysis on the 
immensely popular television series broadcast of  the Hindu epic Ramayan. The 
highly rated mass adulation of  the series was used by the Hindu nationalist 
BJP to stir public interest in the Ayodhya dispute. Hindu nationalists asserted 
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the Babri Mosque was constructed on the site of  a former Hindu temple and 
the birthplace of  the Hindu god Ram (the lead character of  the televised epic 
Ramayan). There were violent outcomes of  this campaign, and in 1992 Hindu 
nationalists were involved in the demolition of  the mosque. (See Rao 2004 
for an incisive analysis of  the legal battles arising from this incident, which 
brought the tensions between constitutional commitments to secularism and 
federalism in Indian politics into focus.)
Indeed, television, the internet and new media have played a signifi cant part 
in creating networks through which religious and nationalist interests travel, 
especially for diasporic communities. Khilnani (2003) captured the confl uence 
of  piety and consumerism, describing the “novel” Hinduism found on urban 
Indian streets: “where holographic gods dangle on well-used key chains and 
cassettes of  devotional ragas are played in traffi c jams” (Khilnani, 2003: 186). 
In Indian business management, Birtchnell (2009) reports that “modern and 
liberal Indian business leaders are committed to integrating a set of  beliefs into 
their working lives” (268), those beliefs being as Birtchnell argues a “Hindu 
ethic” that has been refashioned in India as “cultural capital.” Rajagopal 
(2001) examined the “brand logics” in India’s expanding market through 
which a Hindu cultural identity was constructed through consumer products 
and services. The adoption of  Hindu symbols and practices by businesses does 
not merely signify a marketing strategy to reach new consumers, but also, given 
the rhetoric of  “consumer choice,” that “the economic and cultural spheres 
are apparently working through a model of  consent, creating an apparently 
expanding middle class, and at the same time, a wider acceptance of  Hindu 
dominance” (Rajagopal, 2001: 773).
Rajagopal’s point is that Hinduva “travelled on the back of  expanding 
markets… inserting itself  into spaces party politics had not developed 
systematically, thus bringing itself  closer to people, and advancing its cause” 
(780). The consumer has been mobilized in the branding of  Hindu India. 
Examining the normalization of  Hinduism particularly by urban, middle- 
and elite-class Indians, Anustup Basu (2008) provides a particularly insightful 
analysis of  how the expansion of  the Indian electronic media space has 
enabled new forms of  Hindu power. Through the concept of  “informatic 
modernization,” Basu explores the ways contemporary Hindu assertion “does 
not pertain to orders, spaces, genres and enclosures of  modern knowledge, 
but to a diffuse but kinetic ecology of  sights and sounds” (Basu, 2008: 244). 
Basu draws examples from Indian cinema in which the assemblage of  Hindu 
signs, language, imagery and sounds takes an “informatic” form whereby 
“disparate elements can be orchestrated together without completing a story 
as such” (ibid.: 246). He refl ects on the ways in which similar processes of  
assemblage produce a “metropolitan Hinduness”, which is “not just marked 
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by representational clamour of  subjects and identities, but is an innocuous 
yet omnipresent suffusion of  metropolitan life and language” (ibid.: 249). 
Through this assemblage, signifi ers of  the Hindu are abstracted, historical 
identities are fractured or made irrelevant and hierarchies are recalibrated 
to be based on aesthetic qualities, lifestyles, merit, etc. Religious identities are 
reinscribed by consumer identities. However, by normalizing the metropolitan 
consumer subject through this mode of  apparent religious and social inclusion, 
the social practices through which the religious “other” and the Hindu “self ” 
are constituted are made invisible. As Basu argues “it is thus always possible 
for the Hindu to either hate the Muslim community or express despair over 
its practiced ‘medievalisms’ and at the same time to have ‘Muslim’ friends” 
(ibid.: 249–50).  
Of  course, the older and more explicit forms of  Hindu assertion continue 
to shape social and political life in India. What we see in the examples above 
are the ways in which Hindu power as majoritarian normalcy is distributed 
by networks of  information and products enabled particularly in the so called 
“new” consumer India. As Basu concludes his analysis, “it becomes, quite 
insidiously, a matter of  absolute normalcy to become Hindu in the global 
metropolis” (ibid.: 250).
Indian Diasporic Networks and Consumer Citizenship 
We turn now to consider the implications of  such Hindu normalization for 
India’s “development” activities, particularly concerning the infl uence of  
Indian diasporic communities. As Indian consumers have been mobilized 
within the nation-state to create a modern “Hindu” India, arguably so too 
have the diaspora beyond national borders. Though a heterogeneous group, 
the Indian diaspora are often characterized as successful, entrepreneurial 
professionals and there have been signifi cant moves to encourage diasporic 
capital and infl uence back to India as part of  the country’s “development.” It 
is estimated there are 25–40 million Indian émigrés worldwide, with reports 
that India has the largest volume of  diasporic remittances in the world 
(Bose, 2008). Indian links with diasporic networks have been encouraged through, 
for example, dual citizenship arrangements, state-sponsored conventions, 
conferences for nonresidential Indians (NRIs) and community movements 
and associations. While NRIs have been extended citizenship rights, there are 
questions around the denial of  similar rights for Kashmiris, Gujurati Muslims 
and other marginalized groups: “NRIs were to be ‘welcomed home’ even as 
other communities were driven out” (Gopalakrishnan, 2006: 2809).  
Bose (2008: 127) has explored how diasporic communities have a hand 
in reshaping “the material aesthetic and ideological landscapes of  their 
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homelands” through remittances, investments, property ownership and 
cultural infl uences. Within India, idealized diasporic “tastes” and “interests” 
have had signifi cant infl uence over the nature of  urban development projects 
(such as Westernized malls and NRI housing developments), higher education 
programs (course content oriented towards the globally mobile consumer), 
cinematic and media representations (of  the chic, tech-savvy, English speaking 
Indian) and transnational business relationships. Sumit Sarkar (2008: 430) 
reminds us that these products of  economic liberalization in India have been 
accompanied by “an increasingly aggressive emphasis on ‘Hindu’ cultural-
religious identity.” Hindu assertion (whether explicit or implicit) in these realms 
has led Gopalakrishnan (2006) to argue that diasporic infl uence has redrawn 
India’s social boundaries around a supposedly unitary community – a product 
of  what he sees as the alliance between neoliberalism and Hindutva.
In his research on diasporas and development, Bose (2008) has traced the 
fl ow of  capital into India through diasporic networks. He discusses how a 
number of  initiatives by both Hindu-right and center-left Indian governments 
over the last two decades have strengthened relationships between India and 
its diasporic communities. The potential “good” of  such relationships might 
be seen in terms of  “development assistance, economic aid, increased trade, 
greater cultural connections and understanding and so on” (124). However, 
Bose also raises caution about the potentially detrimental and deleterious 
effects of  diasporic assistance. He examines the unintended outcomes of  
diasporic development activity, for example the mass displacement of  people 
as a result of  the Narmada Valley Development Dam Project that had attracted 
signifi cant diasporic fi nancial support. 
Bose also discusses the entanglement of  diasporic communities in more 
explicit ideological projects to “reshape, resurrect, defend or even enlarge 
homelands” (Bose, 2008: 126). There has been some critique of  diasporic 
support for Hindu nationalist projects in the name of  Indian “development.” 
Commentators have claimed that “Hindu fundamentalism has reemerged in 
India with a new virulence, partly funded by the overseas Indian diaspora” 
(Vicziany, 2004: 113). Bose describes the active international fundraising efforts 
by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, or World Hindu Council). The VHP is one 
of  the many entities of  the sangh parivar, the name given to the “family” of  Hindu 
nationalist organizations which have networks that extend beyond India. Bose 
reports on the extent of  infl uence of  the VHP and its disturbing consequences 
with regards to the 2002 communal violence in the state of  Gujurat:
Perhaps most alarming has been the vocal support and justifi cation 
offered by some within diasporic Hindu communities in North America 
and Western Europe following the pogroms against Muslims…VHP 
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functionaries abroad were particularly active in their defence of  the 
shocking events and sought to minimise the evidence that state authorities 
were complicit in the murders and brutalisation of  the Muslim community 
in Gujurat. (127)
We see here how the transnational travels of  Hindutva ideology have positioned 
Hindu nationalism as “both the globalizing face of  Indian politics, and the bearer 
of  a violent and brutal form of  religious chauvinism” (Rajagopal, 2001: 775). 
Another controversy that raised concerns over the nature of  diasporic 
mobilization for Indian development activity involved the United States-
based India Development and Relief  Fund (IDRF). Vicziany (2004) presents 
a very critical case against the IDRF. She argues the IDRF presented itself  
as a nonprofi t nongovernmental organization which sought to contribute 
to community housing, education and sanitation, as well as disaster relief. 
However, Vicziany reports that the IDRF has been part of  the Hindu 
nationalist sangh parivar. The organization has received a substantial amount 
of  money through diasporic fundraising efforts: “In 2000 alone, over US$3.8 
million was collected by the IDRF in America” (109). International money, 
it is argued, was used to fund sectarian programs and to benefi t Hindu 
communities over other groups during disaster relief. Bose (2008) reports how 
critics of  the IDRF launched a public campaign to highlight the problematic 
connections between diasporic fundraising for development and the growth of  
Hindu nationalist ideas in India. 
As Vicziany (2004) is careful to note, it is uncertain how far diasporic funding 
to Hindu nationalist “development” organizations was driven by sympathy 
for religious nationalist projects or how far donors were “tricked” into their 
support. What is signifi cant is the mechanisms of  this potential “trickery.” 
Such development organizations are potentially able to take on discourses of  
democracy, which can conceal sectarian motives or the privileging of  certain 
groups. As Kaviraj (1995: 312) observes, “since Hinduism is the religion of  
the majority, this makes it easy for its advocates to speak the language of  
democracy.” As the consumption of  goods and images in modern India is seen 
to “normalize” markers of  Hindu society, do philanthropic and development 
organizations address their diasporic donor-consumers through Hindu 
majoritarianism? How far does the normalization of  Hindu-India confi gure 
Indian “development” in terms of  Hindu interests? 
There is an emerging literature that explores neoliberal consumer-
citizenship and the ways in which philanthropic activities (of  nonprofi t 
organizations and otherwise) extend their “products” to reach consumer-citizens. 
Banet-Weiser and Lapsanksy (2008: 1255) note in their work on brand culture 
and consumer citizenship that “the logics of  neo-liberalism have permeated 
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spheres that have traditionally been understood as separate from the everyday 
workings of  capitalism, such as social activism.” We see this in the rise of  “fair 
trade” goods and seemingly class-based practices of  “ethical” consumerism. 
Jeremy Youde (2009: 203) writes that such “political consumerism functions as 
a form of  social movement activity. Political consumerism focuses on a sense of  
social and political global responsibility exercised by consumers.” 
This sense of  social responsibility extends beyond the consumption of  
material goods, as we see in the construction of  the philanthropic donor as a 
“donor-consumer.” Raddon (2008: 42) for example examines the production 
of  the normative neoliberal “caring” citizen who, “emulating the wealthy, 
gives time or money to help the less fortunate.” New modes of  philanthropy 
through consumer-citizenship or the contributions of  the donor-consumer are 
seen as public acts, and Raddon argues that philanthropic organizations are 
increasingly modeled on business principles:
The normative value of  paying taxes, social movement activism, artistic 
and cultural creation, and the everyday work of  caring for people within 
households and neighbourhoods diminishes in comparison to donating 
and fundraising. (42) 
Slocum (2004) too suggests that citizens in neoliberal societies are now 
addressed as consumers. The consumer in politics can be seen either as a dupe 
who follows the hegemony of  his or her country or as a political force when 
refusing to consume certain commodities (e.g. green consumerism and Stop 
the Sweatshops Campaign). In this sense, these citizens would be active in the 
consumption of  commodities and values following the ethos of  a new social 
movement. Kozinets and Handleman (2004) follow this line of  thinking in 
their analysis of  consumer movements. These movements want to challenge 
hegemonic consumption by organizing themselves around goals that resist 
particular industrial or marketing practices.
What identities are constituted and reinforced through Indian diasporic 
fundraising that fl ows into India? Such “buying into” philanthropic practices 
have effects that are transnational: how, through this distance, is India and 
development imagined? After the controversy about diasporic fundraising 
for Hindutva-affi liated “development” programs, there have been efforts 
to highlight the need for ethical practices of  nonresident Indian (NRI) 
investment and support in development activity. Bose (2008: 127) reports 
how the Association for India’s Development (AID), a United States-based 
nongovernmental organization which runs development initiatives in India, 
has suggested that its members ask themselves “what kinds of  developments in 
India are Indians in the US (and other countries) making possible?”  
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Kumarini Silva’s (2010) recent research with AID members explores the 
construction of  the diasporic philanthropic subject and the imagination of  the 
Indian “homeland.” Silva argues that AID tries to “connect the NRI to India 
through the pathos of  nationalism and civic duty” (52). Through interviews 
with AID members in the United States, Silva shows how the language and 
practice of  the Indian diaspora in “giving back” is steeped in neoliberal 
assumptions which allow the organization
to construct their diasporic and expatriate selves as a monolith and 
India as a homogenous nation. Within this simplistic binary, where 
heterogeneity within both community and country are obfuscated, the 
activist relationship is constructed through an affective relationship 
between US –based economic success, vis-à-vis the non-resident-Indian 
(NRI), and diasporic nostalgia and longing for a “homeland.” (48)
The construction of  a homogenous Indian nation enables AID to “promote 
itself  as a movement committed to an India that is united through culture 
rather than religion” (53). This was a way for the organization to distance itself  
from religious affi liation and potential communalism, and was also a useful 
marketing strategy to extend its reach to a wider set of  donor-consumers. In 
terms of  reaching and mobilizing diverse diasporic communities, narratives of  
unity are certainly powerful: “since this imagined community is constructed 
transnationally, rather than locally, it fl ourishes as a collective cause” (51). 
In its newsletters, the AID organization produces narratives of  what 
Silva calls a “domesticated utopia,” asking diasporic Indians to identify with 
“the simple forest-dwelling Indian,” the “children weaving carpets” and the 
“Indian organic farmer.” Silva argues that this vision “preserves existing 
structural inequalities and differences in ethnicity, religion, class and caste. 
It does so by postulating an underlying liberal, universal ‘Indian’ subjectivity 
that orders and manages these differences as if  they were of  no consequence 
to development” (51). This “Indian” subjectivity, like our earlier discussion 
of  Hindu normalization, assembles India in ways that make invisible the 
practices and distribution of  power that marginalizes minority communities. 
As Silva suggests, India is constructed by AID as “one nation far away from a 
geography that is riddled by separatist politics” (51).  
Philanthropic discourses that play down religion by emphasizing a common 
“Indian culture” may well make Hinduism and forms of  Hindu assertion 
less explicit in NRI activity. However, Lal (2003) has argued that there is 
an “anxiety of  infl uence” especially among the middle-class, “modern” 
Hindu Indian diasporic community about the invisibility of  Hinduism as a 
“world religion” despite successful “Indianization” in international business, 
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media and technology. As an example of  this anxiety, he describes how 
diasporic Indians are questioning the relatively weak position of  India in 
United States foreign policy, especially compared to that of  China and 
particularly when the democratic politics of  India would suggest it to be a 
more suitable partner. According to Lal, further dimension of  this anxiety 
stems from the signifi cant global focus on Islam in comparison to a rare 
interest in Hinduism: “to be Hindu is to be nearly condemned to oblivion” 
(30). At the same time as a resurgence of  militant Hinduism is happening in 
India, Lal suggests that many NRIs perceive that Hinduism should be more 
visible outside of  India. His descriptions of  religious marginalization attempt 
to explain how Hindutva as a form of  Hindu assertion is able to gain traction 
among Hindu diasporic communities. The efforts of  such movements to 
homogenize a “Hindu” identity is an exercise in “transforming it into a world 
religion, and placing it within categories of  knowledge that would make it 
into a proper religion” (35). 
We have seen in this section how consumerism and religion are interpenetrated 
in such a way as promoting the development of  a religious view that is closely 
linked to nationalist and developmental projects. It should be noted, as a last point 
for this section, that the confl uence of  religion and consumerism does not indicate 
an “anything goes” characterization of  religious consumption. For example, Lal 
(2003) makes reference to the “American Hindus Against Defamation” who have 
been campaigning against the inappropriate “commercialization” of  Hinduism. 
One example is the campaign against the toilet seat manufacturer Sittin’ Pretty, 
which placed pictures of  Shiva and other Hindu deities on toilet seat covers. 
The merging of  religion with nationalism does not always lead to positive 
consumption (i.e. the promotion of  certain types of  consuming practices) but 
also to a type of  negative consumption (i.e. the prevention of  certain types of  
consuming practices). 
Theoretical Discussion
To understand this intersection of  religion, consumption and neoliberal state 
strategies, we need to revise current theories on consumerism. Featherstone 
(1991) identifi ed three theories of  consumer culture. The fi rst analyzes 
consumerism as a stage of  capitalist development in which the consumer is 
faced with hegemonic force from a technocratic society (e.g. the Frankfurt 
School and the American New Left). The second is a more sociological 
concern about how people delineate their class and status and how they 
create distinction via their consuming habits. The consumer is located in 
a specifi c social class that inscribes his or her presence in a social fi eld by 
creating a social distinction from other social classes (e.g. Bourdieu). The third 
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is concerned with the creativity of  consumer practices and how this leads to 
an aesthetics and emotional pleasure of  consumption. The consumers are 
seen as quasi-heroic people who can create their identities by playing with 
the system and constructing their own identity for themselves in selecting 
what is available in the consuming system (e.g. Certeau). 
Adapting these theories to the fi eld of  religion, we would fi nd that the fi rst 
theory would see religion used as a commodity for a source of  profi t and/
or as a way to maintain status quo in a technocratic society. If  religion for 
Marx was an opium during modernity, consumerism in this perspective has 
become the opium par excellence in which religion is now but a part. With 
the second perspective, we would have specifi c strata of  a society consuming 
religion for specifi c purposes and in distinction from other strata. We would see 
here, for example, some middle-class Christian evangelical groups consuming 
according to their faith while distinguishing themselves from other groups 
such as atheists (e.g. refusal to consume stories supporting evolutionism). The 
third perspective would see the religious person consuming in an apparently 
free-fl oating fashion. An example of  this would be the New Ager who is 
interested in commodities from various religions, as consumption in this case 
is not strictly limited to one religion only (Possamai, 2005).
With reference to the political projects of  Hindutva and consumer 
mobilization, we fi nd limitations with these three theories. The fi rst theory 
would see this phenomenon as providing profi t for the upper classes and/or 
technocrats and as maintaining the status quo of  the neoliberal state. While 
Hindu assertion has been expressed at the national level in party politics, it is 
in fact aiming at changing the status quo through, paradoxically, neoliberal 
means. For this nationalistic movement, religion is used to carry its ideals 
rather than just act as a source of  profi t or control. With regards to the second 
theory, it could be argued that the majority of  these religious consumers are 
from a middle-class background; however, the Hindu nationalist movement 
is not bound by class only. For the last theory, we clearly have a case here of  
people consuming with a specifi c social and cultural outcome in mind, and 
this goes beyond the consumption of  the self  only. To move forward in the 
understanding of  this case study, we need to work on a hybrid theory between 
the fi rst and second perspectives. 
Bourdieu’s research was centered on class. In his analysis of  consuming 
practices in France, he developed his theory of  capital to understand how classes 
operate and create distinctions between themselves. For example, a working-class 
person has a different cultural capital than someone from a higher class and might 
consume a beer at a pub rather than a vintage wine in an upmarket cafe. However, 
if  we were to adapt Bourdieu’s use of  class to that of  a movement – in this case a 
religious and nationalist movement – we could argue that this case study offers a 
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window into the consumption of  a movement that aims to promote a religion with 
a specifi c nationalist agenda as a form of  distinction from other religions (e.g. Islam 
in India) or other political forces rather than other classes. 
When Bourdieu argues that the taste and distaste of  a class is an act of  distinction, 
in this case the positive and negative consumption of  a group or movement is also 
an act of  distinction that goes beyond or across class analysis. His adapted theory 
helps us to understand Hindu nationalism as not only a movement with a specifi c 
goal, but also as a movement that creates distinction with other religious and 
nationalist groups. However, this movement is not just a pro- or contra-consumer 
movement, it is a transformative social movement that attempts to change India 
according to its nationalist and religious views. It is also a transnational movement 
as it gains traction with its diasporic communities. People are mobilized into the 
movement through practices of  consumption. And here we fi nd the connection 
with the fi rst theory in this approach that explains the consumer as a normalized 
self  compelled to consume. But in this case, it is not consumption that is for the 
benefi t of  capitalism but rather for the benefi t of  a movement. Consumption is 
not reinforcing the status quo of  a neoliberal society, but rather using the tools 
offered by a neoliberal society to change the status quo. What we have here is a 
transformative and transnational movement that mobilizes consumers for a specifi c 
combined nationalist and religious agenda. The normalization of  a Hindu India 
may enable Hindu nationalist agendas to operate in the background of  consumer 
practices while an imagined “unifi ed” India is foregrounded.
Conclusion 
Processes of  desecularization are usually understood to occur through religious 
groups politically reentering the public sphere (Kepel, 1994; Lawrence, 1998), 
the cultural transactions between religious and spiritual groups and individuals 
via consumer culture and popular culture (Bauman, 1998; Possamai, 2005) or 
the growth of  a type of  religious social capital generated by the transnational 
networks of  new immigrant and ethnic communities (Possamai and Possamai-
Inesedy, 2007). Through the exploration of  the specifi c case study of  Hindu 
nationalism, we have been able to explore a specifi c non-Western desecularized 
path. Here, the confl uence between nationalistic and religious agendas has 
been carried through consumer cultures of  a transformative and transnational 
social movement. Adapting Bourdieu’s theory of  class, it can be argued that this 
movement creates a type of  social distinction when it comes to its consuming 
practices with regards to religion and nationalism. However, connecting this 
case to the theories from the Frankfurt school, this movement also aims at 
normalizing its consumers not because of  a technocratic or capitalist agenda, 
but because of  a specifi c nationalist and religious agenda.
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Chapter 10
CLASH OF SECULARITY AND 
RELIGIOSITY: THE STAGING OF 
SECULARISM AND ISLAM THROUGH 
THE ICONS OF ATATÜRK AND 
THE VEIL IN TURKEY
Meyda Yeğenoğlu
Bilgi University, Istanbul
1920s Republic 
When the military interrupted parliamentary democratic politics in Turkey 
in 1980, the Turkish population did not know or predict that this was indeed 
the harbinger of  far-reaching transformation in the position Islam has been 
used to occupying in the social and public life of  Turkey. José Casanova’s 
(1994) thesis about the signifi cant “deprivatization” of  religion applies 
well to the noteworthy presence that Islamic religiosity has achieved in 
Turkey’s social, cultural, political and economic life in the last two decades 
or so. The term “deprivatization” signifi es the emergence of  new historical 
developments that entail the reversal of  a certain secular trend, involving 
the entrance of  religion into the public sphere and the arena of  political 
contestation. Religion is called upon not simply to defend the territory that 
has been allocated to it, 
but also to participate in the very struggles to defi ne and set the modern 
boundaries between the private and public spheres, between system and 
life-world, between legality and morality, between individual and society, 
between family, civil society and state, between nations, states, civilizations 
and the world system. (Casanova, 1994: 6)
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Following Casanova’s thinking, it is possible to talk about a process of  
“deprivatization” of  Islam in Turkey since the 1980s. Since then, not only 
has Turkey’s political life become fairly volatile and unpredictable, but the 
social and cultural life has been characterized by the confrontation or clash of  
secular and Islamic ways of  living, styles of  dressing and manners, targeting 
the constitution of  bodies and subjectivities. 
Cohabitation of  the social, cultural and political space by secularists and 
Islamists in Turkey since the establishment of  the republic in the 1920s has 
not been easy. Secularism became the offi cial state ideology of  the republic 
founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In an attempt to establish a new sense 
of  nationhood and a new social order, the Kemalist project took secularism, 
progress and Western modernity as the founding principles of  its ideology. 
The sociopolitical repudiation of  the Islamic Ottoman past was pursued in a 
top-down manner, institutionalizing secularism as the defi ning characteristic 
in Turkey’s constitutional make-up.1 The establishment of  the republic in the 
early twentieth century was secured through authoritarian measures rather 
than a democratic or popular consensual process. Since the authoritarian 
nationalism of  Kemalist secularism tried to achieve social unity by eradicating 
the public visibility of  religious, ethnic and other sorts of  differences, public 
claims for recognition of  differences have become the core of  the politics of  
resistance. As Asad (2006) suggests in his discussion of  French secularism 
(which constituted the role model for secularism in Turkey), the call for unity 
and integration is an integral aspect of  centralized state control. For Asad, “the 
preoccupation with unity has been a central feature of  authoritarian discourse 
and the requirement of  loyalty to symbols of  the nation is central to that 
political tradition… Those who are to be unifi ed or integrated are required to 
submit to a particular normative order” (496). This normative order in Turkey 
has been secular modernization.
In creating a new united secular socious, the utmost importance was 
placed upon appearances in the public realm. The newly established republic 
began wiping out the visibility (if  not the existence) of  all religious signs and 
practices from the public domain. This aim of  secularization of  the public 
and political domain was accompanied by a strong emphasis on transposing 
religion to a matter of  private and individual faith. In addition to the banning 
of  many visible markers of  Islam (through initiatives such as the introduction 
of  the Western calendar, replacement of  the Arabic script with the Latin 
1 A wide range of  social scientists have studied the process of  secular modernization 
in Turkey as well the “return” of  Islam to the sociopolitical scene. See Berkes (1999), 
Çağaptay (2006), Çolak (2003), Çolak and Aydın (2004),  Gülalp (2003) and Çınar 
(2008).
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alphabet, closure of  medreses, tekkes and Sufi  orders, closure of  Shari’a courts, 
implementation of  Swiss Civil Code and promotion of  certain types of  music 
rather than others on state radio channels), a special signifi cance has also been 
given to the way Turkish people look in their manners, dress and lifestyles. 
The Kemalist project did not limit its formation of  a new society to the radical 
reorganization of  the public realm. The private sphere was also subjected to a 
thorough intervention. Even matters that have to do with forms of  socializing 
have become targets of  reformation for the new secular elites. Consequently, 
issues that were deemed to be key to a modern/Western social life have been 
subjected to a scrupulous reformulation, revision and resignifi cation so as to 
cut their umbilical ties with Islam and to lodge secularization in people’s life-
worlds. This desire, and its accompanying processes that aimed to establish a 
new republic out of  what was regarded to be a religious and backward society 
by the secularist elite, implied the constitution of  a new subject population.2 This 
resulted in the formation of  a Western-looking new republican elite group, 
who view those who do not conform to the new social and cultural decorum 
and punctilios as backward, traditional and Islamic. The public sphere 
has thus been thoroughly reshaped as a nonreligious sphere. Hence, what 
characterizes Kemalist secularism is not simply the separation of  the domains 
of  the private and public and the mapping of  this separation onto the religious 
and secular, but the “protection” of  the public from the intrusion of  the religious 
and thereby the privileging and sacralizing of  the public domain’s secular nature.
With the institutionalization of  the Kemalist ideology of  the republic, the 
secular has become the defi ning ingredient of  the hegemonic social imaginary 
of  Turkey. In making the secular the new foundation, ethos, ideology and 
defi ning principle of  the republic, extra weight was placed on appearances 
and visible signs as markers of  the new regime. As a consequence, apparently 
trivial issues such as men’s hats and women’s veiling were highlighted as issues 
of  social remedy or as part of  the program of  Westernization. Modernization 
was identifi ed with Westernization and the ideology of  Westernization gained 
2 I am using the term “subject population” in the Foucauldian sense to refer to technologies 
of  power that mark, stamp, invest, inscribe and act upon bodies. I want to allude to the 
productive principle of  power that constitutes the subject and subject population in their 
materiality. The subjection of  the bodies and souls of  people to power should not be 
seen as a simple process of  subordination or as a repression. Rather, subjection needs 
to be seen as a process, which secures, maintains and puts in place a subject. Therefore, 
it needs to be understood as a process of  subjectifi cation: at the same time a creative and 
coercive process. Thus, I want to allude to the productive, creative yet coercive processes 
by which secular modernization in Turkey has created new subjects in its materiality. 
I discuss the interrelation between the constitution of  bodies, subjectivities and veiling/
unveiling in my Colonial Fantasies (1998).
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additional symbolic value. Men’s traditional headgear (the fez) was replaced 
with the European hat. Although women’s veiling was not outlawed, women 
were strongly discouraged from wearing veils, as the Islamic attire was mapped 
onto backwardness. There was an excessive emphasis placed on women 
being educators of  future generations. Their lives, manners and appearances 
became a major social target of  Atatürk’s, what Gellner (1981) calls “didactic 
secularist” reforms. This didactic reorganization of  the society brought, as 
one scholar puts it, “Islamic authority under the full and absolute control of  
the secular state… The institutionalization of  secularism involved bringing 
all religious activity under the direct control and monopoly of  the secular 
state” (Çınar, 2005: 16). This adamant control of  Islam not only secured the 
formation, survival and weight of  the secular state and of  the secular elites, 
but it also managed to allocate Islam a specifi c slot in the socious, a particular 
place that was and is meticulously controlled, regulated and supervised. In 
an attempt to contain the unregulated dissemination of  Islam in the public 
realm, certain practical measures were taken. The new penal code’s banning 
of  the use of  religion for political purposes, the removal from the constitution 
of  the article that defi ned the Turkish state as “Islamic,” the closure of  self-
governing religious centers and the granting of  the authority to regulate and 
supervise mosques and all sorts of  religious activities to the newly established 
Directorate of  Religious Affairs (Çınar, 2005: 17) were some of  the means by 
which the republic constituted a secular public sphere in the early twentieth 
century. It was through this exclusive inclusion of  Islam that the Kemalist ideology 
managed to launch a secularist ethos in Turkey. This offi cial secular nationalist 
ideology, which the Turkish state chose for itself  as the governing narrative 
for its self-staging and presentation, represented a radical rupture from the 
Ottoman Empire. The institution of  this new sociopolitical order ascribed 
to the state a controlling hand on religion and preeminence and authority 
over religious institutions. It would thus not be unwarranted to claim that 
this offi cial order remained substantially unchallenged until the 1980s. It is 
with “return of  the religious” that the hegemony of  the secularist nationalist 
ideology of  Kemalism began to be unsettled and destabilized.
1990s Islamic Challenge 
The Kemalist sacralized protection of  the public sphere from the intrusion 
of  religious signs and the system of  control and subordination it managed 
to institute since the establishment of  the republic in 1923 have begun to be 
challenged in the name of  freedom of  religious expression. In opposition to the 
authoritarian and centralized secularism of  the state, the military, the courts 
and the educational institutions, a religio-political discourse is questioning 
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the hegemonic distinction between the public and private. Hence, there is 
a quizzical political atmosphere emerging about the state’s unrestricted hold 
and authority over the defi nition and shaping of  public identity. Thus, the 
polarization between Islamists and secularists and the growing schism between 
discourses of  Islamism and secularism are some of  the critical issues that have 
come to shape public life in Turkey since the 1980s. This period has witnessed a 
rapid increase in the visibility of  objects, discourses and issues that are marked 
as Islamic. Although Islam’s presence in various forms has been maintained 
during the whole twentieth century, surviving in informal social gatherings, 
literature, poetry and music, Islamic formations had to maintain a low profi le 
and avoid public visibility (Çınar, 2005: 18). In comparison to this low profi le, 
it is now possible to talk about Islam’s “comeback” into the public domain. 
It was after the 1980 military coup that Islamic groups and practices started 
gaining public presence. When the parliamentary regime resumed in 1983 
in Turkey, the military regime’s backing of  Islamist groups against the left 
had paved the way for the fl ourishing of  Islamist groups. Islam’s fi rst major 
challenge to the hegemony of  secularism was publicly visible through the use 
of  the headscarf  among female university students in the 1980s. The Refah 
Party’s prominent attention to the headscarf  issue as a political matter enabled 
the party (established after the parliamentary regime was restored in 1983) to 
achieve a more overtly Islamic character. The enormous electoral success of  
the Refah Party in the 1994 local elections can be regarded as a turning point 
in the history of  Turkey insofar as the unchallenged continuance of  Kemalist 
secular ideology is concerned. Following the local elections, the Refah Party 
became the top party in general elections in 1995. Its leader Necmettin Erbakan 
became the prime minister in the coalition government in 1996. However, 
with the infamous postmodern coup of  28 February 1997, when the National 
Security Council gave a declaration to the government asking it to take strict 
measures against the threat of  rising Islamism in the country, the coalition 
government was dismantled. After the cessation of  the Refah Party, the Fazilet 
Party was established in 1998. As far as code of  belief, cadre and directorial 
structures are concerned, the Fazilet Party was a carryover of  the Refah Party 
that lasted until 2001. With the split of  the Fazilet Party in 2001, the AK 
Party was founded. Generally speaking, the AK Party is less confrontational 
with the secular military, more moderate in its Islamic line, follows economic 
liberal policies, and is militantly pro-European. Regarding the characterizing 
features of  the AK Party, it can be portrayed as having a liberal conservative 
ideology and social value system, taking its essential charge from Islam and 
Islamism. The AK Party has been in government since 2002, displaying major 
electoral victories both in 2002 and 2005. (For a detailed exposition of  current 
sociopolitical developments, see Çınar, 2005.)
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The period after the 1994 municipal elections when the Islamic Welfare 
Party won the major cities needs special attention. It was in this period 
that the Kemalist elite and the military managed to lay the discursive and 
organizational ground of  an irrational fear and phobia of  Islam. This psychic 
condition appealed to the populace and achieved quite substantial popular 
support. Due to increasing concern about Islamists becoming a vital force in 
the social, cultural and political life of  Turkey (expressed in a way that is akin 
to Europe’s current Orientalist and Islamophobic fantasy about the “threat of  
Islamization”), the Welfare Party’s victory in local elections was experienced 
almost like a sharp and sudden pain by the secular establishment. The psychic 
condition and the neurotic response3 that followed the 1994 local elections 
have since set the tone of  the relation between these two groups, becoming 
even more highlighted and intense. This was a special historical moment in 
Turkey’s social and political life, when the secularist elite of  the republic had 
experienced major shock, utter dismay and consternation to such an extent that 
it might be legitimate to describe the psychic condition as total discomposure. 
The victory of  Islamic parties in municipal elections both in Istanbul and 
in many other major cities resulted in alarm, extreme agitation, frenzy and 
panic. This condition has resulted in a lack of  any rational social negotiation 
between the contending groups and thus needs to been seen as indicative of  
unconscious forces that participate in the structuring of  the political domain. 
3 In the 1994 local elections, the Welfare party’s achievement of  a major victory in 
many cities, especially in Istanbul, was certainly key in the creation of  this secularist 
hysteria. Also, the fact that not only the district municipalities were obtained but also 
the municipality of  greater Istanbul was of  central importance in the formation of  an 
anxiety-ridden and greatly irrational fear and phobia. This phobic sociopsychic condition 
was formed by the dissemination of  rumors that have contributed to the formation of  
a new imaginary cultivating the idea that the secular lifestyles of  middle-class people, 
especially women, are under tremendous threat. As it was believed that Islamic groups’ 
major obsession was with the control of  women, most concerns have revolved around 
the issue of  gender. Navaro-Yashin (2002) cites several of  the rumors that were put into 
circulation immediately after the municipal elections. Most rumors had to do with public 
appearances, lifestyles and women. Some of  these were as follows: women would no 
longer be able to have a public life without wearing proper Islamic clothes as it was 
believed that Islamists were there to impose Islamic ways. Nor would they allow women 
to work or vote. (A female friend of  mine, on hearing the election results, got physically 
ill: her blood pressure went up too high. I met her with a blood clot in her eye the next 
day caused by crying through the whole night, as she truly believed that she would be 
forced to be veiled.) Another rumor of  concern for the secular middle class was that they 
would no longer be able to consume alcohol in restaurants and bars. Many jokes, stories 
and rumors have been instrumental in the creation of  secularist apprehension about the 
future that is waiting for Turkey. These rumors added to the formation of  an imaginary 
that was very similar to the Orientalist fantasy “The Muslims are Coming.” 
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For this reason, to be able to offer an analysis of  the ways in which Islamists 
and secularists have positioned themselves against one another over the last 
20 years in Turkey, one has to attend to the unconscious processes that structure 
the domain of  the political and the role of  these processes in the constitution 
of  the Islamic/secularist schism.4 I will examine below the dynamics that lie 
behind this nonrational dimension. In discussing this, I will examine how 
certain objects are articulated and utilized in the public domain. Standouts 
among the large number of  objects used both by Islamists and secularists are 
the headscarf  used by Islamist women and icons of  Atatürk used in various 
forms by secularists. These objects have become signifi cant in the staging of  
secularity and religiosity, not only because they have been deployed in a wide 
range of  contexts and with great frequency, but also because they have been 
instilled with strong symbolic value.
Objects and Their Social Life 
Certain objects and their transformation into fetish objects played a vital role 
in the creation of  a bifurcation between Islamist and secularist groups. Fear 
and paranoia about an Islamic threat has led to the fetishization as well as 
the commoditization of  certain objects and symbols among secularist groups. 
Consequently, we have started witnessing widespread usage of  icons of  
Atatürk (in homes, offi ces, cars, on dresses and even on bodies), resulting in an 
excessive cultural emphasis on his symbolic image. 5 This new embracing of  the 
Atatürk fi gure by secularists also includes regular visits to his mausoleum (akin 
to visits to a shrine or some other place of  worship) whenever a contentious 
social or political issue emerges. On the other hand, Islamists utilize women’s 
headscarves in an almost fetishistic manner to symbolize their public visibility 
and presence in social and political life.
By examining the increased vitality these objects have gained, one can 
reach a good understanding of  how certain objects move in and out of  
mere commodity status and attain a social and symbolic life. These objects 
certainly did exist before the hype, emotion and paranoia about the Islamic 
“threat” achieved such a heightened condition. However, objects never exist 
in a pure state. They receive a new life as a result of  their commoditization, 
and commoditization is about acquiring a new value. If  we follow the 
4 Navaro-Yashin (2002: 5) also alludes to this unconscious and nonrational dimension of  
the political.
5 In her ethnographic work, Esra Özyürek (2005) offers a detailed description of  the ways 
in which pictures of  Atatürk proliferate in homes and businesses as a potent symbol of  
the secular Turkish state.
232 RELIGION AND THE STATE
Saussurean principle of  language and difference, objects do not have any 
absolute meaning and value. The meaning of  an object is always determined 
in a social relation; therefore, its symbolic value is set reciprocally. Moreover, 
the meaning of  an object is determined in relation to other objects and it 
never exists independently of  the desire that infuses it with value. The desire 
that infuses and marks certain objects with particular values and meanings is 
certainly not a product of  an individual undertaking, but is always conditioned 
and structured by a particular social imaginary.
To be able to understand how certain cultural meanings are mobilized in 
Islamist and secularist politics in Turkey, we need an analysis of  the “life history 
of  objects” and the “cultural biography” (Appadurai, 1986) of  the things 
used in the clash between secularism and religion. By examining how certain 
objects are positioned and articulated, we can reveal the kind of  imaginary 
these groups create, both of  themselves and of  each other, while staging their 
relation to religion and to secularism. 
There is an interesting contrast between the ways in which wars of  
symbolism or wars of  objects have been managed by Islamists and secularists. 
Among Islamists, the women’s headscarf  was attributed a high symbolic value 
and hence a market has developed for it.6 However, interestingly, in an attempt 
to counter the symbolism of  Islamists, the secularists did not necessarily wage 
their politics of  identity through women’s cloths. Instead, the excessive use 
of  Atatürk icons has become the means through which the secularist groups 
signify publicly their politics of  protection of  the secular foundations of  the 
republic. Consequently, the headscarf  and icons of  Atatürk have achieved 
new symbolic values and meanings in relation to each other.
Symbolism of  Cloth 
The raison d’être behind the symbolic importance of  the headscarf  can be 
understood when one takes into consideration the way Islam has been 
lodged in the secular republican heritage of  Turkey. It is perhaps the didactic 
secularism outlined by Gellner that can explain why an apparently simple 
issue of  clothing – the banning of  university students’ wearing of  headscarves 
which occurred in the early 1980s and still continues – has turned into a 
matter of  major social clash and confrontation between secularism and 
Islamism in the current Turkish political conjuncture. Secularism was not 
only established in an authoritarian manner in Turkey, but it has become 
6 Navaro-Yashin (2002) offers a detailed exposition of  the development and proliferation 
of  a new market for manufacturing of  the veil and the portrait of  Atatürk. See especially 
chapter 3.
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the hegemonic nationalist mode in which the Turkish state has managed to 
constitute its public self-image. Through didactic secularism, the state has 
been able to dominate the public, cultural and psychological life of  people in 
Turkey. Any challenge to secularism since its inception has been perceived as a 
fundamental challenge to Turkey’s very being. Hence, secularism was able to 
maintain its legitimacy without allowing counternarratives to fl ourish. But the 
political conjuncture in Turkey since the 1980s has revealed a precarious side 
to the overtly unchallenged legitimacy of  this secular hegemony. Examining 
the dialectic between Islamists and secularists and the way in which secularity 
in Turkey tries to maintain its hegemony in the face of  the challenge posed 
by Islamists can give us hints about the fantasies and therefore about the 
unconscious processes involved in this political battle.
In an attempt to dislodge the secularist erasure of  the traces and presence 
of  Islam from the public domain, Islamists placed great emphasis on the 
headscarf  worn by women. The headscarf  functioned as a very convenient 
visible symbol, not only of  the presence of  people with Islamic faith, but also 
of  the presence of  a way of  living that is guided by the principles of  Islam. 
The headscarf  came to signify that Islam is present and alive not only as an 
individual faith, but as a collective social and cultural set of  principles guiding 
people, manners and styles of  living. But most important of  all, it signifi ed that 
the sacralized and defended space of  the public was now becoming vulnerable 
to the intrusion of  religious signs. Muslim women entering the public space 
with their Islamic headscarves implied the destabilization of  the principles 
of  centralist Kemalist secularism and the Kemal attempt to redefi ne the 
parameters of  the public domain. Hence, the increasing number of  female 
university students wearing headscarves came to signify publicly that Islam is 
present in people’s life-world. 
Although the headscarf  appears to be an item of  individual preference, it 
has also become translated into the lexicon of  a major political battle. It not 
only came to symbolize Islam’s public presence, but was also transformed into 
a key term in the vocabulary of  a grand political discourse that based itself  
on democratic and basic human rights, freedom of  religious expression and 
individual liberties. We will be far from comprehending the transformative 
journey of  the symbolism of  the headscarf  from being a private and individual 
question of  piety into being a question of  Islam’s public presence and freedom 
of  expression and rights if  we simply think that people in Turkey have become 
more religious and have started challenging the foundations of  the secularist 
republic. This sort of  explanation would simply mimic the paranoiac secularist 
politics that is alive in Turkey today. This paranoiac politics insists that the 
headscarf  is a sign of  a hidden agenda of  Islamist political actors, whose 
ultimate aim is to replace the secular republican regime with an Islamist one. 
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However, the public emphasis on the question of  the headscarf  – starting in 
the 1980s and intensifying through the 1990s and 2000s, especially among 
urban, modernized and educated groups of  Islamist activist women – is far 
from indicating the Islamization of  Turkish society. If  we remain within 
statistical logic and point to the total number of  women in Turkey who wear 
the Islamic headscarf, we will not be able to understand the changing nature 
of  Turkish people’s relation to religion. It is important that our analysis attends 
to the changing nature of  the religiosity in Turkey’s social and cultural life. 
I deploy Olivier Roy’s (2006) term “religiosity” rather than religion to refer to 
the manner in which people live their relationship to religion (3). Roy suggests 
that, as a result of  the processes of  globalization, the return to religiosity is 
everywhere in the world. The “return” of  Islam in Turkish social and political 
life is also conditioned and infl uenced by global processes. Unfortunately, 
examination of  Islamism as social movement and of  the global sociopolitical 
dynamics behind its becoming a worldwide phenomenon is outside the scope 
of  this essay. 
The changing nature of  religiosity in Turkey would make sense by 
understanding its mirror opposite: the changing nature of  secularity. In other 
words, understanding either the changing nature of  religiosity or of  secularity 
in Turkey can only be possible by considering their interaction with each 
other. Hence, I use the term secularity to allude to the manner in which 
people’s relation to the secular republican social and political order is lived, 
experienced and imagined. Thus I will suggest that it is not secularism per 
se, but secularity that has changed in response to or in its interaction with the 
increasing visibility of  Islam and things associated with Islam in the Turkish 
people’s lives. It is the nature of  the interaction between the religious and the 
secular that has changed and gained a new life of  its own. However, to be 
able to understand the metamorphoses or transmutations of  secularity and 
religiosity in Turkey since the 1980s, we will need to develop a theoretical 
framework that attends to the processes that differentiate and mark certain 
practices, signs, languages, symbols and discourses as belonging to the realm 
of  either the religious or secular. The current scholarship exemplifi ed in 
the works of  Talal Asad (2003), Gil Anidjar (2008 and 2003), Tomoko 
Masuzawa (2005) and Hent de Vries (2007 and 2006) offer new conceptual 
and theoretical lenses through which we might understand not simply what 
religion is about but, at the same time, the nature of  the processes by which 
the fi eld of  religion is constituted in genealogical terms. If  we follow the 
spirit of  this current scholarship, it is no longer possible simply to delimit 
a space called the religious and examine the “what is” of  religion. Asad’s 
(2003) framework discourages us from regarding the secular as a space 
which was gradually emancipated from religion. As he suggests, “it is this 
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assumption that allows us to think of  religion as ‘infecting’ the secular domain 
or as replicating within it the structure of  theological concepts” (191). The 
distinction between the secular and religious is problematized by another 
scholar as follows: “one can argue that within the semantic of  the modern 
religio-secular paradigm, processes of  ‘religionization’ – i.e. the signifi cation 
of  certain spaces, practices, narratives and languages as religious (as opposed 
to things marked as secular) – and ‘secularization’ are constitutive of  each 
other” (Dressler, 2008: 281). 
Rather than seeing the secular and the religious as two distinct experiential 
realities, I suggest that we understand them in their interaction and hence 
in their reciprocal shaping and constitution of  one another. Dressler’s terms 
religionization and secularization correspond somewhat to my suggestion regarding 
the new forms of  religiosity and secularity in Turkey. With these terms, I want to 
be able to capture the ways in which people’s imaginary and real relationship 
to those things called religious and secular are structured and shaped. Rather 
than attempting to decipher what secularism and Islamism are in Turkey, 
examining the processes, symbols, narratives and practices that contribute to 
the marking of  certain things as religious and others as secular will enable us 
to comprehend the dynamic, processual and relational nature of  the secular 
and of  the religious.
Sacralized Public Space
Marking the headscarf  as a site of  rural traditionalism and lower-class 
ignorance, the republican secularist fashioning of  the public sphere in the 
formative years of  the republic in the 1920s instituted women’s unveiling as 
a key signifi er, not only of  the emancipation of  women from religion and 
ignorance, but of  the modernization of  the country. From the 1980s onward, 
the activism of  students insisting on attending universities wearing their 
headscarves constituted a major challenge to the authority of  the Kemalist 
secularist sacralization of  public spaces. As education was regarded as one 
of  the key institutions in the path of  modernizing Turkey, female university 
students’ claim to be able to attend educational institutions without giving up 
signs of  religiosity was met with great unease. To make sense of  this unease, 
we can perhaps accept Talal Asad’s (2003) suggestion that secularism is not 
simply about separating the fi elds of  religion and politics, but also about the 
suppression and control of  religion by the secular. For Asad, secularism is fi rst 
and foremost about instituting a division or opposition between the secular 
and religious and thus entails the production of  the religious by the secular 
so as to constitute the latter as the norm and accord to itself  a privileged 
position. What maintains secularism’s authority is precisely this power to 
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institute the opposition between itself  and the religious. Thus what constitutes 
a major challenge to secularism is not simply the making visible of  religiosity. 
Rather, it is the confl ation of  the neat binary between the secular and the 
religious that makes maintenance of  the opposition no longer possible that 
constitutes such a troubling destabilization to the privilege and authority of  
the secularist surveillance of  the public.
The offi cial response to the increasing visibility of  the Islamic headscarf  on 
university campuses and hence the confl ation of  the opposition between the 
secular and the religious came with the decree of  the National Security Council 
in 1997. It demanded tighter measures against the threat of  Islamization. 
A ban on the headscarf  was one of  those measures.
A more striking and perhaps defi nitive example of  the mixing or confusion 
of  the binaries between private and public, religious and secular is the 1999 
Merve Kavakçı case. What we witness in the Kavakçı case is a furious reaction 
to any sign of  the entrance or intrusion (to use the parlance of  secularist 
discourse) of  the headscarf  into the sacred institutions of  the state. Merve 
Kavakçı, a 30-year-old woman educated as an engineer in the United States, 
was elected as an MP for the Islamist Virtue Party in 1999 and insisted that she 
attend the oath ceremony in the parliament in her headscarf. Merve Kavakçı’s 
insistence was retorted in a physically powerful manner when she entered the 
parliament to take her seat. The members of  the parliament started banging 
on their desks and chanting the slogan “Turkey is and will remain secular” 
(which became a famous song of  praise among the secularists), thus forcing 
Kavakçı to leave without being sworn in (see Göçek, 1999). 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s speech in criticism of  Merve Kavakçı’s 
insistence on wearing her headscarf  is symptomatic of  the desire to keep the 
private and the public distinct and to keep the state as the guardian of  the 
public: 
In Turkey, nobody interferes in the clothing and the headscarf  of  women 
in private life. However, this is not a domain of  private life. Those who 
serve here, have to suit the tradition and the rules of  the state. This is not 
the place to challenge the state. (Quoted in Dressler, 2008b: 15)
Similarly, Süleyman Demirel, the then-president of  the republic was another 
fi gure who criticized Kavakçı on the grounds that she was creating trouble 
and accused her of  being an agent provocateur controlled by foreign powers. 
Moreover, he saw Kavakçı’s headscarf  as symbolizing the movement which 
aimed to transform Turkey into an Iran, Afghanistan or Algeria. “The chief  
prosecutor used Kavakçı’s action to start a lawsuit against her party for inciting 
her to take a stand against the secular principles of  the state, and to eliminate, 
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once and for all, all party members who were like vampires constantly sucking 
on the blood of  the nations” (Demirel cited in Göçek, 1999: 523).
Popular opposition to Kavakçı was no less hysterical. Her neighbors 
decorated their windows with posters of  Atatürk so as to send the message that 
the threat to the secular order established by Atatürk, presumed to be posed by 
Kavakçı’s wish to be present in the space of  the parliament with her headscarf  
on, would not go unanswered. The widespread media campaign against 
Kavakçı portrayed her as a decoy of  an Islamist party whose hidden aim was 
to institute an Islamic state in Turkey. This negative campaign launched by 
the popular secularist media interrogated Kavakçı’s moral character and her 
private life was put under scrutiny. Consequently, it was discovered that she had 
earlier received American citizenship. Her Turkish citizenship was taken away 
on the grounds that she attained American citizenship without following the 
appropriate bureaucratic procedures in notifying the Turkish state about her 
desire to retain dual citizenship. With the removal of  her Turkish citizenship, 
Kavakçı’s MP position was annulled. (For a detailed explication of  the case of  
Merve Kavakçı, see Göçek, 1999.)
Both the political plight of  Merve Kavakçı, and female students’ insistence 
on wearing their headscarves to university, need to be seen as the destabilization 
of  the very opposition between the private and public that the secularist 
narrative had established. They should function as an important reminder 
that despite the prevailing secularist argument’s relegation of  religion to the 
private domain, religion has never ceased to appear in public space. The very 
act of  separating religion from other domains – in particular from the domains 
of  politics and culture – and the production of  religion by the very forces of  
secularist narrative do not imply that religion’s mode of  presence is simply 
enclosed by secularism, especially in the context of  the geopolitics of  today’s 
globalized world. 
Icons of  Atatürk
In opposition to the symbolism of  the headscarf, the secularist groups have 
used icons of  Atatürk in an excessive manner to make their politics visible 
in the public domain. Atatürk posters have always been present in Turkish 
people’s offi cial and social lives since the establishment of  the republic, 
though not so much in their private lives. But interestingly, not only has the 
sheer quantity of  icons of  Atatürk that people are using in their private lives 
increased, but the form of  these icons has drastically changed. In contrast to 
the traditional colossal statues and posters of  Atatürk, imagery of  Atatürk 
transformed into smaller, private and individual items. To give a context for 
the importance of  the icon of  Atatürk, I must mention that it was widely used 
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during the establishment of  the republic to cement the disparate groups of  
the nation and build the fantasy and cult of  the origination of  the new nation. 
Atatürk posters have been persistently used in state offi ces, but in the 1990s 
the imagery of  Atatürk began to take the form of  individualized objects. People 
started wearing Atatürk pins, displaying him on car stickers and, later and 
most strikingly, wearing his signature or portrait as tattoos on their bodies. 
Obsession with the imagery of  Atatürk arrived at a pinnacle with the Islamic 
Welfare Party’s victory in the general elections. The army’s intervention into 
politics in 1997 was effected by the banning of  its leader from politics and 
the deliverance of  a powerful warning against the “threat of  Islamism.” 
It came to be named a postmodern coup, as its intervention into parliamentary 
democracy was exercised not in the usual military manner and has not 
resulted in the dissolution of  the parliament, but was accomplished through 
a new mode that can be called a “simulated coup.” With this coup, the hype 
about using Atatürk images in a personalized, privatized manner in people’s 
offi ces, homes and on their bodies intensifi ed. We can interpret the privatized 
and individualized usage of  Atatürk icons as an effort by secularist groups to 
symbolize that the people and not simply the state were now functioning as the 
guardians of  the secular regime.7 
7 This emphasis on “people” in the secularist narratives is highly problematical. The 
secularist narratives’ reference to “people” and attribution to them of  a certain kind 
of  spontaneity in the guardianship and support of  the secular regime is very dubious 
and far from being accurate. One example that might help us to question people’s 
spontaneous support of  the secular regime is that of  the seventy-fifth Republic Day 
celebrations. Özyürek (2005) offers us a very illuminating example by unraveling how the 
seventy-fifth anniversary celebration ceremony was also a highly organized and planned 
event designed to convey an anti-Islamist message. During the authoritarian single-party 
regime, the centralized Turkish state had centrally planned and organized an orderly 
and choreographed demonstration to celebrate the tenth anniversary of  the republic. 
However, with the 1994 local electoral victory of  the Islamist party, Islamist mayors 
of  cities turned out not to be too eager about providing passionate celebrations of  the 
Republic Day. The military’s strong warning against the government on 28 February 
1987 was instrumental in setting the tone of  a certain narrative and psychosocial 
atmosphere which can be translated as “It is the people with their free will who are 
now willing to act as the guardians of  the secularist ideology and secular regime.” The 
desire to orchestrate the seventh-fifth anniversary by allocating millions of  dollars for 
the celebrations and to delegate the History Foundation, chaired by well-known city 
planner İlhan Tekeli, as the organizing agent of  the celebrations, demonstrates strikingly 
that those celebrations were far from being spontaneous and were far from being an 
expression of  the “free will” of  the people. It was İlhan Tekeli who came up with the idea 
of  participatory “festival-like celebrations” as opposed to the hierarchical organizations 
of  the state. Tekeli mentioned to Özyürek (2006) in an interview that one of  the 
most important motives for the seventy-fifth anniversary celebrations was to make an 
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However, having Atatürk’s signature and portrait inscribed as a tattoo on 
one’s body is also instructive about an interesting desire, and we can perhaps 
make sense of  this desire when we situate it in the context of  the waging of  a 
war of  symbols. The headscarf, no doubt, is a bodily item. The woman who 
wears a headscarf, in a way, transforms her body into a ground of  a political 
battle.8 If  we follow the Foucauldian principle of  inscription of  bodies and 
the power of  objects and discourses to produce particular types of  bodies 
by inscribing them in particular ways, then this desire to carry Atatürk icons 
on one’s own body, especially in response to the use of  headscarf, can be 
seen as a struggle waged through bodies. The veiled woman’s manner of  
being in public with or without a headscarf  certainly entails different forms 
of  embodiment. Thus secularists, in the battle with the increasing presence 
of  religiosity in the public sphere, have developed a belated or responsive 
desire in an effort to fi nd a matching item that has a comparable weight in 
terms of  its bodily effects.  
In addition to the frenzied interest in Atatürk iconography, a pattern of  
secularist demonstrations has developed. The excessive use of  the Turkish fl ag 
came to identify a particular political message: the people’s guardianship of  
the secular regime. The Turkish fl ag was also used to repeat the republic’s 
anxiety around unity and integration and centralized state control. In addition 
to expressing their desire to have the principles of  the republic inscribed on 
their bodies, guardians of  the republic wanted to convey the message that they 
were capable of  reinstituting and maintaining their hold on the united and 
integrated secular nation. 
What was so unusual about these demonstrations was that the middle-
class urban bourgeois women who earlier had barely had any explicit political 
commitment or taken part in street politics became the central actors of  secular 
guardianship. They were also the key consumers of  Atatürk icons. There 
are two dimensions of  the explanation as to why urban middle-class women 
were so eager to embrace the role of  “guardianship of  secularism.” With the 
 anti-Islamist statement. He underlined that “as enlightened Turks...we felt responsible for 
the republic and wanted to do something against the religious uprising” (138). Perhaps 
this ideology of  “expression of  people’s free will and their guardianship of  the secular 
regime” instituted during the seventy-fifth anniversary celebrations has since shaped the 
nature of  the secularist form of  political expression. Many of  the protests against the 
Islamist government have been accompanied with excessive use of  the Turkish flag and 
the slogan “Turkey is and will remain secular” and have all been infused by the aura: “It 
is now people who are expressing their free will.”
8 For a detailed discussion of  how the veil is turned into a ground of  battle between 
Islamists and the Kemalist elite in the formative years of  the republic, see my Colonial 
Fantasies (1998).
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establishment of  the new republican regime, secularism was promoted as an 
issue of  lifestyle, in particular of  middle-class lifestyle. Great emphasis was 
placed on secularist lifestyles and secularism was associated with Western 
habits of  eating, socializing and dressing. In general, the kind of  social and 
public life one pursued became an important signifi er of  one’s allegiance to a 
secular and modern Western society. Islamic forms, cultural and social habits 
were associated with backwardness and traditionalism. Another explanatory 
dimension is that these groups were the key benefi ciaries of  the newly 
established republic, with its emphasis on education and its encouragement of  
women taking part in social-public life. 
As the above examples illustrate, neither the headscarf  nor Atatürk icons 
are motionless, inert and lifeless objects. Rather, following the understanding 
Appadurai develops in The Social Life of  Things (1986) we can see them as 
things in motion. This would involve understanding the symbolism of  these 
objects as a processual issue; such a focus on process enables us to engage 
with the question of  objects used in the Turkish battle between secularism 
and Islamism as a question of  signifi cation, relationality and opposition and 
thereby to track their social and cultural movement, their paths, diversions, 
directions and mutations. This will enable us to explicate the cultural issues 
surrounding their classifi cation and labeling as well as the political and 
ideological framework which envelopes their articulation. In other words, the 
articulation of  these two objects into the discursive battle between a particular 
secularity and religiosity indicates that these are not lifeless, motionless or 
neutral items, but cultural and political devices that are open for articulation 
and rearticulation and can have a transformative capacity depending on the 
ways they are used. Here I am not simply making the straightforward and 
well-known point that to consume an object is inevitably to convey a message. 
Beyond this familiar point, following Appadurai’s argument, I am suggesting 
that the consumption of  the Islamic headscarf  and the icon of  Atatürk in 
opposition to each other politicize both the reception and the consumption of  
these objects. By consuming the headscarf  and the icon of  Atatürk, Islamists 
and secularists are making symbolic statements and sending particular 
messages. However, perhaps as importantly as sending particular messages, 
they are also receiving messages (Appadurai, 1986: 31). In other words, by 
consuming certain objects that are marked in particular ways, secularist and Islamist 
groups in Turkey are receiving messages about the value of  their Islamism and secularism 
and their relation to religiosity and secularity. The distribution of  knowledge about 
these objects, and the schedule of  values that mark certain objects as religious 
or secular, are of  key consequence to the vitality gained by the objects in the 
staging of  religiosity and/or secularity. 
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Paranoid Nationalism: By Way of  Conclusion 
Secularism can be regarded as a public discourse that is fi ghting for a 
kind of  legitimacy that is not identical to the legitimacy it was striving for 
in the 1920s, which was established in a didactic manner. It would thus be 
misleading to simply suggest that Islamism is becoming more widespread or 
intense in the social, political and cultural life of  Turkey. The visibility Islamic 
ways have gained is not simply a matter of  degree but of  type, in the sense 
that the nature of  religiosity in Turkey has also changed since the 1920s. 
This change contributed to the fantasies, fears and imagery about Islam. It 
is important to note that secularity and Islamic public presence have gained 
new twenty-fi rst century faces through their relationality. To understand how 
the relation between the two has progressed, we can perhaps talk about the 
staging of  religiosity and staging of  secularity. My reason for deploying the term 
staging should not imply that my argument presumes a “real” or “authentic” 
Islam or secularism behind their staging. Rather, I want to emphasize the 
performativity that is associated with both. To understand the characteristics 
of  this performativity, it is important that we attend to the nature of  the 
relation both groups establish with the objects they manipulate (headscarf  
and Atatürk’s icons) as their quintessential signifi ers.
As mentioned above, it is possible to talk about the fl ourishing of  a 
particular secular psychic condition in Turkey since the 1990s. The more 
serene and confi dent secular posture of  the early republican elite displaced 
itself  into a kind of  frantic and irrational fear and phobia of  things deemed 
Islamic or religious in the 1990s. The rational and self-possessed assuredness 
of  the 1920s secular elite no longer surrounds the elite’s relation to secularism 
today. Rather, there is every sign of  an insecure attachment that I would like to 
identify with a term I borrow from Ghassan Hage (2003): paranoid nationalism. 
Particularly after the electoral victory of  the Islamic Refah Party in local 
elections in 1994, secularists developed a condition of  panic, alarm and 
anxiety at the idea of  a “religious invasion” of  the domains of  the political 
and public. Increased consternation about the threat of  Islamization is what 
characterizes the self-presentation of  mainstream and popular media and 
secular elite groups. This paranoid condition, to follow Hage’s understanding, 
brought with it intense “worrying” as a result of  feeling threatened. Such a 
defensive attitude fl ourishes because of  an insecure attachment to a nation 
that is incapable of  properly nourishing its citizens. Worrying thus results 
in the exertion of  “a form of  symbolic violence over the fi eld of  national 
belonging,” obliterating other possibilities and modes of  belonging. The 
paranoid nationalist imaginary forecloses the possibility of  a relation with 
the other. 
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One instance where one can discern this paranoid imaginary in Turkey is 
the systematic and persistent questioning of  the “motives” of  Islamists. The 
Islamic movement and people are attributed “hidden motives” behind their 
apparent political behavior, particularly via the use of  the Islamic notion of  
“takiyye.” According to this concept, which can be translated as “dissimulation,” 
a Muslim is justifi ed in hiding his or her real motives if  the circumstances 
are unfavorable to the exercise of  his or her faith. The concept of  takiyye is 
often used by the secularists indiscriminately without analysis of  any specifi c 
behavior as an umbrella term for Islamic politics in general. The whole of  
Islamic political behavior is thus reduced to so many ways of  covering a larger 
secret political plan to establish an Islamic hegemony and fi nally an Islamic 
regime of  Shari’a. As Asad (2003) notes, the attempts by Muslim movements 
to reform the social body through parliamentary intervention will be opposed 
as “antidemocratic,” as was the case in Turkey in 1997 and in Algeria in 1992. 
Primarily, the intolerant attitude towards the deprivatization of  religion by 
secularists was “because of  the motives imputed to their opponents rather 
than to anything the latter have actually done. The motives signal the potential 
entry of  religion into space already occupied by the secular. It is the nationalist-
secularists themselves, one might say, who stoutly reject the secularization of  
religious concepts and practices here” (199–200).
As outlined above, in defending the secular heritage and principles of  
Turkey, new patterns of  expression have emerged. Secular sentiments, 
symbols and ceremonial and ritualistic practices are being deployed such 
as attending Atatürk’s mausoleum, excessive use of  the Turkish fl ag and 
images of  Atatürk and the use of  the slogan “Turkey is secular and will 
remain secular” on almost every occasion. Such expressions can be seen as 
a process of  sacralization and transcendentalization of  the principles of  secularism. 
This sacralized defense of  the principles of  secularism in turn feeds the 
paranoid nationalist response. The insistence on the categorical separation 
of  the religious and the political leaves no room for a different and more 
responsible articulation of  religion with the secular. 
However, the split and opposition between the secularists and Islamists 
in today’s Turkey is only an apparent one. This is the other reason why 
I will prefer to use the term “staging,” as this term will help me in suggesting 
that the contemporary form of  Islamic religiosity and the new faces of  secularity are 
constitutive of  each other. A closer analysis of  the discourse of  secularists reveals 
that it is very much imbued with a religious language and way of  doing 
things. The Turkish secularists suffer from inadequate secularization and the 
current staging of  secularism evidences the sacralization of  secularism. For 
this reason, ironically, secularist discourse is imbued with the language of  
religion in its fi ght with religion. On the other hand, Islamist politics inherited 
 CLASH OF SECULARITY AND RELIGIOSITY 243
the authoritarian management of  culture from the elitist secularist system 
that denied it legitimate existence. The discourse and the symbolic world 
embodied by the historically hegemonic secularist elite was authoritarian and 
the secularist infusion of  the discourse of  Islamism must be acknowledged 
as an intermingling with authoritarianism. Thus, it is important that we 
remain critical of  any suggestion of  categorical and clear-cut distinctions and 
differences between religiosity and secularity in the Turkish case. 
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Chapter 11
GRAMSCI, JEDIISM, THE 
STANDARDIZATION OF POPULAR 
RELIGION AND THE STATE1
Adam Possamai
University of  Western Sydney
Gramsci viewed popular religion as having the possibility of  being a 
progressive movement against the bourgeois hegemony produced and 
reproduced in symbiosis with offi cial religion and the state. In this pre–mass 
consumption society, there was the germ of  a revolt in popular religion that 
could help the revolutionary push needed and guided by earlier Marxists. 
The goal of  this chapter is to argue that with the entry of  popular religion 
into the consumer societies of  the Western world, popular religion has not 
moved further in terms of  its opposition against the state. A case study of  
hyperreal religions and more specifi cally of  Jediism will form the thread of  
the chapter. Following Simmel and Beck, I will argue that popular religion, 
like money, now individualizes and standardizes and by this process loses its 
oppositional strength.
Introduction
In pre-consumer and pre-cyber culture, Gramsci argued that popular religion 
could help with counterhegemonic forces and that this could offer an opposition 
to the state. Could this still be the case today? Jediism is a spirituality that has 
been inspired by the Star Wars franchise. It is a subset of  popular religion that 
has emerged in consumer and cyber culture and will be used as a case study 
for the purpose of  this chapter.
1 Many thanks to Elena Knox, who provided some research assistance for this chapter.
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Jediism has infi ltrated a few censuses around the world and is actively present 
on the internet. On “The Jediism Way,”2 an internet site dedicated to presenting 
Jediism as a religion, we can fi nd a specifi c view of  the Star Wars mythos that 
does not direct its focus exclusively on the myth and fi ction as created by the 
movie director George Lucas but upon “real life” examples of  Jediism:
Jediism is not the same as that which is portrayed within the Star Wars 
Saga by George Lucas and Lucasfi lm LTD. George Lucas’ Jedi are 
fi ctional characters that exist within a literary and cinematic universe. 
The Jedi discussed within this website refer to factual people within 
this world that live or lived their lives according to Jediism, of  which 
we recognize and work together as a community to both cultivate and 
celebrate… The history of  the path of  Jediism traverses thought which is 
well over 5,000 years old. It shares many themes embraced in Hinduism, 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Gnosticism, Stoicism, Catholicism, Taoism, 
Shinto, Modern Mysticism, the Way of  the Shaolin Monks, the Knight’s 
Code of  Chivalry and the Samurai warriors. We recognize that many 
times the answer to mankind’s problems comes from within the purifi ed 
hearts of  genuine seekers of  truth. Theology, philosophy and religious 
doctrine can facilitate this process, but we believe that it would be a futile 
exercise for any belief  system to claim to hold all the answers to all the 
serious questions posed to seekers of  truth in the 21st century. Jediism 
may help facilitate this process, yet we also acknowledge that it is up to 
the true believer who applies the universal truths inherent with Jediism to 
fi nd the answers they seek.
In the bulk of  its online representations, Jediknightism, or Jediism, is presented 
as an old religion remythologized to a contemporary public. Old techniques 
of  development of  the self  such as meditation, yoga and shamanism are 
used towards this Jedi path. The stories of  Star Wars are in fact presented as a 
support for a mix-and-match of  various religions and philosophies from the 
past and present. 
One of  the messages from the same “Jedi Knight Movement” discussion 
list quoted above states about “Jediknightism”:
Life on planet earth has become much more complex – the churches, 
although meaning well, many times fall short of  the mark of  addressing 
the complexities. The political arena many times disappoints us and falls 
short of  inspiring either ourselves or others to action. 
2 See www.jediism.org. 
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We can read from this statement that people who embrace this religion are 
critical of  mainstream religions and of  political movements. Left without these 
grand narratives they embrace another type of  narrative:
Storytelling is an age-old tradition that has followed mankind for 
millennia – and has been used effectively for transferring ideals, from 
philosophers to prophets. It is an ideal medium to both entertain and 
enlighten simultaneously, which is why it is so powerful and its effects so 
profound when used expertly.3
The spiritual actors from this religion consume popular culture and add it 
to a kind of  religious bricolage. This spirituality is part of  what I have called 
hyperreal religion/spirituality (Possamai, 2007), which is a simulacrum4 of  
a religion partly created out of  popular culture that provides inspiration for 
believers and consumers. At one end of  the spectrum, we can fi nd individuals 
rejecting institutionalized religions and practicing Jediism (appropriated from 
the Star Wars movies) and Matrixism (from the Matrix trilogy) and neopagan 
groups using stories from the Lord of  the Rings and Harry Potter. At the other end 
of  the spectrum, practitioners still involved in mainstream religions such as 
Christianity reveal themselves as being infl uenced or inspired by, for example, 
the Da Vinci Code. These contemporary expressions of  religion are likely to be 
consumed and individualized, and thus have more relevance to the self  than 
to a community and/or congregation. 
As already argued elsewhere (Possamai, 2008), the syncretic aspects of  
hyperreal religion as differentiated from offi cial codifi ed religion bear some 
striking resemblances to popular religion. Although hyperreal religion has 
some clear popular elements and is not led by an elite group, its members 
are quite literate and computer savvy and certainly not part of  a subordinate 
group, contrary to the classical understanding of  popular religion. It is because 
of  this new practice of  using commodifi ed popular culture for religious 
purposes that hyperreal religion is a new subset of  popular religion. This will 
be developed further below.
Star Wars’ fi rst three movies (episodes 4, 5 and 6) involve a Jedi Knight on 
his path to developing himself. This has led many consumers of  these movies 
to be inspired by a spirituality informed by the franchise. In this case, believers 
and consumers reinvent old religions such as shamanism, Buddhism, Taoism 
and even Catholicism to validate the Jedi religion, and apply them in an 
3 See http://groups.yahoo.com/groups/Jedi_Knight_Movement/ (accessed 25 October 
2002 – registration required).
4 As inspired by the work of  Jean Baudrillard (1983).
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individualized way to a new spirituality of  the self. However, another crucial 
aspect of  these movies appears to be of  less importance to the development of  
this spirituality in cyberspace. The Jedi knight in the movies, Luke Skywalker, 
fi ghts against an oppressive regime led by an emperor and his right-hand man, 
Darth Vader. A rebellion (which could have been called a revolution) from a 
subordinate group succeeds at the end of  the fi rst trilogy, pointing out that the 
religion portrayed in the movies has a strong revolutionary nature. However, 
most devotees of  this work of  popular culture are predominantly concerned 
with a spirituality of  the self.
In chat rooms and forums dedicated to Jediism, few discussions are posted 
about political issues. Examining three sites (The Jediism Way, http://www.
thejediismway.org; Temple of  the Jedi Force, http://www.templeofthejediforce.
org; and Temple of  the Jedi Order, http://www.templeofthejediorder.org), 
one can observe that the bulk of  the discussion is about individual spiritual 
training rather than collective political development. When politics is 
mentioned, it is mainly in the context of  current affairs or in the citing of  
various ideologies without evidence of  a specifi c goal or organizing principle. 
From my observation in September–October 2009 of  the discussion in these 
three sites, it appears that, while not apolitical, Jediism is more interested in 
the peacekeeping, protective and defensive ideologies derived from the Star 
Wars series than in the incitement of  governmental overthrow also present in 
the movies.
One interaction is worth mentioning here. At the beginning of  2009, a 
“newbie” to Jediism posted a message to argue that in the hands of  a Jedist, 
politics could be a very positive thing. He states: 
Communism, in my opinion, is essentially the best avenue of  approach. 
The basic underlying tenet of  Communism is basically to free those whom 
are being oppressed or exploited… Every Jedi should feel compelled to 
relieve the suffering of  the opposed [sic] and to combat the spread of  
Capitalism, as a means to exploit and oppress those like the third world, 
and even those at home.5 
Two hours later, a senior member of  this Jedi group replied to this message 
by stating that the implementation of  communism had failed and that “Stalin 
was an ass and Mao an idiot.” There followed from this remark a heated 
exchange of  messages between the newbie and the senior member which led 
to some name calling, even when a third party tried to intervene to calm the 
5 http://www.thejediismway.org/index.php/topic,55.0.html (accessed 2 July 2009 – website 
since discontinued).
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situation down. The whole exchange of  messages lasted a bit more than a day, 
and no one has since posted anything on that specifi c discussion board. This 
exchange could be interpreted in two ways. The fi rst interpretation would 
be that there has been some discussion against capitalism in Jediism and that 
there might be the germination of  some counterhegemonic forces slowly 
emerging. The other is simply that this political spark quickly ran out of  heat 
and became insignifi cant among all the messages in the forum. How to refl ect 
on this incident? Would Jediism and other popular religions on the internet 
provide the type of  counterhegemonic forces that Gramsci was looking for? 
Or would these forces only present an illusion that would never lead to social 
change, or even to opposition against the status quo?
This chapter attempts to explain this case study by fi rst exploring popular 
religion and its revolutionary strength according to Gramsci. It then addresses 
the position of  spiritualities on the internet and their possible counterhegemonic 
strength through a “participatory culture.” The chapter fi nally makes reference 
to the work of  Simmel and Beck in order to understand how consumer culture 
has affected popular religion and how the standardization of  popular religion 
might have affected the revolutionary power of  popular religion.
Revolutionary Aspects of  Popular Religion?
In its worst possible interpretation, popular religion can make reference to 
the “vulgar,” the “superstitious,” the “hopelessly irrational,” the “socially 
retrograde” and the “idiotic” (Berlinerblau, 2001). Popular religion refl ects the 
lived and unstructured religion of  subordinated groups and is a term that has 
developed mainly in contrast to institutionalized, established and/or offi cial 
religion which has a rationalized, codifi ed and written down theology. Popular 
religion refers to the religion of  the people when they subvert the codifi ed 
offi cial religion of  the elite group by, for example, changing the offi cial liturgy 
of  the established religion to their own liking, bringing eclectic elements into a 
syncretic set of  beliefs from other religions that are not offi cially recognized or 
simply following a previous religion in opposition to a new offi cial one (these 
examples are context-dependent). 
To move forward in our sociological discussion, Berlinerblau (2001: 13) 
extrapolated two broad understandings of  popular religion from Weber:
1. “Popular Religion” is that religion, whatever its contents, practiced by 
groups among the masses characterized by nonprivileged social and 
economic status
2. “Popular religion” is constituted by specifi c types of  practices and 
beliefs (i.e. magic, an antirational orientation, a close bond with nature, 
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a “this-worldly” religious attitude, heightened concern with salvation and 
savior-fi gures) held by a particular group
In Parker’s (1998: 205) view, “unlike the [offi cial] religion of  reason 
characteristic of  the intellectual elites and clergy, popular religion is a religion 
of  rites and myths, of  dreams and emotions, of  body and the quest for this-
worldly well-being.” Although popular religion comprises a multitude of  
unorganized elements, often in contradiction, some theorists defi ne popular 
religion specifi cally in terms of  class divide;6 the upper class belonging to 
offi cial religion and the lower to popular religion. These theorists, following the 
legacy of  Gramsci, sometimes see popular religion as a form of  contestation 
against dominant culture, thinking that this type of  religion has the possibility 
of  being a progressive movement.
Gramsci viewed the state as two distinct but interwoven fi elds: political 
society (the fi eld of  force and domination) and civil society (the fi eld of  
hegemony). This creates what he called the “integral state,” which is a 
sociopolitical order with hegemonic equilibrium as a key characteristic and 
is constituted by a “combination of  force and consent which are balanced 
in varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent” 
(Gramsci, quoted by Fontana, 2002: 159). While “force and domination” 
implies the use of  coercion or armed force over other groups, hegemony makes 
reference to the intellectual and moral leadership of  one group over others to 
such a point as the latter become “allies” and “associates” of  the former.  
The church, this offi cial religion, was part of  what Althusser would later call 
an ideological state apparatus. To maintain hegemony, the church managed 
over the years to keep popular religion in check:
The strength of  religions, and of  the Catholic church in particular, has 
lain, and still lies, in the fact that they feel very strongly the need for the 
doctrinal unity of  the whole mass of  the faithful and strive to ensure that 
the higher intellectual stratum does not get separated from the lower. 
The Roman church has always been the most vigorous in the struggle to 
prevent the “offi cial” formation of  two religions, one for the “intellectuals” 
and the other for the “simple souls.” (Gramsci, 1991: 328)
Gramsci sees the subaltern culture as different and in opposition to the 
church’s offi cial values; however, this opposition is not always conscious or 
explicit (Nesti, 1975). Popular culture comprises a multitude of  unorganized 
6 Others, like researchers in Latin America (e.g. Blancarte, 2000) would present this more 
in relation to ethnicity.
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elements often in contradiction. Gramsci argues that some of  the elements 
have a potential to lead to novelty and to a contestation against the 
state. These elements could be framed to build a collective consciousness 
within the popular mass and lead to an organized opposition against 
hegemonic power. 
Gramsci does not make reference to popular religion as a whole when 
it comes to reaching this revolutionary strength. As he clearly points out, 
some elements of  this subaltern culture cannot be of  help as they are 
remnants of  past historical periods and not in line with, for instance, the 
development of  the Italy of  his time as an industrial society. Indeed, he 
states that there is a need to combat “the residues of  the pre-capitalist 
world that still exist among the popular masses, especially in the fi eld of  
religion” (Gramsci, 1991: 392). These popular religious movements, for 
Gramsci, can be both progressive and regressive and only their progressive 
attributes have the potential to be counterhegemonic. Gramsci is here 
explaining how some progressive movements have already attempted 
revolt but have been at a later stage absorbed by the church, counteracting 
their revolutionary power. 
Many heretical movements were manifestations of  popular forces aiming 
to reform the Church and bring it closer to the people by exalting them. 
The reaction of  the Church was often very violent: it has created the 
Society of  Jesus; it has clothed itself  in the protective armour of  the 
Council of  Trent; although it has organised a marvellous mechanism 
of  “democratic” selection of  its intellectuals,7 they have been selected 
as single individuals and not as the representative expression of  popular 
groups. (Gramsci, 1991: 397)
Gramsci (1991: 331–2) also makes reference to other examples such as the 
creation of  strong popular mass movements centered on strong personalities 
such as St Dominic and St Francis. Instead of  allowing such division, the 
church again managed to absorb these personages by creating new religious 
7 Gramsci, in his prison notebooks, believed that intellectuals are bound to their class 
of  origin. Intellectuals cannot form a single group, but are divided into subgroups that 
emerge from and serve specific classes. The bourgeoisie produces its intellectuals, as does 
the proletariat. Intellectuals, for Gramsci, thus work for the interest of  their own class 
and are called within this perspective “organic intellectuals.” He thus viewed the role of  
working class intellectuals as having a key role within the Marxist revolutionary movement. 
And it would be the role of  these organic intellectuals to frame the consciousness of  
the people who are involved in popular religion to help towards a revolt against the 
bourgeois state.
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orders, and thus counteract counterhegemonic processes. For Gramsci, The 
Society of  Jesus was the last of  the great religious orders as its origins were 
reactionary.
Engels already studied heretical movements in the twelfth century, and 
it is no surprise that Gramsci was interested in them as well (Nesti, 1975: 
351). Engels discovered two types of  heretics; those who were revolting 
against the land extension of  the aristocrats, and those who wanted to 
revolutionize the entire system, demanding political and cultural autonomy 
to create a more egalitarian society in light of  Christianity’s perceived 
origins. Indeed, Engels (1959: 170) analyzed the origins of  Christianity 
and discovered that there were strong similarities between the working-
class movement in modernity and the fi rst Christians. Both preached 
forthcoming salvation from bondage and misery, but while Christianity 
placed this salvation in a life beyond death in heaven, socialism situated it 
in this world. However, early Christianity later became a dogmatically fi xed 
universal religion through the Nicene Council (325 AD), which changed 
the early positive nature of  this religion into one that has been negatively 
analyzed by the above authors.
Gramsci’s notions of  state and hegemony would need to be adapted to 
the global context, as radical sociocultural changes have occurred since the 
time of  his writings. Robinson (2005) can here be of  help, as he has reworked 
Gramsci’s notion of  the state to a contemporary setting. Robinson is inspired 
by Gramsci’s understanding of  a hegemony which is not operated by states 
(that would be a statist view of  hegemony) but rather by social groups and 
classes operating through states and other institutions. As dominant social 
groups and classes have become transnational, their hegemonic power can no 
longer been seen as being located within a specifi c state any longer. To adapt 
Gramsci to today’s world, Robinson makes reference to the transnational 
state (TNS).
The TCC [Transnational Capitalist Class] has been attempting to 
position itself  as a new ruling class group worldwide and to bring some 
coherence and stability to its rule through an emergent TNS apparatus. 
What would a potentially hegemonic bloc – henceforth referred to as 
a globalist bloc – under the leadership of  the TCC look like? It would 
clearly consist of  various economic and political forces whose politics and 
policies are conditioned by the new global structure of  accumulation. 
At the center of  the globalist bloc would be the TCC, comprised of  the 
owners and managers of  the transnational corporations and private 
fi nancial institutions and other capitalists around the world who manage 
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transnational capital. The bloc would also include the cadre, bureaucratic 
managers and technicians who administer the agencies of  the TNS, such 
as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, other transnational forums, 
and the states of  the North and the South. (Robinson, 2005: 565)
Although we could still expect today’s popular religions to be antagonistic 
toward specifi c states, we could also envision them working at the global 
level, counterhegemonic not to one state only but to this transnational state 
in general.
Popular Religion: From Gramsci to Today
Enzo Pace (1979) notes that, for Italian scholars, popular religion is a class 
phenomenon. It is followed especially by the subaltern classes and most 
predominantly, but not exclusively, by the agricultural classes. Davidson 
(1991) reminds us that peasantry formed the majority of  the population in 
Gramsci’s time. We can thus expect Gramsci to have been inspired by the 
same understanding of  popular religion. However, popular religion is not 
always the religion of  the underprivileged.  
Making such a distinction solely between the learned and the illiterate 
is not always fruitful. Over the last centuries many of  the elite who have 
wanted to gain knowledge from “popular religion” have studied it and have 
codifi ed some aspects of  it. One might remember that during the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance, popular magic moved from the inarticulate classes 
to the intellectual ones. For example, Jean Pic de la Mirandole, Paracelsus 
and John Dee were learned men who delved into popular religion and 
its magic to codify and rationalize it. This magic, also called esotericism, 
changed through the modern and late modern periods to infl uence New Age 
spiritualities. Through the ages, this “magic” has been commodifi ed and 
gentrifi ed (Possamai, 2005).
Another case in point is the birth of  neopaganism in the late 1940s, 
during which Gerald Gardner (1884–1964) published an ethnography of  
contemporary witches. For Gardner, witches had ancient knowledge and 
powers handed down through generations and he claimed to have been initiated 
into their nature religion. The alleged ancient nature religion (previously seen 
as a folk and popular religion) that Gardner codifi ed in his writing led to the 
birth of  current neopagan movement. By this example, it could be argued 
that contemporary neopaganism is a reinterpretation of  the popular religion 
of  certain folk people. However, many neopagans live in cities, are literate and 
tend to come from middle-class backgrounds.  
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Popular religion in the Western world has been gentrifi ed. It is no longer 
the prerogative of  the peasants and/or lower classes, but it is now accessible, 
if  not carried, by the middle classes as well.8 
One way to defi ne popular religion is to use a social constructionist approach 
(see Beckford, 2003) – basically arguing that understandings of  popular religion 
are in tension with offi cial religion (Berlinerblau, 2001; Possamai, 2008). Popular 
religion exists because offi cial religion desires to distance itself  from more populist 
types of  magical practices. However, popular religion has become so complex in 
recent years in the Western world that the dichotomy between these two religious 
subfi elds is not as clear-cut as it used to be. Over the years, we have seen more 
elitist forms of  religiosity (e.g. Troeltsh’s (1950) mysticism and Campbell’s (1978) 
secret religion of  the educated class) merging with forms of  popular religion 
and vice versa. I have detailed this bridge between these two religious fi elds 
within consumer culture elsewhere with the help of  Jameson’s theory on the 
cultural logic of  late capitalism (Possamai, 2007, 2008) and especially of  his 
work on high and popular culture. Enzo Pace (1987), by using Niklas Luhmann’s 
theory on Complex Society, also reached the same conclusion that mysticism 
(in Troeltsh’s sense) is becoming a form of  religious neopopulism. As popular 
religion becomes a more complex synthesis, it might be better to understand it as 
religion that takes “account of  subjective needs, of  emotional communication, 
of  face to face rapport, as opposed to all the cold forms of  functioning of  the 
traditional religious institution” (Pace, 1987: 12–13). 
To return to Jediism and hyperreal religions, it can easily be argued that 
they fulfi ll their members’ subjective needs. They are all able to express 
themselves on the internet and construct for themselves by themselves their 
view of  Jediism. Emotional communication happens via chat rooms in which 
people are able to express themselves freely, especially behind pseudonymic 
masks. In these forums and chat rooms, people do not have to show their faces 
and can even pretend they are a different gender and age. Some might even 
have more than one cyber name. These hyperreal religions might have been 
able to develop due to the fact that people can play with their identities and 
not suffer from the stigma attached to following a “nerdy” or “wacky” religion. 
Further, people participating in these cyber activities can do it without any 
fear of  offl ine discrimination or harassment, as they do not ever have to meet 
in geographical space.
However, it would be hard to argue that Jediism has liturgies in the classic 
sense (Houk, 1996), although it is as decentralized and syncretic as popular 
8 This is not limited to Western countries. Howell (2006) writes from Indonesia that many 
Muslim and non-Muslim middle-class people have developed an interest in new Western 
spiritualities.
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religion can be. Nevertheless, it can easily be argued that it has instead e-text 
liturgies. Often, in these chat rooms, text tends to be reproduced as if  it 
were part of  an oral conversation. Further, this e-oral liturgy is kept online, 
allowing other people to share and intervene. This creates a new type of  
face-to-face rapport between actors in popular religions that deal in online 
oral or e-text liturgies. 
Syncretic aspects of  hyperreal religion bear some striking resemblances 
to similar aspects of  popular religion. However, the extent of  this syncretism 
in contemporary Western societies has broadened signifi cantly since the 
time of  pre–mass consumption. It mixes even more heteroclite elements 
from religions, philosophies and now from global contemporary popular 
culture. It is because of  this new practice of  using commodifi ed popular 
culture for religious purposes that hyperreal religion is a new subset of  
popular religion. 
A Counterhegemonic Process?
Within the literature on media, Jenkins (2003) studied the participatory 
phenomenon of  the Star Wars culture. Although he did not address Jediism, 
strong similarities can be drawn from his research with that on hyperreal 
religion. Jenkins discovered that Star Wars fans on the internet emulate 
or parody some of  the Star Wars stories and create their own work (e.g. 
homemade movies, pictures and stories). For example, an internet database 
for fan fi lm production has close to three hundred amateur-produced Star 
Wars fi lms. These works are no longer photocopied and/or recorded from 
tape to tape, sent via (snail)mail and thus only accessible to a few dozen 
people, but are put on the internet to be reached by the world. Alternative 
media production has become more visible in mainstream culture. These 
artists/fans create their own stories, which could be interpreted by some as 
questioning the hegemonic representation of  their culture. To refl ect this 
process as amplifi ed by online circulation, Jenkins (2003: 286) uses the term 
“participatory culture”:
Patterns of  media consumption have been profoundly altered by a 
succession of  new media technologies which enable average citizens to 
participate in the archiving, annotation, appropriation, transformation, 
and recirculation of  media content. Participatory culture refers to the 
new style of  consumerism that emerges in this environment.
It can be argued that participatory culture also encompasses hyperreal 
religionists. They now have the ability to discuss their spiritual works on 
256 RELIGION AND THE STATE
the internet and share them with others, something that would have been 
diffi cult to accomplish to such an extent with the use of  a photocopier (or 
even a publishing company!). The internet offers people a vehicle for sharing 
with the world their construction of  themselves (e.g. through photographs, 
video and biography). Some include their views on spirituality; these can 
attract other people toward idiosyncratic spiritualities in a way that was not 
possible pre-internet. People from all over the world can join in the discussion 
at any time and take part in e-activities. Through this they might contribute 
to their own, or someone else’s, spiritual construction, usually by virtue of  
a pseudonym and/or feeling more free to speak in the online world than in 
the offl ine one.
As Jenkins remarks about Star Wars’ participatory culture, the web has 
allowed a return to a type of  folk-understanding of  creativity that was present 
before the Industrial Revolution. Before this revolution, folktales, legends, 
myths and ballads were built up over time as people transformed them into 
more personally meaningful texts. But with the Industrial Revolution, culture 
became privatized and copyrighted, over time allowing corporations to control 
“their” intellectual property and thus impose upon the general population the 
status of  consumers rather than cultural participants. Jenkins describes this 
phenomenon during this industrial time:
The mass production of  culture has largely displaced the old folk culture, 
but we have lost the possibility for cultural myths to accrue new meanings 
and associations over time, resulting in single authorized versions (or at 
best, corporately controlled efforts to rewrite and “update” the myths 
of  our popular heroes). Our emotional and social investments in culture 
have not shifted, but new structures of  ownership diminish our ability to 
participate in the creation and interpretation of  that culture.
Star Wars fans are now able to take part in the formation and discussion of  the 
Star Wars culture via the internet, evoking participatory folk culture before the 
Industrial Revolution. Including for the purpose of  this chapter folk theology as 
part of  folk culture, similarities can easily be drawn between hyperreal religion 
and folk theology, which is generally characterized by decentralization, oral 
liturgies, dynamic and syncretic belief  systems and consensus-based leadership 
(Houk, 1996). Because of  the popular ability to participate in the creation and 
interpretation of  new spirituality on cyberspace by and for the self, one could 
infer potential leverage against various ideological state apparatus. Spirituality 
accruing new meanings on the internet could be a counteraction against a 
church’s effort to control the “offi cial” text/liturgy. But is it really? 
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Standardization
Would this counterhegemonic possibility exist within current Western popular 
religions? Does the internet allow for such a process? To address this question, 
we need to focus on the key aspect of  contemporary popular religions (and 
even contemporary spirituality at large): individualization. Beck’s work is 
enlightening.
Beck (2002) makes reference to a triple individualization process in 
late modernity. The fi rst process is the “disembedding” process, that is the 
individual’s liberation from any prescribed social forms and commitment. 
He or she is no longer bound to follow any dominant traditional institutions 
(e.g. class, family, church). Through the elevation of  the educational system, 
increases in disposable income, changes within the family and new labor 
conditions, the individual has gained a new freedom in late modern society. 
For example, in the sphere of  religion, people can explore different religions, 
pick and mix various parts electively and construct a personal spirituality. 
As an illustration, in Australia it is now less important for Irish migrants to 
be Irish Catholics like our forbears. We can still remain Catholic, but we 
can also explore and choose à la carte other religious elements to create a 
personal identity and spirituality; or move away from Catholicism and still 
consume à la carte, such as studying astrology, being interested in Tibetan 
Buddhism, rereading the Bible and rewatching the Star Wars saga. Beck sees 
in this behavior a liberating dimension from traditional structures. However, 
liberation has consequences. 
The second process, a direct consequence of  the fi rst, is “the loss of  
traditional security with respect to practical knowledge, faith and guiding 
norms.” Beck sees this as the “disenchantment” dimension. The individual 
in late modern society is increasingly uprooted as he or she is deprived of  
the cultural signifi ers of  traditional culture. As Varga (2007: 146) argues, “the 
individual is – to paraphrase Sartre – ‘thrown into choice,’ and collective 
memory is becoming ever more fragmented.”
Indeed, with the advent of  globalization, uncertainty through job insecurity 
has resulted from the delocalization of  industry from the West to the “rest.” 
Generations X and Y do not know if  they will live in the same place for the 
rest of  their lives and they cannot be certain they will last with a partner until 
their deathbeds. If  there is a constant in the lives of  these people who have lost 
the traditional cultural security of  their ancestors, it is that they have to live 
with uncertainty (Possamai, 2009). 
Beck’s two types of  processes are not new in social theory, however his third 
is of  great importance to the argument of  this chapter. Beck’s third process of  
individualization, “reembedding,” is a new type of  social commitment.
258 RELIGION AND THE STATE
Through reembedding the individual is, paradoxically, more dependent on 
social institutions than ever before. To be able to make a choice, a structure 
needs to be put in place that allows such a thing, and this structure depends 
upon institutions. Thus to be a liberated individual, one is dependent upon, 
for example, education, consumption, welfare state regulation and support. As 
Beck (1992: 131) observes, “individualization becomes the most advanced form 
of  societalization dependent on the market, law, education and so on.” The 
individual is free from traditional commitments such as class and family, but 
these constraints are exchanged with a dependency upon external control such 
as the labor market and consumption to a level never encountered before. This 
paradoxical dependency leads to a process of  standardization in which choice 
might not appear to be so liberating. The market, money, law, mobility, education 
and so on are institutions that have created a new type of  dependency: 
Individualization means market dependency in all dimensions of  living…
The individual is indeed removed from traditional commitments and support 
relationships, but exchanges them for the constraints of  existence in the labor 
market and as a consumer, with the standardizations and controls they contain. 
The place of  traditional ties and social forms (social class, nuclear family) is 
taken by secondary agencies and institutions, which stamp the biography of  
the individual and make that person dependent upon fashion, social policy, 
economic cycles and markets, contrary to the image of  individual control 
which establishes itself  in consciousness. (Beck, 1992: 131–2)
One may also remember Simmel, who claims in his Philosophy of  Money that 
money exercises its function as a standard value. Turner (1986: 97) explains that 
money, for Simmel, “creates greater interpersonal freedom through impersonal 
exchange relations, but at the same time makes human life more subject to 
bureaucratic, quantitative regulation.” In this sense, money, like individuation, 
liberates people from any prescribed social forms and commitment but creates 
as well a quantitative regimentation of  individuals: a standardizing process.
To illustrate this standardizing process in terms of  religion, let’s move to 
Beckford (2003), who makes reference to a type of  standardized individuality. 
People might decide to go on a spiritual path towards a new self-identity such as 
being “born again,” “saved,” “enlightened,” “clear” or, may I add, a “Jedi Knight.” 
It is believed that working towards this new self-identity will be an investment that 
will have some practical effects in the everyday life of  the individual. 
In other words, involvement in these individualized forms of  religion is 
not so much a fl ight or escape from the pressure to make lifestyle choices 
as an expression of  the same kind of  “standardized individuality.” An 
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analogy with restaurants will make this point clearer. A wide range 
of  cuisines is on offer in late-modern societies, thereby increasing the 
choices facing customers. But many restaurants belong to transnational 
corporations; and their menus refl ect hybridized and standardized 
notions of  taste. In short, the appearance of  diversity and choice masks 
underlying pressures towards standardization. Individual customers are 
certainly free to exercise their choice but they can only choose from items 
on the menu. (Beckford, 2003: 213)
This, I have argued (Possamai, 2005), has created a religious stasis that is 
linked to the stasis of  culture in general. Culture within late modernity 
cannot create anything new (Jameson, 1991); apparent novelties in culture 
are simply strategies – e.g. “pastiche,” “retro,” “appropriation,” “simulation,” 
“intertextuality” and “resurrectionism” – of  the culture industry to make 
quick profi t. As Hassan (1999: 308) claims, “the stasis of  culture within late 
capitalism has thus produced a culture which is bounded and predetermined 
by the immediate needs of  the culture industries.” By continuously 
rearranging, repackaging, reviving and reinventing culture, the culture 
industry produces an effect of  “difference”, “innovation” and “creativity.” 
However, the appearance of  actual innovation is really illusory and created 
by technological advances. For example, the superheroes from recent movies 
such as X-Men, Spiderman, Daredevil, The Hulk, The League of  Extraordinary 
Gentlemen and Hell Boy look less tacky due to the use of  computer-generated 
images. However, even if  they are more attractive to the young generation 
than the old Superman movies and Batman television series, the content – 
even if  it is more mature – is nothing new.
My point about the stasis of  religion does not question the religious vitality 
of  our time period, even if  it can be argued that this vitality can be standardized. 
The widespread creative use of  technology to express and support a religion 
allows individualized religions to fl ourish, as is the case for hyperreal religions. 
Personal religious involvement in spirituality is strong; however, it could be 
argued that there is a hybridized and standardized notion of  religious/spiritual 
taste in this period of  late capitalism. This might be seen as a paradox. If  we 
come back to Hassan’s (1999) discussion of  cultural stasis, we fi nd that no new 
cultural forms can develop “naturally” as they once did because they are part 
of  the logic of  purely capitalist production and consumption. Religion today 
might be argued to be part of  this logic of  purely capitalist consumption. 
Due to the hyperconsumption of  religion (Possamai, 2007) by the social 
actors that we have studied, no new religious form has the time to develop 
“naturally” because of  the standard way it is individualized almost as soon as 
it is produced.
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Gramsci referred to the way the church managed to absorb 
counterhegemonic religious movements into its order to counteract their 
oppositional stance. In the case of  popular religion in contemporary 
Western societies, consumer culture counteracts this oppositional stance at 
a global level. If  the church was a strong ally to the state in Gramsci’s Italy 
in controlling popular religion, then with regard to the transnational state 
of  today it appears that consumer culture might have replaced the church 
as the controlling agent of  popular religion, and might be regarded as the 
ideological (transnational) state apparatus par excellence.
Through this standardization of  religion/spirituality specifi cally and 
culture in general, it becomes hard to believe that a counterhegemonic germ 
could be found in twenty-fi rst century popular religions. Even if  they have 
some elements of  counterhegemonic force against the transnational state (e.g. 
reappropriating copyrighted elements of  popular culture for spiritual work; 
contestation against religious institutions), these facets are weak compared to 
the essential development of  the level of  class/group consciousness detailed 
by Gramsci. Perhaps we have not moved in any different direction since 
Gramsci’s time. Although we are faced with a transnational state rather than 
a nationally bounded state and although popular religion in the Western 
world is now more articulated due to its gentrifi cation process, the combined 
processes of  the standardization and stasis of  religion/culture would 
prevent any counterhegemonic spark from growing into the full-blown force 
urged by Gramsci. Perhaps the key to understanding this process is to cite 
a popular French proverb “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” (the more 
things change, the more they stay the same), meaning that turbulent social 
and cultural changes do not affect reality on any deeper level than to cement 
the status quo.
Conclusion
Looking at Weber, Turner (2009) found that global commercialism has 
inverted the traditional relationship between the virtuosi (the carriers of  
offi cial religions) and the mass (the consumers of  popular religions). As the 
educated and elite carriers of  religion are now challenged by a global spiritual 
marketplace, we might expect from the mass that has gone through a process 
of  individualization that elements of  contemporary popular religion could 
lead to the progressive advancement that Gramsci saw in the popular religions 
of  the Italian peasantry. 
With the internet and its participatory culture, there are strong indications 
that popular religion online could have a counterhegemonic strength and 
thus achieve the potential that Gramsci alluded to. However, according to 
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Beck, the individualization process is standardized today, dependent on larger 
social institutions and structures such as the labor market and consumption 
in a way that has never been stronger. Popular religion does not escape this 
phenomenon and thus cannot escape its standardizing process. According to 
this view, there would be no possibility of  any counterhegemony towards the 
transnational state, as all possibilities are bounded within a worldwide religious 
marketplace.
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Part III
CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Chapter 12
CONCERNING THE CURRENT 
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AND OF POLITICS
Patrick Michel
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifi que 
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École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris
Although it seems impossible to provide a defi nition of  “religion” that would likely 
be consensual,1 religion yet appears to be an essential analytical key to account 
for the transformations of  the contemporary world. Hence the new visibility 
religion has acquired in the public and scientifi c debate in the last few years: the 
debate has shifted from discussions specifi c to the sociologists of  religion to an 
appropriation of  religion by different disciplinary and theoretical approaches. This 
has led to interpretations through the religious lens of, among other things, ethnic 
confl icts, terrorism, the political evolution of  the Middle East, the management of  
immigration, and even the “civil unrest” in the suburbs of  France.2
This new visibility of  religion does nothing to prevent it from representing a 
continuing enigma: is religion still disappearing? Or is it endlessly reemerging? 
Besides, when religion is foregrounded nowadays, it is often something else 
that is at stake: the relation to the other (and thus to pluralism) or rather, 
identity and consequently the relevance of  the criteria that will allow us to 
defi ne identity. A precondition of  this milieu is the inability to fi nd a register of  
discourse that is better adapted to what tries to be formulated. Herein religion 
1 See “La religion, objet sociologique pertinent?” (Michel, 2003: 159–70).
2 The 2005 “civil unrest” of  October and November was a series of  riots involving mainly 
the burning of  cars and public buildings at night in the periphery of  big cities in France. 
President Jacques Chirac announced a national state of  emergency on 8 November. 
These events led the political authorities to (re)open the file of  national identity. 
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would be the vehicle through which could be articulated, in the words of  
Michel de Certeau, “both the necessity and impossibility of  taking hold again 
of  the whole” (2003: 142).
The task set out here against a background of  ever-increasing tension 
between believers and institutions and a wider problem of  religious 
apportionment and fl ow, is to articulate, from a resolutely theoretical 
perspective, a few remarks around three closely interwoven themes: the 
relation between religion, utopia and democracy; the need for a political 
approach to the religious; and the role of  religion in the global world.
Religion, Utopia, Democratization
According to Lucien Febvre, the fi rst duty of  an historian is to date with 
precision. And trying to do this, with regard to the relation between politics 
and religion, compels us to go back to the founding moment in our period, 
i.e. 1989, which was considered by Eric Hobsbawm (1996) – as we all well 
remember – as marking the end of  the “short twentieth century.” 
Different actors belonging to different scenes have pointed at Pope John 
Paul II as the one who “defeated communism.”3 But although religion played 
a part in the long process of  the exit from communism in the Soviet bloc, 
the responsibility rests fi rst with the Soviet system’s initiation of  religion 
as the instrument that questioned the system’s own legitimacy. By putting 
forward the theory that the exhaustion of  religion is a strong indicator of  the 
advancement of  the project of  building an “harmonious society” and thus 
constituting religion as the only register that it would refuse to ideologically 
integrate, the Soviet-type system built religion into the only space that 
would become irreducibly alien to it. Religion became an “elsewhere” that 
developed into (provided that there were actors who could operationalize 
3 See the subtitle of  Bernard Lecomte’s book, La Vérité l’emportera toujours sur le mensonge 
(1991). Lecomte quotes Pope John Paul II, who claimed during the general audience he 
granted 21 February 1990 that “it was God who defeated in the East” (15). Observing 
in the speech he made on his arrival in Prague on 21 April 1990 that “the claim of  
building a world without God and even against God has proved to be an illusion,” the 
pope subsequently opened up in Centesimus annus (III, 24) about his vision of  the deep 
reasons behind the upheavals that took place in Europe in 1989: “The true cause of  
the new developments was the spiritual void brought about by atheism, which deprived 
the younger generations of  a sense of  direction and in many cases led them, in the 
irrepressible search for personal identity and for the meaning of  life, to rediscover the 
religious roots of  their national cultures, and to rediscover the person of  Christ himself  
as the existentially adequate response to the desire in every human heart for goodness, 
truth and life.” See “La religion, objet sociologique pertinent?” (Michel, 2003: 159–70). 
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its potentiality (which has not been the case everywhere)) a triple liberating 
process: at the individual level, at the level of  the fabric of  community, and 
at the level of  the reiteration of  a nation through the assertion of  its indelibly 
inscribed religious belief. 
But the responsibility of  the Soviet system does not end there. The existence 
of  this system (and of  the mechanism of  legitimization through which it was 
built up, whatever may have been its forced concessions to reality) led to an 
ideologization of  democracy, constituted into a space that embodied Good 
against the “Empire of  Evil.” This sudden emergence of  ethical categories 
was the result of  a particular political enchantment by which communism 
aimed to constitute a utopia as the ultimate reservoir of  legitimacy for the 
Soviet system.
The collapse of  communism brought to light a process that had started 
long before, a process in which communism itself  takes part. Although 1989 
assuredly marked the beginning of  a new era, this era should not be assessed 
according to the criteria of  the breakup. Rather, it should be assessed according 
to a continuity that is not closed by this event, but vindicated and prolonged. 
From this perspective the problem of  the very defi nition of  politics emerges 
in a new light. 
The main issue of  the era begun by the collapse of  communism could well 
stem from the diffi culty for all contemporary societies in abandoning some of  
these “enchanted” political categories. In its long-term history, communism 
has represented an attempt to curb disenchantment simply by sacralizing 
politics (which in the ultimate analysis amounted to disposing of  politics). 
Communism, although it did not reenchant the world, contributed to stop the 
process of  disenchantment. 
The fact that the communist undertaking did not last long (it was confronted 
by the obvious erosion of  its credibility very early on, and thus forced to make 
many settlements with a reality that it could not control or recapitulate) does 
not change the fact that the kernel of  a mechanism of  legitimization organized 
around the reference to utopia was to remain intact during the whole period. 
Communism’s very existence was at stake. The end of  communism is without 
a doubt the (defi nitive?) disqualifi cation of  utopia as the bedrock of  the 
mechanism for the legitimization of  politics. This is despite attempts here 
and there (for example via the political instrumentalization of  religion in the 
aftermath of  the 9/11 crisis) to give the utopian notion back some plausibility. 
Hence the demand and the urgency to redefi ne our conceptual tools. 
The positioning of  communism within the political fi eld was formed 
temporally and spatially around a utopia, not only in the communist 
countries, but also in noncommunist countries. The existence of  an “actual” 
communism materialized by the Soviet Union and its empire served as 
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an organizing principle in contemporary space, a locator of  bearings. 
A frontier physically separated the free world from what was beyond the Iron 
Curtain. It also organized a relation to time, since it ascribed a logic to it: 
the fi ght against the enemy – and a horizon: the perspective of  defeating the 
enemy. The meaning of  the collapse of  communism is thus not exhausted 
with the acknowledgement of  the end of  a system (ideological, political 
economic, military, etc.). As one of  the two opposite poles that structured 
the contemporary space, communism gave form to and organized this 
global space. Its disappearance thus affects the whole space. Communism 
was totalizing everything, including the opposition it aroused. Its collapse 
detotalizes everything, that is to say that it pluralizes everything. It is 
in accordance with this view that the idea has been put forward that all 
contemporary societies are post-communist societies, in the sense that they 
all had to manage the effects of  the disappearance of  communism.
The year 1989 is analyzed here not as a fundamental break but as a 
decisive step in a process that had started long before and which continues 
today. This “disenchantment of  the world” nowadays affects the political 
arena, after having concerned only the religious arena for a long time. After an 
absolute religion founded the political order and after communism’s attempt 
to reenchant the world strove to make credible a political absolute, we are now 
confronted with a situation in which the absolute, whatever its nature, would 
globally be unbelievable. This opens onto a world of  pluralism and relativism 
characterized by new modalities of  articulation of  a believing that is somewhat 
untied from its relation to any content of  belief. It is a matter of  urgency 
that we scrutinize our current theoretical categories and elaborate a sociology 
of  movement, i.e. a sociology of  the itineraries of  meaning which would 
ultimately allow us to decipher trends in the evolution of  the contemporary 
world, the redistributions these trends induce and the recompositions of  the 
believing that they require.4
A Political Approach to Religion
Here is a twofold acknowledgement from which stems a central hypothesis. 
First, we are in fact utterly unable to defi ne the whole extent of  the effects of  a 
trend towards the individuation of  relation to meaning, this trend being broad 
and universal (not limited to the so-called “Western” societies, but affecting 
all contemporary societies according to specifi c modalities). The religious 
appears here as the vehicular or the revelatory element of  this individuation 
of  believing and also as a potential resource by which groups might curb, 
4 See Michel (1994). 
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contest or even refuse individuation and the strong tendencies it may seem to 
reiterate. The religious fi eld promotes its own existence here by supplying the 
requisite indexes to ensure its translation, ontological tools by which we might 
“get to grips” with these trends. 
Secondly, and from the same perspective, we should acknowledge 
the limits with which “traditionally” developed analyses concerning the 
religious must contend. The contemporary processes of  decomposition-
recomposition experienced by our societies emphasize the obsolescence of  a 
conceptual apparatus, a notion articulated for the most part within theories of  
secularization and – accordingly rather than contrarily – within the “religious 
creations” of  modernity (whether it be a “hyper-” or a “post-” modernity). 
Hence the necessity of  rethinking the relationship of  our societies with 
believing, by thinking anew through the believing, and of  drawing out a 
renewed and effective intellectual toolbox from this refl ection.5
The need for such a renewal is evidenced by the existing confusion. 
Religion is de facto often analytically constituted as an object exterior to social 
evolutions, its relation to which can be consequently studied. There would 
thus be, for instance, a “religious dimension of  globalization.”6 Globalization 
would bring about adaptations, adjustments and/or transformations affecting 
religion. In fact, such an approach, which perpetuates the idea that there is 
a religious fi eld characterized by an (at least relative) autonomy, stems from a 
double premise. First, the premise that assumes it would be possible to equate 
the mutations of  the contemporary believing to what can be perceived in the 
sole register of  the religious. Secondly, the premise that a conception of  
this religious, forged in and through the reference to an organizing stability, 
would remain usable enough to identify and validate any evolutions induced 
by contemporary global movement.
These presuppositions are at work in the way certain types of  questions 
are formulated and handled mediatically, politically and also scientifi cally. Is 
religion favorable to some form of  economy or other? Is religion (or some 
denomination or other, most notably Islam) compatible or not with democracy? 
Or again, more trivially, is there a “renewal” or a “return of  religion” or even 
a “revenge from God”? Is secularism threatened?
Finally, it is important to come back to Michel de Certeau’s statement that 
when politics gives ground, the religious comes back. But if  it comes back, 
5 This is contrary to the approach of  Danièle Hervieu-Léger, who declared that she didn’t 
“accept the way the sociology of  religion was eclipsed into a vast socio-anthropology of  
the believing, which would comprehensively grasp its issues and its functioning” (1987: 28). 
6 See for example the special report on “Effervescences religieuses dans le monde” in Esprit 
(March–April, 2007).
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it is most certainly not in its own guise. Such visibility would fi rst fulfi ll the 
function of  stressing a defi cit of  politics that is so cruel that it would not have 
the political words to tell itself. Hence politics’ recourse to the religious as 
a register of  articulation. Against a background of  the exhaustion of  the 
believable, the generalized wavering of  reference points and markers and 
the urgency and simultaneous impossibility of  building a renewed relation to 
totality, the credibility of  politics is now being questioned even more than the 
credibility of  religion.
A traditional mode of  analysis of  the relation between politics and 
religion consists of  taking a look at the political positioning of  the great 
religious institutions and denominations in order to fi gure out the strategies 
implemented and redeployed in the contemporary world. This mode of  
analysis is admittedly not devoid of  interest. Nevertheless, as it privileges 
institutions, it perpetuates a reading that does not account for much larger 
processes and whose contemporary reliance on religion (moreover, often in 
the mode of  its extrainstitutional resurfacing) produces what can only be 
symptoms or revealers. 
Consequently, it is an approach through the “believing” that must be 
substituted, a view to which Georges Balandier ascribed in Le dédale (1994: 
175, my translation) when he emphasized how much 
the space of  the believing is the site where a working reconfi guration 
is now taking place… Some memory is being recomposed there, some 
continuity is being restored, some meaning is being looked for, as well as 
the revealing/revelatory signs of  burgeoning affi nities with a world that 
is continually transforming itself. 
The believing is the mechanism, necessarily dynamic and therefore 
evolutionary, through which some meaning is looked for and allocated. 
This mechanism has the distinctive feature that all its confi gurations have 
simultaneous elements of  anticipation and lateness with regard to time. 
Delay arises because the believing, as an undertaking to allocate meaning, 
tends to curb movement by endeavoring to translate movement into already 
felt categories of  meaning. Anticipation exists because the believing, as 
an undertaking to allocate meaning, tends to orient movement, inscribe 
it in these felt categories in order to modify them or inscribe it into new 
categories which it contributes toward inventing. The believing consists 
of  all the constant reshuffl e carried out for the purposes of  managing this 
contradictory simultaneity between anticipation and delay. It is therefore the 
privileged space of  an adjustment, the place where a coincidence is felt (and 
where it is to be felt).
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This believing is particularly solicited – and disrupted – in situations 
characterized on the one hand by acceleration of  movement and on the 
other by the urgent need to defi ne a new relationship with movement.7 
By movement, I mean simultaneously the transformations that take place 
on a scene/stage, the state of  consciousness of  these transformations and 
the procedure that leads, on the basis of  this state of  consciousness, to 
the articulation of  a relationship with the transformations. The speeding 
up of  this movement is combined with the lack of  plausible bearings that 
traditionally allowed us if  not to frame then at least to pretend that framing 
was possible. In other words, we have exited a time when it was possible to 
substantiate the existence of  stabilities organizing reality and entered an era 
in which reference to these stabilities no longer appears to be globally or 
wholly convincing or credible. 
Religion and the “Global” World
The speeding-up of  contemporary movement, quite widely confused with 
that felt due to a “globalization” with which all societies are confronted, 
induces multiple and profound transformations, one of  the major dimensions 
of  which affects “individuals.” This issue of  individuation in the new context 
of  globalization seems to constitute the privileged juncture at which the 
ongoing evolutions can be questioned: does the emergence of  the “modern 
individual” constitute the unavoidable arrival point of  all evolutions? To 
what extent is this individual, in the words of  Amartya Sen (2000, 2005), 
the “only invention of  Europe” as the spreading of  this model consequently 
partakes in a form of  violence imposed by the West on other “civilizations”? 
(We are obviously overlooking the issue, recurrent in the discourse of  some 
social actors on the international stage, of  knowing if  this “individual” does 
not represent a “dead end.”)
The effects of  globalization have been described many times: free fl ow in a 
space thought to be unifi ed, simultaneity in a supposedly worldwide time. The 
individual is precisely supposed to be the basic entity of  this scene. There is a 
redistribution of  the roles given to the different authorities that concurs with 
the making of  the individual. In the context of  this redistribution, which is 
largely conditioned and shaped by the economy, religion fulfi lls new functions. 
Whereas within modernity religion constituted one of  the vehicles of  
individualization as well as the barrier that had to be broken down in order to 
reach it, a certain form of  religion has set itself  the role on the globalized stage 
7 As I set out to show in my analysis of  the public’s reactions at the Museum of  Religion 
in Glasgow (1999).
272 RELIGION AND THE STATE
of  producing an individual who is “compatible” with the rules in force in the 
market world. These rules apply entirely in this case insofar as they constantly 
trace and retrace the profi le of  a producing and consuming individual who is 
as adapted as possible to the market logics.
The modern process of  individualization occurred in a context of  
confrontation between institutional religion and the state, a process stemming 
partly from the action of  the latter through various bodies, most particularly 
through education. As for contemporary individuation, it is a form of  
contestation of  the primacy of  the state and it testifi es to the existence of  
a process of  privatization in which the functions that were granted to the 
state in modernity are now dependent on private initiative. The way the new 
Evangelical community institutions endeavor to manufacture a globalized 
individual according to entirely integrated market principles appears to be 
particularly signifi cant in this milieu. 
The “constant and generalized progression” of  conservative Protestant 
Christianity, in the words of  David Martin (2001: 81–2), compels us to revisit the 
idea of  a continuous and irreversible secularization of  societies that are upset 
by the logics of  a plural modernity. The progression compels us so much that 
it could have been used to support the reverse theory of  a desecularization or 
even of  a “return of  God” or the “reenchantment of  the world” (to  take up the 
titles of  the books published by Harvey Cox and Peter Berger, 8 who used to be 
the great theoreticians of  secularization and are now confessing that they were 
radically mistaken about the interpretation of  a world that becomes, according 
to them, “more furiously religious than ever” (Berger, 2001:15)). It is in this vein 
that neo-Pentecostalism has been presented as the religion of  the future. 
In the North American conservative conception of  society and of  the 
world, of  which neo-Pentecostalism is a major vehicle of  diffusion, the frontiers 
between politics, religion, economy and ideology tend to fade, if  not disappear. 
The collapse of  communism has admittedly deprived this denomination of  
the enemy that was giving it a certain meaning. But, when interpreted as a 
sign of  divine blessing, this very collapse outlines the horizon of  a planet with 
American colors, a project which is informed by a “theology of  prosperity and 
wealth” serving the “mission” America would have to see through. According 
to this view, the relationship with Islam is essential, since Islam (which is 
necessarily radical) appears to be the other religion which would be constantly 
gaining ground. It also appears to be the religion of  the Other, which would 
substantiate the existence of  a “clash of  civilization” in which, like in the Cold 
War, the United States would embody Good.
8 Peter L. Berger (ed.), Le Réenchantement du monde (2001); Harvey Cox (trans. Michel Valois), 
Le Retour de Dieu: Voyage en pays pentecôtiste (1995).
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The parallel with radical Islam is also likely to make sense in the register 
of  contemporary identities and of  the generalized wavering that identities 
are experiencing because of  recompositions induced by economic and 
cultural globalization. Just as radical Islam would be the pure product of  the 
confrontation with a Western modernity that is simultaneously desired and 
rejected – a privileged space of  the articulation of  fantasies and frustrations – 
the progress of  conservative Evangelism would constitute, as such, an 
interpretative grid of  modalities of  management of  the reconstruction of  
identitary mechanisms. This would allow the adherent to “come to grips” with 
movement. And, ultimately – to come full circle – the increase in the power of  
fundamentalism would seem to evidence the big comeback of  religion on the 
domestic, transnational and internal scenes.
The individual whose primacy is displayed on the globalized stage is not the 
one stemming from the modern process of  the emergence of  the autonomous 
subject, from the emancipation from the community logics and the forced 
affi liations that kept her/him in check. However, contemporary individuation 
takes advantage of  modern individuation in terms of  legitimization. But 
contemporary individuation aims to produce more than an autonomous 
individual; it aims to produce an individual who adheres to renewed forms 
of  communities in close line with the demands of  the world market. In the 
constant interaction affecting contemporary societies – production of  the 
global from the local and recomposition of  the local by the global – the making 
of  the individual can only be understood as the making of  the compatible 
individual. And if  religion has a central place in this procedure, it is because 
it is one of  the most effective registers in which to recompose a totality in line 
with the ideological demands that shape and affect a specifi c moment in the 
history of  a contemporary society.
Several questions emerge. The fi rst concerns the reasons for the particular 
aptitude that is recognized and/or allotted to religion and which religion can 
take advantage of  in order to pretend to display itself  as such in the public 
space (in recomposition). The second question ponders whether, when religion 
is at stake, it is not in a generic way. (The religious experience relevant to the 
management of  and making of  a compatible individual is not the traditional 
one organized by the fi ction of  autonomous fi elds but, to take up the category 
of  Zygmunt Bauman (2006), a “fl uid” religion that rejects the institutional 
model handed down by a monopoly and which is almost perfectly illustrated 
by neo-Pentecostalism.) The third question interrogates the idea that what 
is fundamentally at stake is not religion or the making of  the individual, but 
religion’s capacity to spread a model and to make people believe in the emergence 
through religion of  an individual. The subsidiary issue here is the nature of  the 
institution; it is clear that in the context thus described, autonomous individual 
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actors are in possession of  an operationality that cannot be compared with the 
one that “historical” (in particular, Catholic) churches could boast of. The nature 
of  the institution/operation presents a fourth problem: does the making of  a 
compatible individual amount to a pure manipulation which, under the guise of  
religion, pursues the purpose of  setting up and spreading a model and eliciting 
submission to the modalities of  the functioning of  said model?
In any case, religion does not have a meaning of  its own. It is, above all 
other defi nitions, a repertoire that provides opposing parties with the necessary 
resources to articulate (or rearticulate) a relation to the self, to the other, to the 
world. This repertoire is neutral insofar as the content it offers is so fl exible 
that it can be used to serve contradictory as well as accepted strategies. 
What is highlighted here is the lost relevance of  the criteria traditionally 
used to justify the stability of  the identitary mechanism. But it is not an 
absolute loss; the criteria are somewhat recycled by the very circulation 
caused by the loss of  relative relevance. In other words, a movement of  
oscillation constitutes a strong indicator of  identity deregulation, denoting a 
space in which a redefi nition is at work. Oscillation thus becomes the major 
characteristic of  a social landscape in which identities are simultaneously felt 
as being organizing centralities and being inescapably relativized in a situation 
of  constant circulation between different supplies and articulations of  content 
(which of  course does not imply that an adherence to one supply or another 
cannot take place at a given time and for a given period). 
The oscillation does not constitute the space of  a potential reconstruction 
but one that is mapped out by various propositions of  reconstructions to 
which the individual is asked to adhere. Two of  these can be distinguished: the 
identity that stems from a sense of  belonging (organized by the reference to 
“ethnicity” or to the “nation”) and the identity that stems from an adherence 
(shaped by religion). The major difference between the two is the claimed 
absence of  reference to a hierarchy in the case of  ethnic identity and the 
insistence on submission to a hierarchy in the case of  an identity reformulated 
through religion (a submission that is likely to be exported to other registers, 
and in particular to the political register).
Indeed, privatized religion mobilized for the management of  the consequences 
of  globalization on societies deterritorializes itself  at the same time as ethnicity 
(or the national factor) is being activated. Yet this activation, which also stems 
from the global, takes place due to the reiteration of  the origin in the context 
of  reasserting the relevance of  territory as regards identitary demands. This 
paradoxical evolution of  the relation to territoriality – erasing or exceeding 
vs. reaffi rmation – forces us to rethink the issue of  belonging through the lens 
of  a structuring tension in which the choice of  criterion becomes central. In 
other words, depending on whether someone defi nes himself  or herself  by his/
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her ethnicity or by his/her religion, the issues of  the relation to the territory, to 
politics and to legitimacy will be articulated according to different terms. The 
problem is that quite often both criteria are used simultaneously, producing 
many contradictions. Privatized religion disqualifi es ethnicity on grounds 
of  paganism.9 Ethnicity successively turns out to be able to reappropriate 
practices by raising them to the rank of  religious practices and thus mobilizing 
the religious register in the context not only of  identitary assertion but also of  
the directly political demand to share or exercise power.
The current world is characterized by an intense fl uidity between 
religion, economy and politics. The feeling of  acceleration experienced in 
contemporary societies because of  globalization – which proceeds through a 
reindifferentiation – problematizes the idea of  the existence of  distinct fi elds 
and therefore the resulting analysis that draws attention to the mechanisms 
of  exchange between said fi elds. From this perspective, religion was grasped 
in its relation to the economy and/or politics in the knowledge that it was not 
exhausted by the interactions thus described and ultimately had retained a 
supposedly specifi c nature. What was necessary was for academics to attempt 
to check the fact that what was happening in any of  the fi elds turned out to be 
likely to be transferred into another. 
The fi rst function of  a religious actor is to sell religion and to conquer market 
shares against the strong competition created by the increased pluralization of  
the religious supply. Therefore there is not (or not anymore) any reason to raise 
the question, induced by the privatization of  religion, of  whether business is 
at the service of  religion or whether religion is a business. This is because religion 
and business both partake of  the same global logic, as they are registers within a 
common matrix whose object is to produce a stand on contemporary societies. 
The problem here is no longer that of  the relation between fi elds thought to 
be different. It is the problem of  the modalities of  circulation in a global space 
whose actors are able to simultaneously slip into all multiple roles. 
The remarks that have been articulated here draw the outline of  a 
program that aims at seizing the recompositions of  the believing in order to 
constitute them into so many indicators and modes of  management of  the 
transformations taking place nowadays. These transformations include a triple 
redistribution of  the relation to time, the relation to space and the relation 
to authority; a triple crisis affecting identity, mediation and centrality; and a 
triple disadjustment of  political defi cit, the explosion and inadequacy of  the 
supply of  meaning, and the strong decrease and withdrawal of  credibility. 
9 For instance, in Latin America, Indian peoples’ demands for recognition can be expressed 
through the rediscovery of  traditional religions. Denouncing paganism thus constitutes a 
resource used to fight against these demands. 
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Chapter 13
PUBLIC RELIGIONS AND THE STATE: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai 
and Bryan S. Turner
The preceding chapters highlight a number of  aspects of  religion which depart 
from, fundamentally modify and recontextualize the received wisdom about 
religion, especially as it has been understood through the prism of  classical 
sociology. Each of  the distinct sources of  the classical perspective outlines an 
understanding of  religion that – while contrasting with other understandings – 
has been taken with the others to represent the various facets of  religion in the 
modern world. And yet none of  these facets of  religion is today found in forms 
projected by the sociological luminaries.
Émile Durkheim famously characterized religion in terms of  a distinction 
he believed inherent in all religions, namely that between the sacred and the 
profane. The sacred, Durkheim held, was a symbolic form of  the enduring 
and defi ning values of  the society itself  in which the religion in question 
resides. But the coherence of  a more or less societally wide normative 
consensus that Durkheim assumes in making this claim is in fact not to be 
found in modern societies. This is largely because the populations of  modern 
societies are not unitary in terms of  their origins and historical memory, either 
through geographic mobility that accompanies modern occupational careers 
or through international migration, which has been a major demographic 
factor throughout the twentieth century and promises to continue in the 
present. Associated with these trends, the idea of  the sacred – which requires a 
traditional understanding of  received meaning supported by ritual practices – 
has given way if  not to a scientifi c to at least a mundane utilitarian and 
therefore market set of  values. These values coexist with quite a different idea 
of  spirituality that does not compliment so much as displace the idea of  the 
sacred which Durkheim found in the religions of  settled and unifi ed societies.
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Against what is often thought of  as Durkheim’s view of  religion’s conservative 
function, Max Weber saw the revolutionary possibility of  rationalizing religion – 
fi nding its apotheosis in ascetic Protestantism – which transforms the world. But 
rather than generating the cognitive and emotional tensions Weber described 
that would lead to major historical changes, religion today more typically serves 
an opposite function of  smoothing existential disjuncture and disharmonies by 
offering various types of  comfort in the world. If  ascetic Puritanism is implicated 
in the development of  capitalism, as Weber argues, the success of  capitalism and 
the ever-expanding markets it encourages have caught religion in their own nets. 
Religious beliefs, practices and adherence are today arguably packaged and 
provided as consumer goods available in religious markets that trade in branded 
identities and lifestyles. This is a palliative of  well-being and more palpably, a 
provider of  materially social and economic welfare.
Karl Marx’s famous view of  religion as both the “sigh of  the oppressed 
creature” and the “opiate of  the masses” (Marx and Engels, 1972: 38) is 
possibly closer to the reality of  religion today than either Durkheim’s or 
Weber’s vision, but the grandiose form of  its expression is too bold and unitary 
to capture the diversity of  the forms of  religion, the uses to which religions 
are put by adherents and the ways in which the meaning and practices of  
religions are renegotiated and transformed by those who adopt or consume 
them. However, even more telling of  the limitations of  Marx’s vision is his 
expectation that religion would simply decline through the progressive 
development of  economic institutions. It is of  particular interest that one 
of  Marx’s intellectual sources, Adam Smith, in an important but neglected 
discussion of  religious institutions as (potential) recipients of  state revenue, 
outlines a clear materialist sociology of  religion which projects a continuing 
future for religious organizations necessarily subject to changing form and 
purpose (Smith, 1979: 788–816).
The departures from the classical sociological vision of  religion, provided by 
the preceding chapters of  this book, can be understood in terms of  a number 
of  changes that might be summarized by the term “globalization.” The view 
that globalization, as late modernist phenomena involving the extension of  
international markets and the mores of  rational organizational form, could 
reasonably be expected to convey associated norms of  modernity including 
secularization is not challenged here. But secularization in this context cannot 
mean the absence of  a religious presence but rather transformations in its 
role or function and location in social, economic and cultural processes. 
A changing vision in understanding the nature of  religion implies changes 
in the way the concept of  secularization is understood. Whereas historically 
earlier representations of  secularization meant a decline in the signifi cance of  
religious institutions and symbols, it can now be shown that in fact these latter 
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gain a certain credence, even nourishment from global tendencies which at 
the same time changes their effi cacy and usefulness for adherents. Having said 
this, it must be added that globalization does not promote an undifferentiated 
religious transformation. 
It is important to appreciate that distinct aspects of  globalization are associated 
with different types of  religious changes and that these are achieved through 
a range of  dissimilar mechanisms. In the broadest terms, it can be noted 
that some religious developments arise in opposition to globalization and 
are reactive defenses against what are taken to be despoliation of  existing 
religious and cultural values. Militant Islam is an obvious example of  this 
type of  relationship between globalization and religious revival. Another 
possibility is that religious reinvigoration and modifi cation is not primarily 
sponsored by globalization as a negative reaction, but arises as a consequence 
of  distributional struggles subsequent to certain structural consequences of  
globalization. Aspects of  Hindu revivalism and the political mobilization 
of  religion in India may be described in these terms. A further relationship 
between global currents and revivalism is entailed in new opportunities for 
religious expression provided by aspects of  globalization. The expansion of  
existing religions and the development of  new religious movements in China 
is arguably an instance of  this last variant of  encouragement of  religion by 
globalization. Aspects of  these and similar developments are discussed in a 
number of  the chapters above.
Against this background of  the signifi cance of  globalization for religion 
in the modern period, there are two interrelated changes in particular that 
are characteristic of  religion. Firstly, as religion has been constructed through 
globalization as a unifi ed and recognizable institution, it is also increasingly 
managed by the state as a set of  services that can contribute to welfare 
provisions in society. Religions appear to thrive in secular societies that provide 
little coordinated welfare for their citizens. This might explain at least in part 
the success of  religious organizations in the United States and the current 
religious developments in China where the state-managed professionalization 
of  traditional religions has encouraged an outreach and welfare function they 
previously did not possess. This management of  religion typically involves 
an upgrading of  religion to make it technically effi cient and rational, as the 
discussion of  Singapore in the chapter on religion in authoritarian states 
indicates. 
Secondly, globalized religions are constantly and inevitably drawn into 
the global circuits of  capital insofar as they are themselves converted into 
lifestyles and institutions offering services that cater to the needs of  those 
participating in their activities. These participants may still be described 
as their congregations, but might more realistically be called their clients. 
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While much of  popular religion is shaped by secular consumerism, there 
are also powerful forms of  opposition to capitalism that draw upon a more 
traditional language of  religious protest, most prominently of  course the 
growth of  “political Islam” as noted above. Our conclusion therefore supports 
a particular interpretation of  secularization, namely that it involves a merger 
between religion and consumerism and the erosion of  the sacred by science, 
urbanization, industrialization and political instrumentalism. 
In a differentiated global religious market, the various segments of  the 
religious market compete with each other and tend to overlap. The new 
spirituality, for instance, which may be seen as an alternative to organized 
religion, is genuinely a consumerist religion; fundamentalism, on the other 
hand, appears to challenge Western consumer values. But in doing so it is in 
fact operating on the principle of  individual or market choice – “buying” in a 
religious market – a lifestyle based on special diets, alternative education, health 
regimes and mentalities. The global religious market is highly fragmented into 
fundamentalist groups, charismatic movements, Pentecostalism, traditional 
religions, spirituality and so forth, but these are all to varying degrees infl uenced 
by a consumerist ethos in which a choice between alternative offerings is made 
by an individual in satisfaction of  a “preference.” The consumer markets or 
audiences for religious services are also fragmented by class, gender, education, 
region and so forth. The triumph of  popular democratizing global culture is 
now having a deep impact on traditional hierarchical, patriarchal religions of  
the past. Perhaps the most important development in modern religion is the 
changing status of  women in religious communities. A principal organizational 
development of  the late twentieth century has been the ordination of  women 
in a variety of  Protestant churches and within non-Orthodox branches of  
Judaism. Indeed, it is possible that women will become increasingly important 
in religious leadership (Tong and Turner, 2008). Gender is a crucial feature of  
the new consumerist religiosity where women increasingly dominate the new 
spiritualities. Women will be and to some extent already are the “taste leaders” 
in the emergent global spiritual marketplace.
While globalization theory has concentrated attention on modern 
fundamentalism (as a critique of  traditional and popular religiosity) and on 
religious radicalism (as a critique of  American foreign policy), perhaps the real 
effect of  globalization is the triumph of  heterodox, commercial, hybrid popular 
religion over orthodox, authoritative professional versions of  the spiritual life. 
Their ideological effects cannot be controlled by religious authorities and 
they have a greater impact than offi cial messages. In Weber’s terms, it is the 
triumph of  mass over virtuoso religiosity. David Martin (2002) provides a 
brilliant account of  the various ways in which Pentecostalism has prepared the 
lower middle classes for participation in the emerging consumer economy of  
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Latin America. In a similar fashion, reformist Islam in Southeast Asia provides 
newly urbanized people, especially women, with values and practices that are 
relevant to life in complex, multicultural urban spaces where international 
corporations have provided employment for young women willing or able to 
leave their villages for work in the megacities.
Contemporary manifestations of  religion are basically compatible 
with the lifestyles of  a commercial world in which the driving force of  the 
economy is domestic consumption. Megachurches have embraced the sales 
strategies of  late capitalism to get their message out to the public. On these 
grounds, we would argue that modern religions are compromised because 
the tension between the world and the religion is lost. We may defi ne these 
developments as a form of  social secularization. Following Casanova (1994), 
who distinguished three dimensions of  secularization – the differentiation of  
secular spheres from religions norms and institutions, a decline of  religious 
belief  and practices, and the marginalization of  religion to a privatized sphere – 
we can argue that with social differentiation, the market no longer plays to 
the tune of  religion. Furthermore, these secular developments are global 
rather than local. The result is a sociological paradox or set of  paradoxes. 
Religion has erupted into the public domain, being associated with a number 
of  radical or revolutionary movements from Iran to Brazil and from Poland 
to Columbia, but at the same time religion is subject to subtle changes that 
have brought about secularization through commodifi cation. More precisely, 
as a number of  the chapters above have demonstrated, the secularization 
of  religion has occurred through a double movement: democratization and 
commercialization. The sense of  mystery and awe surrounding the ineffable 
character of  the sacred has been eroded by the ethos of  liberal democracies 
in which egalitarian, immediate and intimate relations are valued over 
hierarchical, distant and formal relationships. Religion is further corroded by 
the loss of  any signifi cant contrast between the sacred and the world. Religion 
has specialized in providing personal services and therefore has to compete 
with various secular agencies also offering welfare, healing, comfort and 
meaning. In this competition, religious groups have by and large taken over 
the methods and values of  a range of  institutions operating within what we 
can for want of  a more sophisticated term call “the leisure industries.”
Given the developments mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it can be 
seen that the state can intervene in the management of  religion in civil society 
under two very distinct circumstances. In the fi rst, fears about security from the 
presence of  radical religion force the state to develop strategies to bring such 
groups under adequate surveillance and control. These strategies may include 
more systematic control of  migration and the repatriation of  troublesome 
minorities. In the second, there may be anxieties about the quality of  religious 
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services and a fear that cults may adversely infl uence youth. However, across 
a broad spectrum of  politics – from the most repressive authoritarian states to 
liberal democratic regimes – states are drawn into the management of  religion. 
The root cause of  both sets of  circumstances is in general terms globalization. 
Global labor markets produce religious diversity through migration and global 
religious competition produces innovation, including the employment of  
commercial strategies to promote religious growth. These trends point to a 
general erosion of  the liberal tradition in which religion could be regarded as 
a matter of  private conscience outside the orbit of  state affairs.
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